ASG Law

Category: Commercial Law

  • Summary Judgment vs. Trial: Protecting Parties’ Rights in Contract Disputes

    In Majestic Plus Holding International, Inc. v. Bullion Investment and Development Corporation, the Supreme Court ruled that a summary judgment was improperly issued because genuine issues of material fact existed, necessitating a full trial. The court emphasized that summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts are undisputed, and no genuine issue requires evidentiary proof. This decision safeguards parties’ rights to present evidence and have factual disputes resolved through trial, ensuring fairness and due process in contract disputes.

    Meisic Mall Showdown: When Should a Court Skip Trial?

    This case arose from a dispute between Majestic Plus Holding International, Inc. (Majestic) and Bullion Investment and Development Corporation (Bullion) over a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning the development of Meisic Mall in Manila. Bullion, having entered into a contract with the City of Manila to lease and develop a property, sought Majestic’s investment to complete the construction of a commercial building intended as a mall. A MOA was executed, outlining Majestic’s acquisition of an 80% equity interest in Bullion, subject to certain terms and conditions. However, disagreements arose, leading to a legal battle involving specific performance, injunction, and damages.

    The central issue revolved around whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) properly rendered a summary judgment in favor of Majestic, ordering Bullion to comply with the MOA. A summary judgment is a procedural shortcut that allows a court to decide a case without a full trial if there are no genuine disputes over material facts. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision, finding that genuine issues of fact existed, thus making summary judgment inappropriate.

    At the heart of the matter was the question of whether Bullion had validly rescinded the MOA due to Majestic’s alleged failure to meet its payment obligations. Majestic argued that it had substantially complied with its obligations and that Bullion had failed to adhere to the MOA’s conditions for rescission. Bullion, on the other hand, claimed that Majestic’s default in payment entitled it to rescind the agreement. The MOA itself outlined specific conditions for default and rescission:

    7.1. Should MAJESTIC default in the payment of at least two (2) installment dues under this contract, BULLION, at its sole option may elect to rescind the contract in which event only half of the total amount paid by MAJESTIC shall be refunded to it without need of demand. MAJESTIC shall be considered in default upon its failure to pay the full amount of the outstanding obligation within fifteen (15) days from written demand of BULLION.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a full trial in resolving factual disputes. The Court cited the case of Calubaquib, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, highlighting the conditions for summary judgment:

    In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition.

    The Court found that the RTC had erred in issuing a summary judgment without conducting a hearing to determine whether genuine issues of fact existed. Majestic’s claims that it incurred significant expenses in completing the Meisic Mall’s construction, totaling P134,522,803.22, were contested by Bullion. The Court stated, “Undoubtedly, the case at bar may not, even by the most liberal or strained interpretation, be considered as one not involving genuine issues of fact which necessitates presentation of evidence to determine which of the two conflicting assertions is correct.”

    Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of rescission, noting that Majestic strongly opposed Bullion’s decision to rescind the MOA. It reiterated that extrajudicial rescission is only legally effective when the other party does not object to it. Since Majestic contested the rescission, a judicial determination was necessary, requiring an examination of evidence presented during a full trial. The Court agreed with the CA’s assessment that the issue of rescission necessitated judicial intervention, including the examination of evidence presented by the parties in a full trial.

    The Supreme Court also affirmed the CA’s decision to restore possession and control of Meisic Mall to Bullion, citing the principle that a corporation’s business and affairs are managed by its Board of Directors, not its controlling stockholder. Even if Majestic had become the controlling stockholder, this did not automatically grant it the right to physical possession and operation of the mall.

