ASG Law

Category: Administrative Law

  • Upholding Notarial Duties: Consequences of Unauthorized Notarization and Legal Ethics Violations

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda, Jr. v. Alvarez, Sr. underscores the gravity of adhering to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court found Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr. guilty of violating these rules by performing notarial acts without a valid commission, notarizing documents lacking proper signatory identification, and failing to submit required documentation to the Clerk of Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court suspended him from the practice of law for two years, revoked his notarial commission, and perpetually disqualified him from being commissioned as a notary public, thus reinforcing the importance of integrity and compliance within the legal profession.

    When Boundaries Blur: Questioning the Ethical Lines in Notarial Practice

    The case of Pablito L. Miranda, Jr. v. Atty. Jose B. Alvarez, Sr. began with a complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that Atty. Alvarez notarized documents despite his notarial commission having expired. The complainant presented evidence indicating that Alvarez maintained multiple notarial offices and notarized documents outside his authorized jurisdiction, leading to questions about his compliance with the Notarial Rules and his ethical responsibilities as a lawyer. This administrative case thus highlights the critical role of notaries public in ensuring the integrity of legal documents, and it serves as a reminder that only qualified and authorized individuals must perform notarial acts to maintain public trust and confidence in the legal system.

    The facts revealed that Atty. Alvarez had committed several violations. First, he notarized documents in San Pedro, Laguna, despite his commission for that jurisdiction having expired in 2005. While he held a valid commission in Biñan, Laguna, from 2010 to 2011, he performed notarial acts in San Pedro, effectively operating outside the territorial limits of his authorization. Furthermore, the Court noted that Atty. Alvarez notarized an Affidavit for Death Benefit Claim in Biñan, Laguna, on April 10, 2012, after his Biñan commission had also expired. These actions clearly contravene the Notarial Rules, which stipulate that notarial acts must be performed within the commissioning court’s territorial jurisdiction and during the commission’s validity.

    Building on this, the Court found that Atty. Alvarez notarized documents lacking proper identification of the signatories. One specific instance was the 2010 Application for Business Permit, which lacked details of the signatory’s competent evidence of identity. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a notary public must ensure the identity of the signatory through personal knowledge or competent evidence. The failure to do so not only violates the Notarial Rules but also undermines the integrity of the notarized document. As emphasized in Gaddi v. Velasco,

    In the present case, contrary to [Atty.] Velasco’s claim that Gaddi appeared before him and presented two identification cards as proof of her identity, the notarial certificate, in rubber stamp, itself indicates: “SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS APR 22, 2010 x x x AT MAKATI CITY. AFFIANT EXHIBITING TO ME HIS/HER C.T.C. NO. ______ ISSUED AT/ON ______.” The unfilled spaces clearly establish that Velasco had been remiss in his duty of ascertaining the identity of the signatory to the document. Velasco did not comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, that is, to require the presence of Gaddi; otherwise, he could have ascertained that the handwritten admission was executed involuntarily and refused to notarize the document. Furthermore, Velasco affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial certificate. x x x

    Moreover, the Court found that Atty. Alvarez failed to forward certified copies of monthly entries and duplicate original copies of acknowledged instruments to the Clerk of Court (COC), another violation of the Notarial Rules. The September 21, 2011, Certification issued by COC Beran-Baraoidan confirmed that a copy of the SPA executed by Amante was not submitted to the RTC-San Pedro. This requirement ensures proper record-keeping and accountability, and failure to comply is grounds for revocation of a notary public’s commission.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that these violations also reflect on Atty. Alvarez’s standing as a lawyer. As a member of the Bar, he is expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. By repeatedly flouting the Notarial Rules, he engaged in unlawful conduct, violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Specifically, he violated Canon 1, which mandates that a lawyer shall uphold the constitution and obey the laws; Rule 1.01, which prohibits unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct; and Canon 7, which requires lawyers to uphold the integrity of the legal profession.

    The penalties imposed by the Court, including suspension from the practice of law, revocation of his notarial commission, and perpetual disqualification from being a notary public, are consistent with established jurisprudence. The Court has consistently held that notarization is not a mere formality but an act imbued with public interest, necessitating strict compliance with the rules.

    In addition to these violations, the Court addressed complainant’s motion for reconsideration, which raised concerns about Atty. Alvarez practicing law despite an existing suspension order. The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) certified that Atty. Alvarez had been suspended for five months in 2000, and this suspension had not been lifted. The Court clarified that the lifting of a suspension is not automatic. A lawyer must file a motion, provide certifications from the Executive Judge and the IBP, and obtain a favorable recommendation from the OBC. Since Atty. Alvarez had not complied with this procedure, he was directed to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and/or further disciplined for allegedly practicing law during his suspension.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Atty. Alvarez violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility through unauthorized notarial acts and other misconduct. The Supreme Court addressed the extent and consequences of these violations.
    What specific violations did Atty. Alvarez commit? Atty. Alvarez performed notarial acts without a valid commission, notarized documents lacking proper signatory identification, and failed to submit required documentation to the Clerk of Court. These actions directly contravened the Notarial Rules.
    What penalties did the Supreme Court impose? The Court suspended Atty. Alvarez from the practice of law for two years, revoked his notarial commission, and perpetually disqualified him from being commissioned as a notary public. These penalties reflect the severity of his violations.
    Why is notarization considered important? Notarization is not a mere formality but an act imbued with public interest. It converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity, thus requiring strict compliance with the rules.
    What is the role of a notary public? A notary public is authorized to administer oaths, certify documents, and perform other acts specified by law. Their role is to prevent fraud and forgery, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of legal documents.
    What does the Code of Professional Responsibility say about upholding the law? The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that lawyers uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. Violations of the Notarial Rules reflect poorly on an attorney’s standing and ethics.
    What must a lawyer do to have a suspension lifted? A lawyer must file a motion, provide certifications from the Executive Judge and the IBP, and obtain a favorable recommendation from the OBC. The lifting of a suspension is not automatic upon expiration.
    What is competent evidence of identity according to the Notarial Rules? Competent evidence of identity refers to the means by which a notary public can verify the identity of a signatory, such as government-issued identification documents with a photograph and signature.

    In conclusion, the Miranda, Jr. v. Alvarez, Sr. case serves as a stark reminder of the importance of upholding notarial duties and adhering to the ethical standards of the legal profession. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the principle that notaries public must strictly comply with the Notarial Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility to maintain public trust and ensure the integrity of legal documents.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Miranda, Jr. v. Alvarez, Sr., A.C. No. 12196, September 03, 2018

  • Resignation vs. Reinstatement: When Can a Government Employee Reverse Course?

    The Supreme Court ruled that a government employee who voluntarily applies for and receives separation benefits cannot later seek reinstatement to their former position. This decision emphasizes that public servants are accountable for their choices, especially when those choices involve financial benefits tied to resignation. The ruling underscores the principle that one cannot benefit from a severance and then demand the job back, particularly when done to evade administrative liability.

    Quitting to Evade Charges: Can a Public Employee Game the System?

    This case revolves around Gabriel Moralde, a Dental Aide in Misamis Oriental’s Provincial Health Office, who faced administrative charges for falsifying his Daily Time Records. While the investigation was ongoing, Moralde applied for retirement benefits from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Subsequently, he was found guilty and dismissed from service. Moralde then appealed his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which initially ordered his reinstatement. However, the Province later discovered that Moralde had already retired and received his benefits. The CSC then reversed its decision, deeming Moralde’s reinstatement moot. The Court of Appeals sided with Moralde, but the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the CA’s decision, siding with the Civil Service Commission and the Province.

