ASG Law

Category: Administrative Law

  • Condonation Doctrine: Re-election Clears Misconduct Despite Circumvention Attempt

    The Supreme Court held that the re-election of a public official effectively condones prior misconduct, even if the official initially conspired to circumvent term limits. This ruling applies the condonation doctrine, which, although prospectively abandoned, was still in effect at the time of the actions in question. The decision highlights the importance of the electorate’s will in cleansing past administrative liabilities, reinforcing the principle that re-election signifies the people’s forgiveness.

    Resignation Ruse or Political Redemption: Did Re-election Erase Prior Misconduct?

    In Edgardo M. Aguilar v. Elvira J. Benlot and Samuel L. Cuico, the central issue revolves around whether a public official, initially involved in a scheme to bypass term limits, can benefit from the condonation doctrine after being re-elected to office. The case originated from the resignations of several barangay officials, allegedly orchestrated to allow Aguilar to succeed as Punong Barangay and serve a fourth consecutive term. Respondents Elvira J. Benlot and Samuel L. Cuico filed a complaint against Aguilar, accusing him of violating Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Dereliction of Duty. The Ombudsman initially dismissed the complaint based on the condonation doctrine, but later reversed this decision, finding Aguilar guilty of Grave Misconduct.

    The condonation doctrine, rooted in the 1992 case of Aguinaldo v. Hon. Santos, posits that a public official’s re-election by the same electorate effectively forgives any prior administrative misconduct. The Supreme Court in Aguinaldo v. Hon. Santos held that:

    When a public official is re-elected, it indicates that the electorate is satisfied with their performance, thus blotting out any prior misconduct.

    The Ombudsman, in its reconsideration, argued that the condonation doctrine did not apply because Aguilar was not re-elected to the same position he held during the alleged misconduct. He was initially elected as Barangay Kagawad before succeeding as Punong Barangay. However, the Supreme Court addressed this point, clarifying that the doctrine could extend to officials elected to different positions, provided they were re-elected by the same electorate.

    Procedural issues also played a significant role in this case. The Court of Appeals initially dismissed Aguilar’s appeal due to procedural infirmities, such as failing to specify the date of receipt of the Ombudsman’s order and not providing an explanation for why the petition was not personally filed. While the Supreme Court acknowledged these lapses, it emphasized that procedural rules should be relaxed in cases where the merits warrant it. Citing Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, the Court acknowledged the importance of upholding procedural rules but also recognized exceptions in justifiable cases.

    The Supreme Court delved into the evidence supporting the allegation of conspiracy. The resignations of the barangay officials, occurring immediately after their oaths of office, raised suspicions. Additionally, their subsequent re-appointment or employment by the city government further fueled the belief that their resignations were part of a coordinated plan. The court in People v. Angelio, held that:

    Conspiracy is sufficiently established when the concerted acts show the same purpose or common design and are united in its execution.

    Despite finding evidence of conspiracy and Grave Misconduct, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Aguilar, due to the application of the condonation doctrine. The court acknowledged its previous abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Ombudsman Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals, but emphasized that the abandonment was prospective. Therefore, since the events in Aguilar’s case occurred before this abandonment, he was entitled to benefit from the doctrine.

    The decision underscores the importance of the electorate’s role in determining the fate of public officials accused of misconduct. Even if an official engages in questionable behavior, their subsequent re-election can serve as a form of absolution, preventing the imposition of penalties. This ruling also highlights the tension between upholding procedural rules and ensuring that cases are decided on their merits. Courts must balance the need for efficiency and adherence to rules with the imperative of dispensing justice fairly.

    The Court addressed the argument that Aguilar’s succession to the position of Punong Barangay should not be counted towards the three-term limit. While the Court acknowledged the principle that assumption of office by operation of law is generally involuntary, it noted that Aguilar’s willful act of conspiring to circumvent the law indicated voluntariness. However, this issue was ultimately mooted by the application of the condonation doctrine.

    FAQs

    What was the central issue in this case? The central issue was whether the condonation doctrine applied to a public official who was re-elected after allegedly conspiring to circumvent term limits, even though he was elected to a different position.
    What is the condonation doctrine? The condonation doctrine, as previously applied, held that the re-election of a public official by the same electorate forgives any prior administrative misconduct. This doctrine was abandoned prospectively by the Supreme Court in Ombudsman Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals.
    Did the Supreme Court find evidence of misconduct? Yes, the Supreme Court agreed with the Ombudsman’s finding that Aguilar and other officials conspired to circumvent the three-term limit, constituting Grave Misconduct.
    Why was Aguilar not penalized despite the misconduct? Aguilar was not penalized because the condonation doctrine was still in effect at the time of the misconduct and his subsequent re-election as Punong Barangay effectively condoned his prior actions.
    Did the fact that Aguilar was elected to a different position matter? No, the Supreme Court clarified that the condonation doctrine can apply even if the official is elected to a different position, as long as they are re-elected by the same electorate.
    What was the significance of the abandonment of the condonation doctrine? The abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Ombudsman Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals means that re-election no longer automatically forgives prior misconduct, but this abandonment was prospective and did not apply retroactively to Aguilar’s case.
    What is Grave Misconduct? Grave Misconduct is a serious transgression of established rules, implying wrongful intention and directly related to the performance of official duties, amounting to maladministration or willful neglect.
    What procedural issues were raised in this case? The Court of Appeals initially dismissed Aguilar’s appeal due to procedural lapses, such as failing to specify the date of receipt of the Ombudsman’s order and not providing an explanation for the petition not being personally filed.
    Did the Supreme Court address the issue of term limits? Yes, the Supreme Court discussed term limits and the voluntariness of assuming office, but this issue was ultimately mooted by the application of the condonation doctrine.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Aguilar v. Benlot demonstrates the enduring impact of the condonation doctrine, even in the face of questionable conduct. This case highlights the importance of electoral mandate and its impact on administrative liabilities. This decision underscores the legal complexities involved in cases of misconduct, especially when intertwined with electoral processes and legal doctrines.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: EDGARDO M. AGUILAR, PETITIONER, V. ELVIRA J. BENLOT AND SAMUEL L. CUICO, RESPONDENTS., G.R. No. 232806, January 21, 2019

  • Unexcused Absence: When Neglect of Duty Leads to Removal from Public Service

    The Supreme Court’s decision in RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. STEVERIL J. JABONETE, JR. underscores the serious consequences of neglecting one’s duties as a public servant. The Court affirmed the dropping from the rolls of a Junior Process Server who had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for an extended period. This ruling reinforces the principle that consistent dereliction of duty warrants removal from service, emphasizing accountability and the maintenance of public trust.

    Vanishing Act: How Unexplained Absence Undermines Public Service

    Steveril J. Jabonete, Jr., a Junior Process Server at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, disappeared from his post. Records showed that Jabonete had an approved leave until June 3, 2011, but he never returned to work, nor did he file any further leave applications. This prolonged absence prompted the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to investigate, ultimately recommending his removal from the rolls.

    The Employees’ Leave Division (ELD) of the OCA made multiple attempts to contact Jabonete, directing him to submit his Daily Time Records (DTRs) and warning him of the potential consequences of non-compliance. Judge George S. Patriarca, the Acting Presiding Judge of the MTC, even personally handed Jabonete one of these letters. Despite these efforts, Jabonete remained unresponsive, leading to the withholding of his salaries and benefits.

    The OCA’s investigation revealed that Jabonete had not applied for retirement, was still listed as an active employee, had no pending administrative cases, and was not an accountable officer. Based on these findings, the OCA recommended that Jabonete be dropped from the rolls, his position be declared vacant, and that he be informed of his separation. The OCA also noted that Jabonete would still be entitled to any benefits he may be eligible for under existing laws and would not be barred from future government employment.

    The Supreme Court agreed with the OCA’s recommendation, citing Section 93(a), Rule 19 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). This provision states that an officer or employee who is continuously absent without official leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) working days shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice.

