ASG Law

Category: Administrative Law

  • Challenging Ombudsman Decisions: Certiorari vs. Appeal in Administrative Cases

    In a ruling that clarifies the procedural pathways for challenging decisions made by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), the Supreme Court held that when the OMB absolves an elective public official in an administrative case, and that absolution is final and unappealable under the OMB’s rules, the proper legal remedy is a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals (CA). This remedy is available to question the decision on grounds of grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that while appeals are generally filed via a petition for review, certiorari serves as an exception when the OMB’s decision is final but tainted with grave abuse of discretion, ensuring that even final administrative rulings are subject to judicial scrutiny for potential errors.

    When Condonation Clouds Justice: Can Re-election Excuse Nepotism?

    This case originated from an administrative complaint filed by Domingo Crebello against Timoteo T. Capoquian, Jr., then Mayor of Gamay, Northern Samar, alleging nepotism. Crebello asserted that Capoquian appointed his sister, Raquel Capoquian, to the Board of Directors of the Gamay Water District, a clear violation of nepotism rules. The OMB initially investigated the matter, and the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO) recommended upgrading the case for preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication. However, the OMB ultimately dismissed the charges against Capoquian, citing the doctrine of condonation because Capoquian had been re-elected as mayor in the 2010 elections. This meant that any administrative offenses committed during his prior term were supposedly forgiven due to his re-election.

    Crebello contested the OMB’s decision, arguing that the doctrine of condonation had already been abandoned by the Supreme Court in Morales v. Court of Appeals. He maintained that applying condonation to Capoquian’s case was improper after the doctrine had been effectively nullified. The OMB countered that the abandonment of condonation only took effect on April 12, 2016, after the final denial of their motion for reconsideration in the Morales case. The CA dismissed Crebello’s petition for certiorari, stating that the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as established in Fabian v. Desierto. This dismissal prompted Crebello to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court, questioning whether certiorari was indeed the wrong remedy and whether the OMB had committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

    The Supreme Court addressed the procedural issue first, clarifying the appropriate remedy when challenging decisions of the OMB. The Court acknowledged the general rule established in Fabian v. Desierto, which dictates that appeals from OMB decisions in administrative cases should be brought to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. However, the Court emphasized a critical exception: where the OMB’s decision is final and unappealable under its own rules, such as in cases where the respondent is absolved, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari. The Court cited Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, which explicitly states that decisions absolving a respondent are final, executory, and unappealable.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that a final and unappealable decision by the OMB can still be questioned through a petition for certiorari if there is an allegation and proof of grave abuse of discretion. The Court quoted Republic v. Francisco, stating:

    “Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.”

    This means that while the OMB’s decisions carry weight, they are not immune to judicial scrutiny, especially when there is a clear showing of abuse of authority.

    Addressing the substantive issue of condonation, the Court acknowledged that the doctrine’s abandonment took effect on April 12, 2016. While the OMB’s decision to apply condonation on March 31, 2016, might have been initially justifiable, the Court raised a crucial point: Capoquian never invoked condonation as a defense. In Morales v. Court of Appeals, the OMB itself argued that condonation is a matter of defense that must be raised during the administrative proceedings. The Court agreed with this stance, asserting that condonation is an affirmative defense that the respondent must actively assert to allow the OMB to consider it fully.

    Capoquian’s failure to file a counter-affidavit or verified position paper indicated that he did not raise condonation or any other defense before the OMB. Consequently, the Court found that the OMB acted improperly in absolving Capoquian based on condonation. The Court held that Capoquian was administratively liable for nepotism. Given that Capoquian’s term during which the act occurred had already expired, the penalty of dismissal could not be imposed. However, the Court stressed that he should still suffer the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and a bar from taking civil service examinations. This ensures that the law is not rendered a travesty.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the Ombudsman’s decision absolving the respondent from administrative charges of nepotism, and whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the doctrine of condonation.
    What is the doctrine of condonation? The doctrine of condonation, before its abandonment, held that an elective official’s administrative liability for misconduct committed during a prior term is forgiven upon re-election to the same position, implying that the electorate has already considered and accepted the official’s past actions.
    When was the doctrine of condonation abandoned? The Supreme Court officially abandoned the doctrine of condonation on April 12, 2016, with the final denial of the motion for reconsideration in the case of Morales v. Court of Appeals.
    What is the proper legal remedy to question an Ombudsman’s decision? Generally, appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are brought to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, when the Ombudsman’s decision is final and unappealable, but is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari.
    Why was the petition for certiorari initially dismissed by the CA? The Court of Appeals initially dismissed the petition for certiorari, believing the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43, following the precedent set in Fabian v. Desierto.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case? The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed the CA’s decision, and found Timoteo T. Capoquian, Jr. guilty of nepotism. Although the penalty of dismissal could not be imposed due to the expiration of his term, the Court imposed accessory penalties, including disqualification from holding public office.
    Why did the Supreme Court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman? The Supreme Court found that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion because the respondent, Timoteo T. Capoquian, Jr., never invoked the doctrine of condonation as a defense during the administrative proceedings.
    What are the accessory penalties imposed on Capoquian? The accessory penalties imposed on Timoteo T. Capoquian, Jr. include cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and a bar from taking civil service examinations.

    This case underscores the importance of procedural accuracy when challenging administrative decisions and reaffirms that even final decisions can be reviewed for grave abuse of discretion. It also clarifies that affirmative defenses must be properly raised by the respondent during administrative proceedings. While the doctrine of condonation is no longer applicable, this case highlights the repercussions for public officials found guilty of administrative offenses.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: DOMINGO CREBELLO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND TIMOTEO T. CAPOQUIAN, JR., G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019

  • Tax Refund Claims: Timely Filing and the Commissioner’s Inaction

    The Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer’s judicial claim for a tax refund, filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) after an administrative claim with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) remained unacted upon, was valid despite the BIR’s lack of a formal decision. The Court emphasized that the two-year prescriptive period for filing a refund claim is crucial and that taxpayers should not be penalized for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s (CIR) inaction, which could effectively bar them from seeking judicial recourse. This decision clarifies the interplay between administrative and judicial remedies in tax refund cases, protecting taxpayers’ rights to recover erroneously paid taxes.

    Unlocking Tax Refunds: When Inaction Speaks Louder Than Denial

    This case revolves around Univation Motor Philippines, Inc.’s (formerly Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc.) claim for a tax refund. The core legal question is whether the CTA prematurely assumed jurisdiction over the judicial claim for a tax refund when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had not yet acted on the administrative claim. The CIR argued that Univation Motor prematurely filed its judicial claim with the CTA, depriving the BIR of the opportunity to act on the administrative claim. The CIR also argued that Univation Motor’s administrative claim was deficient due to incomplete documentation, violating the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

    Sections 204 and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) govern tax refund claims. Section 204 pertains to administrative claims filed with the CIR, while Section 229 addresses judicial claims pursued in courts. The NIRC states the significance of the two-year period for filing a claim for tax refund:

    SEC. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. — The Commissioner may —

    x x x x

    (c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.

    The Supreme Court has clarified that the two-year prescriptive period begins from the filing of the final adjusted tax return, which reflects the audited results of a business’s operations. In this instance, Univation Motor filed its administrative claim on March 12, 2012, and its judicial claim on April 12, 2013, both within the two-year window from the filing of the final adjustment return on April 15, 2011. If the company had waited for the CIR’s decision, the prescriptive period might have lapsed, resulting in the loss of their right to seek judicial recourse.