    The case underscores the principle that summary judgment is inappropriate when genuine factual disputes exist, requiring the presentation of evidence and a full trial to resolve conflicting claims. The decision also reaffirms that a corporation’s management is vested in its Board of Directors, not merely in a controlling stockholder, further protecting corporate governance structures. The court’s ruling serves as a reminder that procedural shortcuts should not compromise the fundamental right to a fair hearing and the opportunity to present evidence in support of one’s claims.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) properly rendered a summary judgment in favor of Majestic, ordering Bullion to comply with a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), or if genuine issues of material fact existed that required a full trial.
    What is a summary judgment? A summary judgment is a procedural device used to expedite a case by allowing a court to decide it without a full trial if there are no genuine disputes over material facts. It is appropriate when the evidence shows that there is no real issue to be tried and that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    When is a summary judgment not appropriate? A summary judgment is not appropriate when there are genuine disputes over material facts, meaning the parties disagree about facts that could affect the outcome of the case. In such cases, a full trial is necessary to allow the parties to present evidence and have the factual issues resolved by the court.
    What was the Court’s reasoning for reversing the summary judgment? The Court found that genuine issues of material fact existed, particularly regarding whether Bullion had validly rescinded the MOA due to Majestic’s alleged failure to meet its payment obligations and whether Majestic had incurred certain expenses. These issues required the presentation of evidence and a full trial for resolution.
    What is the significance of extrajudicial rescission in this case? The Court noted that extrajudicial rescission is only legally effective when the other party does not object to it. Since Majestic strongly opposed Bullion’s rescission of the MOA, a judicial determination was necessary, requiring an examination of evidence presented during a full trial.
    Who has the right of possession and control of the Meisic Mall? The Court affirmed the CA’s decision to restore possession and control of Meisic Mall to Bullion, citing the principle that a corporation’s business and affairs are managed by its Board of Directors, not its controlling stockholder.
    What does this case teach us about factual disputes? This case underscores the principle that summary judgment is inappropriate when genuine factual disputes exist, requiring the presentation of evidence and a full trial to resolve conflicting claims. It emphasizes the importance of a fair hearing and the opportunity to present evidence.
    What is the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court denied Majestic’s petitions and affirmed the CA’s decisions. The case was remanded to the RTC of Manila to be re-raffled to a non-commercial court for further proceedings and proper disposition.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case highlights the importance of due process and the right to a full trial when genuine issues of material fact are in dispute. The ruling underscores the need for courts to carefully consider whether summary judgment is appropriate and to ensure that parties have the opportunity to present evidence and have their claims fully adjudicated.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Majestic Plus Holding International, Inc. v. Bullion Investment and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 215289, December 5, 2016

  • Mandatory Arbitration: Prioritizing Dispute Resolution in Commercial Contracts

    The Supreme Court ruled that when a contract contains a mandatory arbitration clause, parties must exhaust arbitration proceedings before resorting to court action. This decision reinforces the importance of upholding contractual agreements that prioritize alternative dispute resolution methods. This ruling impacts how businesses handle disputes, emphasizing the need to first adhere to agreed-upon arbitration processes, which can lead to more efficient and cost-effective resolutions.

    Contractual Promises: Must Arbitration Precede Legal Action?

    In UCPB General Insurance Company, Inc. v. Hughes Electronics Corporation, the core dispute revolved around whether Hughes Electronics could directly sue UCPB Insurance without first undergoing arbitration, as stipulated in their contract. Hughes Electronics had a contract with One Virtual Corporation (OVC) for VSAT equipment and services, with UCPB Insurance acting as the surety for OVC’s payments. When OVC failed to meet its payment obligations, Hughes Electronics bypassed the arbitration clause in their contract and sued UCPB Insurance directly. This decision by Hughes sparked a legal battle centered on the interpretation and enforceability of the arbitration clause within the contract.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the mandatory nature of the negotiation process outlined in the contract’s dispute resolution clause. The contract stated that parties “shall attempt to resolve any dispute… through good faith negotiations.” The Court interpreted the word “shall” as an imperative, indicating that negotiation was a compulsory first step. Good faith, in this context, requires an honest effort to resolve disputes amicably, without malice or intent to defraud. Hughes Electronics’ failure to engage in meaningful negotiation with OVC before suing UCPB Insurance was a critical factor in the Court’s decision. Instead of attempting negotiation, Hughes Electronics immediately sought recourse from UCPB Insurance, which the Court viewed as a violation of the contractual agreement.

    Furthermore, the Court addressed the interpretation of the arbitration clause, specifically the use of the word “may” and the waiver provision. The Court acknowledged that “may” typically implies discretion, indicating liberty or permission. However, the Court also recognized that contractual interpretation must consider the parties’ intent and the overall context of the agreement. Contract interpretation requires that provisions be read in relation to each other, not in isolation, to achieve the intended purpose. The waiver provision, allowing parties to bypass negotiation and arbitration under certain conditions, was also scrutinized. The Court found no evidence that Hughes Electronics would suffer “irrevocable harm” from the delay caused by arbitration, negating the justification for waiving the arbitration requirement.