    The Court emphasized the importance of public accountability and maintaining public faith in the judiciary. Jabonete’s failure to report for work was a gross disregard and neglect of his duties, failing to adhere to the high standards of public accountability expected of government employees. However, the Court also clarified that dropping from the rolls is a non-disciplinary measure. As such, Jabonete’s separation would not result in the forfeiture of his benefits or disqualify him from reemployment in the government, as provided under Section 96, Rule 19 of the RRACCS.

    The Supreme Court explicitly quoted Section 93 (a), Rule 19 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service:

    Rule 19
    DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS

    Section 93. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls. — Officers and employees who are either habitually absent or have unsatisfactory or poor performance or have shown to be physically or mentally unfit to perform their duties may be dropped from the rolls subject to the following procedures:

    a. Absence Without Approved Leave

    1. An officer or employee who is continuously absent without official leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) working days shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He/she shall, however, be informed of his/her separation not later than five (5) days from its effectivity which shall be sent to the address appearing on his/her 201 files or to his/her last known address;

    This case serves as a reminder to all government employees of their responsibility to fulfill their duties diligently and to adhere to the rules and regulations governing their employment. While the penalty of being dropped from the rolls is severe, it is a necessary measure to ensure the integrity and efficiency of public service. This ruling is consistent with jurisprudence that underscores the high standard of conduct required from public servants.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a Junior Process Server who had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for an extended period should be dropped from the rolls.
    What does “dropping from the rolls” mean? “Dropping from the rolls” is an administrative procedure where an employee is removed from the list of active employees due to prolonged absence without leave or other specified reasons. It is a form of separation from service.
    Is dropping from the rolls considered a disciplinary action? No, dropping from the rolls is considered a non-disciplinary action. It does not result in the forfeiture of benefits or disqualification from reemployment in the government.
    What is the minimum period of AWOL required for dropping from the rolls? Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), an employee who is continuously absent without official leave for at least thirty (30) working days may be dropped from the rolls.
    Was the employee in this case notified of his impending separation? Yes, the Employees’ Leave Division (ELD) sent multiple letters to the employee, directing him to submit his Daily Time Records (DTRs) and warning him of the potential consequences of non-compliance.
    Did the employee respond to these notifications? No, the employee did not respond to any of the notifications, nor did he submit his DTRs or file any further leave applications.
    Is the employee entitled to any benefits after being dropped from the rolls? Yes, the employee is still qualified to receive any benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws, as dropping from the rolls is a non-disciplinary action.
    Can the employee be reemployed in the government after being dropped from the rolls? Yes, the employee is not disqualified from reemployment in the government, as dropping from the rolls is a non-disciplinary action.

    In conclusion, this case reinforces the importance of fulfilling one’s duties as a public servant and adhering to the rules and regulations governing government employment. While the consequences of prolonged absence without leave can be severe, the ruling also clarifies that such separation is non-disciplinary in nature, preserving the employee’s rights to benefits and future employment opportunities.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. STEVERIL J. JABONETE, JR., A.M. No. 18-08-69-MTC, January 21, 2019

  • Absence Without Leave: Upholding Public Service Standards in the Philippine Judiciary

    This Supreme Court resolution addresses the case of Steveril J. Jabonete, Jr., a Junior Process Server at the Municipal Trial Court of Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, who was dropped from the rolls due to prolonged absence without official leave (AWOL). The Court affirmed the Office of the Court Administrator’s (OCA) recommendation to remove Jabonete from his position, emphasizing the critical importance of public accountability and adherence to duty among court personnel. Despite this separation, Jabonete remains eligible for benefits and future government re-employment, underscoring the non-disciplinary nature of being dropped from the rolls.

    When Silence Speaks Volumes: The Case of the Absent Process Server

    This case centers on Steveril J. Jabonete, Jr., a Junior Process Server who vanished from his post in June 2011 without any approved leave or communication. The central legal question is whether his prolonged absence warrants his removal from service, and what implications this has for his rights and future employment. This situation highlights the balance between maintaining public trust in the judiciary and ensuring fair treatment of government employees.

    The records indicated that Jabonete had approved leave until June 3, 2011, but failed to return to work or submit required documentation thereafter. Despite repeated notices from the Employees’ Leave Division (ELD) and the Acting Presiding Judge, Jabonete remained unresponsive. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) investigated and found no pending administrative case, retirement application, or accountability issues, yet his continued presence on the court’s plantilla while being absent raised serious concerns about the integrity of public service.

    The Supreme Court, in its resolution, firmly grounded its decision on Section 93(a), Rule 19 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). This provision explicitly addresses the consequences of prolonged unauthorized absences:

    Rule 19
    DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS

    Section 93. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls. — Officers and employees who are either habitually absent or have unsatisfactory or poor performance or have shown to be physically or mentally unfit to perform their duties may be dropped from the rolls subject to the following procedures:

    a. Absence Without Approved Leave

    An officer or employee who is continuously absent without official leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) working days shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He/she shall, however, be informed of his/her separation not later than five (5) days from its effectivity which shall be sent to the address appearing on his/her 201 files or to his/her last known address;

    Applying this rule, the Court underscored that Jabonete’s absence far exceeded the thirty-day threshold, justifying his separation from service. The ruling emphasizes that the conduct of court personnel must reflect the highest standards of public accountability. Failing to report for work and neglecting official duties undermines public trust in the judiciary. This principle is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the judicial system and ensuring that those entrusted with public service fulfill their responsibilities diligently.

    However, the Court was also careful to clarify that being dropped from the rolls is distinct from a disciplinary action. This distinction is significant because it protects Jabonete’s rights to receive benefits and to seek future employment within the government. Section 96, Rule 19 of the RRACCS states:

    Section 96. Dropping From the Rolls; Non-Disciplinary in Nature. – This mode of separation from the service for unauthorized absences or unsatisfactory or poor performance or physical or mental incapacity is non-disciplinary in nature and shall not result in the forfeiture of any benefit on the part of the official or employee or in disqualification from reemployment in the government.

    Thus, while Jabonete’s actions warranted his removal from his current position, they do not permanently bar him from public service. This aspect of the ruling balances the need for accountability with the recognition that individuals deserve a chance to rehabilitate their careers.

    Issue Court’s Reasoning
    Prolonged Absence Without Leave Jabonete’s continuous absence since June 6, 2011, violated Section 93(a) of the RRACCS, which mandates separation from service for employees AWOL for at least 30 working days.
    Public Accountability Court personnel must adhere to high standards of public accountability. Jabonete’s neglect of duties undermined public trust in the judiciary.
    Non-Disciplinary Nature Dropping from the rolls is not a disciplinary action. Therefore, Jabonete retains his eligibility for benefits and future government employment, as per Section 96 of the RRACCS.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case reaffirms the importance of diligence and accountability within the Philippine judiciary. By upholding the rule that prolonged unauthorized absences can lead to separation from service, the Court sends a clear message about the standards expected of public servants. At the same time, the ruling acknowledges the non-disciplinary nature of being dropped from the rolls, safeguarding the affected employee’s rights and future prospects.

    FAQs

    What was the main reason for Steveril Jabonete’s separation from service? Jabonete was dropped from the rolls due to being absent without official leave (AWOL) for an extended period, specifically since June 6, 2011. This violated civil service rules regarding unauthorized absences.
    What is the legal basis for dropping an employee from the rolls due to AWOL? Section 93(a), Rule 19 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) allows for separation from service for employees continuously absent without leave for at least 30 working days. The 2017 RACCS also contains a similar provision in Section 107.
    Is being dropped from the rolls considered a disciplinary action? No, being dropped from the rolls is considered non-disciplinary. This means it doesn’t result in forfeiture of benefits or disqualification from future government employment, according to Section 96 of the RRACCS.
    What benefits is Jabonete still entitled to after being dropped from the rolls? Jabonete is still qualified to receive benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws, as the separation is non-disciplinary. These benefits may include retirement contributions and other entitlements.
    Can Jabonete be re-employed in the government in the future? Yes, Jabonete is not disqualified from re-employment in the government. The separation from service due to being dropped from the rolls does not bar him from seeking future government positions.
    What steps did the court take before dropping Jabonete from the rolls? The Employees’ Leave Division (ELD) sent multiple letters to Jabonete, directing him to submit his Daily Time Records (DTRs) and warning him of the potential consequences of non-compliance. His Presiding Judge also personally handed him a letter.
    What is the significance of public accountability in this case? The court emphasized that court personnel must uphold high standards of public accountability. Jabonete’s prolonged absence and neglect of duties undermined public trust in the judiciary.
    Where was the notice of separation sent to Jabonete? The notice of separation was sent to Jabonete’s last known address appearing in his 201 file, as required by Section 93(a)(1), Rule 19 of the RRACCS.