    The Court addressed the CIR’s argument regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, explaining that the law only requires the prior filing of an administrative claim to give the BIR an opportunity to act. Inaction by the CIR does not preclude a taxpayer from seeking judicial relief, especially when the prescriptive period is nearing its end. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9282 reinforces this by granting the CTA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over tax refund claims when the CIR fails to act.

    Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. —The CTA shall exercise:

    (a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

    (1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

    (2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;

    (3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.

    Regarding the CIR’s claim that Univation Motor’s failure to submit complete documents at the administrative level warranted dismissal, the Court clarified that the CTA can consider evidence not initially presented to the BIR. Proceedings before the CTA are not strictly bound by technical rules of evidence, prioritizing the ascertainment of truth.

    Cases filed in the CTA are litigated de novo, allowing the taxpayer to present all necessary evidence. Jurisprudence dictates the basic requirements for claiming a tax credit or refund: timely filing, proof of withholding, and declaration of income. The Court affirmed the CTA’s finding that Univation Motor had adequately substantiated its claim with supporting documents, even though some income payments related to the withheld taxes spanned multiple years. The key requirement is that the income upon which taxes were withheld was duly declared in the company’s returns.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) prematurely assumed jurisdiction over a judicial claim for a tax refund when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had not yet acted on the administrative claim.
    What is the two-year prescriptive period for tax refund claims? The National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) requires that a claim for tax refund be filed within two years from the date of payment of the tax, but jurisprudence clarifies that this period starts from the filing of the final adjusted tax return.
    What happens if the CIR doesn’t act on an administrative claim? Inaction by the CIR can be deemed a denial, allowing the taxpayer to seek judicial recourse with the CTA, especially if the prescriptive period is about to expire.
    Can the CTA consider evidence not presented to the BIR? Yes, the CTA is not strictly bound by the technical rules of evidence and can consider new evidence presented during the judicial proceedings.
    What are the basic requirements for claiming a tax credit or refund? The requirements are: timely filing, proof of withholding (BIR Form 2307), and demonstration on the income returns that the income received was declared as part of the gross income.
    What if the income payments span multiple years? The critical factor is whether the income upon which taxes were withheld was duly declared in the company’s income tax returns, regardless of when the payments were made.
    What is the significance of litigating cases de novo in the CTA? Litigating cases de novo means that the CTA can consider all evidence presented, including those not initially submitted during the administrative claim.
    What is the role of Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 53-98 and Revenue Regulations No. 2-2006? RMO No. 53-98 and Revenue Regulations No. 2-2006 outline the documentary requirements for administrative claims. However, failure to comply at the administrative level does not necessarily bar the CTA from considering the claim if the inaction of the CIR prompts the judicial recourse.
    Why is the CTA’s expertise on tax matters important? The Supreme Court recognizes the CTA’s expertise in tax matters and gives weight to its conclusions, unless there is an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.

    This case underscores the importance of timely filing tax refund claims and the taxpayer’s right to seek judicial relief when the CIR fails to act on an administrative claim. It reinforces the principle that the CTA can consider all evidence presented, even if not initially submitted to the BIR, ensuring a fair and just resolution of tax disputes.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Univation Motor Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 231581, April 10, 2019

  • SALN Compliance: Clarifying Negligence vs. Misconduct in Public Office

    In San Diego v. Fact-Finding Investigation Committee, the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between simple negligence and more serious offenses like dishonesty and grave misconduct in the context of a public official’s Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN). The Court ruled that omissions or errors in a SALN do not automatically amount to dishonesty or grave misconduct unless there is malicious intent or unexplained wealth disproportionate to the official’s income. This decision provides a more nuanced understanding of the responsibilities of public officials in filing their SALNs and the potential consequences of non-compliance, emphasizing the importance of intent and the opportunity to correct unintentional errors. San Diego’s initial dismissal was reduced to suspension, underscoring a practical application of differentiating honest mistakes from deliberate wrongdoing.

    When an Omission Isn’t Always a Crime: Did a Police Inspector’s Errors Warrant Dismissal?

    This case revolves around P/Insp. II Gilbert C. San Diego, who faced administrative charges for several alleged discrepancies and omissions in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs), as well as for failing to secure proper travel authority for his foreign trips. The Fact-Finding Investigation Committee initially found San Diego guilty of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, leading to his dismissal from service. San Diego contested these findings, arguing that the discrepancies were due to honest mistakes and that he had not intentionally violated any rules or regulations.

    At the heart of the matter was whether San Diego’s actions constituted serious offenses warranting dismissal or whether they were merely negligent oversights. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the evidence, took a more lenient view. It recognized that while San Diego had indeed made errors in his SALNs and had failed to secure proper travel authority, his actions did not necessarily demonstrate malicious intent or a deliberate attempt to deceive the authorities.

    The Court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between simple negligence and more serious offenses like dishonesty and grave misconduct. It noted that mere non-declaration of required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. According to the Court, “Dishonesty requires malicious intent; to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of acquisitions.” This distinction is crucial in determining the appropriate penalty for administrative offenses.

    In San Diego’s case, the Court found that he had provided reasonable explanations for the omissions and discrepancies in his SALNs. For example, he claimed that he was merely a nominal stockholder in his wife’s corporation and that he had mistakenly believed he did not need to disclose his wife’s business interests. The Court acknowledged that the source of the undisclosed wealth was evidently his wife, Atty. Francisco. Therefore, San Diego could not be adjudged guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty, but was liable for Simple Negligence for failure to disclose his business interest in the SALN.

    Regarding his failure to secure proper travel authority, the Court again found that while San Diego had violated the rules, his actions did not constitute serious dishonesty. The Court cited Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, stating that “misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.” The absence of evidence showing corruption or willful intent led the Court to conclude that San Diego was guilty only of simple misconduct.

    The Court also considered the principle that if a government officer or employee is guilty of Dishonesty or Grave Misconduct, even if such defect of character was not connected with his office, it affects his right to continue in office. However, in San Diego’s case, the Court found that his actions did not rise to the level of dishonesty or grave misconduct, warranting a lesser penalty.

    As a result of its findings, the Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals’ decision. San Diego was found guilty of four counts of simple negligence for violations of the SALN law and eleven counts of simple misconduct for failing to secure prior approval for foreign travel. The penalty was reduced from dismissal to a suspension of seven months without pay. The Court also ordered San Diego’s immediate reinstatement to his original position without loss of seniority rights and the restoration of all his rights and benefits, except for back salaries.

    The Supreme Court’s decision serves as an important reminder that administrative penalties should be proportionate to the offense committed. It also underscores the need for a careful examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged violations of the law, particularly in cases involving public officials. The Court’s ruling emphasizes the importance of intent and the opportunity to correct unintentional errors, aligning with principles of fairness and due process. It also reinforced that the private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life, and dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether P/Insp. II Gilbert C. San Diego’s actions warranted a finding of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, leading to his dismissal, or whether his actions constituted simple negligence and misconduct, justifying a lesser penalty. The resolution hinged on determining his intent and the nature of his violations.
    What is a Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)? A SALN is a mandatory declaration of assets, liabilities, and net worth required of all government officials and employees in the Philippines. It aims to promote transparency and accountability in public service and serves as a tool to prevent corruption.
    What is the difference between simple negligence and grave misconduct? Simple negligence is the omission of diligence required by the nature of the obligation. Grave misconduct involves corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.
    What was San Diego’s explanation for the errors in his SALNs? San Diego claimed the errors were due to honest mistakes and confusion. He stated that he was merely a nominal stockholder in his wife’s corporation and mistakenly believed he did not need to disclose her business interests, among other explanations.
    Why was San Diego initially charged with serious dishonesty? San Diego was initially charged with serious dishonesty for misrepresentations in his SALNs and for using a different middle name in his passport applications. He was also charged for not securing the proper authority in his travels.
    What did the Supreme Court ultimately decide? The Supreme Court found San Diego liable for four counts of simple negligence related to his SALNs and eleven counts of simple misconduct for traveling abroad without proper approval. His penalty was reduced to a seven-month suspension without pay.
    What happens if a public official fails to file a truthful SALN? Failing to file a truthful SALN can lead to administrative and criminal liabilities, including suspension, dismissal from service, fines, and imprisonment. The severity of the penalty depends on the nature of the violation and the intent of the official.
    How does this case impact public officials in the Philippines? This case clarifies the distinction between simple negligence and more serious offenses in SALN compliance, emphasizing the importance of intent. It provides a more nuanced understanding of the responsibilities of public officials in filing their SALNs and the potential consequences of non-compliance.

