The Supreme Court’s decision in Canonizado v. Aguirre clarifies the rights of public officials removed from their positions due to laws later declared unconstitutional. The Court ruled that accepting another government position during the pendency of a legal challenge to their removal does not automatically constitute abandonment of the original post, especially when the removal was based on an unconstitutional law. This ensures that public officials can seek gainful employment without forfeiting their rights to reinstatement if the basis for their removal is later invalidated.

From Commissioner to Inspector General: Can Acceptance of a New Post Forfeit Reinstatement?

The case revolves around Alexis C. Canonizado, Edgar Dula Torres, and Rogelio A. Pureza, who were removed as Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) following the enactment of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551). Section 8 of RA 8551 effectively terminated their terms, leading to their replacement. The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of this provision, arguing it violated their right to security of tenure. During the legal proceedings, Canonizado accepted an appointment as Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP). This led to the central legal question: Did Canonizado’s acceptance of the Inspector General position constitute an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement as NAPOLCOM Commissioner?

The respondents argued that by accepting the position of Inspector General, Canonizado abandoned his claim for reinstatement, citing the incompatibility of the two offices. They invoked the principle that accepting an incompatible office automatically vacates the first. Canonizado, however, maintained that his pursuit of the case indicated no intention to abandon his former office. The Court, in its analysis, delved into the concept of **abandonment of office**, defining it as the voluntary relinquishment of an office with the intention of terminating possession and control. This requires both an intent to abandon and an overt act carrying that intention into effect. The Court emphasized that such abandonment must be total and clearly indicate an absolute relinquishment of duties. Non-performance of duties due to involuntary circumstances, such as an unconstitutional removal, does not constitute abandonment.

The Supreme Court underscored that Canonizado’s removal from the NAPOLCOM was not voluntary but compelled by Section 8 of RA 8551, which the Court later declared unconstitutional. This invalidated the premise for his removal, negating any claim of voluntary relinquishment. Furthermore, the Court examined the argument of **incompatibility of offices**, acknowledging that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of the IAS are indeed incompatible. RA 8551 prohibits IAS personnel from participating in committees involved in the appointment, promotion, or assignment of PNP personnel, while the NAPOLCOM exercises control and supervision over the PNP. However, the Court clarified that the rule on incompatibility applies only when an individual simultaneously holds and discharges the functions of two incompatible offices. In Canonizado’s case, he did not hold both positions concurrently. He was effectively forced out of his NAPOLCOM position before being appointed as Inspector General.

The Court drew parallels to previous cases, such as Tan v. Gimenez and Gonzales v. Hernandez, where public officials accepted temporary positions while appealing their removal from their original posts. In those cases, the Supreme Court held that accepting a second position during the pendency of an appeal does not constitute abandonment of the original position, especially when the removal was contested. Similarly, Canonizado’s acceptance of the Inspector General position was viewed as a means of continued service and livelihood during the legal challenge to his removal. The Court emphasized that denying him the right to reinstatement would be tantamount to punishing him for an act based on an unconstitutional law.

Building on this principle, the Court addressed questions regarding the execution of its decision, specifically concerning the reinstatement of the Commissioners. The respondents argued that reinstating the three petitioners would create an issue, since the NAPOLCOM already had four sitting commissioners. The Court clarified that since Section 8 of RA 8551 was declared unconstitutional, all appointments made under that provision were null and void. Therefore, all commissioners appointed under RA 8551 should be removed to make way for the reinstatement of the petitioners. It was reiterated that an unconstitutional act confers no rights and imposes no duties, rendering any actions taken under it invalid from the start. The Court also addressed the contention that the case was akin to a quo warranto proceeding, requiring the impleading of the incumbent commissioners. The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the primary issue was the constitutionality of RA 8551, and the removal of the commissioners was a direct consequence of the Court’s ruling.

This approach contrasts with the respondents’ request to apply the ruling in Mayor v. Macaraig, which allowed illegally removed officials to receive salaries and benefits for the unexpired portions of their terms, instead of reinstatement. The Court declined this request, as the petitioners in this case specifically sought reinstatement, unlike the petitioners in Mayor, who had made an alternative prayer. Finally, the Court addressed the argument that the petitioners’ reappointment under RA 6975 violated Section 16 of that law. The Court deemed this issue waived, as it was not raised in the initial comment to the petition. Furthermore, the validity of the appointments under RA 6975 was never the central issue of the case. The Supreme Court ultimately denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration, clarifying that its decision mandated the reinstatement of the petitioners, including Jose Percival L. Adiong, to the NAPOLCOM pursuant to his original appointment under RA 6975, contingent on Canonizado’s resignation from his position as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether Alexis Canonizado’s acceptance of the position of Inspector General of the IAS-PNP constituted an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement as NAPOLCOM Commissioner, a position he was removed from due to a law later declared unconstitutional.
What is “abandonment of office”?	Abandonment of office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating their possession and control. It requires both an intention to abandon and an overt act carrying that intention into effect, demonstrating a complete and absolute relinquishment of duties.
Why did the Court rule that Canonizado did not abandon his NAPOLCOM position?	The Court ruled that Canonizado’s removal from the NAPOLCOM was not voluntary, but rather compelled by an unconstitutional provision of law. His acceptance of the Inspector General position was a means of continued service during the legal challenge to his removal.
What is the significance of the “incompatibility of offices” argument?	The respondents argued that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General were incompatible. The Court acknowledged this incompatibility but clarified that the rule applies only when an individual simultaneously holds and discharges the functions of two incompatible offices, which was not the case here.
How did the Court distinguish this case from Mayor v. Macaraig?	In Mayor v. Macaraig, the petitioners had made an alternative prayer for salaries and benefits in lieu of reinstatement. In this case, the petitioners specifically sought reinstatement, making the ruling in Mayor inapplicable.
What was the effect of declaring Section 8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional?	The declaration that Section 8 of RA 8551 was unconstitutional rendered all actions taken under that provision null and void. This included the removal of the petitioners and the appointment of new commissioners, paving the way for their reinstatement.
What is a quo warranto proceeding, and why was it relevant to this case?	A quo warranto proceeding is an action to determine the right of a person to hold a public office. The respondents argued the case was similar, requiring the impleading of the incumbent commissioners, but the Court disagreed, stating the primary issue was the constitutionality of RA 8551.
What condition was placed on Canonizado’s reinstatement?	Before Canonizado could re-assume his post as Commissioner, he was required to resign from his position as Inspector General of the IAS-PNP, to prevent any conflict of interest.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Canonizado v. Aguirre underscores the importance of security of tenure for public officials and clarifies the circumstances under which accepting another position does not constitute abandonment of their original post. The ruling ensures that officials removed due to laws later deemed unconstitutional are not penalized for seeking alternative employment while pursuing their legal challenges, safeguarding their rights to reinstatement.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, February 15, 2001