    The central legal question is whether Moralde’s prior application for and receipt of separation benefits, while facing administrative charges, barred him from later seeking reinstatement. The Supreme Court emphasized the **doctrine of immutability of final judgments**, which generally prevents the modification of final and executory decisions. The Court in Social Security System v. Isip[73] articulated:

    When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.

    However, the Court also recognized exceptions to this doctrine, including situations where supervening events make the execution of a judgment unjust or inequitable. These exceptions serve substantial justice, balancing the need for finality with fairness and practicality. As stated in Barnes v. Padilla:[86]

    Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

    In Moralde’s case, the Supreme Court found that his voluntary application for retirement benefits constituted a **supervening event** that rendered his reinstatement impractical and unjust. The Court reasoned that Moralde had willfully severed his employer-employee relationship with the government by petitioning for these benefits. This action indicated his intent to terminate his employment, especially considering it occurred while he was under investigation for administrative offenses.

    The Court differentiated between retirement benefits (under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 8291) and separation benefits (under Section 11 of the same act). While the specific requirements and benefits differ, the Court emphasized that both imply a complete and unequivocal termination of the employment relationship. The court stated: “While retirement benefits differ from separation benefits, a public officer who applies to receive either of them nevertheless acts out of the same contemplation: the complete and unequivocal termination of his or her employer-employee relationship with the government.” Regardless of whether Moralde technically qualified for retirement or separation, his action demonstrated a clear intention to leave his position.

    The Court distinguished this case from previous rulings such as Dytiapco v. Civil Service Commission[135] and Yenko v. Gungon,[136] where employees accepted separation pay due to economic necessity while appealing their dismissals. In those cases, the employees were dismissed first and then, out of financial need, accepted separation benefits. In contrast, Moralde applied for retirement benefits *before* any adverse ruling, suggesting an attempt to circumvent potential disciplinary action. The court found this critical difference demonstrated a lack of good faith on Moralde’s part.

    Furthermore, the Court highlighted that Moralde’s actions constituted **estoppel**. He concealed his retirement application from the Province and the CSC, leading them to believe he was actively pursuing his appeal. This concealment prejudiced the Province, which would have acted differently had it known the truth. As stated in Kalalo v. Luz:[118]

    As related to the party to be estopped, the essential elements are: (1) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least influence, the other party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.

    The Court concluded that allowing Moralde’s reinstatement would condone deceit and dishonesty, undermining the integrity of the civil service. Public office is a public trust, and those who hold it must maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct. The Supreme Court emphasized this point: “Public officers and employees cannot forestall a finding of liability by opting out of employment. It is doubly worse when they reap financial benefits through severance packages upon opting out of employment. Public service is a public trust, and to hold a government position, no matter the rank, is a privilege, not a right.”

    This case serves as a warning to public servants: actions have consequences, and attempting to manipulate the system for personal gain will not be tolerated.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a government employee who voluntarily applied for and received retirement/separation benefits could later seek reinstatement after being dismissed for misconduct.
    What is the doctrine of immutability of final judgments? This doctrine states that final judgments can no longer be modified or altered, even by the highest court. However, exceptions exist, such as when supervening events make execution unjust.
    What are supervening events? Supervening events are circumstances that occur after a judgment becomes final and make its execution unjust or impossible. In this case, Moralde’s retirement application was considered a supervening event.
    What is the difference between retirement and separation benefits? Retirement benefits are typically for those meeting age and service requirements, while separation benefits are for those leaving service before meeting those requirements. Both benefits, however, signify a termination of employment.
    Why was Moralde’s case different from Dytiapco and Yenko? Unlike Dytiapco and Yenko, Moralde applied for benefits before any dismissal ruling, suggesting an intent to avoid potential penalties, rather than economic necessity after dismissal.
    What is estoppel? Estoppel prevents a person from denying or disproving prior actions or representations that another party has relied upon to their detriment. Moralde was estopped from seeking reinstatement due to his prior actions.
    What did the Supreme Court say about public service? The Court emphasized that public office is a public trust and that public servants must maintain high ethical standards. Dishonesty and deceit cannot be tolerated.
    What was the final ruling in this case? The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the Civil Service Commission’s ruling, denying Moralde’s reinstatement.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling for government employees? The ruling prevents government employees from reversing course if they opt out of their employment through applying for and receiving separation benefits, particularly to avoid disciplinary action.

    The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces accountability in public service and clarifies the consequences of voluntarily leaving government employment. It ensures that the system cannot be manipulated for personal gain at the expense of public trust.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. GABRIEL MORALDE, G.R. No. 211318, August 15, 2018

  • Voluntary Departure vs. Forced Removal: When Retirement Applications Bar Reinstatement Claims

    The Supreme Court has ruled that public officers who voluntarily apply for retirement or separation benefits are generally bound by their decision to leave public service. They cannot later demand reinstatement and backwages unless their initial choice was clearly compelled by dire circumstances. This principle prevents employees from strategically using retirement to avoid administrative consequences, only to later seek reinstatement and additional compensation.

    The Case of the Contradictory Civil Servant: Retirement vs. Reinstatement?

    This case involves Gabriel Moralde, a Dental Aide in Misamis Oriental, who faced administrative charges for falsifying his Daily Time Records. While the investigation was ongoing, Moralde applied for retirement benefits with the GSIS. The Province of Misamis Oriental then dismissed him for falsification. Moralde appealed the dismissal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which initially ordered his reinstatement. However, the province later discovered Moralde’s prior retirement application and argued he could not be reinstated. The CSC then reversed its decision, deeming the reinstatement moot. The Court of Appeals sided with Moralde, but the Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision.

    The central legal question revolves around whether Moralde’s voluntary application for retirement benefits, while facing administrative charges, prevents him from later seeking reinstatement to his former position and claiming backwages.

    The Supreme Court anchored its decision on the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, recognizing its importance in ensuring stability and order in the judicial system. The immutability doctrine essentially means that once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be altered or modified, even by the highest court. This principle is crucial for avoiding delays in the administration of justice and for bringing an end to legal controversies. However, the Court also acknowledged established exceptions to this rule, such as correcting clerical errors, making nunc pro tunc entries (corrections effective retroactively), dealing with void judgments, and addressing supervening events that render the execution of the judgment unjust or inequitable.

    Here, the Court found that Moralde’s voluntary application for retirement benefits constituted a supervening event that rendered his reinstatement unjust and inequitable. Moralde, by his own actions, had severed his employment relationship with the government. The Court highlighted that his actions were particularly problematic because they occurred while he was facing administrative charges. This raised concerns that he was attempting to circumvent the disciplinary process. According to the Supreme Court, Moralde had willingly terminated his employment and sought to capitalize on benefits available only upon such termination.

    The Supreme Court carefully distinguished between retirement benefits under Section 13 and separation benefits under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8291. Retirement benefits generally require a minimum age (60 years) and a specific length of service (15 years). Separation benefits, on the other hand, are available to employees below 60 who resign or separate from service after a certain period of employment. Although Moralde mistakenly applied for retirement benefits, the critical point for the Court was that he voluntarily intended to terminate his employment, regardless of which type of benefit he sought.