    The San Diego case is a significant reminder that while public officials are held to a high standard of accountability, there is room for considering mitigating circumstances and honest mistakes. This ruling underscores the importance of examining intent and providing opportunities for correction before imposing harsh penalties.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: P/INSP. II GILBERT C. SAN DIEGO v. FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 214081, April 10, 2019

  • SALN Violations and Government Ethics: Differentiating Dishonesty from Simple Negligence

    The Supreme Court’s decision in San Diego v. Fact-Finding Investigation Committee clarifies the nuances of administrative offenses related to the filing of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN). The Court differentiated between grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and simple negligence, ultimately reducing the penalties imposed on the petitioner. This ruling underscores the importance of proving malicious intent in cases of SALN misrepresentation and provides a clearer understanding of the responsibilities of public officials in disclosing their assets.

    Omissions or Intentions? When a SALN Error Doesn’t Equal Dishonesty

    The case originated from a lifestyle check on Gilbert C. San Diego, a Special Investigator of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), due to alleged extravagant spending inconsistent with his declared income. This led to administrative charges, including grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and gross neglect of duty, based on discrepancies and omissions in his SALNs and other documents. The Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of OMB-MOLEO filed several Affidavit-Complaints, leading to a decision by the OMB-MOLEO finding San Diego guilty of sixteen counts of Grave Misconduct and six counts of Serious Dishonesty, resulting in his dismissal from service.

    San Diego appealed, arguing that the Ombudsman’s decision violated his right to be informed of the charges against him and that the findings of guilt were not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied his petition, leading to the Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court acknowledged some merit in San Diego’s arguments, particularly regarding the designation of administrative offenses and the corresponding penalties. The central issue revolved around whether San Diego’s actions constituted serious offenses warranting dismissal or lesser violations due to negligence or honest mistake.

    The Supreme Court referenced the principle established in Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, emphasizing that the designation of an offense is not controlling, and one may be found guilty of a different offense if the evidence supports it. The key is whether the individual was informed of the accusations and had an opportunity to respond. The Court noted that San Diego had ample opportunity to address each accusation, thus upholding the procedural aspect of due process.

    However, the Court then scrutinized the substantive aspect of the charges, particularly those related to misrepresentations in San Diego’s SALNs. San Diego argued that these misrepresentations did not relate to his official functions as a police investigator and should not be considered misconduct. The Supreme Court, citing Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, rejected this argument, reaffirming that dishonesty or grave misconduct affects an employee’s right to continue in office, regardless of whether the actions are directly related to their official duties.

    “The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.”

    The Court examined San Diego’s explanations for omissions in his SALNs, such as his belief that he only had a nominal interest in A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation, owned by his late wife, and that the non-disclosure of a condominium unit was due to its being paid on installment basis. The Supreme Court differentiated between simple and gross negligence, emphasizing that dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or make false statements.

    “Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or probity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt on one’s ability to perform duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.”

    The Court found that there was no substantial evidence of malicious intent on San Diego’s part, particularly given the source of the undisclosed wealth could be traced to his wife. In Daplas v. Department of Finance, the Supreme Court had held that mere non-declaration does not automatically amount to dishonesty, particularly when the source of undisclosed wealth is properly accounted for, deeming it “explained wealth” which the law does not penalize. As such, the Court reduced San Diego’s liability to Simple Negligence for failing to disclose his business interest in the SALN.

    Regarding the misdeclaration of a Nissan Patrol SUV in his 2006 SALN and the non-disclosure of the condominium unit, the Court again found no substantial evidence of intent to deceive. The Court emphasized that what would constitute serious dishonesty would be if a luxury vehicle were found to be registered under his name, but he failed to declare it in his SALN and explain how he acquired such wealth. The Court held that San Diego could only be held liable for Simple Negligence in these instances.

    With respect to the alleged falsification of his passport applications, the Court disagreed with the CA’s finding of Serious Dishonesty. After a careful review of the passport applications attached to the Affidavit-Complaint, the Court found no substantial evidence to prove deliberate intent to mislead, deceive or defraud which causes such serious damage or grave prejudice to the government. Included in the passport application dated April 26, 2005 is a checklist of documents that may be submitted to establish the identity of the applicant and to comply with the requirements for securing passport. The same passport application reveals that San Diego secured and submitted an authenticated birth certificate. The Court ruled that it was wrong for San Diego to indicate in his passport applications that his middle name is “Careon,” such act alone does not constitute Dishonesty, because the veracity of such information ought to have been verified by the DFA from his birth certificate before issuing him a new passport.

    Finally, regarding the charges related to foreign travels without proper authority, the Court determined that San Diego was liable for Simple Misconduct, not Serious Dishonesty. The Court agreed with the CA’s finding that San Diego traveled abroad without proper approval as required by Memorandum Circular No. 304. It concluded that the failure to secure prior approval, despite knowing the requirement, constituted simple misconduct because there was no element of corruption or willful intent to violate the law.

    The Supreme Court ultimately modified the CA decision, finding San Diego liable for four counts of Simple Negligence for violations of the SALN law and eleven counts of Simple Misconduct for failing to secure prior approval for foreign travel. Considering the violations, the Court sentenced San Diego to a total of seven months of suspension without pay. It deemed the period during which his case was pending appeal as service of his penalty of suspension, ordering his immediate reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and restoration of all his rights and benefits without payment of back salaries.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the actions of P/Insp. II Gilbert C. San Diego constituted serious offenses (Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty) warranting dismissal, or lesser violations due to negligence or honest mistake, particularly regarding his SALN and foreign travels.
    What is a Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)? A SALN is a document that government officials and employees are required to file annually, declaring their assets, liabilities, and net worth, along with those of their spouses and dependent children. It is intended to promote transparency and prevent corruption.
    What is the difference between Serious Dishonesty and Simple Negligence in the context of SALN filings? Serious Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or make false statements, while Simple Negligence involves a failure to exercise the diligence required in properly accomplishing the SALN, without malicious intent. The presence of malicious intent distinguishes dishonesty from mere negligence.
    What was Memorandum Circular No. 304 and why was it relevant? Memorandum Circular No. 304, issued in 1969, requires government personnel to obtain prior approval from the Office of the President for all foreign travels, even those taken during leave of absence. It was relevant because San Diego was charged with violating this circular by traveling abroad without securing the necessary travel authority.
    What was the final ruling of the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court found San Diego guilty of four counts of Simple Negligence for SALN violations and eleven counts of Simple Misconduct for unauthorized foreign travels. It sentenced him to a total of seven months of suspension without pay, considering the time served during the pendency of his appeal.
    What is the practical implication of this case for government employees? This case clarifies that not all inaccuracies or omissions in SALN filings automatically amount to dishonesty. It highlights the importance of demonstrating malicious intent to prove dishonesty and provides a clearer understanding of the distinction between serious offenses and simple negligence.
    How did the Court determine that San Diego’s actions were Simple Negligence rather than Dishonesty? The Court considered that San Diego did not have malicious intent to conceal the truth and that he had satisfactorily explained the source of his assets. The Court also looked at the circumstances surrounding the mistakes in San Diego’s SALN filings, finding that there was no intent to deceive or defraud.
    What should government employees do to avoid similar charges? Government employees should exercise diligence in accurately completing their SALNs, disclosing all required information, and seeking clarification from relevant authorities if they are unsure about any aspect of the filing. They should also adhere to all requirements for obtaining proper travel authorization before traveling abroad.

