The Supreme Court ruled that a writ of mandamus cannot compel the Philippine National Police (PNP) to issue absorption orders to former Philippine Constabulary (PC) constables. The Court emphasized that the power to appoint personnel is discretionary, not ministerial, and therefore not subject to mandamus. This decision clarifies the limits of judicial intervention in executive functions, protecting the PNP’s autonomy in personnel decisions, and highlights that mandamus is only applicable when a clear legal right exists and the duty to be performed is purely ministerial.
From Constables to Cops: Can a Court Force the PNP to Hire?
The case of Ex-C1C Jimmy B. Sanchez and Ex-C2C Salvador A. Meteoro v. Roberto T. Lastimoso revolves around the question of whether a court can compel the Director-General of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to issue absorption orders to former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Petitioners Sanchez and Meteoro, former PC constables, were discharged from service but later cleared of all charges. They sought reinstatement, but their applications remained unacted upon, even after the PC’s integration into the PNP.
The petitioners anchored their claim on National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105, which initially appeared to favor their absorption into the PNP. However, NAPOLCOM subsequently issued Resolution No. 99-061, recalling the earlier resolutions. Despite this, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Sanchez and Meteoro, ordering the PNP to issue the absorption orders and declaring Resolution No. 99-061 void ab initio. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court.
At the heart of this legal battle is the nature of the remedy of mandamus. The Supreme Court reiterated that mandamus is a legal remedy used to compel the performance of a ministerial duty—a duty that is clearly and indisputably required by law. However, it cannot be used to compel the performance of a discretionary duty, where the officer has the power to decide whether or not to act. As the Supreme Court stated in Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc.:
In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists.
The Court found that the issuance of absorption orders by the PNP Chief is not a ministerial duty. Rather, it involves the exercise of discretionary power. The Court emphasized that with the integration of the PC into the PNP, the matter at hand was no longer reinstatement, but a new appointment. The Supreme Court has held in Gloria v. De Guzman that appointment is essentially discretionary, subject only to the condition that the appointee possesses the qualifications required by law. This discretionary power cannot be controlled by a writ of mandamus.
Furthermore, the petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the absorption orders. They based their claim on NAPOLCOM Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105. However, the Court emphasized that Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), the law governing the PNP, vests the power to appoint PNP personnel with the rank of “Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV” in the PNP regional director or the Chief of the PNP, not in NAPOLCOM. Section 31 of RA 6975 states:
Section 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members.—The appointment of the officers and members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:
(a) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV.—Appointed by the PNP regional director for regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for the national headquarters personnel and attested by the Civil Service Commission.
Even assuming that the petitioners could derive a right from the NAPOLCOM resolutions, the subsequent issuance of Resolution No. 99-061, which recalled the earlier resolutions, effectively nullified their claim. The Court noted that the trial court should have dismissed the mandamus petition upon the submission of Resolution No. 99-061, as courts do not resolve moot questions. Building on this principle, the Supreme Court clarified that the RTC’s declaration that NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 was void ab initio was also improper. NAPOLCOM, the entity that issued the resolution, was not impleaded as a party in the case. As an indispensable party, NAPOLCOM’s absence deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on the validity of its resolution. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void.
This case serves as a reminder of the distinct roles of the executive and judicial branches of government. The power to appoint personnel within the PNP lies with the executive branch, specifically the PNP regional director or the Chief of the PNP. Courts cannot encroach upon this discretionary power through a writ of mandamus unless there is a clear legal right and a corresponding ministerial duty. This approach contrasts with a scenario where the duty is ministerial, such as processing undisputed retirement benefits where all legal requirements have been met.
FAQs
What was the key issue in this case? | The central issue was whether a writ of mandamus could compel the PNP Director-General to issue absorption orders to former PC constables. The Supreme Court ruled that it could not, as the power to appoint is discretionary, not ministerial. |
What is a writ of mandamus? | A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a government official or body to perform a ministerial duty. It is issued when there is a clear legal right and a corresponding duty to perform. |
What is the difference between a ministerial and a discretionary duty? | A ministerial duty is one that is clearly and indisputably required by law, leaving no room for judgment or discretion. A discretionary duty involves the exercise of judgment and the power to decide whether or not to act. |
Why couldn’t the petitioners rely on NAPOLCOM resolutions? | RA 6975 vests the power to appoint PNP personnel in the PNP regional director or the Chief of the PNP, not NAPOLCOM. Therefore, the petitioners could not derive a clear legal right from NAPOLCOM resolutions. |
What was the effect of NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061? | NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 recalled the earlier resolutions that initially appeared to favor the petitioners’ absorption. This effectively nullified their claim, making their mandamus petition moot. |
Why was it improper for the trial court to declare NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 void? | NAPOLCOM was not impleaded as a party in the case, and as an indispensable party, its absence deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on the validity of its resolution. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. |
What is the significance of this case for government appointments? | This case underscores the principle that the power to appoint government personnel is generally a discretionary function. Courts should not interfere with this discretion through mandamus unless there is a clear legal right and a corresponding ministerial duty. |
What law governs the appointment of PNP officers and members? | Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 8551, governs the appointment of officers and members of the PNP. This law vests the power of appointment in the PNP regional director or the Chief of the PNP. |
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the principle of separation of powers and the limits of judicial intervention in executive functions. The ruling clarifies that mandamus is not a tool to compel discretionary actions, such as appointments within the PNP, but rather a remedy reserved for cases where a clear legal right and a ministerial duty coincide.
For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.
Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Ex-C1C Jimmy B. Sanchez and Ex-C2C Salvador A. Meteoro, v. Roberto T. Lastimoso, G.R. No. 161735, September 25, 2007
Leave a Reply