    The Court contrasted Moralde’s situation with those in previous cases like Dytiapco v. Civil Service Commission and Yenko v. Gungon, where employees applied for separation benefits only after being illegally dismissed and while pursuing appeals for reinstatement. In those cases, the employees’ actions were seen as driven by economic necessity rather than a desire to leave government service. Moralde, however, applied for benefits *before* any adverse ruling against him, suggesting an attempt to preempt potential disciplinary actions and secure a more favorable exit from public service.

    Building on this premise, the Supreme Court invoked the principle of estoppel against Moralde. **Estoppel** prevents a party from contradicting their previous actions or representations if another party has relied on those actions to their detriment. The Court found that Moralde had concealed his retirement application from the Province and the CSC, leading them to believe that he was genuinely seeking reinstatement. The Province, in good faith, even initiated the process of reinstating him, only to discover his prior retirement. Moralde’s concealment and subsequent attempt to claim reinstatement were deemed unfair and prejudicial to the Province and the CSC.

    The Court emphasized that public office is a public trust, and employees must maintain integrity and honesty. Moralde’s actions, characterized by deceit and concealment, were deemed incompatible with the standards expected of public servants. The Court also stated that, “Public officers and employees cannot forestall a finding of liability by opting out of employment. It is doubly worse when they reap financial benefits through severance packages upon opting out of employment.”

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of honesty and transparency in public service. Employees cannot manipulate administrative processes or exploit benefit schemes to avoid accountability. The ruling serves as a deterrent against similar attempts to circumvent disciplinary procedures and unjustly enrich oneself at the expense of the government and the public trust.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a public employee who voluntarily applied for retirement benefits while facing administrative charges could later seek reinstatement and backwages.
    What is the doctrine of immutability of final judgments? The doctrine states that once a court decision becomes final, it cannot be altered, even by the highest court. This promotes stability and finality in legal proceedings.
    What are the exceptions to the immutability doctrine? Exceptions include correcting clerical errors, making nunc pro tunc entries, dealing with void judgments, and addressing supervening events that make the execution of the judgment unjust.
    What are separation benefits under RA 8291? Separation benefits are monetary benefits available to government employees who resign or separate from service before reaching the retirement age of 60, subject to certain service requirements.
    What is the principle of estoppel? Estoppel prevents a person from denying or contradicting their previous conduct or statements if another person has relied on them, suffering detriment as a result.
    How did the Court differentiate this case from Dytiapco and Yenko? In Dytiapco and Yenko, employees applied for separation benefits *after* being illegally dismissed, driven by economic necessity. Moralde applied *before* any adverse ruling, suggesting an intent to circumvent disciplinary processes.
    What is the significance of the timing of Moralde’s retirement application? The timing was crucial because it preceded any adverse ruling or dismissal, leading the Court to infer that he sought to avoid potential disciplinary action.
    What is the main takeaway from this Supreme Court ruling? The ruling reinforces that public officers cannot strategically use retirement to escape accountability and then seek reinstatement for additional compensation.

    This decision serves as a warning to public servants who might contemplate manipulating the system for personal gain. It emphasizes the importance of integrity, honesty, and transparency in public service, ensuring that those who breach the public trust are held accountable for their actions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, V. GABRIEL MORALDE, RESPONDENT., G.R. No. 211318, August 15, 2018

  • Breach of Authority: When Local Executives Overstep Legislative Mandates

    This case underscores the importance of strict adherence to legislative mandates by local chief executives. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Governor Josie Castillo-Co for violating Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Court ruled that she entered into a transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government by purchasing reconditioned heavy equipment instead of brand new equipment, as authorized by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino, thus holding her accountable for the detriment caused to the local government unit.

    Quirino’s Quandary: Did Governor Co’s Equipment Purchases Violate Anti-Graft Laws?

    The case revolves around a complaint filed against Josie Castillo-Co, then Governor of Quirino, for alleged violations of anti-graft laws related to the purchase of heavy equipment from Nakajima Trading Co., Ltd. Representative Junie E. Cua alleged several irregularities, including the purchase of reconditioned equipment instead of brand new ones as authorized, making advance payments prohibited by the Local Government Code, and purchasing overpriced equipment. The Sandiganbayan found Gov. Co guilty, leading to her appeal before the Supreme Court.

    At the heart of the legal matter is Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, which prohibits public officers from entering into contracts or transactions that are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. To establish a violation of this provision, the prosecution must prove that the accused is a public officer, that they entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government, and that the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The critical question before the Supreme Court was whether Gov. Co’s actions met these criteria, particularly whether the disadvantage to the government was indeed “gross and manifest.”

    The Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of whether a disadvantage is “gross and manifest” should be made on a case-to-case basis, considering the specific circumstances involved. “Gross” implies something glaring, reprehensible, flagrant, or shocking, while “manifest” means evident to the senses, open, obvious, notorious, and unmistakable. The Court identified three key acts that caused gross and manifest disadvantage to the Province of Quirino, namely: purchasing reconditioned equipment contrary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s authorization, advancing 40% of the total contract price in violation of the Local Government Code, and paying the remaining balance despite Nakajima Trading’s non-compliance with the delivery timeline.

    Gov. Co argued that she relied on the recommendation of the Provincial Engineer, Virgilio Ringor, who suggested purchasing reconditioned equipment due to insufficient funds. She invoked the *Arias vs. Sandiganbayan* doctrine, which allows heads of offices to rely on their subordinates. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the *Arias* doctrine is not absolute and does not excuse public officers from exercising a higher degree of circumspection when circumstances warrant it. In this case, the Court found that Resolution No. 120, which explicitly authorized the purchase of brand new equipment, should have prompted Gov. Co to be more cautious in her dealings with Nakajima Trading.

    Moreover, the Court rejected Gov. Co’s claim that Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 205 ratified the contract with Nakajima Trading, finding that it merely re-appropriated unutilized loan proceeds without explicitly approving the change from brand new to reconditioned machinery. The Supreme Court emphasized that a resolution represents the will of a local government unit, and in this case, the province’s clear intention was to procure brand new heavy machinery. By knowingly expending public funds on reconditioned equipment instead, Gov. Co acted to the detriment of the province.

    Regarding the advance payment, Gov. Co argued that she consulted her private lawyer, Atty. Primitivo Marcos, who advised her that Section 338 of the Local Government Code did not apply. She again invoked the *Arias* doctrine, claiming good faith reliance on legal advice. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the *Arias* doctrine applies to subordinates within the same government agency, not to private legal consultants. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance, and a mistake of law cannot justify an illegal act.

    The Supreme Court also highlighted the purpose of prohibiting advance payments, which is to ensure the receipt of goods or the performance of services and to prevent suppliers from absconding with public funds. The Court noted that the risk of loss is even greater when dealing with foreign suppliers, who may be difficult to pursue through domestic legal channels. The Court declared:

    Section 338. Prohibitions Against Advance Payments. – No money shall be paid on account of any contract under which no services have been rendered or goods delivered.

    The Court found that the mere risk of losing a substantial amount of money (P15,881,115.50) caused gross and manifest disadvantage to the Province of Quirino. Public officers are expected to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the performance of their duties, including the prudent disbursement of public funds. Gov. Co’s failure to abide by the law and her disregard for the risks associated with advance payments constituted a breach of public trust.

    Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of Nakajima Trading’s failure to fully comply with the delivery terms of the agreement. Despite full payment, the provincial government did not receive all the equipment due under the contract, and the delivered equipment was not always in the agreed-upon condition. This further underscored Gov. Co’s negligence in handling public funds and her failure to ensure that the province received the full value for its expenditure.