    This case underscores the judiciary’s commitment to maintaining the integrity of public service. The decision serves as a reminder that government employees are expected to fulfill their duties diligently, and prolonged unauthorized absences will be met with appropriate action. While upholding accountability, the Court also ensured that Jabonete’s rights were protected, highlighting the nuanced approach to administrative matters.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MR. STEVERIL J. JABONETE, JR., A.M. No. 18-08-69-MTC, January 21, 2019

  • Tax Amnesty: Compliance Shields Taxpayers from Deficiency Assessments

    In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Transfield Philippines, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed that taxpayers who fully comply with the requirements of a tax amnesty are immune from deficiency tax assessments for the years covered by the amnesty. This means that if a taxpayer properly avails of a tax amnesty program by fulfilling all the stipulated conditions, the government cannot later collect additional taxes for the covered period, providing a clean slate for taxpayers who have chosen to settle their past tax obligations.

    Taxpayer’s Triumph: How Amnesty Compliance Trumped Tax Deficiency Claims

    This case arose from a deficiency tax assessment issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) against Transfield Philippines, Inc. (Transfield) for the fiscal year 2001-2002, covering income tax, Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT), and Value-Added Tax (VAT). Transfield, contesting the assessment, subsequently availed of the tax amnesty program under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9480. R.A. No. 9480 offered a tax amnesty for national internal revenue taxes for the taxable year 2005 and prior years, aiming to provide taxpayers a chance to settle unpaid tax liabilities. Transfield complied with all the requirements for availing the tax amnesty, including submitting the necessary documents and paying the amnesty tax. However, the CIR later issued a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy (WDAL) to seize Transfield’s assets for the alleged deficiency taxes, arguing that Transfield was not eligible for the tax amnesty because it had delinquent accounts.

    The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) ruled in favor of Transfield, declaring the WDAL null and void, and precluding the CIR from collecting the assessed tax liability. The CTA emphasized that Transfield had complied with all the legal requirements for tax amnesty under R.A. No. 9480. The CIR appealed the CTA’s decision, leading to the Supreme Court, which was tasked to determine whether the CTA erred in ruling that Transfield was entitled to the immunities under the tax amnesty program.

    The Supreme Court affirmed the CTA’s decision, underscoring the principle that compliance with the tax amnesty requirements grants immunity from tax liabilities covered by the amnesty. The Court cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 9480, which provides that those who availed themselves of the tax amnesty and have fully complied with all its conditions shall be immune from the payment of taxes, as well as additions thereto, and the appurtenant civil, criminal, or administrative penalties under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The Court also referred to Department of Finance (DOF) Department Order No. 29-07 (DO 29-07), which implements R.A. No. 9480 and outlines the method for availing a tax amnesty.

    SEC. 6. Immunities and Privileges. — Those who availed themselves of the tax amnesty under Section 5 hereof, and have fully complied with all its conditions shall be entitled to the following immunities and privileges:

    (a) The taxpayer shall be immune from the payment of taxes, as well as additions thereto, and the appurtenant civil, criminal or administrative penalties under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, arising from the failure to pay any and all internal revenue taxes for taxable year 2005 and prior years.

    The Supreme Court rejected the CIR’s argument that Transfield was disqualified from the tax amnesty because of delinquent accounts, as stated in Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 19-2008. The Court clarified that administrative regulations cannot expand or amend statutory requirements. RMC No. 19-2008, in providing for the exception that delinquent accounts, or accounts receivable considered assets of the government are not eligible under the tax amnesty program, cannot prevail over the express provisions of R.A. No. 9480. The Court emphasized that the exceptions to the tax amnesty are explicitly listed in Section 8 of R.A. No. 9480, and delinquent accounts are not among them.

    The Court also cited the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that the express mention of one thing excludes all others. Since R.A. No. 9480 explicitly lists the exceptions to the tax amnesty, the CIR cannot add to these exceptions through administrative issuances. The Court underscored that while tax amnesty laws should be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, the rule-making power of administrative agencies cannot be extended to amend or expand statutory requirements or to embrace matters not originally encompassed by the law.

    The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the timeliness of the petition for review, stating that the reckoning point of the 30-day period to appeal the assessments is immaterial because the assessments had already been extinguished by Transfield’s compliance with the requirements for tax amnesty under R.A. No. 9480. To require Transfield to appeal the assessment even after complying with the tax amnesty law would negate the amnesty granted and create a condition not found in the law. The Court emphasized that taxpayers may immediately enjoy the privileges and immunities under R.A. No. 9480 as soon as they fulfill the suspensive condition imposed therein, namely, the submission of the required documents and payment of the amnesty tax.

    The decision in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Transfield Philippines, Inc. clarifies the rights and obligations of taxpayers availing of tax amnesty programs. It reinforces the principle that full compliance with the requirements of a tax amnesty grants immunity from tax liabilities covered by the amnesty. This provides certainty to taxpayers who have availed of tax amnesty programs in good faith and ensures that they are not subjected to further tax assessments for the same period. By extension, the ruling also underscores the limits on the power of administrative agencies to issue regulations that expand or amend statutory requirements. The Supreme Court thus affirmed that the deficiency taxes for Fiscal Year July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002 were deemed settled in view of Transfield’s compliance with the requirements for tax amnesty under R.A. No. 9480.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Transfield, having complied with the requirements for tax amnesty under R.A. No. 9480, was immune from deficiency tax assessments for the fiscal year 2001-2002.
    What is a tax amnesty? A tax amnesty is a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law.
    What did R.A. No. 9480 provide? R.A. No. 9480 authorized the grant of a tax amnesty for all national internal revenue taxes for the taxable year 2005 and prior years, with or without assessments duly issued therefor, that have remained unpaid as of December 31, 2005.
    What were the requirements for availing the tax amnesty under R.A. No. 9480? The requirements included submitting a Notice of Availment of Tax Amnesty, Tax Amnesty Return, Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) as of December 31, 2005, and Tax Amnesty Payment Form, as well as paying the corresponding amnesty taxes.
    What is the significance of complying with the tax amnesty requirements? Compliance with the tax amnesty requirements grants immunity from the payment of taxes, as well as additions thereto, and the appurtenant civil, criminal, or administrative penalties under the NIRC for the covered period.
    Can the BIR add exceptions to the tax amnesty not mentioned in the law? No, the BIR cannot add exceptions to the tax amnesty that are not explicitly listed in the law. Administrative regulations cannot expand or amend statutory requirements.
    What is the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius? The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that the express mention of one thing excludes all others.
    What was the Court’s ruling on the timeliness of the petition for review? The Court ruled that the timeliness of the petition for review was immaterial because the assessments had already been extinguished by Transfield’s compliance with the requirements for tax amnesty.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Transfield Philippines, Inc. reinforces the importance of adhering to the statutory provisions of tax amnesty laws and the limitations on administrative agencies in expanding or amending these laws. This ruling provides clarity and protection for taxpayers who avail of tax amnesty programs in good faith.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Transfield Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 211449, January 16, 2019

  • Breach of Trust: Court Employee Liable for Dishonest Investment Dealings

    The Supreme Court held a court employee liable for less serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for soliciting investments in a fraudulent scheme, even though his actions were not directly related to his official duties. The Court emphasized that all court personnel must maintain the integrity of the judiciary in both their official and private conduct. This ruling underscores the high ethical standards expected of those serving in the judicial system, reinforcing public trust and accountability.