    This case underscores the importance of accurately and truthfully disclosing assets and liabilities in SALNs, as well as adhering to rules regarding foreign travel. The ruling emphasizes that while public officials are expected to uphold transparency, the government must also ensure fairness and due process by considering the intent behind any discrepancies or omissions before imposing severe penalties.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: P/Insp. II Gilbert C. San Diego v. Fact-Finding Investigation Committee, G.R. No. 214081, April 10, 2019

  • Mining Rights and State Control: When Can a Mineral Agreement Be Amended?

    In a dispute over a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), the Supreme Court clarified that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) cannot be compelled by a court order to amend an MPSA to include a new contractor without the DENR’s consent. The Court emphasized that the state maintains full control over the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. This decision protects the government’s authority in managing the country’s natural resources and ensures that any changes to mineral agreements adhere to the requirements of the Philippine Mining Act.

    From Courtroom to Quarry: Can a Judicial Sale Rewrite a Mining Contract?

    The case began with a debt collection lawsuit filed by Diamond Drilling Corporation of the Philippines (DDCP) against Pacific Falkon Resources Corporation (PFRC). DDCP won the case and, to satisfy the judgment, PFRC’s 40% interest in a mining project covered by MPSA No. 057-96-CAR was auctioned off. DDCP emerged as the highest bidder, believing this entitled them to be recognized as a co-contractor in the MPSA. However, the DENR refused to amend the MPSA, leading DDCP to seek a court order compelling the DENR to recognize its 40% ownership. The central legal question is whether a court can force the DENR to amend a mineral agreement to reflect a transfer of interest acquired through a judicial sale.

    The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially sided with DDCP, ordering the DENR to amend the MPSA. However, this decision was challenged, resulting in conflicting rulings from the Court of Appeals (CA). One CA division upheld the RTC’s order, while another sided with the DENR, annulling the order. The Supreme Court then stepped in to resolve the conflicting decisions and provide clarity on the matter. The Court looked at the interplay between private contracts and the state’s authority over mineral resources.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the principle of state control over mineral resources, as enshrined in the Constitution and the Philippine Mining Act. According to Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution:

    SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils…and other natural resources are owned by the State. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State…

    Building on this principle, the Court cited Section 4 of the Mining Act, which reinforces the state’s ownership and control over mineral resources. This control is exercised through the DENR, which is responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the state’s mineral resources. The DENR’s powers include entering into Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs) on behalf of the government.

    MPSAs are agreements between the government and a contractor, granting the contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a specified area in exchange for a share in the proceeds. The Court highlighted that an MPSA is not merely a private contract but a contract imbued with public interest, reflecting the state’s control over mineral resources. Therefore, any amendment to an MPSA, including the addition of a new co-contractor, requires the government’s consent, as manifested by the DENR Secretary’s approval.

    The Court scrutinized the transactions that led DDCP to claim its right to be a co-contractor. PFRC’s 40% interest in the Guinaoang Project stemmed from a Letter-Agreement with Crescent Mining. The Court emphasized that these transactions constituted transfers of rights in the MPSA and were thus governed by Section 30 of the Mining Act and Section 46 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). The requisites for a valid transfer or assignment of rights in an MPSA are clearly outlined in these provisions.

    The Court identified several key requirements for a valid transfer, including an application for transfer, payment of fees, submission of a Deed of Assignment, proof of compliance with the terms of the agreement, approval of the DENR Secretary, and assumption of obligations by the transferee. DDCP argued that the transfer should be deemed automatically approved because the DENR failed to act on the Letter-Agreement within 30 days. However, the Court rejected this argument, holding that the automatic approval clause applies only to applications that satisfy all the requisites laid down in Section 46 of the IRR.

    The Court also emphasized that the DENR Secretary’s power to approve transfers and assignments of mineral agreements is discretionary. In determining whether to approve a transfer, the DENR Secretary assesses whether the assignee is a “qualified person” under the Mining Act, considering their technical and financial capability. This discretionary power underscores the state’s control over mineral resources and the importance of ensuring that only qualified parties are involved in mining operations.

    The Supreme Court declared that since the transfer of the 40% interest to PFRC was invalid due to non-compliance with the requirements of the Mining Act and its IRR, the subsequent sale to DDCP did not confer any right to be included in the MPSA. The DENR cannot be compelled to amend the MPSA based on an invalid transfer of rights. This ruling reinforces the principle that the buyer in an execution sale only acquires the rights of the judgment debtor and that DDCP could only acquire those rights legally held by PFRC.

    The ruling in this case underscores the importance of adhering to the requirements of the Philippine Mining Act when transferring rights in mineral agreements. It also affirms the DENR Secretary’s discretionary power to approve or disapprove such transfers, ensuring that the state maintains control over the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that the DENR’s role in managing mineral resources remains protected from undue judicial interference.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether a court could compel the DENR to amend a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) to include a new contractor based on a transfer of interest acquired through a judicial sale. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the DENR cannot be compelled to amend the MPSA without its consent and compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Mining Act.
    What is a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)? An MPSA is an agreement where the government grants a contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations in a specified area, sharing the production as the owner of the minerals. The contractor provides financing, technology, management, and personnel.
    What does the Philippine Mining Act say about transferring rights in an MPSA? The Mining Act requires that any transfer of rights in an MPSA be subject to the prior approval of the DENR Secretary. This approval is not automatic and requires compliance with specific conditions outlined in the law and its implementing rules.
    What are the key requirements for a valid transfer of rights in an MPSA? Key requirements include filing an application, paying fees, submitting a Deed of Assignment, proving compliance with the terms of the agreement, obtaining DENR Secretary approval, and the transferee assuming all obligations under the MPSA. These requirements ensure that the state maintains control over mining operations.
    Why did the Supreme Court rule against DDCP? The Court ruled against DDCP because the transfer of the 40% interest to PFRC, which DDCP later acquired, was invalid due to non-compliance with the requirements of the Mining Act. This invalid transfer meant DDCP did not acquire any right to be included in the MPSA.
    What is the DENR Secretary’s role in transferring rights? The DENR Secretary has the discretionary power to approve or disapprove transfers of rights in MPSAs. This power ensures that the assignee is a “qualified person” capable of undertaking mineral resources development.
    What is the automatic approval clause, and why didn’t it apply in this case? The automatic approval clause states that a transfer is deemed approved if the Secretary does not act on it within 30 days. However, the Court clarified that this clause only applies if all other requirements for a valid transfer have been met, which was not the case here.
    What does this ruling mean for future transfers of rights in MPSAs? This ruling emphasizes the need to comply strictly with the requirements of the Philippine Mining Act when transferring rights in MPSAs. It also reinforces the DENR Secretary’s authority to approve such transfers, ensuring the state maintains control over mineral resources.
    Can a court order override the DENR’s authority in managing mineral agreements? No, this ruling makes it clear that a court order cannot override the DENR’s authority in managing mineral agreements. The state’s control over mineral resources is paramount and cannot be circumvented through judicial action.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of adhering to the strict requirements of the Philippine Mining Act and the state’s authority in managing mineral resources. The ruling clarifies that the DENR’s consent is necessary for any amendment to an MPSA involving the transfer of rights, protecting the government’s ability to control and supervise the exploration, development, and utilization of the country’s mineral resources.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Diamond Drilling Corporation vs. Crescent Mining, G.R. No. 207360, April 10, 2019