    In sum, the Supreme Court found that Gov. Co’s actions demonstrated a wanton disregard for the proper handling of public funds and a failure to adhere to the legislative mandates of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Her decision to purchase reconditioned equipment, make advance payments, and neglect to ensure full compliance with the contract terms all contributed to a transaction that was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Province of Quirino.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Governor Co violated Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 by entering into a transaction that was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Provincial Government of Quirino. This involved purchasing reconditioned equipment instead of brand new equipment as authorized, and making unlawful advance payments.
    What is Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019? Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, prohibits public officers from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government that is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same. It aims to prevent public officials from engaging in corrupt practices that harm the government’s interests.
    Why was purchasing reconditioned equipment a problem? The Sangguniang Panlalawigan authorized Gov. Co to obtain a loan for the purchase of brand new heavy equipment. By purchasing reconditioned equipment, she acted outside the scope of her authority, thus violating the trust placed in her by the local legislative body.
    What is the significance of the advance payment issue? Section 338 of the Local Government Code prohibits advance payments for contracts where no services have been rendered or goods delivered. The advance payment made by Gov. Co violated this provision, placing the provincial government at risk of financial loss.
    What is the Arias doctrine? The Arias doctrine generally allows heads of offices to rely on their subordinates in good faith. However, this doctrine does not apply when there are circumstances that should prompt the head of office to exercise a higher degree of circumspection.
    Did the court accept Gov. Co’s reliance on legal advice? No, the court did not accept Gov. Co’s reliance on her private lawyer’s advice as a valid defense. The Arias doctrine does not extend to private legal consultants, and ignorance of the law is not an excuse for non-compliance.
    What was the outcome of the case? The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s decision finding Gov. Co guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. She was sentenced to imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from public office.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling? The ruling reinforces the importance of public officials adhering strictly to legislative mandates and exercising due diligence in handling public funds. It serves as a reminder that deviations from authorized actions can lead to criminal liability and significant penalties.

    This case serves as a crucial reminder to all public officials about the importance of adhering to legal mandates and exercising due diligence in handling public funds. The Supreme Court’s decision underscores that failure to do so can have severe consequences, including criminal prosecution and disqualification from public office. Understanding the nuances of this case can help other government officials avoid similar pitfalls and ensure responsible governance.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: JOSIE CASTILLO-CO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 184766, August 15, 2018

  • Probable Cause and Ombudsman’s Discretion: When Can Courts Intervene?

    The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the wide latitude given to the Ombudsman in determining probable cause for filing criminal charges against public officials. Unless there’s grave abuse of discretion—an arbitrary exercise of power—courts will generally not interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings. This means public officials facing such charges have a high burden to prove the Ombudsman acted beyond their authority.

    Rice Program Gone Wrong: Did Officials Abuse Their Authority?

    This case revolves around allegations of corruption and misuse of public funds within the Provincial Government of Isabela. Then Governor Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, along with Servando Soriano and Dionisio Pine, faced accusations related to a P25 million loan granted to a private foundation, Economic Development for Western Isabela and Northern Luzon Foundation, Inc. (EDWINLFI), for a priority agricultural modernization project. The core legal question: Did the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan abuse their discretion in finding probable cause to indict the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Malversation of Public Funds?

    Santiago Respicio filed a complaint alleging irregularities in how the loan was handled. He claimed that the loan, sourced from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), was released to EDWINLFI, a private entity, and that the funds used to repay the loan were improperly taken from the province’s Economic Development Fund. Padaca, Soriano, and Pine were implicated due to their roles in approving and managing the loan and its subsequent disbursement. The Ombudsman’s office initiated an investigation, leading to a resolution recommending the filing of criminal charges against the petitioners.

    Padaca defended her actions by citing a Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) Resolution No. 061, which authorized her to enter into a loan contract with Land Bank of the Philippines. She argued that the SP’s subsequent ratification of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the provincial government and EDWINLFI validated the program’s legality and propriety. Soriano and Pine denied the allegations, with Soriano emphasizing that he was not a member of the SP that ratified the transaction. Pine contended that as a private individual, he could not be held as a conspirator without sufficient evidence.

    Despite these defenses, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Padaca, Soriano, and Pine for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for Malversation of Public Funds. The Ombudsman concluded that Padaca’s actions showed manifest partiality, giving unwarranted preference and benefits to EDWINLFI. The Ombudsman also noted Soriano’s and Pine’s collaborative actions in the implementation of the Provincial Rice Program as indicating a common design to obtain unwarranted benefits at the expense of the Provincial Government. This finding was affirmed despite an initial recommendation from Assistant Special Prosecutor II May Ann T. Vela to set aside the resolution for lack of probable cause.

    The Sandiganbayan subsequently ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Soriano and Pine filed an Omnibus Motion to recall the warrant of arrest and to dismiss the case for lack of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion, stating that the issuance of the arrest warrant indicated a finding that the Informations were valid on their face and that the Ombudsman had not committed grave abuse of discretion. The Sandiganbayan emphasized that the petitioners’ arguments were matters of defense to be addressed during trial.

    The petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions. The Supreme Court, however, sided with the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, emphasizing its general reluctance to interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause. Citing Dichaves vs. Office of the Ombudsman and the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Court reiterated that both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The court recognizes that the rule on non-interference is based on “respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman.”

    The Court recognized an exception to this general rule when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. However, it clarified that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Because no such grave abuse of discretion was evident, the Court upheld the Ombudsman’s findings.

    The Court also addressed the petitioners’ arguments regarding the elements of the offenses charged. It emphasized that in determining the existence of probable cause, “the Ombudsman does not touch on the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.” The function of the Office of the Ombudsman is not to rule on such issue. Being merely based on opinion and belief, “a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.” Citing Galario vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), the Court reiterated that a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused.

    Specifically, the Court addressed the finding of probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which states:

    Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawfull:

    x x x x

    (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

    The Court concurred with the Sandiganbayan that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Ombudsman, as the finding of probable cause rested on substantial basis. The Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out that absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the accused. Consequently, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan in denying Soriano and Pine’s Omnibus Motion.

    The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a reminder of the broad discretion afforded to the Ombudsman in investigating and prosecuting public officials. While the Court acknowledged its power to review the Ombudsman’s actions for grave abuse of discretion, it emphasized that such intervention is warranted only in cases of arbitrary or despotic exercise of power. The case also underscores the importance of due diligence and adherence to procurement rules in government transactions to avoid allegations of corruption and misuse of public funds.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to charge the petitioners with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Malversation of Public Funds. The Supreme Court ultimately found no such abuse of discretion.
    What is the significance of ‘probable cause’ in this context? Probable cause is the legal standard that must be met to warrant criminal charges. It means there’s enough evidence to suggest a crime was committed and the accused likely committed it, although it doesn’t determine guilt or innocence.
    What does ‘grave abuse of discretion’ mean? Grave abuse of discretion refers to a situation where an official exercises their power in an arbitrary or capricious manner, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. It’s a high legal bar to clear when challenging an official’s decision.
    What was the role of EDWINLFI in this case? EDWINLFI was a private foundation that received a P25 million loan from the Provincial Government of Isabela for an agricultural project. The allegations centered on whether the loan was properly awarded and managed.
    What was Governor Padaca’s defense? Governor Padaca argued that she acted within her authority, based on a resolution from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and that the agreement with EDWINLFI was properly ratified.
    Why were Soriano and Pine implicated? Soriano and Pine were implicated due to their positions within EDWINLFI and their alleged involvement in the irregular handling of the loan funds. They were accused of conspiring to obtain unwarranted benefits.
    What is the Ombudsman’s role in cases like this? The Ombudsman is responsible for investigating and prosecuting public officials accused of corruption and other offenses. They have broad discretion in determining whether probable cause exists to file charges.
    What is the Sandiganbayan? The Sandiganbayan is a special court in the Philippines that handles cases involving public officials accused of graft and corruption. It has jurisdiction over cases like this one.

