In Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano v. Judge Cader P. Indar, the Supreme Court addressed the permissible duration and conditions for issuing Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs). The Court found Judge Indar liable for exceeding the allowed timeframe for a TRO and clarified the need for strict adherence to procedural rules. This case underscores the importance of judges observing the specific timelines and requirements set forth in the Rules of Court when issuing injunctive reliefs.

Balancing Urgency and Due Process: The Saga of IRA Release in Balabagan

This case arose from an administrative complaint filed against Judge Cader P. Indar, Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malabang, Lanao del Sur. The complainants, led by Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, alleged that Judge Indar committed gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality, and serious acts of impropriety. These charges stemmed from Judge Indar’s issuance of an Order dated October 11, 2004, in Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 12-173, which involved a dispute over the release of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the municipality.

The dispute originated from a prior electoral contest between Sampiano and his uncle, Sumulong Sampiano Ogka. This contest led to conflicting orders from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) regarding who should rightfully hold the mayorship. Ogka, in turn, sought to prevent the Philippine National Bank (PNB) from releasing the IRA to Sampiano, citing the pending electoral dispute. Subsequently, Ogka filed SCA No. 12-173 with the RTC, seeking to prohibit the release of the IRA to Sampiano. On the same day, respondent Judge issued an Order setting the hearing of the petition on October 14, 2004. He likewise directed, pending resolution of the said petition, the PNB-Marawi to hold or defer the release of the IRA for the Municipality of Balabagan unless ordered otherwise by the court

The central issue revolved around whether Judge Indar acted within his authority in issuing the October 11, 2004 Order, which effectively froze the release of the IRA. Sampiano argued that the order was akin to a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or preliminary injunction, issued without proper notice and in violation of the Local Government Code (LGC). The core question for the Supreme Court was whether Judge Indar had complied with the procedural requirements for issuing injunctive reliefs and whether he had overstepped his jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court addressed the question of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the petition. Citing the principle that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the law, the Court stated, “[j]urisdiction over the subject matter on the existence of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or relief sought therein. Such jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.” The Court found that the petition involved determining whether Ogka was entitled to a TRO or injunction, rather than enforcing election laws. Therefore, the RTC had jurisdiction under Section 21 of BP 129, which grants Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over injunctions.

The Court also rejected Sampiano’s argument that the October 11, 2004 Order violated Section 286 of the LGC, which mandates the automatic release of IRA shares. The Court clarified that while the LGC requires the national government to release IRA funds directly to local government units, it does not prevent a court from deferring or suspending the release of funds to specific local officials when a legal question arises. In this case, the legal question pertained to the rights of the parties to receive the IRA, which was a proper subject for judicial determination.

Analyzing the nature of the October 11, 2004 Order, the Supreme Court found that it was effectively a TRO or preliminary injunction order. The order directed PNB to withhold the release of the IRA pending resolution of the case, aligning with the relief Ogka sought in his petition. However, the Court emphasized that the issuance of such orders must comply strictly with Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. This provision requires notice and hearing before granting a preliminary injunction, with limited exceptions for TROs issued ex parte.

The Court emphasized the procedural requirements for issuing TROs, quoting Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. – No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from the facts shown by the affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order (as amended by En Banc Resolution of the Supreme Court, Bar Matter No. 803, dated February 17, 1998).

The ruling also stated that, “Here, respondent Judge issued the October 11, 2004 Order on the very same day it was filed, and without any hearing and prior notice to herein complainants. As discussed above, respondent was allowed by the Rules to issue ex parte a TRO of limited effectivity and, in that time, conduct a hearing to determine the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.”

The Supreme Court found that Judge Indar violated these rules by issuing the October 11, 2004 Order without prior notice or hearing. While the Rules allow for ex parte TROs, they are subject to strict limitations on duration and require a subsequent hearing to determine whether the TRO should be extended or a preliminary injunction issued. In this case, the TRO was effective for eleven days, exceeding the allowable period for a TRO issued ex parte without a proper hearing.

Despite finding a violation of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court considered whether Judge Indar acted in bad faith. It held that bad faith requires a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. The Court found no evidence that Judge Indar was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in issuing the assailed Order. Instead, he took into account the circumstances between the parties, including the existing tensions between the families involved. Consequently, the Court sustained the penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), imposing a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on Judge Indar for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Judge Indar violated the Rules of Court by issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) without proper notice and by exceeding the allowable duration for such an order.
Did the Supreme Court find Judge Indar guilty of any violation?	Yes, the Supreme Court found Judge Indar guilty of violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court by issuing a TRO without prior notice and exceeding its allowable duration.
What is the allowable duration of a TRO issued ex parte?	A TRO issued ex parte is effective for a limited period, and the court must conduct a hearing within that period to determine whether to extend the TRO or issue a preliminary injunction.
Was bad faith a factor in the Supreme Court’s decision?	While Judge Indar was found to have violated the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court found no evidence of bad faith or ill motives in his actions, which influenced the penalty imposed.
What penalty was imposed on Judge Indar?	The Supreme Court imposed a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on Judge Indar for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Does the automatic release of IRA under the LGC prevent courts from intervening?	No, the automatic release of IRA under the Local Government Code does not prevent a court from deferring or suspending the release of funds when a legal question pertaining to the rights of the parties arises.
What is the significance of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court?	Section 5, Rule 58 sets forth the procedural requirements for issuing preliminary injunctions and TROs, including the need for notice, hearing, and limitations on the duration of TROs.
Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the case involving the IRA release?	Yes, the Supreme Court held that the RTC had jurisdiction because the case involved determining whether Ogka was entitled to a TRO or injunction, which falls under the RTC’s original jurisdiction.

This case serves as a reminder to judges of the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements when issuing injunctive reliefs, especially TROs. While judges have the discretion to issue TROs in urgent situations, they must strictly comply with the timelines and notice requirements set forth in the Rules of Court to ensure due process and fairness. The ruling underscores the need for judicial restraint and careful consideration of the potential impact of injunctive orders on the parties involved.

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Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: MAYOR HADJI AMER R. SAMPIANO, et al. VS. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009