    Investment Gone Sour: When a Court Employee’s Side Hustle Leads to Administrative Liability

    This case revolves around an administrative complaint filed by Judge Vivencio Gregorio G. Atutubo III, Atty. Teresita A. Tuazon, Attys. Delight Aissa A. Salvador, and Joevanni A. Villanueva against Ramdel Rey M. De Leon, an Executive Assistant III in the Office of Associate Justice Jose P. Perez. The complainants alleged that De Leon engaged in dishonest and deceitful conduct by soliciting money for investments in a purported business venture involving suppliers of San Miguel Corporation (SMC). The complainants claimed that De Leon, taking advantage of his close friendship and their trust, enticed them to invest in his brother’s alleged business transactions with SMC suppliers, promising solid and risk-free returns. However, the investment scheme turned out to be a scam, resulting in financial losses for the complainants.

    The complainants detailed how De Leon actively solicited investments, emphasizing the legitimacy of the business and the involvement of his brother, Rammyl Jay De Leon, a bank manager. They alleged that De Leon represented that Rammyl had clients and contacts who supplied requirements to SMC, and that the investment would provide cash for these suppliers. Complainants asserted that they had no reason to doubt De Leon’s claims due to his elaborate explanations and the specificity of the investment details. The investments were commonly referred to as “Investment sa kapatid ni Ramdel” within the OAJ Perez. The investments of Judge Atutubo, Atty. Tuazon, Atty. Salvador, and Atty. Villanueva varied in amounts and timeframes, but all relied on the representations and assurances of De Leon. The scheme unraveled when another individual involved in the business, Ferdinand John Mendoza, allegedly went missing with all the investment funds.

    De Leon denied the allegations, claiming that the complainants initiated the investment discussions and dealings with the intent to gain additional income. He explained that he himself was an investor in Mendoza’s check-rediscounting business, which involved providing cash to SMC suppliers in exchange for discounted checks. De Leon argued that he merely facilitated the investments of the complainants and that he had no direct involvement in the management of the business. He stated that he was also a victim of Mendoza’s fraudulent scheme, having invested a significant amount of his own money. However, the Court found that De Leon had indeed committed less serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that although the acts complained of were not directly related to De Leon’s official duties, his conduct still reflected on the integrity of the judiciary. The Court noted that **dishonesty** is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” In this case, De Leon was found to have been dishonest in his dealings with the complainants by continuing to accept their investments even after he knew of Mendoza’s financial difficulties and by not truthfully disclosing the actual rate of interest earned from the rediscounting business. This constituted a violation of the trust reposed in him by his colleagues.

    Moreover, the Court found De Leon guilty of **conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service**. The Court stated that conduct is prejudicial to the public service if it violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes — or tends to diminish — the people’s faith in the Judiciary. De Leon’s involvement in the check-rediscounting business, even as a recruiter, tarnished the image and integrity of the judiciary. The Court cited Largo v. Court of Appeals, stating that if an employee’s questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he was liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. His actions were in violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, specifically Section 4(c), which commands that public officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest.

    Additionally, the Court noted that De Leon’s conduct violated several administrative rules, including Sec. 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which mandates that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours, and Sec. 5, Canon III of the same code, which provides that the full-time position in the Judiciary of every court personnel shall be the personnel’s primary employment. The recruitment of third-party investors to the check-rediscounting business also constituted a violation of the SC-A.C. No. 5-88, which prohibits officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging in any private business or related activities.

    In determining the appropriate penalty, the Court considered both mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The mitigating circumstances included De Leon’s first infraction and his more than ten years of service in the Judiciary. The aggravating circumstances included the conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, the violation of SC-A.C. No. 5-88, and the violations of Sec. 5 of Canon III and Sec. 1 of Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Because De Leon was found guilty of multiple administrative offenses, the Court, adopting Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), imposed the penalty corresponding to the most serious charge (less serious dishonesty) and considered the rest as aggravating circumstances. The penalty for less serious dishonesty is suspension for six months and one day to one year. However, since De Leon had already resigned from his position, the Court imposed a fine equivalent to his salary for one year at the time of his resignation, to be deducted from whatever benefits he may still be entitled to receive.

    The ruling reinforces the principle that public office is a public trust, and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serving them with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The Supreme Court decision serves as a reminder to all court employees that their conduct, both official and private, must be beyond reproach to maintain the public’s trust and confidence in the judiciary. As highlighted in Release of Compulsory Retirement Benefits Under R.A. No. 8291 of Mr. Isidro P. Austria, etc.:

    all court employees, being public servants in the Judiciary, must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. To maintain the people’s respect and faith in the Judiciary, they should be upright, fair and honest. Respondent should avoid any act or conduct that tends to diminish public trust and confidence in the courts.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a court employee should be held administratively liable for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for soliciting investments in a fraudulent scheme.
    What is considered as dishonesty in this case? Dishonesty in this case involves continuing to accept investments despite knowledge of financial difficulties in the investment scheme and failing to disclose the actual interest rates earned to investors. These actions constituted a breach of trust and lack of integrity.
    What does conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service mean? Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service refers to actions that violate public accountability norms and undermine public faith in the Judiciary, as seen in the employee’s involvement in a fraudulent investment scheme.
    What administrative rules did the respondent violate? The respondent violated Sec. 1, Canon IV and Sec. 5, Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, as well as Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5-88, by engaging in private business activities during office hours.
    What were the mitigating circumstances in this case? The mitigating circumstances included the respondent’s first infraction and his more than ten years of service in the Judiciary.
    What were the aggravating circumstances in this case? The aggravating circumstances included conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, violations of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5-88, and violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
    What penalty was imposed on the respondent? Because the respondent had already resigned, the Court imposed a fine equivalent to his salary for one year at the time of his resignation, to be deducted from any benefits he may still be entitled to.
    What is the significance of this ruling for court employees? This ruling underscores the high ethical standards expected of court employees and reinforces the principle that their conduct, both official and private, must be beyond reproach to maintain public trust in the judiciary.

    In conclusion, this case serves as a critical reminder of the stringent ethical standards expected of all employees within the Philippine judicial system. By holding the respondent accountable for his dishonest actions and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of maintaining public trust and upholding the integrity of the judiciary. This decision underscores that those in positions of public trust must not only adhere to the law but also embody the highest ethical standards in all aspects of their lives.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST MR. RAMDEL REY M. DE LEON, A.M. No. 2014-16-SC, January 15, 2019

  • Tax Assessment Prescription: Waivers Must Clearly Define Tax Liabilities for Validity

    The Supreme Court has affirmed that waivers extending the prescriptive period for tax assessments must strictly comply with legal requirements, particularly specifying the nature and amount of the tax involved. This ruling protects taxpayers by ensuring that waivers are clear and unambiguous, preventing indefinite extensions of the tax assessment period. It reinforces the importance of adhering to procedural rules to safeguard taxpayers’ rights against potential overreach by tax authorities.

    La Flor’s Tax Battle: When Do Waivers Truly Waive Tax Assessment Limits?

    This case, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Flor dela Isabela, Inc., revolves around the validity of tax assessments for Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT) and Withholding Tax on Compensation (WTC) for the year 2005. The central issue is whether the waivers executed by La Flor effectively extended the prescriptive period for the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to issue these assessments. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) argued that the waivers were valid, while La Flor contended that they were defective and did not comply with the requirements set forth in Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90, thus rendering the assessments time-barred.

    The factual backdrop involves La Flor, a domestic corporation, which filed monthly returns for EWT and WTC for the calendar year 2005. Subsequently, La Flor executed several waivers purportedly extending the period for the BIR to assess its internal revenue liabilities. The CIR issued Formal Letter of Demand and Final Assessment Notices (FANs) on December 17, 2009, covering deficiency taxes for the taxable year 2005. La Flor protested these assessments, leading to a Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) issued by the CIR. Aggrieved, La Flor filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Division.

    The CTA Division ruled in favor of La Flor, canceling the deficiency tax assessments. It found that the assessments were issued beyond the three-year prescriptive period under Section 203 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). The CTA Division also held that the waivers were ineffective, as they did not comply with RMO No. 20-90, failing to state the nature and amount of the tax to be assessed. The CIR’s subsequent appeal to the CTA En Banc was also dismissed, leading to the present petition before the Supreme Court.