    This case reaffirms the judiciary’s respect for the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial independence, absent clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion. It emphasizes the importance of adhering to legal and procedural safeguards in government transactions to prevent any perception of impropriety and ensure public funds are used responsibly. The ruling highlights that disagreements with the Ombudsman’s findings or questions about the validity of criminal charges are best addressed during trial, not through preliminary challenges based on alleged abuse of discretion.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: GOVERNOR MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA v. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, G.R. Nos. 204007-08, August 8, 2018

  • Res Judicata and Forum Shopping: Reassessing Importation Bans

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing a petition for indirect contempt based on res judicata and forum shopping. The case stemmed from conflicting interpretations of executive orders regarding the importation of used motor vehicles. This decision clarifies that differing legal issues and causes of action prevent the application of res judicata, ensuring that parties are not unjustly barred from seeking redress for alleged contempt of court orders.

    Import Bans and Conflicting Rulings: When is a Court Order Truly Violated?

    This case revolves around Fenix (CEZA) International, Inc.’s (petitioner) attempt to hold several government officials in contempt for allegedly disobeying a court order related to the importation of used motor vehicles. The legal saga began with Executive Order (EO) 156, which banned the importation of used motor vehicles. Later, EO 418 imposed a specific duty on imported used motor vehicles. The petitioner successfully challenged EO 418, but the Bureau of Customs (BOC) continued to disallow its importations, citing EO 156. This led to the contempt case, which the lower courts dismissed based on res judicata and forum shopping, arguing that previous cases had already settled the issue of importation bans.

    The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts’ application of res judicata and forum shopping. The Court emphasized that the previous cases, namely Hon. Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., dealt with the constitutionality of EO 156, while the Fenix Case concerned EO 418. The contempt case, on the other hand, focused on whether the respondents violated the Writ of Execution issued in the Fenix Case. Because these cases involved different issues and causes of action, the principle of res judicata could not apply. The court’s discussion on res judicata is critical in understanding the scope and limitation of the doctrine.

    Res judicata, as the Court explained, prevents parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court. The Court reiterated the two concepts of res judicata: bar by former judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. The former requires identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action, while the latter only requires identity of parties and subject matter. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court encapsulates the doctrine.

    Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

    (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

    (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

    In the present case, the Supreme Court noted that the causes of action were distinct. In Southwing and Forerunner, the core issue was the validity of EO 156, which imposed a ban on the importation of used vehicles. In contrast, the Fenix Case challenged the constitutionality of EO 418. The court highlighted that the contempt case centered on the government’s compliance with the Writ of Execution in the Fenix Case, marking a clear departure from the issues previously adjudicated. This difference in the causes of action was pivotal in the Court’s decision to reverse the lower courts.

    The Court also addressed the issue of forum shopping, which occurs when a party seeks multiple judicial remedies in different courts based on the same facts and issues. Since res judicata was deemed inapplicable, the Court also found that there was no forum shopping. The Court relied on the test of litis pendentia, emphasizing that the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for must be identical for forum shopping to exist. In this case, the dissimilar causes of action negated the presence of forum shopping, further supporting the Court’s decision to reinstate the contempt case.

    The Supreme Court’s decision emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between different legal issues and causes of action when determining the applicability of res judicata and forum shopping. By clarifying these distinctions, the Court ensures that parties are not unfairly prevented from pursuing legitimate claims based on the specific facts and circumstances of their case. The Court’s meticulous analysis reaffirms the judiciary’s commitment to upholding due process and ensuring that legal principles are applied correctly and consistently.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the dismissal of a contempt case based on res judicata and forum shopping, despite the case concerning a different legal issue from prior rulings.
    What is res judicata? Res judicata is a legal doctrine that prevents the same parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court, ensuring finality and preventing endless litigation.
    What is forum shopping? Forum shopping occurs when a party files multiple lawsuits based on the same facts and issues in different courts, seeking a favorable outcome, which is considered an abuse of judicial process.
    What is Executive Order (EO) 156? EO 156 is an executive order that generally bans the importation of used motor vehicles into the Philippines, with certain exceptions.
    What is Executive Order (EO) 418? EO 418 is an executive order that modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import duty on used motor vehicles under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978.
    Why did the lower courts dismiss the contempt case? The lower courts dismissed the contempt case based on the belief that prior judgments, specifically Southwing and Forerunner, had already resolved the issues related to the importation of used motor vehicles, making the case barred by res judicata.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling? The Supreme Court ruled that res judicata and forum shopping did not apply because the contempt case involved a different cause of action than the previous cases, and therefore, the case should be reinstated for further proceedings.
    What was the specific act of contempt alleged by Fenix (CEZA)? Fenix (CEZA) alleged that the respondents committed indirect contempt by disobeying the Writ of Execution issued in the Fenix Case, which they believed allowed their importations, but the Bureau of Customs disallowed these importations.

    This ruling serves as a reminder that the application of legal doctrines like res judicata and forum shopping must be carefully considered, taking into account the specific issues and causes of action involved in each case. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that parties are not unjustly deprived of their right to seek legal remedies when genuine disputes arise.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: FENIX (CEZA) INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 235258, August 06, 2018

  • Upholding Transparency: Competitive Bidding Mandate in Power Supply Agreements

    The Supreme Court declared that the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) does not have the statutory authority to postpone the implementation of Competitive Selection Process (CSP) for Power Supply Agreements (PSAs). This decision ensures that all PSAs submitted after June 30, 2015, must undergo CSP, which mandates competitive public bidding to secure transparent and reasonable electricity prices for consumers. The Court emphasized that ERC’s actions, which effectively delayed CSP implementation, were a grave abuse of discretion that compromised the public’s interest in affordable and fair electricity rates. As a result, power purchase costs from non-compliant PSAs cannot be passed on to consumers, reinforcing the State’s commitment to regulating monopolies and ensuring fair competition in the energy sector.

    Safeguarding Affordable Electricity: Did the ERC Overstep Its Authority in Postponing Competitive Bidding?

    In Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. (ABP) v. Energy Regulatory Commission, the Supreme Court addressed the critical issue of transparency and fairness in the procurement of power supply agreements (PSAs). The case stemmed from a petition filed by ABP challenging the Energy Regulatory Commission’s (ERC) decision to postpone the mandatory implementation of the Competitive Selection Process (CSP) for PSAs, a move ABP argued undermined the public’s right to affordable and reasonably priced electricity.

    At the heart of the controversy was ERC Resolution No. 1, Series of 2016 (ERC Clarificatory Resolution), which effectively delayed the effectivity of the CSP, a mechanism designed to ensure that Distribution Utilities (DUs) purchase power at the most competitive rates through public bidding. ABP contended that this postponement, orchestrated by the ERC, was a grave abuse of discretion, violating the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. DC2015-06-0008 (2015 DOE Circular), which mandated the CSP. The Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the ERC had the authority to unilaterally postpone the CSP’s effectivity, thus potentially compromising transparency and fairness in the energy sector.

