In the Philippines, the crime of concubinage requires proof that the husband kept a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, had sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman not his wife, or cohabited with her elsewhere. This case clarifies that a wife’s prior knowledge of her husband’s infidelity, without specific knowledge of concubinage, does not automatically constitute condonation or forgiveness, thus allowing prosecution for concubinage to proceed. The Supreme Court emphasized the Ombudsman’s discretionary authority in determining probable cause and underscored the high burden of proving condonation or challenging recanted testimonies.

When a Wife’s Forgiveness Isn’t: The Busuego Concubinage Case

The case of Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman revolves around Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego, who faced concubinage charges filed by his wife, Rosa S. Busuego. Rosa accused Alfredo of maintaining illicit relationships with other women, specifically Emy Sia and Julie de Leon, while they were still married. The central legal question was whether Rosa’s knowledge of Alfredo’s infidelity, coupled with her continued visits, amounted to condonation, thereby precluding a concubinage prosecution.

The facts presented a marriage marred by infidelity and estrangement. Rosa claimed that Alfredo’s affairs began in the 1980s. Despite suspecting his infidelity, Rosa continued to visit him annually. In 1997, she found that a certain Emy Sia was living in their conjugal home. Later, their son Robert and househelpers corroborated Rosa’s claims, stating that Alfredo had affairs with Sia and de Leon, who at times stayed in the conjugal home. Alfredo denied all accusations, arguing that Rosa’s actions implied condonation, and that the alleged concubines were not initially included in the complaint.

The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Alfredo and Sia for concubinage. This prompted Alfredo to file a petition for certiorari, arguing grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman. Alfredo contended that the inclusion of Sia and de Leon as party-respondents was improper, the case should have been referred to the Department of Justice, Rosa had condoned his actions, the recantation of a witness should have been considered, and ultimately, there was no basis to indict him for concubinage. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the Ombudsman’s decision.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s discretionary authority in determining probable cause. The Court emphasized that judicial review of the Ombudsman’s resolutions is limited to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Alfredo failed to demonstrate such abuse, as the Ombudsman acted within its procedural rules and constitutional mandate. The Court referenced Kalalo v. Office of the Ombudsman, stating:

“The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation.”

This highlights the deference given to the Ombudsman’s judgment unless a clear abuse of discretion is evident.

Regarding the inclusion of Sia and de Leon as respondents, the Court clarified that the Ombudsman merely facilitated the amendment of the complaint to address a procedural defect pointed out by Alfredo himself. Dismissing the complaint and requiring Rosa to re-file would have been superfluous. The Court stated that:

“If the case will be dismissed based on procedural infirmity, Rosa could still amend her complaint and re-file this case since the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in the preliminary investigation stage of the proceedings.”

This underscores the importance of procedural efficiency and the permissibility of amending complaints to include necessary parties.

Alfredo’s argument that the case should have been referred to the Department of Justice was also rejected. The Supreme Court reiterated that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the DOJ to investigate offenses involving public officers. Citing Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, the Court emphasized the Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The Court further stated:

“The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors.”

Therefore, the Ombudsman was not obligated to defer to the DOJ in this matter.

The Court dismissed the claim of condonation. The court noted that condonation requires the wife’s full knowledge and forgiveness of the specific acts of concubinage. The Supreme Court noted that:

“Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation.”

Rosa’s general knowledge of Alfredo’s infidelity and her continued visits did not constitute condonation. The Court emphasized that there was no evidence that Rosa consented to or acquiesced in Alfredo’s specific relations with Sia and de Leon. Her belief that Alfredo had stopped womanizing does not equate to condoning specific acts of concubinage, especially keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling.

The affidavit of recantation by Liza S. Diambangan was given little weight. The Court reiterated its disfavor towards retracted testimonies, considering them unreliable. Citing Firaza v. People, the Court noted that:

“Affidavits of recantation are unreliable and deserve scant consideration. The asserted motives for the repudiation are commonly held suspect, and the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently and deservedly subject to serious doubt.”

Liza’s recantation did not negate the consistent testimonies of Robert and Melissa Diambangan, which still provided a basis for finding probable cause.

Ultimately, the Court found sufficient basis for indicting Alfredo and Sia for concubinage. Under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling constitutes concubinage. The testimonies of Robert, Melissa, and Liza indicated that Alfredo kept Sia in the conjugal dwelling, where she sometimes stayed in the conjugal room. The Court concluded that this established a prima facie case, stating:

“Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling… shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.”

Alfredo’s defense that Sia may have stayed in the house but not as his mistress was deemed a matter of defense to be raised in court.

In summary, the Supreme Court upheld the Ombudsman’s findings, emphasizing the importance of specific knowledge in establishing condonation and the discretionary authority of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations. The Court underscored the significance of consistent testimonies and the reliability of evidence in determining probable cause for concubinage.

FAQs

What is concubinage under Philippine law?	Concubinage is a crime committed by a husband who keeps a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, has sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman not his wife, or cohabits with her elsewhere. It is defined under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code.
What is condonation in the context of concubinage?	Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense, such as concubinage, which bars the offended spouse from pursuing legal action. It requires the offended spouse to have full knowledge of the offense and to voluntarily forgive the offending spouse.
What was the main issue in Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman?	The central issue was whether Rosa Busuego’s knowledge of her husband’s infidelity and continued visits constituted condonation, preventing the prosecution of Alfredo Busuego for concubinage. The Court ruled it did not constitute condonation.
Why did the Supreme Court uphold the Ombudsman’s decision?	The Court upheld the Ombudsman’s decision because Alfredo failed to prove grave abuse of discretion. The Ombudsman followed proper procedure in including the alleged concubines in the complaint, and Rosa’s actions did not amount to condonation of the specific acts of concubinage.
Does a wife’s knowledge of her husband’s infidelity automatically mean she has condoned it?	No, general knowledge of infidelity is not sufficient to establish condonation. Condonation requires specific knowledge of the acts of concubinage and a clear indication of forgiveness and acceptance of those acts.
What weight is given to a recanting witness?	The Philippine Supreme Court generally looks with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously given in court. Affidavits of recantation are unreliable and deserve scant consideration.
What are the elements needed to prove concubinage?	The elements include the husband keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, having sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife; and cohabiting with her in any other place.
What is the role of the Ombudsman in cases involving public officials?	The Ombudsman has the authority to investigate and prosecute public officials for offenses, and had primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, which can include criminal cases.

The Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman case clarifies the nuances of condonation in concubinage cases under Philippine law. It underscores the importance of specific knowledge and intent in determining whether an offended spouse has truly forgiven the acts of concubinage. This decision highlights the protection afforded to marital fidelity and the stringent requirements for proving condonation.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 196842, October 09, 2013