    The Supreme Court addressed whether Section 203 of the NIRC applies to EWT and WTC assessments. The CIR contended that the prescriptive period does not apply to withholding agents like La Flor because the amount collected is a penalty, not the tax itself. However, the Court clarified that withholding taxes are indeed internal revenue taxes covered by Section 203 of the NIRC. Section 203 states:

    SEC. 203. Period of Limitation Upon Assessment and Collection. — Except as provided in Section 222, internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within three (3) years after the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the return, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period: Provided, That in case where a return is filed beyond the period prescribed by law, the three (3)-year period shall be counted from the day the return was filed. For purposes of this Section, a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day.

    Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that withholding taxes are a method of collecting income tax, with the withholding agent acting as the government’s agent to ensure payment. Two distinct liabilities arise: one for the income earner/payee and another for the withholding agent. As the Court stated in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:

    It is, therefore, indisputable that the withholding agent is merely a tax collector and not a taxpayer… Under the withholding system, however, the agent-payor becomes a payee by fiction of law. His (agent) liability is direct and independent from the taxpayer, because the income tax is still imposed on and due from the latter. The agent is not liable for the tax as no wealth flowed into him — he earned no income. The Tax Code only makes the agent personally liable for the tax arising from the breach of its legal duty to withhold.

    Thus, the Court rejected the CIR’s argument that withholding tax assessments are merely penalties outside the scope of Section 203 of the NIRC. These assessments aim to collect unpaid income taxes, not just penalize the withholding agent. The Court held that a holistic reading of the Tax Code reveals that the tax assessment for withholding tax deficiency is distinct and independent from possible penalties imposed for failure to withhold and remit taxes.

    The CIR also argued that the waivers executed by La Flor extended the prescriptive period, even if Section 203 applied. The CIR contended that the CTA erred in disregarding the waivers because evidence not formally offered may be considered if they form part of the records. However, the Court reiterated that waivers must strictly comply with RMO No. 20-90, which requires the indication of the nature and amount of the tax due. As the Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Systems Technology Institute, Inc., “These requirements are mandatory and must strictly be followed.”

    In the present case, the waivers failed to indicate the specific tax involved and the exact amount of the tax to be assessed or collected. The Court emphasized that these details are material because there can be no true and valid agreement between the taxpayer and the CIR absent this information. Thus, the waivers did not effectively extend the prescriptive period under Section 203 due to their invalidity.

    The Court determined that the assessments against La Flor had prescribed because the waivers were invalid. As the Supreme Court emphasized, compliance with RMO No. 20-90 is not merely directory but mandatory, ensuring that taxpayers are fully aware of the implications of waiving their right to the statute of limitations. This requirement provides taxpayers with a clear understanding of the extent of their waiver, preventing the tax authorities from making indefinite or arbitrary assessments.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the waivers executed by La Flor dela Isabela, Inc. effectively extended the prescriptive period for the CIR to assess deficiency taxes for EWT and WTC. The court focused on the validity of these waivers under RMO No. 20-90.
    What is the prescriptive period for tax assessment under the NIRC? Under Section 203 of the NIRC, the BIR has three years from the last day prescribed by law for filing the return to assess internal revenue taxes. This period can be extended through a valid waiver.
    What are the requirements for a valid waiver of the statute of limitations? A valid waiver must comply with RMO No. 20-90, which requires the waiver to specify the nature of the tax involved, the amount of the tax to be assessed or collected, and the specific date to which the period is extended.
    Why were the waivers in this case deemed invalid? The waivers were deemed invalid because they failed to indicate the specific tax involved and the exact amount of the tax to be assessed or collected, violating the requirements of RMO No. 20-90.
    Does Section 203 of the NIRC apply to withholding tax assessments? Yes, the Supreme Court clarified that Section 203 of the NIRC applies to withholding tax assessments. Withholding taxes are considered internal revenue taxes subject to the prescriptive periods outlined in the NIRC.
    What is the role of a withholding agent? A withholding agent is a payor who acts as the government’s agent for collecting taxes to ensure payment. The withholding agent retains a portion of the amount due to the income earner.
    What is the difference between the liability of the taxpayer and the withholding agent? The taxpayer (payee) is liable for the tax on their income, while the withholding agent is liable for failing to withhold the tax and remit it to the government. Their liabilities are distinct and independent.
    What happens if a withholding agent fails to withhold taxes properly? If a withholding agent fails to deduct the required amount from its payment to the payee, it is liable for deficiency taxes and applicable penalties. This liability is separate from the income tax liability of the payee.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of strict compliance with the requirements for waivers of the statute of limitations in tax assessments. This ensures that taxpayers are protected from indefinite extensions of the assessment period and that the tax authorities adhere to established legal procedures. The ruling provides clarity on the application of Section 203 of the NIRC to withholding tax assessments and reinforces the necessity of specifying the nature and amount of tax in any waiver agreement.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, V. LA FLOR DELA ISABELA, INC., RESPONDENT., G.R. No. 211289, January 14, 2019

  • Navigating VAT Refund Timelines: Strict Compliance Under the Tax Code

    In a ruling with significant implications for businesses in the Philippines, the Supreme Court affirmed the strict application of the 120+30 day rule for value-added tax (VAT) refund claims. This rule dictates the period within which taxpayers must both file their administrative claim with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) and, if denied or unacted upon, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The Court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Steag State Power, Inc., underscoring that failure to comply with these statutory deadlines results in the CTA losing jurisdiction over the refund claim. This decision reinforces the principle that claims for tax refunds, being in the nature of tax exemptions, are construed strictly against the claimant, and adherence to the prescribed procedures is mandatory.

    Can Belated Appeals Find Refuge? The Strict Timelines for VAT Refunds

    Steag State Power, Inc., a power generation company, sought a refund of unutilized input VAT payments on capital goods. After the CIR failed to act on its administrative claims, Steag State Power filed petitions for review with the CTA, but these were filed beyond the 120+30 day period stipulated in Section 112 of the National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code). The CTA dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction, a decision later affirmed by the CTA En Banc and initially by the Supreme Court. Steag State Power moved for reconsideration, arguing that its claims, though filed beyond the 120+30 day periods, were filed within the two-year period under Section 229 of the Tax Code, and that non-compliance with the 120+30 day periods should not be a jurisdictional defect. The Supreme Court’s resolution definitively addresses the interpretation and application of these timelines, providing clarity on the procedural requirements for VAT refund claims.

    The heart of the matter lies in Section 112(D) of the Tax Code, which prescribes the period within which the CIR must act on a refund claim and the period within which the taxpayer can appeal to the CTA:

    SECTION 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

    ….

    (D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. – In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.

    In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.

    The Supreme Court, in line with established jurisprudence such as Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, emphasized that this provision must be applied strictly. The 120-day period is for the CIR to process the refund claim, and the 30-day period is for the taxpayer to appeal to the CTA in case of denial or inaction. These periods are not merely directory but mandatory, as they define the CTA’s jurisdiction over the case.

    Steag State Power’s argument that it relied on Revenue Regulation No. 7-95, which seemingly allowed appeals to the CTA after the 120-day period but before the two-year period, was deemed untenable. The Court clarified that when Steag State Power filed its judicial claims in 2006, the prevailing rule was Revenue Regulation No. 16-2005, which mirrored the 120+30 day periods outlined in the Tax Code. Therefore, the claim of good faith reliance on an outdated regulation was misplaced. Moreover, the Court reiterated that the two-year prescriptive period under Section 112(A) of the Tax Code applies only to the filing of the administrative claim with the CIR, not to the judicial appeal before the CTA.

    The Supreme Court also addressed the argument that the window created in San Roque Power Corporation by BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which provided an exception for prematurely filed judicial claims, should also extend to belatedly filed claims. The Court rejected this argument, stating that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 specifically pertained to cases where the taxpayer did not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before seeking judicial relief. It did not, in any way, imply that late filings of judicial claims would be acceptable. This distinction is crucial, as it underscores the importance of adhering to the precise timelines set forth in the Tax Code.