    The Supreme Court clarified that the intent of the parties, as reflected in the entirety of the contract, should guide the interpretation of specific clauses. In this case, the initial mandatory negotiation clause, coupled with the absence of demonstrated irreparable harm, indicated that arbitration should have been pursued before litigation. The Court underscored that, per Article 1370 of the Civil Code, if the terms of a contract are clear, the literal meaning controls, but the intent of the parties prevails if the words contradict that intent. Moreover, Article 1374 directs that stipulations be interpreted together to derive their collective meaning. It is standing jurisprudence that in interpreting a contract, its provisions should not be read in isolation but in relation to each other and in their entirety so as to render them effective, having in mind the intention of the parties and the purpose to be achieved. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly

    The Court also recognized the importance of arbitration in resolving technical disputes, such as those involving the installation of the Burroughs protocol. Arbitration is particularly suited for these matters because it allows for the involvement of experts with specialized knowledge. The arbitration clause in the contract demonstrated the parties’ intent to resolve disputes outside of court, fostering a less antagonistic environment. The Supreme Court quoted Koppel, Inc. v. Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Inc., emphasizing that arbitration is rooted in party autonomy, allowing parties to tailor their dispute resolution process.

    The Court emphasized that compliance with a condition precedent, such as the arbitration clause, is necessary before any right or action can be enforced. Since Hughes Electronics failed to comply with the mandatory arbitration clause, their lawsuit was deemed premature. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, ordering the parties to proceed with arbitration in accordance with the International Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether Hughes Electronics was required to undergo arbitration before filing a lawsuit against UCPB Insurance, given the arbitration clause in their contract.
    What did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that the arbitration clause was mandatory and that Hughes Electronics should have exhausted arbitration proceedings before resorting to court action.
    What does “good faith” mean in the context of negotiations? “Good faith” implies an honest intention to resolve disputes amicably, without malice or intent to defraud, and with a genuine belief in the validity of one’s position.
    Why is arbitration important in commercial disputes? Arbitration is important because it provides a less formal and more efficient way to resolve disputes, often involving technical issues, through the use of expert arbitrators.
    What is a condition precedent? A condition precedent is a requirement that must be fulfilled before a right or action can be enforced; in this case, it was the completion of arbitration proceedings.
    What does the word “shall” mean in a contract? The word “shall” typically indicates a mandatory obligation, meaning the parties are required to perform the specified action.
    Under what circumstances can arbitration be waived? Arbitration can be waived if both parties agree in writing that the nature of the dispute cannot be resolved through negotiations or if a party would suffer irrevocable harm due to the delay.
    What is the significance of party autonomy in arbitration? Party autonomy means that parties have the freedom to agree on the terms of their dispute resolution process, allowing them to tailor the process to their specific needs.
    What Civil Code Articles were relevant to the Court’s decision? Articles 1370 and 1374 of the Civil Code, which provide guidelines for interpreting contracts and determining the intent of the parties, were particularly relevant.

    This case serves as a reminder of the importance of adhering to contractual agreements, especially those involving dispute resolution mechanisms like arbitration. Businesses should carefully review their contracts and ensure they understand their obligations regarding arbitration. Failure to comply with these clauses can result in legal setbacks and increased costs.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: UCPB General Insurance Company, Inc. v. Hughes Electronics Corporation, G.R. No. 190385, November 16, 2016

  • VAT Refund Denied: The Critical Role of Official Receipts in Zero-Rated Sales

    In Takenaka Corporation-Philippine Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a VAT refund claim due to the taxpayer’s failure to present official receipts to substantiate zero-rated sales. The Court emphasized that sales invoices are insufficient to prove the sale of services, for which official receipts are required. This ruling reinforces the importance of adhering to stringent documentation requirements when claiming VAT refunds, highlighting the distinction between invoices and receipts in tax compliance.

    Takenaka’s Tax Troubles: Can Sales Invoices Substitute Official Receipts for VAT Refund?