    The facts leading up to the case are significant. The DOE, in its efforts to promote transparency and reasonable electricity prices, issued the 2015 DOE Circular mandating all DUs to undergo CSP in securing PSAs. Section 3 of the 2015 DOE Circular mandated CSP whenever DUs secure PSAs and took effect on June 30, 2015, upon its publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Subsequently, the ERC issued the CSP Guidelines, fixing a new date of effectivity for compliance with CSP, effectively postponing the date of effectivity of CSP from June 30, 2015, to November 7, 2015. Later, the ERC issued the ERC Clarificatory Resolution, which restated the date of effectivity of the CSP Guidelines from November 7, 2015, to April 30, 2016.

    The ERC’s decision to postpone the CSP implementation allowed several PSAs between Manila Electric Company (Meralco) and its power suppliers to be executed and submitted to the ERC within ten days before the restated April 30, 2016 deadline. These PSAs, according to the ERC Clarificatory Resolution, were not required to comply with CSP. Meralco admitted that no actual bidding is conducted. According to the petitioner, non-implementation of CSP affects various areas of the country, and the postponement resulted in the exemption from CSP of a total of ninety (90) PSAs covering various areas of the country.

    In its analysis, the Supreme Court emphasized the constitutional mandate for the State to regulate monopolies when the public interest requires, as enshrined in Section 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Since electricity distribution utilities operate as regulated monopolies, competitive public bidding becomes essential to prevent price gouging and ensure fair rates for consumers. The Court underscored that competitive bidding is the most efficient, transparent, and effective guarantee against price gouging, aligning with practices adopted in numerous countries worldwide.

    The Court found that the ERC’s actions in postponing the CSP’s implementation were a grave abuse of discretion, particularly due to the absence of coordination or approval from the DOE, thus violating Section 4 of the 2015 DOE Circular mandating CSP. According to the Supreme Court, the ERC’s delegated authority is limited to implementing or executing CSP in accordance with the 2015 DOE Circular, not postponing CSP so as to freeze CSP for at least 20 years, effectively suspending CSP for one entire generation of Filipinos. To further strengthen its argument, the Supreme Court quotes the Section 43 of the EPIRA, prescribing the functions of the ERC, and there is absolutely nothing whatsoever in this complete enumeration of the ERC’s functions that grants the ERC rule-making power to supplant or change the policies, rules, regulations, or circulars prescribed by the DOE.

    The Supreme Court also noted that the postponements effectively allowed Distribution Utilities (DUs) nationwide to avoid the mandatory CSP, freezing for at least 20 years the DOE-mandated CSP to the great prejudice of the public. The high court explained that without CSP, there is no transparency in the purchase by DUs of electric power, and thus there is no assurance of the reasonableness of the power rates charged to consumers. As a consequence, all PSA applications submitted to the ERC on or after June 30, 2015, should be deemed not submitted and should be made to comply with CSP.

    In resolving the case, the Supreme Court ultimately granted ABP’s petition, holding that the ERC does not have the statutory authority to postpone the date of effectivity of CSP, and thereby cannot amend the 2015 DOE Circular. As a result, the 90 PSAs submitted to the ERC after the effectivity of CSP on or after June 30, 2015, cannot serve as a basis to pass on the power cost to consumers. The ERC was mandated to require CSP on all PSA applications submitted on or after June 30, 2015.

    The implications of the Supreme Court’s decision are far-reaching, particularly for electricity consumers across the Philippines. By nullifying the ERC’s postponements, the Court reinforced the mandatory nature of CSP, requiring all Distribution Utilities (DUs) to adhere to competitive public bidding in securing Power Supply Agreements (PSAs) after June 30, 2015. This ensures a more transparent and competitive procurement process, fostering fair and reasonable electricity rates for consumers. Moreover, it underscores the crucial balance between regulatory independence and adherence to statutory mandates within the energy sector, promoting accountability and public interest.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the ERC had the authority to postpone the mandatory implementation of the Competitive Selection Process (CSP) for Power Supply Agreements (PSAs).
    What is the Competitive Selection Process (CSP)? The CSP is a mechanism that requires Distribution Utilities (DUs) to undergo competitive public bidding when securing Power Supply Agreements (PSAs) to ensure transparency and reasonable electricity prices.
    Why is CSP important for consumers? CSP is vital for consumers as it helps prevent price gouging by distribution utilities and ensures they purchase electricity at the most competitive rates.
    What did the Supreme Court rule in this case? The Supreme Court ruled that the ERC did not have the authority to postpone the implementation of CSP and that all PSAs submitted after June 30, 2015, must comply with the CSP.
    What was the effect of the ERC’s postponements of the CSP? The ERC’s postponements allowed several PSAs to be executed without complying with CSP, potentially leading to non-transparent and less competitive electricity prices.
    What happens to PSAs that did not comply with CSP due to the postponement? The Supreme Court ruled that power purchase costs from PSAs that did not comply with CSP cannot be passed on to consumers.
    Did the Supreme Court question the ERC’s regulatory authority? No, the Supreme Court affirmed the ERC’s regulatory authority but emphasized that it must operate within the bounds of its statutory mandate and in coordination with the DOE.
    What is the role of the Department of Energy (DOE) in this process? The DOE formulates policies and issues rules and regulations for the energy sector, while the ERC enforces these policies and ensures fair competition and reasonable prices.
    What is the significance of this ruling for the energy sector? The ruling reinforces the importance of transparency and competitive bidding in the energy sector and holds regulatory bodies accountable for upholding the public interest.
    What is the current regulation regarding Competitive Selection Process (CSP)? On February 1, 2018, the DOE issued Circular No. DC2018-02-0003 entitled “Adopting and Prescribing the Policy for the Competitive Selection Process in the Procurement by the Distribution Utilities of Power Supply Agreements for the Captive Market”.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission serves as a landmark ruling, underscoring the vital role of transparency and competitive bidding in the Philippine energy sector. By reaffirming the State’s commitment to regulating monopolies and ensuring fair competition, the Court has fortified protections for electricity consumers and promoted a more equitable distribution of power and responsibilities within the industry.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 227670, May 03, 2019

  • Challenging Ombudsman Decisions: Certiorari vs. Appeal in Administrative Cases

    In a ruling that clarifies the procedural pathways for challenging decisions made by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), the Supreme Court held that when the OMB absolves an elective public official in an administrative case, and that absolution is final and unappealable under the OMB’s rules, the proper legal remedy is a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals (CA). This remedy is available to question the decision on grounds of grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that while appeals are generally filed via a petition for review, certiorari serves as an exception when the OMB’s decision is final but tainted with grave abuse of discretion, ensuring that even final administrative rulings are subject to judicial scrutiny for potential errors.

    When Condonation Clouds Justice: Can Re-election Excuse Nepotism?

    This case originated from an administrative complaint filed by Domingo Crebello against Timoteo T. Capoquian, Jr., then Mayor of Gamay, Northern Samar, alleging nepotism. Crebello asserted that Capoquian appointed his sister, Raquel Capoquian, to the Board of Directors of the Gamay Water District, a clear violation of nepotism rules. The OMB initially investigated the matter, and the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO) recommended upgrading the case for preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication. However, the OMB ultimately dismissed the charges against Capoquian, citing the doctrine of condonation because Capoquian had been re-elected as mayor in the 2010 elections. This meant that any administrative offenses committed during his prior term were supposedly forgiven due to his re-election.