    A key principle highlighted in this case is that the right to appeal to the CTA is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. As such, it can only be invoked by strictly complying with the conditions set by law. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, explicitly provides for a 30-day period to appeal either from receipt of the CIR’s adverse decision or from the lapse of the period fixed by law for action. Failure to comply with this period results in the CTA losing jurisdiction over the petition, a defect that cannot be waived.

    The implications of this ruling are far-reaching. Taxpayers seeking VAT refunds must meticulously observe the 120+30 day periods to ensure their claims are not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. This requires careful planning and timely action, both in the preparation and submission of administrative claims and in the subsequent filing of judicial appeals. It is crucial for businesses to have robust systems in place to track these deadlines and to seek legal counsel if necessary. Otherwise, they risk forfeiting significant amounts of potential refunds.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized that interpretations of law made by courts have retroactive effect. This means that the principles established in Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. and San Roque Power Corporation apply not only to future cases but also to pending cases, as demonstrated by the denial of Philex Mining Corporation’s claim in San Roque Power Corporation due to late filing. This underscores the importance of staying abreast of the latest jurisprudence and adjusting practices accordingly.

    Ultimately, this case serves as a stark reminder of the importance of procedural compliance in tax matters. Claims for tax refunds are construed strictly against the claimant, and any deviation from the prescribed procedures can have dire consequences. Taxpayers must be vigilant in ensuring that they meet all the requirements of the law to successfully claim their refunds.

    FAQs

    What is the 120+30 day rule for VAT refunds? It refers to the 120-day period for the CIR to process a VAT refund claim and the subsequent 30-day period for the taxpayer to appeal to the CTA if the claim is denied or unacted upon.
    What happens if a taxpayer files an appeal to the CTA after the 30-day period? The CTA loses jurisdiction over the petition, and the appeal will be dismissed due to late filing.
    Does the two-year prescriptive period apply to judicial claims before the CTA? No, the two-year prescriptive period only applies to the filing of the administrative claim with the CIR. The judicial claim must be filed within 30 days from the denial of the administrative claim or after the expiration of the 120-day period for the CIR to act.
    What was the significance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 in relation to VAT refunds? It allowed taxpayers to file judicial claims prematurely, without waiting for the 120-day period to lapse. However, this ruling does not apply to cases of late filing.
    Is the right to appeal to the CTA a constitutional right? No, it is a statutory privilege, and its exercise requires strict compliance with the conditions attached by the statute.
    What regulation was prevailing when Steag State Power filed its judicial claims? Revenue Regulation No. 16-2005, which mirrored the 120+30 day periods outlined in the Tax Code, was prevailing at the time.
    Can the CTA motu proprio pass upon the issue of the appeals’ timeliness? Yes, the CTA is not precluded to pass on this issue motu proprio, regardless of any purported stipulation made by the parties.
    Does this ruling apply retroactively? Yes, interpretations of law made by courts generally have retroactive effect.

    This case underscores the critical importance of adhering to procedural requirements in tax matters, particularly the strict timelines for VAT refund claims. Businesses must ensure they have robust systems in place to track deadlines and seek legal counsel when necessary to avoid the costly consequences of non-compliance.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: STEAG STATE POWER, INC. VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 205282, January 14, 2019

  • Relief from Accountability: Proving Diligence in Handling Public Funds Despite Loss

    In Dr. Consolacion S. Callang v. Commission on Audit, the Supreme Court ruled that a public officer was not liable for the loss of public funds due to robbery, overturning the Commission on Audit’s (COA) decision. The Court found that Dr. Callang, a District Supervisor, acted with reasonable diligence in safeguarding the funds, considering the circumstances of past burglaries at her office and the lack of a secure vault. This decision clarifies that negligence in handling public funds is determined by the specific facts of each case, and accountable officers are not liable if they exercise prudence, even if loss occurs due to unforeseen events.

    When Past Burglaries Justify a Risky Decision: Can a Robbed Official Be Excused?

    The case revolves around Dr. Consolacion S. Callang’s petition against the COA, which had held her liable for P537,454.50 lost in a robbery. Callang, a District Supervisor for the Department of Education (DepEd) in Nueva Vizcaya, had encashed checks to pay the 2005 Year-End Bonus and Cash Gift for her district’s teaching and non-teaching personnel. After distributing part of the funds, she decided to bring the remaining amount home, as a colleague was hesitant to keep it in the office’s steel cabinet. The next day, while en route to her office, Callang was robbed of the money and her personal belongings. She promptly reported the incident and requested relief from money accountability, which was initially supported by the Audit Team Leader (ATL) and Supervising Auditor (SA) but later denied by the COA.

    The COA argued that Callang was negligent because she opted to have lunch at a fast-food restaurant and brought the money home despite the presence of a safety deposit box in her office. Callang countered that her office had been burglarized multiple times in the past and that the ‘safety deposit box’ was merely a steel cabinet. This prompted the Supreme Court to examine whether Callang’s actions constituted negligence in handling public funds, considering the specific circumstances she faced. The Court had to weigh her responsibility to protect public money against the practical realities and security concerns of her work environment.

    The legal framework for this case is rooted in Section 105 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, which states that accountable officers are liable for the loss of government property or funds if it’s due to their negligence. However, if the loss occurs despite the officer exercising due diligence, they should be relieved from accountability. The Supreme Court has consistently held that negligence is a relative concept, dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. As the Court stated in Bintudan v. Commission on Audit:

    Negligence is the omission to do something that a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent man and [a] reasonable man could not do. Stated otherwise, negligence is want of care required by the circumstances. Negligence is, therefore, a relative or comparative concept. Its application depends upon the situation the parties are in, and the degree of care and vigilance which the prevailing circumstances reasonably require.

    The Court emphasized that determining negligence requires evaluating the specific context and the level of care reasonably expected from the accountable officer.

    The Supreme Court disagreed with the COA’s assessment that Callang was negligent. The Court noted that her decision to have lunch at a fast-food restaurant was partly to meet with other school principals for fund distribution. Moreover, the robbery did not occur at the restaurant, so any perceived negligence during lunch was not directly linked to the loss. Similarly, her brief stop at her granddaughter’s school, located near her home, did not significantly alter her route or increase her risk of robbery. The critical point of contention was Callang’s choice to bring the money home, which the COA considered a breach of her duty of care.

    However, the Court sided with Callang, noting that her office had a history of burglaries and that the so-called ‘safety deposit box’ was just a steel cabinet. The Court highlighted that the ATL found the office had been subject to multiple burglary incidents and lacked a proper safety vault, only having a wooden cabinet and a steel cabinet. The Supreme Court found this crucial in determining whether Callang had acted prudently. As the Court noted in Gutierrez v. Commission on Audit, the safety of money cannot be ensured if it is deposited in enclosures other than a safety vault.

    Callang’s decision to bring the money home was deemed reasonable under the circumstances. The Court compared her situation to that in Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, where the accountable officer faced a dilemma with each option presenting risks. In this case, Callang had to decide between leaving the money in an insecure office or taking it home for safekeeping. The Court stated:

    Hindsight is a cruel judge. It is so easy to say, after the event, that one should have done this and not that or that he should not have acted at all, or else this problem would not have arisen at all. That is all very well as long as one is examining something that has already taken place… For most of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might happen, based on common sense and our own experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and without any mystic ability to peer into the future. So it was with the petitioner.

    This highlights the principle that an officer’s actions must be judged based on the information and circumstances available at the time, not with the benefit of hindsight. Therefore, Callang’s decision was a reasonable response to the potential risks.

    Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that Callang’s actions should be evaluated based on the conditions she faced, which included past burglaries and inadequate storage facilities. This approach contrasts with the COA’s view, which focused solely on the fact that the money was lost while in Callang’s possession. Furthermore, in Leano v. Hon. Domingo, the Court affirmed that a steel cabinet is an inadequate storage for government funds, especially when the office’s security is compromised.

