In Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete, the Supreme Court clarified that both the appointing authority and the appointee have the legal right to challenge the disapproval of an appointment in civil service. This decision ensures that appointees have recourse when their appointments are invalidated, protecting their rights and ensuring fairness in the civil service system. The ruling acknowledges that appointees, like the appointing authority, have a significant stake in the validity of their appointments and should be able to appeal decisions affecting their positions.

Whose Fight Is It? Appointees’ Standing in Contested City Jobs

After the 2001 mayoral elections in Dumaguete City, the outgoing mayor made numerous appointments. When the new mayor took office, he refused to honor these appointments, leading to a legal battle by the affected employees. The central legal question was whether these employees had the right to appeal the Civil Service Commission’s (CSC) invalidation of their appointments, or if that right belonged solely to the appointing authority.

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of legal standing, distinguishing it from being a real party-in-interest. Legal standing concerns whether a party has a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy, while a real party-in-interest is directly benefited or injured by the judgment. The Court referenced Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, clarifying that standing arises when parties allege a personal stake that ensures concrete adverseness, vital for illuminating constitutional questions.

Building on this principle, the Court asserted that if standing is granted to challenge laws without personal injury, appointees should certainly be allowed to contest appointment nullifications. This perspective broadens the scope of who can seek judicial review, ensuring that those directly affected by administrative decisions have a voice. This approach contrasts with a narrower interpretation that would limit challenges only to the appointing authority.

The Court then addressed the question of who constitutes the real party-in-interest. Citing Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, the real party-in-interest is defined as someone who benefits or is injured by the judgment. This definition extends to those with a material interest in the issue, directly affected by the decree. The Supreme Court also noted the ruling in the case of Abella,, stating that both the appointing authority and the appointee may question the disapproval of an appointment.

The appointing authority is naturally affected because the CSC’s disapproval challenges their discretionary power to appoint. Conversely, the appointee is injured because the disapproval prevents them from permanently assuming their position, affecting their rights and privileges. This dual interest justifies allowing both parties to appeal.

The Court clarified who holds the power of appointment, explaining that it is vested in the office of the chief executive, not the individual occupying the position at a particular time. As stated in Republic Act (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code, specifically Section 444 (v):

Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(v) Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of municipal funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint;

Therefore, the mayor in office at the time of the appeal, not the former mayor who made the initial appointment, has the authority to challenge the invalidation. Despite this, the Court emphasized that the appointee is not precluded from also taking action, referencing Hon. Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania.

The Supreme Court noted that the Civil Service Commission itself, in Resolution 040932, recognized the appointees’ right to appeal the nullification of their appointments, especially when a new appointing authority is in place. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for injunction, as Director Abucejo’s action was not yet final due to the petitioners’ timely appeal. Therefore, the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s finding was also an error.

Despite this, the Court upheld the lifting of the preliminary injunction, but on different grounds. The Court found that the petition for injunction was premature because it was filed before the CSC had invalidated the appointments. The petitioners acted after the new mayor’s announcement but before any formal action by the CSC. Therefore, they had ample administrative remedies available, making the court action premature.

The Court also noted that petitioners sought the same relief in two different forums. While pursuing the case in the RTC, they also appealed to the CA Cebu City, seeking to stay the implementation of the CSC resolutions invalidating their appointments. This simultaneous pursuit of the same relief is proscribed.

Moreover, the Court reiterated the requirements for issuing an injunctive writ. As noted in Almeida v. Court of Appeals and Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos:

[T]here is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages.

Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.

Since the petitioners had adequate remedies through administrative channels, there was no emergency justifying injunctive relief. The Court also stated that it could not rule on the validity of the appointments, as that matter was before the CA, Cebu City. The Court emphasized that appointments must comply with all legal requirements, as highlighted in Civil Service Commission v. Tinaya.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether appointees have the legal standing to appeal the invalidation of their appointments by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), or if only the appointing authority has that right. The Supreme Court ruled that both have the right to appeal.
What is legal standing?	Legal standing refers to a party’s right to bring a case before a court based on having a sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged. It ensures that the party has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.
What is a real party-in-interest?	A real party-in-interest is the party who would be directly benefited or injured by the judgment in a case. This means they have a material interest in the issue and would be affected by the court’s decision.
Who is the appointing authority in this context?	The appointing authority is the mayor or local chief executive holding office at the time of the appeal, not the former mayor who made the initial appointment. The power to appoint is vested in the office, not the individual.
Why did the Court deny the petition for injunction?	The Court denied the petition for injunction because it was filed prematurely, before the CSC had formally invalidated the appointments. The petitioners had adequate administrative remedies available, making court intervention unnecessary.
What does the Local Government Code say about the power to appoint?	Section 444(v) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) states that the chief executive has the power to appoint officials and employees whose salaries are paid out of municipal funds, unless otherwise provided by law.
Can an appointee appeal even if there’s a new appointing authority?	Yes, the Civil Service Commission recognizes that appointees can appeal the disapproval of their appointments, especially when a new appointing authority is in place who may not pursue the appeal.
What are the requirements for issuing an injunctive writ?	An injunctive writ requires a material and substantial invasion of a clear and unmistakable right, and an urgent necessity to prevent serious damage. It is not designed to protect contingent or future rights.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete affirms the rights of civil service appointees to challenge decisions affecting their appointments. While the specific request for an injunction was denied due to prematurity, the Court’s clarification on legal standing and real party-in-interest provides crucial protection for appointees in similar situations. This case underscores the importance of due process and fairness in civil service appointments.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, G.R. NO. 168484, July 12, 2007