    Crebello contested the OMB’s decision, arguing that the doctrine of condonation had already been abandoned by the Supreme Court in Morales v. Court of Appeals. He maintained that applying condonation to Capoquian’s case was improper after the doctrine had been effectively nullified. The OMB countered that the abandonment of condonation only took effect on April 12, 2016, after the final denial of their motion for reconsideration in the Morales case. The CA dismissed Crebello’s petition for certiorari, stating that the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as established in Fabian v. Desierto. This dismissal prompted Crebello to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court, questioning whether certiorari was indeed the wrong remedy and whether the OMB had committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

    The Supreme Court addressed the procedural issue first, clarifying the appropriate remedy when challenging decisions of the OMB. The Court acknowledged the general rule established in Fabian v. Desierto, which dictates that appeals from OMB decisions in administrative cases should be brought to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. However, the Court emphasized a critical exception: where the OMB’s decision is final and unappealable under its own rules, such as in cases where the respondent is absolved, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari. The Court cited Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, which explicitly states that decisions absolving a respondent are final, executory, and unappealable.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that a final and unappealable decision by the OMB can still be questioned through a petition for certiorari if there is an allegation and proof of grave abuse of discretion. The Court quoted Republic v. Francisco, stating:

    “Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.”

    This means that while the OMB’s decisions carry weight, they are not immune to judicial scrutiny, especially when there is a clear showing of abuse of authority.

    Addressing the substantive issue of condonation, the Court acknowledged that the doctrine’s abandonment took effect on April 12, 2016. While the OMB’s decision to apply condonation on March 31, 2016, might have been initially justifiable, the Court raised a crucial point: Capoquian never invoked condonation as a defense. In Morales v. Court of Appeals, the OMB itself argued that condonation is a matter of defense that must be raised during the administrative proceedings. The Court agreed with this stance, asserting that condonation is an affirmative defense that the respondent must actively assert to allow the OMB to consider it fully.

    Capoquian’s failure to file a counter-affidavit or verified position paper indicated that he did not raise condonation or any other defense before the OMB. Consequently, the Court found that the OMB acted improperly in absolving Capoquian based on condonation. The Court held that Capoquian was administratively liable for nepotism. Given that Capoquian’s term during which the act occurred had already expired, the penalty of dismissal could not be imposed. However, the Court stressed that he should still suffer the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and a bar from taking civil service examinations. This ensures that the law is not rendered a travesty.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the Ombudsman’s decision absolving the respondent from administrative charges of nepotism, and whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the doctrine of condonation.
    What is the doctrine of condonation? The doctrine of condonation, before its abandonment, held that an elective official’s administrative liability for misconduct committed during a prior term is forgiven upon re-election to the same position, implying that the electorate has already considered and accepted the official’s past actions.
    When was the doctrine of condonation abandoned? The Supreme Court officially abandoned the doctrine of condonation on April 12, 2016, with the final denial of the motion for reconsideration in the case of Morales v. Court of Appeals.
    What is the proper legal remedy to question an Ombudsman’s decision? Generally, appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are brought to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, when the Ombudsman’s decision is final and unappealable, but is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari.
    Why was the petition for certiorari initially dismissed by the CA? The Court of Appeals initially dismissed the petition for certiorari, believing the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43, following the precedent set in Fabian v. Desierto.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case? The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the CA’s decision, and found Timoteo T. Capoquian, Jr. guilty of nepotism. Although the penalty of dismissal could not be imposed due to the expiration of his term, the Court imposed accessory penalties, including disqualification from holding public office.
    Why did the Supreme Court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman? The Supreme Court found that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion because the respondent, Timoteo T. Capoquian, Jr., never invoked the doctrine of condonation as a defense during the administrative proceedings.
    What are the accessory penalties imposed on Capoquian? The accessory penalties imposed on Timoteo T. Capoquian, Jr. include cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and a bar from taking civil service examinations.

    This case underscores the importance of procedural accuracy when challenging administrative decisions and reaffirms that even final decisions can be reviewed for grave abuse of discretion. It also clarifies that affirmative defenses must be properly raised by the respondent during administrative proceedings. While the doctrine of condonation is no longer applicable, this case highlights the repercussions for public officials found guilty of administrative offenses.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: DOMINGO CREBELLO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND TIMOTEO T. CAPOQUIAN, JR., G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019

  • Tax Refund Claims: Timely Filing and the Commissioner’s Inaction

    The Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer’s judicial claim for a tax refund, filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) after an administrative claim with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) remained unacted upon, was valid despite the BIR’s lack of a formal decision. The Court emphasized that the two-year prescriptive period for filing a refund claim is crucial and that taxpayers should not be penalized for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s (CIR) inaction, which could effectively bar them from seeking judicial recourse. This decision clarifies the interplay between administrative and judicial remedies in tax refund cases, protecting taxpayers’ rights to recover erroneously paid taxes.

    Unlocking Tax Refunds: When Inaction Speaks Louder Than Denial

    This case revolves around Univation Motor Philippines, Inc.’s (formerly Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc.) claim for a tax refund. The core legal question is whether the CTA prematurely assumed jurisdiction over the judicial claim for a tax refund when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had not yet acted on the administrative claim. The CIR argued that Univation Motor prematurely filed its judicial claim with the CTA, depriving the BIR of the opportunity to act on the administrative claim. The CIR also argued that Univation Motor’s administrative claim was deficient due to incomplete documentation, violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

    Sections 204 and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) govern tax refund claims. Section 204 pertains to administrative claims filed with the CIR, while Section 229 addresses judicial claims pursued in courts. The NIRC states the significance of the two-year period for filing a claim for tax refund:

    SEC. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. — The Commissioner may —

    x x x x

    (c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.

    The Supreme Court has clarified that the two-year prescriptive period begins from the filing of the final adjusted tax return, which reflects the audited results of a business’s operations. In this instance, Univation Motor filed its administrative claim on March 12, 2012, and its judicial claim on April 12, 2013, both within the two-year window from the filing of the final adjustment return on April 15, 2011. If the company had waited for the CIR’s decision, the prescriptive period might have lapsed, resulting in the loss of their right to seek judicial recourse.

    The Court addressed the CIR’s argument regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, explaining that the law only requires the prior filing of an administrative claim to give the BIR an opportunity to act. Inaction by the CIR does not preclude a taxpayer from seeking judicial relief, especially when the prescriptive period is nearing its end. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9282 reinforces this by granting the CTA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax refund claims when the CIR fails to act.

    Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. —The CTA shall exercise:

    (a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

    (1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

    (2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;

    (3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.

    Regarding the CIR’s claim that Univation Motor’s failure to submit complete documents at the administrative level warranted dismissal, the Court clarified that the CTA can consider evidence not initially presented to the BIR. Proceedings before the CTA are not strictly bound by technical rules of evidence, prioritizing the ascertainment of truth.