    The significance of this decision lies in its emphasis on a fact-specific inquiry into claims of negligence involving public funds. Accountable officers are expected to exercise diligence, but their actions must be evaluated in the context of their working conditions and the resources available to them. The ruling clarifies that negligence is not simply a failure to prevent loss but a failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.

    The Supreme Court’s decision provides practical guidance for public officers handling government funds. It reinforces that they are not strictly liable for any loss, but their actions will be judged based on reasonableness and prudence. The ruling serves as a reminder that an officer’s duty is to act with due care, and when faced with difficult choices, their decisions will be evaluated based on the information they had at the time. This provides a degree of protection for public servants acting in good faith and with reasonable judgment.

    Ultimately, the Court found that Callang had taken appropriate measures to safeguard the funds under her control, given the challenges she faced. Her decision to bring the money home was a responsible choice, considering the risks associated with leaving it in an insecure office. Therefore, she should be relieved from money accountability for the loss due to the robbery.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Dr. Callang was negligent in handling public funds, making her liable for the money lost during a robbery. The Supreme Court assessed her actions in the context of her office’s security issues and her reasonable belief that bringing the money home was the safer option.
    What did the Commission on Audit (COA) argue? The COA argued that Dr. Callang was negligent because she had lunch at a fast-food restaurant instead of immediately returning to her office and because she took the money home despite the presence of a safety deposit box. They contended that she failed to take adequate precautionary measures to protect the funds.
    What was Dr. Callang’s defense? Dr. Callang argued that her office had a history of burglaries and the ‘safety deposit box’ was merely a steel cabinet, not a secure vault. She also stated that she had lunch at a fast-food restaurant in order to meet with other school principals for fund distribution.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court reversed the COA’s decision, ruling that Dr. Callang was not negligent and should be relieved from money accountability. The Court found that she acted reasonably and prudently under the circumstances, especially considering the security concerns at her office.
    What is the legal basis for the Supreme Court’s decision? The decision is based on Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, which holds accountable officers liable for losses due to negligence but allows relief from accountability if they exercise due diligence. The Court also considered past rulings emphasizing that negligence is a relative concept dependent on specific circumstances.
    Why did the Court emphasize the past burglaries at Dr. Callang’s office? The Court emphasized the past burglaries to demonstrate that Dr. Callang had a valid reason to believe that her office was not a secure place to leave the money. This context supported her decision to bring the money home as a more prudent alternative.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling for public officers? The ruling provides guidance for public officers handling government funds, clarifying that they are not strictly liable for any loss. Their actions will be judged based on reasonableness and prudence, considering the circumstances and resources available to them, providing a degree of protection for those acting in good faith.
    How does this case relate to the concept of negligence? This case illustrates that negligence is a fact-specific inquiry, and a public officer’s actions must be evaluated in the context of their working conditions and resources. It clarifies that negligence is not simply a failure to prevent loss but a failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.

    This case underscores the importance of considering the totality of circumstances when determining liability for the loss of public funds. It highlights the need for a balanced approach, weighing the duty of care against the practical realities and security concerns faced by public officers. The decision provides valuable guidance for evaluating negligence claims and ensures that accountable officers are not unfairly penalized when they act prudently and in good faith.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: DR. CONSOLACION S. CALLANG VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 210683, January 08, 2019

  • Breach of Legal Ethics: Attorney Suspended for Negligence and Deceit in Handling Client’s Case

    In Everdina C. Angeles v. Atty. Wilfredo B. Lina-ac, the Supreme Court addressed the serious ethical violations committed by Atty. Lina-ac, who was found negligent and deceitful in handling his client’s annulment case. The Court emphasized that lawyers must uphold the highest standards of competence, integrity, and diligence. Atty. Lina-ac’s failure to file the petition, coupled with his attempt to deceive his client with a fabricated court stamp, constituted a grave breach of his professional obligations. The ruling serves as a reminder that the practice of law is a privilege and that any deviation from ethical standards will be met with appropriate sanctions, reinforcing the public’s trust in the legal profession.

    Deceived and Defrauded: Can a Lawyer’s Actions Lead to Suspension?

    Everdina Angeles sought the services of Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac to file a petition for the nullity of her marriage. She paid him P50,000.00 in professional fees, but Atty. Lina-ac failed to file the petition promptly. To make matters worse, he presented Angeles with a copy of the complaint bearing a fake Regional Trial Court stamp, misleading her into believing that the case had been filed. Upon discovering the deception, Angeles demanded the return of her money and eventually filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Lina-ac for negligence and deceit. The case highlights the critical importance of honesty and diligence in the legal profession.

    The Supreme Court’s decision rested heavily on the lawyer’s duty to serve clients with competence and diligence, as mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 17 explicitly states, “A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” This trust was undeniably broken when Atty. Lina-ac not only neglected his client’s case but also actively deceived her. Moreover, Canon 18 further emphasizes the need for competence and diligence, with Rule 18.03 stating, “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” Atty. Lina-ac’s actions clearly violated these tenets, leading to his suspension.

    The Court also highlighted the gravity of Atty. Lina-ac’s deceitful conduct, which violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.” Presenting a fabricated document to a client is a direct affront to this rule and undermines the integrity of the legal profession. Even after the attorney-client relationship was severed, Atty. Lina-ac filed a second complaint in an attempt to rectify his initial negligence, further demonstrating a lack of integrity. This series of actions painted a clear picture of an attorney who failed to uphold the standards expected of a member of the bar.

    In its analysis, the Court quoted Del Mundo v. Atty. Capistrano, emphasizing that “the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.” Lawyers have a fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts, and their clients, and must adhere to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Failing to meet these standards can result in disciplinary actions, tailored to the specific facts of each case.

    However, the Court also considered Atty. Lina-ac’s advanced age when determining the appropriate penalty. While acknowledging the severity of his misconduct, the Court opted to temper justice with mercy, imposing a two-year suspension from the practice of law instead of disbarment. This decision reflects the Court’s recognition of the lawyer’s age and its desire to balance justice with compassion, even in cases involving serious ethical violations. The Court also ordered Atty. Lina-ac to return the P50,000.00 to Angeles with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of promulgation of the Resolution until fully paid.

    The ruling reinforces the importance of maintaining the public’s trust in the legal profession by holding lawyers accountable for their actions. Attorneys must understand that their conduct directly impacts the perception of the entire legal system. The Supreme Court’s firm stance against negligence and deceit serves as a strong deterrent, encouraging lawyers to uphold their ethical obligations and responsibilities. This case acts as a crucial reminder that the legal profession is built on trust and integrity, and any breach of that trust will be met with appropriate consequences.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Atty. Lina-ac violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to file a petition for annulment for his client, presenting a fabricated court stamp, and engaging in deceitful conduct. The Supreme Court had to determine if his actions warranted disciplinary action.
    What specific violations did Atty. Lina-ac commit? Atty. Lina-ac violated Canon 17 (fidelity to client’s cause), Canon 18 (competence and diligence), Rule 18.03 (neglect of legal matter), Rule 18.04 (failure to keep client informed), and Rule 1.01 (dishonest conduct) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. These violations stemmed from his failure to file the petition, presenting a fake court stamp, and subsequent attempts to cover up his negligence.
    What was the penalty imposed on Atty. Lina-ac? Initially, the IBP Board of Governors suspended Atty. Lina-ac for two years and ordered him to return P50,000.00 to Angeles. The Supreme Court modified this, ultimately suspending him from the practice of law for two years and ordering him to return the P50,000.00 with interest.
    Why did the Supreme Court temper the penalty? The Supreme Court considered Atty. Lina-ac’s advanced age (approximately 78 years old at the time of promulgation) and opted for a two-year suspension instead of disbarment, balancing justice with compassion. This decision was based on the acknowledgment of his age and the potential impact of disbarment at that stage of his life.
    What is the significance of the fake court stamp? The fake court stamp was a critical piece of evidence demonstrating Atty. Lina-ac’s intent to deceive his client, Everdina Angeles. It showed that he was not only negligent but also actively attempting to mislead her into believing that the petition had been filed when it had not.
    What duties does a lawyer owe to their client? A lawyer owes their client duties of competence, diligence, fidelity, and honesty. This includes keeping the client informed of the status of their case, acting in their best interest, and avoiding any form of deceit or misrepresentation.
    What happens if a lawyer neglects a legal matter? If a lawyer neglects a legal matter entrusted to them, they may be held administratively liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility. This can result in penalties such as suspension from the practice of law or, in severe cases, disbarment.
    Can a lawyer be disciplined even after the attorney-client relationship ends? Yes, a lawyer can still be disciplined for actions taken during the attorney-client relationship, even after it has ended. Atty. Lina-ac was disciplined for his actions even after Angeles terminated their agreement.