  • Dismissal for Dishonesty: When Soliciting Money Violates Public Trust

    The Supreme Court has affirmed that soliciting and accepting money from a party litigant constitutes grave misconduct and dishonesty, warranting dismissal from service for court employees. This ruling emphasizes that such actions not only violate the explicit provisions of the Rules of Court but also erode public trust in the judiciary. The Court underscored that mitigating circumstances cannot be considered when the offense is punishable by dismissal, reinforcing the stringent standards of conduct expected from those serving in the justice system. This decision serves as a stern warning against corruption and abuse of authority within the judicial ranks, ensuring that those who compromise the integrity of the service are held accountable.

    Sheriff’s Overreach: Can a Public Servant Solicit Funds?

    This case arose from a complaint filed by Roman P. Trinidad against Alan C. Javier, a Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court in Tanauan City, Batangas, concerning the execution proceedings in Civil Case No. 1316. Trinidad alleged that Javier solicited and received money under the guise of expenses for implementing a writ of execution. Specifically, Javier demanded an initial P50,000, followed by additional amounts, purportedly for police assistance and logistical support. The core legal question revolved around whether Javier’s actions constituted grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and a violation of the Rules of Court, thereby warranting disciplinary action.

    The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found substantial evidence that Javier had indeed violated Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which governs sheriff’s expenses in executing writs. According to the rule, the interested party must deposit the estimated expenses with the clerk of court, who then disburses the funds to the assigned deputy sheriff, subject to liquidation and court approval. The rule explicitly states that the sheriff should estimate the expenses, obtain court approval, and ensure proper liquidation and reporting. The OCA determined that Javier’s direct solicitation and acceptance of money from Trinidad constituted conduct unbecoming of a court employee, thus qualifying as grave misconduct and dishonesty.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that Javier failed to rebut the evidence presented against him. Despite Javier’s denial, the complainant presented receipts and notebook entries signed by Javier acknowledging receipt of the funds. The Court found Javier’s insistence that the signatures were dissimilar to his usual signature unconvincing, noting that altering a signature to mislead others is easily done. The Court also criticized Javier for not submitting the documents for expert examination to support his claim of forgery. The court’s decision highlights the importance of adhering to procedural rules and maintaining transparency in financial transactions, especially for those entrusted with public office.

    The Court referred to the case of Litonjua v. Marcelino, where a sheriff was dismissed for failing to observe procedural rules. Building on this precedent, the Court underscored that Javier’s actions not only violated the prescribed procedure but also demonstrated a deliberate disregard for the rules by directly demanding and receiving money from Trinidad. Moreover, Javier’s failure to execute the writ of execution prejudiced Trinidad, rendering the favorable judgment ineffective. His refusal to return the funds further suggested misappropriation, which the Court equated with dishonesty. The court reinforced that failing to turn over amounts received in an official capacity constitutes misappropriation and dishonesty.

    The Supreme Court underscored that Javier’s actions constituted dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and grave misconduct. While dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service are punishable by suspension, grave misconduct is a grave offense that warrants dismissal from the service, even for a first-time offense. The Court cited Section 50(A) of the Rule on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which classifies grave misconduct as a grave offense punishable by dismissal. The court noted that even under the 1999 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS), grave misconduct carries the same penalty.

    The Court clarified that mitigating circumstances, such as being a first-time offender or having a long tenure in public service, cannot be considered when the offense is punishable by dismissal. Section 53 of the 2017 RACCS explicitly states that mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated for offenses punishable by dismissal from the service. In this case, the Court emphasized that the severity of Javier’s actions outweighed any potential mitigating factors. The Court also emphasized the importance of public trust in the judiciary, quoting from Office of the Court Administrator v. Umblas:

    [T]hose in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. In this light, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.

    The ruling underscores that public servants, particularly those in the judiciary, are held to a high standard of conduct and accountability. Any deviation from these standards, especially those involving dishonesty and abuse of authority, will be met with severe disciplinary action. The Court’s decision reinforces the principle that public office is a public trust, and those who violate this trust will be held accountable to the fullest extent of the law.

    The Supreme Court in this case emphasized the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the judicial system. The Court has consistently held that public officials must adhere to the highest standards of ethical conduct. The Court’s ruling serves as a reminder to all court personnel of their duty to uphold the law and maintain public trust. The ruling also serves as a reminder to the public to report any misconduct by court personnel.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Sheriff Alan C. Javier’s act of soliciting and accepting money from a litigant constituted grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, warranting disciplinary action.
    What specific violations did the sheriff commit? The sheriff violated Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court by directly soliciting and accepting money from the complainant instead of following the prescribed procedure for handling sheriff’s expenses. He also committed dishonesty by misappropriating the funds and denying that he received the money.
    What was the court’s ruling in this case? The Supreme Court found Sheriff Alan C. Javier guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As a result, he was dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and was barred from re-employment in any government branch or instrumentality.
    Can mitigating circumstances be considered in this type of case? No, the Supreme Court clarified that mitigating circumstances cannot be considered when the offense is punishable by dismissal from the service, as stated in Section 53 of the 2017 RACCS. This is because the severity of the offense outweighs any potential mitigating factors.
    What is the significance of this ruling? This ruling underscores the high standard of conduct expected from those in the judiciary and reinforces the principle that public office is a public trust. It serves as a deterrent against corruption and abuse of authority within the judicial ranks.
    What does the Rules of Court say about sheriff’s expenses? The Rules of Court requires that interested parties deposit estimated expenses with the clerk of court, who disburses the funds to the deputy sheriff. The sheriff must then provide a liquidation report, and any unspent amount must be refunded.
    What is considered as grave misconduct in the judiciary? Grave misconduct involves intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. It is considered grave when elements of corruption, intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present.
    What does conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service mean? Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service refers to actions that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office. It includes any behavior that undermines the public’s confidence in the government and its employees.

    This case underscores the importance of ethical conduct and adherence to the law, especially for those serving in the judiciary. The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a clear warning against corruption and abuse of authority, emphasizing that public office is a public trust that must be upheld with the highest standards of integrity.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: ROMAN P. TRINIDAD v. ALAN C. JAVIER, A.M. No. P-11-2894, April 10, 2019

  • Quo Warranto: The Impact of Dishonesty on Public Office Eligibility

    The Supreme Court ruled that a person found liable for dishonesty and falsification of official documents is ineligible to hold public office and cannot initiate a quo warranto proceeding to claim a right to that office. This decision emphasizes the importance of integrity in public service and prevents individuals with a history of dishonesty from holding positions of authority. It also protects the public interest by ensuring that only qualified and trustworthy individuals hold public office, maintaining the integrity of government functions.

    When a Falsified Degree Undermines a Claim to Public Office

    This case revolves around a petition for certiorari filed by Lee T. Arroyo against the Court of Appeals (CA) and Ulysses A. Brito, challenging the CA’s decision to execute a prior ruling in a quo warranto case. The original quo warranto petition was filed by Brito, seeking to be reinstated to his former position as Regional Director of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). Arroyo contested Brito’s claim, arguing that he was not qualified for the position due to falsification of his college degree. The Supreme Court ultimately sided with Arroyo, highlighting the critical impact of dishonesty on an individual’s eligibility to hold public office and initiate legal proceedings related to it.