    Takenaka Corporation, a Philippine branch of a foreign entity, sought a refund for excess input value-added tax (VAT) from its zero-rated sales of services for the taxable year 2002. Takenaka had entered into a subcontract with Philippine Air Terminal Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino Terminal III (NAIA-IPT3). PIATCO was registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as an Ecozone Developer/Operator. Takenaka filed its quarterly VAT returns for 2002, later amending them to reflect zero-rated sales to PIATCO. In January 2003, the BIR issued VAT Ruling No. 011-03, confirming that Takenaka’s sales of services to PIATCO were subject to zero-percent (0%) VAT and required no prior approval based on Revenue Memorandum Circular 74-99. However, the core legal issue centered on whether the sales invoices submitted by Takenaka sufficed as evidence to prove its zero-rated sale of services, entitling it to the VAT refund.

    The case initially saw conflicting decisions within the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The Former First Division initially granted Takenaka a reduced refund amount, but this was later amended to a full grant upon reconsideration. However, the CTA En Banc reversed this decision, denying Takenaka’s claim. This denial was based on the premise that Takenaka failed to provide proper VAT official receipts to substantiate its zero-rated sales of services to PEZA-registered entities. This led Takenaka to appeal to the Supreme Court, questioning the sufficiency of sales invoices as proof of zero-rated transactions.

    The Supreme Court addressed the issue of timeliness, emphasizing that jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. The Court referred to the guidelines established in Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which outlines the periods for filing administrative and judicial claims for VAT refunds. The Court reiterated that an administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated sales were made. The CIR then has 120 days to decide the claim, and a judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the CIR’s decision or the expiration of the 120-day period.

    Applying these guidelines to Takenaka, the Court found that while the administrative claim was timely filed, the judicial claim with the CTA was filed 184 days after the deadline. This delay meant the CTA did not acquire jurisdiction over Takenaka’s appeal. Even though the judicial claim was brought within the two-year prescriptive period, the Court clarified that this period applies to the administrative claim, not the judicial claim. Accordingly, the CTA should have initially denied Takenaka’s claim for lack of jurisdiction.

    Building on this procedural point, the Supreme Court also addressed the substantive issue of documentation. The Court emphasized the distinction between a VAT invoice and a VAT official receipt. A VAT invoice is used for sales of goods or properties, while a VAT official receipt is for lease of goods or properties and sales of services. The Court quoted Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining Corporation to highlight these differences:

    A ‘sales or commercial invoice’ is a written account of goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices charged therefor or a list by whatever name it is known which is used in the ordinary course of business evidencing sale and transfer or agreement to sell or transfer goods and services.

    A ‘receipt’ on the other hand is a written acknowledgment of the fact of payment in money or other settlement between seller and buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or person rendering services and client or customer.

    Since Takenaka provided sales invoices instead of official receipts, its submissions were deemed inadequate. The Court sided with the CTA En Banc’s conclusion that without proper VAT official receipts, Takenaka’s payments for services to PEZA-registered entities could not qualify for VAT zero-rating. This meant that Takenaka could not claim such sales as zero-rated VAT not subject to output tax. The Court also cited Western Mindanao Power Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, emphasizing that even with an approved zero-rating application, taxpayers must still comply with invoicing and accounting requirements to justify a refund or tax credit.