    This case underscores the judiciary’s commitment to upholding ethical standards within the legal profession. It serves as a reminder to all attorneys of their duty to act with competence, diligence, and honesty in all their dealings with clients. The consequences of failing to meet these standards can be severe, impacting not only the lawyer’s career but also the public’s trust in the legal system.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: EVERDINA C. ANGELES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. WILFREDO B. LINA-AC, RESPONDENT, A.C. No. 12063, January 08, 2019

  • Upholding Police Accountability: Grave Misconduct and the Limits of Procedural Technicalities in Administrative Appeals

    In Quirino T. Dela Cruz v. National Police Commission, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a police officer found guilty of grave misconduct, underscoring that procedural rules should not shield erring law enforcers. The Court emphasized that administrative bodies must have the latitude to effectively discipline their ranks. This case reinforces the principle that those sworn to uphold the law are held to the highest standards of conduct, and deviations from these standards will be met with appropriate sanctions. Ultimately, this ruling serves as a reminder that public servants are accountable for their actions, and the pursuit of justice should not be hindered by mere technicalities.

    When Duty Betrays Public Trust: Examining Police Misconduct and Due Process

    The case stemmed from a complaint filed by Sonny Villarias against SPO4 Quirino Dela Cruz and PO2 Ariel Cantorna, alleging that the officers unlawfully arrested him and stole personal belongings during the arrest. Villarias detailed how SPO4 Dela Cruz allegedly pointed an armalite rifle at him, handcuffed him, and, along with other officers, ransacked his house, taking valuables. He further claimed that the arrest was instigated by a neighbor, Ruby Carambas, with whom he had a dispute, and who was allegedly associated with PO1 Cantorna. These accusations formed the basis of an administrative complaint for grave misconduct against the officers.

    The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) found SPO4 Dela Cruz and PO2 Cantorna culpable of grave misconduct, leading to their dismissal from service. NAPOLCOM relied heavily on Villarias’s detailed account, as well as the testimony of a witness who corroborated the unlawful entry and seizure of items from Villarias’s residence. The Commission deemed their actions as “unforgivable atrocities” and found that they made untruthful statements during the proceedings. Aggrieved, SPO4 Dela Cruz appealed the decision, but the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dismissed his appeal for being filed out of time.

    Dela Cruz then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the CSC’s decision, emphasizing that while procedural rules can be relaxed, there must be a substantial basis for doing so. The CA found that Dela Cruz failed to provide sufficient proof that his appeal was filed within the prescribed period. Further, the CA held that Dela Cruz was not denied due process since he had the opportunity to present evidence supporting his claim of timely filing during the motion for reconsideration before the CSC. This consistent upholding of the original decision highlights the importance of adhering to procedural rules while also ensuring fairness and due process.

    The Supreme Court, in denying Dela Cruz’s petition, reiterated that it is not a trier of facts and will not delve into factual issues already resolved by lower tribunals. The Court emphasized that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari should only pertain to questions of law. Here, the petitioner raised factual questions regarding the timeliness of his appeal and the sufficiency of evidence against him. The Court noted that Dela Cruz had not provided sufficient justification for it to deviate from this rule. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the factual findings of the CA, which affirmed the decisions of the CSC and NAPOLCOM, were binding and conclusive.

    Central to the Court’s decision was the principle that administrative agencies are best equipped to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence presented before them. The Court recognized NAPOLCOM’s assessment of Villarias’s testimony and the corroborating evidence, which led to the finding of grave misconduct. The Court also highlighted that Dela Cruz had not adequately addressed the NAPOLCOM’s finding that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. This failure to timely seek reconsideration meant that the original decision had already become final and executory, further undermining his appeal.

    The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of relaxing procedural rules. Citing Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, the Court reiterated that relaxation of procedural rules is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. In this case, the Court found no such compelling reason to justify a departure from the established rules. The Court stressed the importance of adhering to procedural rules to ensure the orderly and speedy administration of justice. In the context of administrative proceedings involving erring police officers, the Court emphasized that it would not tolerate abuse of police authority and would not provide relief to those who have committed atrocities against civilians.

    This decision underscores the importance of accountability within the police force and sends a clear message that misconduct will not be tolerated. The Court’s firm stance against abuse of authority and its adherence to procedural rules reinforce the integrity of the justice system. By upholding the dismissal of SPO4 Dela Cruz, the Supreme Court has affirmed the principle that law enforcers must be held to the highest standards of conduct and that their actions must be subject to scrutiny. This case serves as a reminder that public trust is paramount and that those who violate that trust will face appropriate consequences.

    The ruling in Dela Cruz v. National Police Commission reaffirms several key legal principles. First, it highlights the importance of timely filing of appeals in administrative proceedings. Second, it reinforces the principle that factual findings of administrative agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally binding on appellate courts. Third, it reiterates that relaxation of procedural rules is an exception, not the norm, and requires compelling justification. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, it underscores the accountability of law enforcement officers and the commitment to upholding public trust.

    The implications of this decision extend beyond the specific facts of the case. It serves as a precedent for future administrative proceedings involving allegations of police misconduct. It also provides guidance to administrative agencies on how to assess evidence and make findings of fact. Ultimately, this ruling contributes to a more accountable and transparent police force, which is essential for maintaining public confidence in the justice system.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the dismissal of Dela Cruz’s appeal for being filed out of time and whether the evidence presented to the National Police Commission was sufficient to establish his liability for grave misconduct.
    What is grave misconduct? Grave misconduct generally involves acts that are inherently immoral, dishonest, or that demonstrate a blatant disregard for established rules and procedures. In the context of law enforcement, it often involves abuse of authority or violations of the public trust.
    What is the standard of proof in administrative cases? The standard of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is a lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is required in criminal cases.
    Why did the Supreme Court refuse to review the facts of the case? The Supreme Court generally does not review factual findings of lower courts and administrative agencies, especially when they are supported by substantial evidence. The Court’s role is primarily to resolve questions of law, not to re-evaluate the evidence.
    What is the significance of the timely filing of appeals? Timely filing of appeals is crucial because it ensures the finality of decisions and promotes the orderly administration of justice. Failure to file an appeal within the prescribed period generally results in the loss of the right to appeal.
    What is the role of the Civil Service Commission in administrative cases involving government employees? The Civil Service Commission (CSC) is the central personnel agency of the Philippine government, responsible for administering the civil service system. It has the authority to review and decide appeals in administrative cases involving government employees, including police officers.
    What factors does the Court consider when deciding whether to relax procedural rules? The Court may relax procedural rules in exceptional circumstances where strict adherence would frustrate the ends of justice. Factors considered include the presence of compelling reasons, the lack of prejudice to the other party, and the overall interest of justice.
    What is the implication of this ruling for police accountability? This ruling reinforces the importance of police accountability and sends a message that misconduct will not be tolerated. It underscores the need for law enforcement officers to adhere to the highest standards of conduct and to respect the rights of citizens.

    The Quirino T. Dela Cruz v. National Police Commission serves as a significant precedent for administrative cases involving allegations of police misconduct. It reinforces the principle that law enforcement officers must be held accountable for their actions and that procedural rules should not be used to shield erring officers from disciplinary action. The decision also provides valuable guidance to administrative agencies on how to assess evidence and make findings of fact in these types of cases.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: QUIRINO T. DELA CRUZ, VS. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 215545, January 07, 2019