    The controversy began with the reorganization of the NCIP following the enactment of Republic Act No. 8371, also known as “The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997.” Brito, who was temporarily appointed as Regional Director for Region V, was later replaced by Arroyo. Subsequently, Brito filed a petition for quo warranto, asserting his right to security of tenure and questioning Arroyo’s qualifications. Arroyo countered that Brito’s appointment was temporary and that he lacked the necessary Career Executive Service (CES) eligibility. In its initial decision, the CA partially granted Brito’s petition, ordering his reinstatement. However, Arroyo moved for reconsideration, presenting evidence that Brito had falsified his bachelor’s degree, which is a requirement for the position.

    Arroyo submitted a certified true copy of the Office of the President’s (OP) decision, which found Brito guilty of dishonesty and falsification of official documents, leading to his dismissal from government service. Despite this, the CA denied Arroyo’s motion for reconsideration and granted Brito’s motion for execution of the original quo warranto judgment. The CA reasoned that Brito had appealed the OP decision, but Arroyo challenged this, arguing that Brito failed to provide evidence of such an appeal. This led to the current petition before the Supreme Court, which was asked to determine whether the CA had gravely abused its discretion in directing the execution of its decision in favor of Brito.

    The Supreme Court addressed whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in directing the execution of its judgment on the quo warranto petition. The Court acknowledged the general principle of the immutability of judgments, which dictates that final and executory judgments can no longer be reviewed or modified. However, it also recognized exceptions to this rule, including situations where circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgment that would render its execution unjust or inequitable. Arroyo invoked this exception, arguing that the OP’s decision finding Brito liable for dishonesty due to the falsified college degree constituted a supervening event that made the execution of the quo warranto judgment unjust.

    The Court emphasized that for a supervening event to apply, it must be based on proven facts that alter the parties’ situation in a way that makes the execution of the judgment unfair. Here, the OP’s decision, which became final after the CA’s initial ruling and Arroyo’s failure to appeal, was deemed such a supervening event. The decision established that Brito had falsified his bachelor’s degree, which is a fundamental requirement for admission into the career service and for holding a position within the Career Executive Service (CES). The court quoted the factual findings of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), affirmed by the OP, which revealed that Brito never obtained a diploma from Naga College Foundation (NCF) and that his Special Order was unauthorized.

    In the present case, the registrar, Josefina P. Villanueva of the [NCF], has declared that [Brito] never obtained a diploma from their institution.

    The Supreme Court also underscored the significance of Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, which requires individuals initiating quo warranto proceedings to demonstrate their eligibility for the contested public office. Given Brito’s dishonesty and falsification of official documents, the Court found that he was ineligible for admission into the career service. This disqualification meant that he could not claim a better right to the Regional Director position through a quo warranto proceeding. Consequently, the CA was deemed to have gravely abused its discretion in directing the execution of its judgment, as it would result in a violation of civil service laws and be contrary to the interests of justice.

    The Court also addressed the CA’s finding that Brito had appealed the OP decision, noting that Arroyo had submitted certified true copies of the OP’s decision and order confirming its finality. The Court pointed out that Brito failed to present any direct evidence to support his claim of an existing appeal. He could have easily submitted a copy of his petition for review to the CA, but he did not. Lacking any proof, the CA’s independent verification of the appeal was deemed arbitrary and insufficient to overcome the evidence presented by Arroyo. The Court emphasized that allegations alone are not evidence and that the burden of proof lies with the party asserting the affirmative of an issue.

    Given Brito’s lack of eligibility and the final judgment against him, the Court determined that the CA had indeed gravely abused its discretion. This abuse was based not only on errors of jurisdiction but also on a gross misapprehension of facts. The Court found that the dismissal of Brito from government service and his disqualification from reemployment rendered the execution of the CA’s quo warranto judgment impossible, inequitable, and unjust. To provide a complete resolution, the Court also addressed the potential implications if Brito had been reinstated to the Regional Director position pending the resolution of the case.

    The Court invoked the de facto officer doctrine, which validates the actions of an officer exercising authority under a color of appointment or election, even if that appointment is later found to be defective. The doctrine is intended to protect those who rely on the official acts of public officials by ensuring the functioning of the government despite technical defects in an official’s title to office. The elements of the de facto officer doctrine were further discussed: (1) there must be a de jure office; (2) there must be a color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and (3) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

    The Court applied the de facto officer doctrine to the actions of Brito as Regional Director, stating that he had a colorable title to the position by virtue of the CA’s initial decision, even though he was ultimately found ineligible. It was emphasized that Brito’s ineligibility was unknown to the public at the time, and therefore, his official acts during his tenure were deemed valid. Nonetheless, the Court clarified that Brito did not possess the Regional Director position in good faith, given his awareness of his fabricated academic degree. This absence of good faith disqualified him from retaining the salaries and emoluments he received during his time as a de facto officer. The Court concluded that he must account for these amounts to the rightful officer, Arroyo.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in directing the execution of a judgment in a quo warranto petition, given that the petitioner was later found liable for dishonesty and falsification of official documents.
    What is a quo warranto proceeding? A quo warranto proceeding is a legal action to determine whether a person has the right to hold a public office or position. It is used to challenge the validity of someone’s claim to an office.
    What is the de facto officer doctrine? The de facto officer doctrine validates the actions of a person who holds a public office under a color of authority, even if their appointment is later found to be defective. This doctrine protects the public who rely on the official acts of those in apparent authority.
    What was the supervening event in this case? The supervening event was the Office of the President’s decision finding Ulysses A. Brito liable for dishonesty and falsification of official documents, which made him ineligible for the Regional Director position after the initial quo warranto judgment.
    Why was Brito deemed ineligible for the Regional Director position? Brito was deemed ineligible because he falsified his bachelor’s degree, which is a requirement for admission into the career service and for holding a position within the Career Executive Service (CES).
    What happens to the salaries Brito received as a de facto officer? Since Brito did not possess the Regional Director position in good faith due to his falsification, he is not allowed to retain the salaries and emoluments he received. He must account for these amounts to the rightful officer, Lee T. Arroyo.
    What did the Supreme Court ultimately decide? The Supreme Court granted the petition, modified the Court of Appeals’ decision to direct the dismissal of the quo warranto petition against Arroyo, and nullified the resolutions directing the execution of the quo warranto judgment.
    What is the significance of Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court? This section requires individuals initiating quo warranto proceedings to demonstrate their eligibility for the contested public office. Without such eligibility, the action may be dismissed at any stage.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the vital role of honesty and integrity in public service. By invalidating the CA’s decision and emphasizing the disqualification of individuals found guilty of dishonesty, the Court reinforced the necessity of maintaining high ethical standards in government. The ruling also clarifies the application of the de facto officer doctrine, ensuring that while official actions may be validated, individuals who obtained their positions through dishonesty cannot benefit from their wrongful tenure.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: LEE T. ARROYO v. COURT OF APPEALS and ULYSSES A. BRITO, G.R. No. 202860, April 10, 2019

  • When Lawyers Fail: Unauthorized Notarization and the Erosion of Legal Trust

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Spouses Frias v. Atty. Abao underscores the critical importance of adherence to the rules governing notarial practice. The Court found Atty. Nelly E. Abao guilty of violating the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility for notarizing a document without a valid notarial commission. This ruling emphasizes that lawyers who engage in unauthorized notarial acts undermine the integrity of the legal profession and erode public trust in the notarization process, leading to severe disciplinary actions, including suspension from the practice of law and permanent disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public.

