The Supreme Court ruled that a writ of mandamus cannot compel the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief to issue absorption orders to former Philippine Constabulary (PC) members. This decision underscores that the power to appoint individuals to the PNP involves discretionary authority, not a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. The Court emphasized that appointments require evaluating qualifications and suitability, which falls under the purview of the appointing officer’s judgment. This case clarifies the boundaries of judicial intervention in executive decisions, particularly in matters of appointment within law enforcement agencies.
From Constable to Civilian: Can Courts Force PNP to Absorb Ex-PC Officers?
The case revolves around Ex-C1C Jimmy B. Sanchez and Ex-C2C Salvador A. Meteoro, former constables of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) who sought reinstatement into the Philippine National Police (PNP) after being cleared of previous charges. Their applications, however, were not acted upon, leading them to invoke resolutions issued by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) that seemingly favored their absorption. When the PNP failed to issue the corresponding absorption orders, Sanchez and Meteoro filed a petition for mandamus, seeking a court order to compel the PNP to reinstate them. The legal question at the heart of this case is whether the issuance of absorption orders by the PNP Chief is a ministerial duty that can be compelled by mandamus, or a discretionary act beyond the reach of such judicial intervention.
The petitioners anchored their claim on NAPOLCOM Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105, which appeared to mandate the absorption of qualified ex-PC officers into the PNP. Resolution 98-037 stated that former PC members, who were discharged due to pending cases but later acquitted or had their cases dismissed and had filed petitions for reinstatement, should be considered absorbed into the PNP. Resolution 98-105 confirmed the absorption of 126 ex-PC constables, including Sanchez and Meteoro, effective January 27, 1998. However, NAPOLCOM subsequently issued Resolution No. 99-061, recalling Resolution No. 98-105. This recall was based on the finding that the list of constables submitted for absorption was actually of those whose applications still needed review and evaluation by the PNP Special Committee.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 void ab initio and ordering the PNP to issue absorption orders. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision, holding that the petitioners had not established a clear legal right to be absorbed into the PNP, and that a writ of mandamus was therefore inappropriate. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, emphasizing the principle that mandamus is only available to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
The Court underscored that the power to appoint PNP personnel is vested in the PNP regional director or the Chief of the PNP, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 6975, also known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. Specifically, Section 31 states:
Section 31. Appointment of PNP Officers and Members.–The appointment of the officers and members of the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:
(a) Police Officer I to Senior Police Officer IV.–Appointed by the PNP regional director for regional personnel or by the Chief of the PNP for the national headquarters personnel and attested by the Civil Service Commission.
Building on this principle, the Court cited Gloria v. De Guzman, noting that employing former PC members in the PNP amounts to issuing a new appointment, a discretionary power vested in the appointing officer. The decision highlighted the distinction between reinstatement and new appointment. With the abolition of the Philippine Constabulary, the petitioners could not seek reinstatement. Instead, they were applying for positions in a new organization, the PNP. The Court reasoned that appointment entails evaluation of qualifications and suitability, making it a discretionary act not subject to mandamus. The Court cited Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc. to emphasize that a writ of mandamus can only be issued when the applicant’s legal right to the performance of a particular act is clear and complete, one which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.
Moreover, the Supreme Court pointed out that even if the petitioners could initially claim a right based on NAPOLCOM Resolution Nos. 98-037 and 98-105, that right was extinguished by the subsequent issuance of NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061, which recalled the earlier resolutions. According to the Court, the trial court should have dismissed the mandamus petition upon being informed of the recall, as courts generally refrain from resolving moot questions. In addition to the impropriety of the mandamus petition, the Court also found fault with the trial court’s declaration that NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 was void ab initio. The Court held that NAPOLCOM, as the issuer of the resolution, was an indispensable party to any legal challenge against it, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the resolution’s validity in NAPOLCOM’s absence.
Furthermore, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The Court emphasized that NAPOLCOM was not impleaded in the case, making it a stranger to the proceedings and therefore not bound by the trial court’s judgment.
FAQs
What was the key issue in this case? | The central issue was whether a writ of mandamus could compel the PNP Chief to issue absorption orders to former PC members, or if such issuance was a discretionary act. |
What is a writ of mandamus? | A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a government official or body to perform a ministerial duty, which is a duty clearly required by law. It cannot be used to compel discretionary acts. |
Why did the Supreme Court deny the petition for mandamus? | The Court ruled that the issuance of absorption orders was a discretionary act, not a ministerial duty, as it involved evaluating the qualifications and suitability of the applicants. Therefore, mandamus was not the appropriate remedy. |
What role did NAPOLCOM resolutions play in the case? | NAPOLCOM initially issued resolutions seemingly mandating the absorption of qualified ex-PC officers, but later recalled one of the resolutions. The Court held that the recall negated any right the petitioners might have derived from the initial resolutions. |
Why was NAPOLCOM not a party to the case? | NAPOLCOM was not impleaded as a party in the case, even though the trial court declared one of its resolutions void. The Supreme Court held that this was a fatal flaw, as NAPOLCOM was an indispensable party whose rights would be affected by the ruling. |
What is the significance of the distinction between reinstatement and new appointment? | The Court emphasized that with the abolition of the PC, the petitioners could not seek reinstatement. Instead, they were applying for new positions in the PNP, which required a new appointment and discretionary evaluation. |
What is the legal basis for the PNP Chief’s power to appoint? | Republic Act No. 6975 vests the power to appoint PNP personnel in the PNP regional director or the Chief of the PNP. |
What happens when an indispensable party is not included in a case? | The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. |
What is the effect of a court resolving a moot question? | Courts generally refrain from resolving moot questions, as there is no actual controversy to be decided. The Court noted that the trial court should have dismissed the case once the NAPOLCOM resolution was recalled. |
This case reaffirms the principle of separation of powers, highlighting the judiciary’s respect for the executive branch’s discretionary authority in matters of appointment within the PNP. It serves as a reminder that while individuals have the right to seek redress for grievances, the remedy of mandamus is limited to compelling the performance of ministerial duties, not influencing discretionary decisions.
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Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Sanchez v. Lastimoso, G.R. No. 161735, September 25, 2007
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