In Monasterio-Pe vs. Tong, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of an ejectment suit filed by an attorney-in-fact and the implications of forum shopping. The Court ruled that an attorney-in-fact can execute a certificate against forum shopping on behalf of the principal and that a prior case involving ownership does not automatically bar a subsequent ejectment action. This decision clarifies the scope of an attorney-in-fact’s authority and the conditions under which an ejectment case can proceed, even when ownership disputes are ongoing. It underscores the principle that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.

Ejectment Saga: Can an Attorney-in-Fact Steer the Ship While Ownership Remains at Sea?

The case originated from an ejectment action filed by Jose Juan Tong, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Jose Y. Ong, against Anita Monasterio-Pe and the Spouses Romulo Tan and Editha Pe-Tan. Tong claimed ownership of the land and asserted that the petitioners were occupying it without any lease agreement or payment of rentals, merely through his tolerance. The petitioners countered that Tong was not the true owner and that a prior case involving the ownership of the property was pending before the Court of Appeals (CA). They argued that this pending case should halt the ejectment proceedings.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ruled in favor of Tong, ordering the petitioners to vacate the property and pay compensation for its use. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed this decision, leading the petitioners to seek recourse before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court, however, found that the petitioners had raised factual issues that are inappropriate for a Rule 45 review. Furthermore, the RTC’s decision was rendered in its appellate jurisdiction, making a petition for review with the CA the proper mode of appeal.

Despite these procedural missteps, the Supreme Court addressed the substantive issues raised by the petitioners. One key point of contention was whether Ong, as Tong’s attorney-in-fact, could validly execute the certificate against forum shopping. Petitioners argued that Tong himself should have signed the certificate. The Supreme Court disagreed, citing Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which typically requires the principal party to sign the certification. However, the Court acknowledged an exception when the attorney-in-fact initiates the action, as they possess the necessary knowledge to certify the absence of forum shopping.

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein.

The Court emphasized that the rationale behind requiring the principal to sign—having actual knowledge of related actions—is satisfied when the attorney-in-fact initiates the suit. The Supreme Court referenced Wee v. De Castro, solidifying the principle that an attorney-in-fact with the authority to file a complaint is considered a party to the suit for purposes of the certification requirement. Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court explicitly includes the representative of the owner as a party authorized to institute ejectment proceedings.

Another argument raised by the petitioners was that the ejectment case constituted forum shopping because a prior case (Civil Case No. 20181/CA-G.R. CV No. 52676) involving the same issues was pending before the CA. They contended that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction because the issue of physical possession was already included in the earlier case, thus splitting the cause of action. The Supreme Court refuted this argument by highlighting the history of the property dispute. Two earlier cases filed by the petitioners against Tong had already been resolved, with final judgments affirming Tong’s ownership. The Court noted that neither of those cases definitively addressed the issue of ejectment.

The principle of res judicata did not apply to bar the ejectment action because the specific issue of ejectment had not been conclusively decided in the previous cases. Even though the earlier cases involved ownership, the right of possession, which is a necessary incident of ownership, was not explicitly litigated in the context of an ejectment proceeding. Thus, Tong was not barred from filing the ejectment case.

The petitioners further argued that Tong should have filed an accion publiciana (a plenary action for recovery of possession) rather than an unlawful detainer case, claiming that the one-year period to file the latter had lapsed. The Supreme Court clarified the requirements for an unlawful detainer case under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In cases of possession by tolerance, the one-year period begins to run from the date of demand to vacate.

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied… may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court.

Tong’s complaint alleged that the petitioners’ occupation was based on his mere tolerance, which became unlawful upon their refusal to vacate after a demand letter dated December 1, 1999. Since the ejectment case was filed on March 29, 2000, it fell within the one-year period, making unlawful detainer the appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that Tong lacked a cause of action because the property was never delivered to him.

Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to delivery unless a contrary intention appears. Petitioners failed to prove that they did not intend to deliver the property when they executed the deed of sale in Tong’s favor. Their continued possession was merely by Tong’s tolerance and did not negate the fact of delivery.

Finally, the Court addressed the petitioners’ claim that the barangay conciliation proceedings were defective. The RTC found that the Barangay Kauswagan had issued two certificates to file action after failed attempts at amicable settlement. Any initial defects in the conciliation process were cured when the MTCC referred the case back to the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo for proper conciliation, which resulted in a renewed certificate to file action.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether an attorney-in-fact could execute a certificate against forum shopping and whether a prior case involving ownership barred a subsequent ejectment action. The Court clarified the scope of an attorney-in-fact’s authority and the conditions for an ejectment case.
Can an attorney-in-fact sign a certificate against forum shopping?	Yes, the Supreme Court held that an attorney-in-fact can execute the certificate if they initiated the action, as they possess the necessary knowledge of related cases. This is an exception to the general rule requiring the principal party to sign.
What is the significance of “possession by tolerance” in this case?	The Court determined that the petitioners occupied the property by Tong’s tolerance, which meant their possession was lawful initially but became unlawful upon Tong’s demand to vacate. This triggered the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer case.
What is the one-year period for filing an unlawful detainer case, and when does it begin?	The one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case, under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, begins to run from the date of the demand to vacate. This is crucial in cases of possession by tolerance.
How does Article 1498 of the Civil Code relate to the delivery of property in this case?	Article 1498 provides that the execution of a public instrument (like a deed of sale) is equivalent to delivery of the property unless a contrary intention is proven. The petitioners failed to demonstrate such contrary intention.
What is the role of barangay conciliation in ejectment cases?	Barangay conciliation is a prerequisite to filing a case in court, including ejectment cases. The barangay attempts to mediate a settlement between the parties. If conciliation fails, a certificate to file action is issued, allowing the case to proceed in court.
What is res judicata, and why didn’t it apply in this case?	Res judicata prevents the same parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided in a prior case. It didn’t apply here because the specific issue of ejectment (physical possession) had not been definitively resolved in the earlier ownership dispute cases.
What is the difference between accion publiciana and unlawful detainer?	Accion publiciana is a plenary action for recovery of possession, filed after the one-year period for unlawful detainer has lapsed. Unlawful detainer is a summary action for recovery of possession filed within one year from the demand to vacate.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Monasterio-Pe vs. Tong reaffirms the principle that an attorney-in-fact can validly represent a principal in legal proceedings, including the execution of a certificate against forum shopping. It also clarifies that a prior case about ownership does not automatically prevent a subsequent ejectment action, emphasizing the distinct nature of possession and ownership. This ruling provides valuable guidance for property owners and their representatives in navigating ejectment cases.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Monasterio-Pe vs. Tong, G.R. No. 151369, March 23, 2011