    Forged Trust: When a Lawyer’s False Notarization Undermines a Land Dispute

    The case revolves around a land dispute between Spouses Pepito and Prescila Frias and the Spouses Escutin. The Spouses Frias claimed they had merely leased their land to the parents of the Spouses Escutin, while the latter presented a Deed of Absolute Sale, purportedly signed by the Frias spouses, as evidence of ownership. The Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized by Atty. Nelly E. Abao. However, the Frias spouses denied ever executing the deed, claiming they were in Mindanao at the time of its alleged execution. Further investigation revealed that Atty. Abao was not commissioned as a notary public in the relevant jurisdiction at the time she notarized the document.

    At the heart of this case is the integrity of the notarial process. Notarization imbues a private document with public character, lending it credence and admissibility in court. The Supreme Court has consistently held that notarization is far from a mere formality; it is an act imbued with public interest, demanding strict adherence to the rules and ethical standards by those authorized to perform it. The Court has emphasized the significance of a notary public’s role, noting that “A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.”

    Atty. Abao’s actions directly contravened these principles. The certification from the Clerk of Court of Roxas City confirmed that Atty. Abao was not commissioned as a Notary Public in the City of Roxas, Province of Capiz for the year 1995 and had no notarial files on record for the same year. By performing notarial acts without the requisite commission, Atty. Abao violated the Rules on Notarial Practice and Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. These canons mandate that lawyers must not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct and must uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

    The legal framework governing notarial practice is explicit. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stipulate that a person commissioned as a notary public may perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two years from the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made. Without a valid commission, a lawyer is bereft of the authority to perform any notarial acts. The Supreme Court in Japitana v. Atty. Parado reiterated this principle, stating that Commission either means the grant of authority to perform notarial or the written evidence of authority. Without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts.

    In this case, Atty. Abao misrepresented herself as a duly authorized notary public, an act the Court deemed a form of falsehood antithetical to the lawyer’s oath. As the Court in Nunga v. Atty. Viray, stressed:

    where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

    The Supreme Court referenced several similar cases to illustrate the gravity of Atty. Abao’s misconduct. In Zoreta v. Atty. Simpliciano, a lawyer was suspended for two years and permanently barred from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing documents after his commission had expired. Similarly, in Judge Laquindanum v. Atty. Quintana, a lawyer was suspended for six months and disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for notarizing documents outside the area of his commission and with an expired commission. Most recently, in Japitana v. Atty. Parado, the lawyer was suspended for two years and forever barred from becoming a notary public when he notarized documents with no existing notarial commission. These precedents underscore the Court’s consistent stance against unauthorized notarial acts.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court found Atty. Abao guilty of malpractice and violation of the lawyer’s oath. The Court deemed the IBP’s recommended penalty insufficient, considering the severity of the offense and Atty. Abao’s lack of a valid defense. Consequently, the Court imposed a harsher penalty: suspension from the practice of law for two years and permanent disqualification from being commissioned as a Notary Public.

    FAQs

    What was the central issue in this case? The central issue was whether Atty. Abao violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law by notarizing a document without a valid notarial commission.
    What did the IBP recommend as a penalty? The IBP recommended a six-month suspension from the practice of law for notarizing documents without a notarial commission, and a one-year suspension for executing an untruthful judicial affidavit.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case? The Supreme Court found Atty. Abao guilty and imposed a penalty of two years suspension from the practice of law and permanent disqualification from being commissioned as a Notary Public.
    Why is notarization important? Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. This process relies heavily on the notary’s integrity.
    What rules did Atty. Abao violate? Atty. Abao violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
    What is the territorial jurisdiction for a notary public? Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, a notary public can perform notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for two years from the commissioning date.
    Can a lawyer notarize documents without a commission? No, a lawyer must have a valid notarial commission to perform notarial acts. Notarizing without a commission is a direct violation of the Notarial Law.
    What is the significance of the Nunga v. Atty. Viray case? The Nunga v. Atty. Viray case emphasizes that notarizing a document without authorization is a violation of the lawyer’s oath and constitutes deliberate falsehood.

    The Spouses Frias v. Atty. Abao case serves as a stark reminder of the ethical obligations of lawyers, particularly when acting as notaries public. The Supreme Court’s decision sends a clear message that any deviation from the established rules and ethical standards will be met with severe consequences, ensuring the integrity of the legal profession and the public’s trust in the administration of justice.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Spouses Pepito and Prescila Frias, Complainants, vs. Atty. Nelly E. Abao, Respondent., A.C. No. 12467, April 10, 2019

  • Eminent Domain vs. Ejectment: Protecting Public Service Continuity

    In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a landowner cannot file an ejectment suit against a public utility corporation that occupies their land for public service without prior expropriation. Instead, the landowner’s remedy lies in seeking just compensation for the land. This ruling underscores the paramount importance of uninterrupted public services and clarifies the legal recourse available to landowners affected by such occupations.

    When Public Use Trumps Private Property: The TransCo-Bermuda Dispute

    The case revolves around a dispute between National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) and Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC). TransCo, responsible for electrical transmission, occupied BDC’s land to erect a transmission line. BDC filed an unlawful detainer case against TransCo, seeking to evict the corporation from the property. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of BDC, ordering TransCo to vacate the land and pay rentals. TransCo appealed, and subsequently filed an expropriation case to legally acquire the land. However, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed TransCo’s appeal in the unlawful detainer case, deeming it moot due to the expropriation proceedings.

    The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC’s decision, but the Supreme Court reversed these rulings, holding that the MTC should have dismissed the unlawful detainer case from the outset, recognizing TransCo’s power of eminent domain and the public interest served by the transmission line. The Supreme Court emphasized the principle that when a public utility corporation occupies land for public use, the landowner’s recourse is not eviction but just compensation. The Court anchored its decision on established jurisprudence, particularly the case of Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, which underscored the precedence of public policy considerations over private property rights in such scenarios.

    Building on this principle, the Supreme Court highlighted that allowing ejectment actions against public utilities would disrupt essential services to the public. The court cited Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes, a case dating back to 1915, which established that ejectment or injunction will not lie against a railroad company, but only an action for damages, that is, recovery of the value of the land taken, and the consequential damages, if any.

    From the afore-cited cases, it is clear that recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

    The Court acknowledged TransCo’s authority under Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, which grants it the power of eminent domain. This power, however, is subject to the constitutional requirement of just compensation to the landowner. The Supreme Court, therefore, clarified the procedural lapse: the MTC erred in proceeding with the unlawful detainer case instead of recognizing TransCo’s eminent domain authority and dismissing the case without prejudice to BDC’s claim for just compensation.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of rental arrears awarded by the MTC. The Court clarified that the award of rental in arrears was improper because BDC’s entitlement is limited to the just compensation for the subject land and consequential damages, as determined under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. The proper remedy is an expropriation case where just compensation is determined. This provides a fair valuation of the property at the time of taking, ensuring the landowner is justly compensated for the use of their property by the public utility.

