The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Candy Ferrer and Dhayme Jamuad for qualified trafficking in persons, emphasizing that the act of recruiting and transporting individuals for prostitution constitutes the crime, regardless of whether the victims were actually subjected to it. The Court underscored that the intent and actions taken to exploit vulnerable individuals are sufficient to establish guilt, even if law enforcement intervenes before the exploitation occurs. This ruling reinforces the state’s commitment to protecting individuals from human trafficking, highlighting that preparatory actions with clear exploitative intent are punishable under the law.

Enticement and Exploitation: Did Transporting Recruits for Prostitution Constitute Trafficking?

The case stems from an incident in Cebu City, Philippines, where Candy Ferrer and Dhayme Jamuad, along with other individuals, were charged with qualified trafficking in persons for recruiting and transporting several women, including minors, from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The charge alleged that the purpose was for prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation. The Regional Trial Court convicted Ferrer and Jamuad, a decision later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The central question before the Supreme Court was whether the actions of Ferrer and Jamuad constituted trafficking, given that the victims were intercepted by authorities before any actual exploitation occurred.

In examining the definition of trafficking in persons, the Supreme Court referred to Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, which defines trafficking as:

“the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.”

The court underscored that the law considers the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child for exploitation as trafficking, irrespective of the means employed. Building on this principle, the Supreme Court then referenced its previous ruling in Arambullo v. People, clarifying that Section 3(a) of RA 9208 provides a general definition, while the specific punishable acts are detailed in Sections 4 and 5. Specifically, Section 4(a) addresses:

“To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.”

The Court outlined the essential elements for a successful prosecution under Section 4(a): (a) the act of recruitment, transportation, or transfer; (b) the means used, such as taking advantage of vulnerability or offering payments; and (c) the purpose of trafficking, specifically exploitation. All these elements were found to be duly established in the case. The victims testified that Ferrer and Jamuad recruited them in Cagayan de Oro, organized their transport, and paid for their fares to Cebu. Moreover, the recruiters took advantage of the victims’ vulnerabilities as impoverished minors by enticing them with promises of higher earnings.

The court emphasized the critical point that consent is not a determining factor in cases of trafficking, especially when minors are involved. The Supreme Court cited People v. Ramirez, which in turn cited People v. Casio, stating, “The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free will.”

The court also dismissed the defense’s argument that the accused, being prostitutes themselves, could not be held liable for trafficking. The Supreme Court underscored that their occupation doesn’t preclude their culpability; rather, it may have facilitated their ability to commit the crime. The unity of action and purpose among the accused pointed towards conspiracy. The court observed that the acts of recruiting, funding transport, and briefing the victims indicated a common criminal design rather than mere accompaniment.

Addressing the argument that the victims were not actually subjected to prostitution, the Supreme Court clarified that RA 9208 does not require the victims to be prostituted for the accused to be prosecuted. It cited People v. Estonilo, stating, “Neither the presence of the trafficker’s clients, nor their intercourse with the victim/s, is required to support a finding of trafficking.” The key element is recruiting and transporting individuals for the purpose of prostitution, not whether the exploitation actually occurs.

Lastly, the defense argued that the offense should be categorized as attempted trafficking in persons under RA 10364, which amended RA 9208. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that RA 10364 cannot be retroactively applied to benefit the accused in this case. Moreover, even under the amended law, the actions of Ferrer and Jamuad would still constitute consummated trafficking, not merely attempted trafficking, because all elements of the crime under RA 9208 had been fulfilled.

The Supreme Court underscored that the lower courts correctly sentenced each petitioner to life imprisonment and ordered them to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00, in accordance with Section 10(c) of RA 9208. The court also affirmed the award of moral and exemplary damages, referencing People v. Lalli, which stated that trafficking in persons for prostitution is “analogous to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts,” and is even worse. As such, the court upheld the order for the petitioners to jointly and severally pay each of the victims P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the act of recruiting and transporting individuals for prostitution constitutes trafficking in persons under RA 9208, even if the victims were intercepted before actual exploitation. The Court clarified that the intent and actions taken to exploit vulnerable individuals are sufficient.
What is the definition of trafficking in persons according to RA 9208?	Trafficking in persons is defined as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, with or without their consent, for the purpose of exploitation, including prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor, or slavery. This can be achieved through various means, such as coercion, deception, or abuse of power.
Is consent a valid defense in trafficking cases?	No, consent is not a valid defense, especially when the victims are minors. The law recognizes that victims may be coerced, deceived, or otherwise unable to give genuine consent.
Do victims need to be prostituted for a trafficking crime to occur?	No, RA 9208 does not require the victims to actually be subjected to prostitution or exploitation. The act of recruiting and transporting them for that purpose is sufficient to constitute the crime.
What role did the victims’ testimonies play in the ruling?	The victims’ testimonies were crucial in establishing the elements of the crime, including the recruitment, transportation, and intended purpose of exploitation. Their accounts were consistent and credible, leading the court to give them significant weight.
Can someone who is also a victim of prostitution be charged with trafficking?	Yes, the court clarified that being a victim of prostitution does not preclude someone from being charged with trafficking. In fact, their own experiences may make them more capable of exploiting others.
What is the significance of RA 10364 in this case?	RA 10364, which amended RA 9208, was not retroactively applied in this case. The Court noted that even if it were applicable, the actions of the accused would still constitute consummated trafficking, not merely attempted trafficking.
What was the penalty imposed on the accused?	The accused were sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of P2,000,000.00 each. They were also ordered to jointly and severally pay each of the victims P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

This case underscores the Philippine judiciary’s commitment to combating human trafficking and protecting vulnerable individuals from exploitation. The ruling emphasizes that the intent and actions to recruit and transport individuals for prostitution are punishable offenses, regardless of whether the exploitation actually occurs. This decision sends a clear message that those who seek to exploit others will be held accountable under the law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Candy Ferrer v. People, G.R. No. 223042, July 06, 2022