The Supreme Court in Abraham Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., held that a mayor’s duty to issue business permits involves discretionary powers, not subject to a writ of mandamus. This decision clarifies the extent of local executives’ authority in granting or denying business permits, emphasizing that such actions are an exercise of delegated police power. It underscores that the judiciary cannot compel a mayor to issue a business permit, reinforcing the principle that mandamus applies only to ministerial duties, not discretionary ones. The ruling reaffirms the importance of administrative discretion in local governance and limits judicial intervention in matters within the executive’s purview, thereby safeguarding the balance of power between the branches of government at the local level.

Emission Impossible: Can Courts Force a Mayor’s Hand?

This case arose from a dispute between Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. and Abraham Rimando, the mayor of Naguilian, La Union. The corporation sought a writ of mandamus to compel Mayor Rimando to issue a business permit. The mayor refused, citing that the corporation needed to execute a contract of lease with the municipality since its business operated on land allegedly owned by the local government. The central legal question was whether the court could compel the mayor to issue the permit through a writ of mandamus.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially sided with the mayor, reasoning that the municipality owned the land and the mayor had the discretion to deny the permit. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, finding that the tax declaration was insufficient to prove ownership and that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution imposing rental fees was invalid. Despite declaring the case moot due to the lapse of the period for which the permit was sought, the CA still ruled in favor of the corporation.

The Supreme Court (SC), however, agreed with the CA on the mootness of the case but disagreed with the dispositive portion of its decision. The SC emphasized that the core issue—the issuance of a business permit for a past period—no longer presented a justiciable controversy. The Court highlighted that even if a writ of mandamus were issued, it would have no practical effect since the permit’s validity period had already expired. This underscores the principle that courts generally refrain from resolving moot issues.

Building on this principle, the SC delved into the nature of a mayor’s power to issue business permits. It cited Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, which elucidated that the power to issue licenses and permits is a manifestation of delegated police power. As such, it is not a purely ministerial function that can be compelled by mandamus. The Court quoted Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
x x x x
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.

This provision empowers the mayor to issue, suspend, or revoke licenses and permits based on compliance with laws and ordinances, indicating a level of discretion. This discretion stems from the **general welfare clause** embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, which delegates police power to local government units. The exercise of police power, including the issuance of permits, is inherently discretionary and aimed at promoting the well-being of the community.

The Court further elaborated that the remedy for questioning the validity of the mayor’s exercise of power lies in a writ of certiorari, not mandamus. Certiorari is appropriate when questioning whether a public official acted with grave abuse of discretion, while mandamus is limited to compelling the performance of a ministerial duty. Here is a table summarizing the key differences:

Feature	Mandamus	Certiorari
Purpose	To compel performance of a ministerial duty	To review acts with grave abuse of discretion
Nature of Duty	Ministerial (clear and specific duty)	Discretionary (involving judgment)
Grounds for Issuance	Refusal to perform a clear legal duty	Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

The Supreme Court thus concluded that the petition for mandamus was an improper remedy to compel the mayor to issue the business permit. The Court reinstated the RTC’s decision, emphasizing that the mayor’s duty to issue business permits involves discretionary powers inherent in delegated police power.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a mayor could be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue a business permit. The court needed to determine if the issuance of a business permit is a ministerial duty or a discretionary act.
What is a writ of mandamus?	A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a government official or body to perform a specific ministerial duty. It is issued when there is a clear legal right to the performance of the duty and no other adequate remedy is available.
What does ‘moot and academic’ mean in legal terms?	A case becomes moot and academic when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy, meaning the issue has been resolved or circumstances have changed such that a court ruling would have no practical effect. Courts generally decline to resolve moot issues.
What is the ‘general welfare clause’ in the Local Government Code?	The general welfare clause, found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, grants local government units the power to exercise powers necessary for efficient governance and promoting the general welfare of their inhabitants. This includes the exercise of police power.
What is ‘delegated police power’?	Delegated police power refers to the authority granted to local government units by the national legislature to enact and enforce laws and regulations for the protection of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. It includes the power to regulate businesses and issue permits.
Why did the Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision?	The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision because, despite acknowledging that the case was moot, the CA still reversed the RTC’s decision. The SC held that the CA should have dismissed the case entirely due to its mootness.
What is the difference between mandamus and certiorari?	Mandamus compels the performance of a ministerial duty, while certiorari reviews acts performed with grave abuse of discretion. Mandamus is appropriate when there is a clear legal duty, while certiorari is used to correct jurisdictional errors or acts beyond the scope of authority.
What was the significance of the Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor case?	The Roble Arrastre case established that the issuance of business permits by a mayor is an exercise of delegated police power and is therefore discretionary, not ministerial. This precedent was crucial in determining that mandamus was not the proper remedy in the Rimando case.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Abraham Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. reaffirms the principle that the issuance of business permits by local executives is a discretionary function rooted in delegated police power. This ruling underscores the limits of mandamus as a legal remedy and reinforces the importance of administrative discretion in local governance.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Abraham Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012