    In effect, this ruling harmonizes the exercise of eminent domain with the protection of private property rights. It confirms that public interest prevails when a public utility occupies private land, but also ensures the landowner is not left without recourse. The landowner is entitled to just compensation, which must be determined through proper expropriation proceedings. This ruling reinforces the importance of balancing public needs with private rights in infrastructure development and the provision of essential services.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether a landowner could file an ejectment suit against a public utility corporation occupying their land for public service without prior expropriation.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court ruled that ejectment is not the proper remedy. The landowner’s recourse is to seek just compensation for the land through an expropriation case.
    Why was the ejectment case dismissed? The ejectment case was dismissed because the public utility corporation has the power of eminent domain and occupies the land for public service. Ejectment would disrupt essential services to the public.
    What is eminent domain? Eminent domain is the right of the government to expropriate private property for public use, with payment of just compensation. This power is often delegated to public utility corporations.
    What is just compensation? Just compensation refers to the fair market value of the property at the time of taking, plus any consequential damages. It aims to put the landowner in as good a position as they would have been had the property not been taken.
    What is the proper legal procedure in these situations? The public utility should initiate expropriation proceedings to legally acquire the land and determine just compensation. If they fail to do so, the landowner can file an action for just compensation.
    What happens to rental arrears awarded by lower courts? The Supreme Court ruled that awarding rental arrears in an unlawful detainer case is improper. The landowner is only entitled to just compensation and consequential damages determined in expropriation proceedings.
    What law grants TransCo the power of eminent domain? Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, grants the National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) the power of eminent domain.
    Can a landowner prevent a public utility from using their land? Generally, no. However, the landowner is entitled to just compensation. Refusal to allow entry may lead to expropriation proceedings.

    This decision clarifies the legal landscape surrounding land use by public utility corporations and the rights of affected landowners. It underscores the importance of procedural compliance in exercising eminent domain and ensuring that landowners receive just compensation for the use of their property in the service of public needs.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs. BERMUDA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 214782, April 03, 2019

  • Neglect of Duty in Public Service: Upholding Diligence and Accountability in the Judiciary

    The Supreme Court held a court stenographer liable for Simple Neglect of Duty for failing to prepare an order of referral, emphasizing the importance of diligence among court personnel. Despite eventually issuing the order, the initial failure prejudiced the parties involved and warranted disciplinary action. This ruling underscores that public officers must be accountable and efficient, as even seemingly minor tasks contribute significantly to the justice system’s integrity and public trust.

    The Case of the Missing Order: When Negligence Hinders Justice

    In 2011, Ione Bethelda C. Ramos filed a complaint against Reba A. Beligolo, a court stenographer, for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Court Employee. The case stemmed from Beligolo’s failure to prepare an order of referral for a mediation proceeding, which Ramos needed as the attorney-in-fact for one of the parties. Despite a court order instructing the parties to attend mediation and obtain the referral order, Beligolo’s negligence caused a delay. This situation raised questions about the responsibilities of court personnel and the consequences of failing to perform assigned duties. The Supreme Court’s decision addresses these concerns by reinforcing the importance of diligence and accountability within the judiciary.

    The case began when Judge Agreda directed parties in a civil case to attend mediation and secure an order of referral. Ramos diligently followed up, but Beligolo failed to produce the order. According to Ramos, Beligolo sarcastically stated she was unable to prepare the order, leading to a contentious exchange. Beligolo countered that there was an internal agreement that the clerk of court could issue the order or delegate the task to other employees. She claimed she assumed another employee had completed the task to avoid delay. Despite the subsequent issuance of the order, the initial failure caused the parties to miss the scheduled mediation.

    The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Beligolo liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. The OCA emphasized that Beligolo did not deny the task was hers. Her assumption that another employee had handled it was imprudent. This inattention resulted in the rescheduling of mediation, prejudicing the parties. However, the OCA clarified that Beligolo’s actions did not constitute Grave Misconduct. Her transgression lacked unlawful intent, gross negligence, corruption, or willful disregard for established rules. Also, there was not enough evidence to prove that Beligolo exhibited irate, sarcastic, or disrespectful behavior to warrant Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee.

    The Supreme Court adopted the OCA’s findings, highlighting Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. This canon mandates that court personnel must perform official duties properly and diligently. The Court has consistently held that all individuals involved in administering justice bear a heavy responsibility. They must perform their duties with utmost efficiency and competence. The failure to prepare the order of referral was a clear breach of this duty.

    “Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence.”

    The Court defined Simple Neglect of Duty as the failure to give proper attention to a required task due to carelessness or indifference. The Court noted that this conclusion remained valid even though the parties eventually obtained the order and attended mediation. The initial failure to fulfill her responsibility constituted neglect. Beligolo had been previously found guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty for failing to submit stenographic notes on time. Given this prior offense, the standard penalty would have been dismissal from service.

    Despite the seemingly warranted penalty of dismissal, the Supreme Court has the discretion to temper justice with mercy. In a similar case, Re: Illegal and Unauthorized Digging and Excavation Activities inside the Supreme Court Compound, Baguio City, a court employee also faced a second charge of Simple Neglect of Duty. Instead of dismissal, the Court imposed a two-year suspension without pay, considering the employee’s long service in the Judiciary. The Court decided to take a similar approach in Beligolo’s case. The Court acknowledged her nearly fifteen years of service in the judiciary. As such, it deemed a suspension more appropriate than dismissal.

    Consequently, the Court ordered Beligolo’s suspension for two years without pay, cautioning against future similar offenses. The Court also made a final reminder that public officers must be accountable. They must serve with the utmost degree of responsibility and efficiency. Any act that falls short of these standards is unacceptable, especially for those responsible for upholding the judiciary’s image. Every member of the court has a duty to maintain its good name as a true temple of justice.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Reba A. Beligolo, a court stenographer, should be held administratively liable for failing to prepare an order of referral, which constitutes Simple Neglect of Duty. The court examined whether her actions warranted disciplinary measures, considering her responsibilities and the impact of her negligence.
    What is Simple Neglect of Duty? Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. It involves a lack of diligence or attention to one’s responsibilities.
    What penalty did the court impose on Beligolo? The court suspended Beligolo for a period of two years without pay, considering her nearly fifteen years of service in the judiciary and the fact that she had previously been found liable for Simple Neglect of Duty. This was a tempered penalty in lieu of dismissal.
    Why was Beligolo not dismissed from service, given her prior offense? Although the standard penalty for a second offense of Simple Neglect of Duty is dismissal, the Supreme Court has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy. The Court considered Beligolo’s long years of service in the judiciary.
    What is the significance of Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel? Canon IV mandates that court personnel must perform official duties properly and with diligence. It underscores the high standards of conduct expected of those working in the judiciary.
    What was the role of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in this case? The OCA investigated the complaint, determined that Beligolo was liable for Simple Neglect of Duty, and recommended a penalty of a fine. The Supreme Court adopted the OCA’s findings but modified the recommended penalty.
    What does this case teach us about the duties of public officers? This case highlights the importance of diligence, efficiency, and accountability among public officers. It emphasizes that even seemingly minor tasks are essential to maintaining the integrity of the justice system.
    How does this ruling affect future cases involving neglect of duty? This ruling reinforces the Supreme Court’s commitment to upholding high standards of conduct within the judiciary. It serves as a reminder to court personnel that neglecting their duties can result in disciplinary action.
    What constitutes ‘Conduct Unbecoming of a Court Employee’? While the complaint initially included this charge, the OCA and the Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to prove that Beligolo’s behavior was irate, sarcastic, or disrespectful. ‘Conduct Unbecoming’ generally refers to behavior that undermines the dignity and integrity of the court.

    This case serves as a crucial reminder that diligence and accountability are fundamental to maintaining the integrity of the Philippine judicial system. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the importance of even the smallest tasks performed by court personnel. By holding employees accountable for neglect, the Court ensures that the wheels of justice continue to turn smoothly and efficiently. This ruling not only disciplines the individual involved but also sets a clear standard for all those serving within the judiciary.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Ione Bethelda C. Ramos v. Reba A. Beligolo, A.M. No. P-19-3919, April 02, 2019