    Cases filed in the CTA are litigated de novo, allowing the taxpayer to present all necessary evidence. Jurisprudence dictates the basic requirements for claiming a tax credit or refund: timely filing, proof of withholding, and declaration of income. The Court affirmed the CTA’s finding that Univation Motor had adequately substantiated its claim with supporting documents, even though some income payments related to the withheld taxes spanned multiple years. The key requirement is that the income upon which taxes were withheld was duly declared in the company’s returns.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) prematurely assumed jurisdiction over a judicial claim for a tax refund when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had not yet acted on the administrative claim.
    What is the two-year prescriptive period for tax refund claims? The National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) requires that a claim for tax refund be filed within two years from the date of payment of the tax, but jurisprudence clarifies that this period starts from the filing of the final adjusted tax return.
    What happens if the CIR doesn’t act on an administrative claim? Inaction by the CIR can be deemed a denial, allowing the taxpayer to seek judicial recourse with the CTA, especially if the prescriptive period is about to expire.
    Can the CTA consider evidence not presented to the BIR? Yes, the CTA is not strictly bound by the technical rules of evidence and can consider new evidence presented during the judicial proceedings.
    What are the basic requirements for claiming a tax credit or refund? The requirements are: timely filing, proof of withholding (BIR Form 2307), and demonstration on the income returns that the income received was declared as part of the gross income.
    What if the income payments span multiple years? The critical factor is whether the income upon which taxes were withheld was duly declared in the company’s income tax returns, regardless of when the payments were made.
    What is the significance of litigating cases de novo in the CTA? Litigating cases de novo means that the CTA can consider all evidence presented, including those not initially submitted during the administrative claim.
    What is the role of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 53-98 and Revenue Regulations No. 2-2006? RMO No. 53-98 and Revenue Regulations No. 2-2006 outline the documentary requirements for administrative claims. However, failure to comply at the administrative level does not necessarily bar the CTA from considering the claim if the inaction of the CIR prompts the judicial recourse.
    Why is the CTA’s expertise on tax matters important? The Supreme Court recognizes the CTA’s expertise in tax matters and gives weight to its conclusions, unless there is an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.

    This case underscores the importance of timely filing tax refund claims and the taxpayer’s right to seek judicial relief when the CIR fails to act on an administrative claim. It reinforces the principle that the CTA can consider all evidence presented, even if not initially submitted to the BIR, ensuring a fair and just resolution of tax disputes.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Univation Motor Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 231581, April 10, 2019

  • SALN Compliance: Clarifying Negligence vs. Misconduct in Public Office

    In San Diego v. Fact-Finding Investigation Committee, the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between simple negligence and more serious offenses like dishonesty and grave misconduct in the context of a public official’s Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN). The Court ruled that omissions or errors in a SALN do not automatically amount to dishonesty or grave misconduct unless there is malicious intent or unexplained wealth disproportionate to the official’s income. This decision provides a more nuanced understanding of the responsibilities of public officials in filing their SALNs and the potential consequences of non-compliance, emphasizing the importance of intent and the opportunity to correct unintentional errors. San Diego’s initial dismissal was reduced to suspension, underscoring a practical application of differentiating honest mistakes from deliberate wrongdoing.

    When an Omission Isn’t Always a Crime: Did a Police Inspector’s Errors Warrant Dismissal?

    This case revolves around P/Insp. II Gilbert C. San Diego, who faced administrative charges for several alleged discrepancies and omissions in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs), as well as for failing to secure proper travel authority for his foreign trips. The Fact-Finding Investigation Committee initially found San Diego guilty of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, leading to his dismissal from service. San Diego contested these findings, arguing that the discrepancies were due to honest mistakes and that he had not intentionally violated any rules or regulations.

    At the heart of the matter was whether San Diego’s actions constituted serious offenses warranting dismissal or whether they were merely negligent oversights. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence, took a more lenient view. It recognized that while San Diego had indeed made errors in his SALNs and had failed to secure proper travel authority, his actions did not necessarily demonstrate malicious intent or a deliberate attempt to deceive the authorities.

    The Court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between simple negligence and more serious offenses like dishonesty and grave misconduct. It noted that mere non-declaration of required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. According to the Court, “Dishonesty requires malicious intent; to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of acquisitions.” This distinction is crucial in determining the appropriate penalty for administrative offenses.

    In San Diego’s case, the Court found that he had provided reasonable explanations for the omissions and discrepancies in his SALNs. For example, he claimed that he was merely a nominal stockholder in his wife’s corporation and that he had mistakenly believed he did not need to disclose his wife’s business interests. The Court acknowledged that the source of the undisclosed wealth was evidently his wife, Atty. Francisco. Therefore, San Diego could not be adjudged guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty, but was liable for Simple Negligence for failure to disclose his business interest in the SALN.

    Regarding his failure to secure proper travel authority, the Court again found that while San Diego had violated the rules, his actions did not constitute serious dishonesty. The Court cited Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, stating that “misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.” The absence of evidence showing corruption or willful intent led the Court to conclude that San Diego was guilty only of simple misconduct.

    The Court also considered the principle that if a government officer or employee is guilty of Dishonesty or Grave Misconduct, even if such defect of character was not connected with his office, it affects his right to continue in office. However, in San Diego’s case, the Court found that his actions did not rise to the level of dishonesty or grave misconduct, warranting a lesser penalty.

    As a result of its findings, the Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals’ decision. San Diego was found guilty of four counts of simple negligence for violations of the SALN law and eleven counts of simple misconduct for failing to secure prior approval for foreign travel. The penalty was reduced from dismissal to a suspension of seven months without pay. The Court also ordered San Diego’s immediate reinstatement to his original position without loss of seniority rights and the restoration of all his rights and benefits, except for back salaries.

    The Supreme Court’s decision serves as an important reminder that administrative penalties should be proportionate to the offense committed. It also underscores the need for a careful examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged violations of the law, particularly in cases involving public officials. The Court’s ruling emphasizes the importance of intent and the opportunity to correct unintentional errors, aligning with principles of fairness and due process. It also reinforced that the private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life, and dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether P/Insp. II Gilbert C. San Diego’s actions warranted a finding of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, leading to his dismissal, or whether his actions constituted simple negligence and misconduct, justifying a lesser penalty. The resolution hinged on determining his intent and the nature of his violations.
    What is a Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)? A SALN is a mandatory declaration of assets, liabilities, and net worth required of all government officials and employees in the Philippines. It aims to promote transparency and accountability in public service and serves as a tool to prevent corruption.
    What is the difference between simple negligence and grave misconduct? Simple negligence is the omission of diligence required by the nature of the obligation. Grave misconduct involves corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.
    What was San Diego’s explanation for the errors in his SALNs? San Diego claimed the errors were due to honest mistakes and confusion. He stated that he was merely a nominal stockholder in his wife’s corporation and mistakenly believed he did not need to disclose her business interests, among other explanations.
    Why was San Diego initially charged with serious dishonesty? San Diego was initially charged with serious dishonesty for misrepresentations in his SALNs and for using a different middle name in his passport applications. He was also charged for not securing the proper authority in his travels.
    What did the Supreme Court ultimately decide? The Supreme Court found San Diego liable for four counts of simple negligence related to his SALNs and eleven counts of simple misconduct for traveling abroad without proper approval. His penalty was reduced to a seven-month suspension without pay.
    What happens if a public official fails to file a truthful SALN? Failing to file a truthful SALN can lead to administrative and criminal liabilities, including suspension, dismissal from service, fines, and imprisonment. The severity of the penalty depends on the nature of the violation and the intent of the official.
    How does this case impact public officials in the Philippines? This case clarifies the distinction between simple negligence and more serious offenses in SALN compliance, emphasizing the importance of intent. It provides a more nuanced understanding of the responsibilities of public officials in filing their SALNs and the potential consequences of non-compliance.

    The San Diego case is a significant reminder that while public officials are held to a high standard of accountability, there is room for considering mitigating circumstances and honest mistakes. This ruling underscores the importance of examining intent and providing opportunities for correction before imposing harsh penalties.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: P/INSP. II GILBERT C. SAN DIEGO v. FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 214081, April 10, 2019