    The ruling in Takenaka Corporation-Philippine Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue underscores the critical importance of maintaining proper documentation, specifically official receipts, to substantiate claims for VAT refunds on zero-rated sales of services. This decision serves as a reminder to taxpayers to adhere strictly to the invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and its implementing regulations. The failure to provide the correct documentation, in this case, official receipts instead of sales invoices, can lead to the denial of a refund claim, regardless of the validity of the underlying zero-rated transaction. This ensures proper tax compliance and prevents potential revenue loss for the government. For businesses engaged in zero-rated sales of services, this means meticulous record-keeping and a thorough understanding of the specific documentation required for VAT refund claims. It is not enough to have the transactions approved for zero-rating; the documentary requirements must be fulfilled.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the sales invoices presented by Takenaka Corporation were sufficient evidence to prove its zero-rated sale of services to PIATCO, thereby entitling it to a refund of excess input VAT for taxable year 2002.
    Why was Takenaka’s claim for VAT refund denied? The claim was denied because Takenaka submitted sales invoices instead of official receipts to support its claim for zero-rated sales of services. The Supreme Court ruled that official receipts are required to substantiate sales of services.
    What is the difference between a VAT invoice and a VAT official receipt? A VAT invoice is used for sales of goods or properties, while a VAT official receipt is used for lease of goods or properties and sales of services. They serve different purposes in documenting transactions for VAT purposes.
    What did the Supreme Court say about the timeliness of the judicial claim? The Supreme Court found that Takenaka’s judicial claim was filed beyond the prescribed 30-day period from the expiration of the 120-day period for the CIR to act on the administrative claim, thus the CTA did not acquire jurisdiction.
    What is the importance of VAT Ruling No. 011-03 in this case? VAT Ruling No. 011-03 stated that Takenaka’s sales of goods and services to PIATCO were subject to zero-percent (0%) VAT. However, compliance with the invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by the NIRC is still required to be entitled for the refund.
    What is the significance of the Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership case? The Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership case provided the guidelines for the periods to file administrative and judicial claims for VAT refunds, which the Supreme Court used to determine the timeliness of Takenaka’s claim.
    Can a taxpayer still be denied a VAT refund even if their zero-rating application is approved? Yes, the Supreme Court clarified in Western Mindanao Power Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that even with an approved zero-rating application, taxpayers must still comply with invoicing and accounting requirements to justify a refund or tax credit.
    What is the key takeaway for businesses from this case? Businesses must meticulously maintain proper documentation, particularly official receipts for sales of services, to substantiate claims for VAT refunds on zero-rated sales. Failure to do so can result in the denial of their claims.

    In conclusion, the Takenaka case reinforces the need for strict adherence to documentation requirements in VAT refund claims. Businesses must ensure they provide the correct type of document, such as official receipts for service transactions, and comply with the prescribed timelines for filing claims to avoid denial due to procedural or substantive deficiencies.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Takenaka Corporation-Philippine Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 193321, October 19, 2016

  • VAT Refund Claims: The Critical Role of Official Receipts in Zero-Rated Sales

    The Supreme Court ruled that a taxpayer’s claim for a VAT (Value Added Tax) refund, based on zero-rated sales, was denied because the taxpayer submitted sales invoices instead of official receipts as evidence. This reinforces the strict documentary requirements necessary to substantiate claims for tax refunds or credits, highlighting that approval for zero-rating alone does not guarantee a refund if proper documentation is lacking. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to the specific invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and its implementing regulations.

    Navigating VAT Zero-Rating: Takenaka’s Quest for a Refund and the Invoice vs. Receipt Showdown

    The case of Takenaka Corporation-Philippine Branch vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue revolves around Takenaka’s claim for a refund of excess input VAT arising from its zero-rated sales of services to Philippine Air Terminal Co., Inc. (PIATCO). Takenaka, a subcontractor, had an On-Shore Construction Contract with PIATCO for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino Terminal III (NAIA-IPT3). PIATCO was registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as an Ecozone Developer/Operator under RA 7916. The central issue was whether the sales invoices presented by Takenaka were sufficient evidence to prove its zero-rated sale of services, thus entitling it to a refund of excess input VAT for the taxable year 2002. The Court’s decision hinged on the distinction between sales invoices and official receipts and the stringent requirements for substantiating VAT refund claims.

    The initial step in the Court’s analysis was determining the timeliness of Takenaka’s judicial claim for refund. The Court underscored the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any time, even motu proprio. Quoting Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court outlined the steps and timelines for VAT refund claims:

    (1)
    An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were made.
       
    (2)
    The CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the administrative claim within which to decide whether to grant a refund or issue a tax credit certificate. The 120-day period may extend beyond the two-year period from the filing of the administrative claim if the claim is filed in the later part of the two-year period. If the 120-day period expires without any decision from the CIR, then the administrative claim may be considered to be denied by inaction.
       
    (3)
    A judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the CIR’s decision denying the administrative claim or from the expiration of the 120-day period without any action from the CIR.
       
    (4)
    All taxpayers, however, can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional 120+30 day periods.

    The Court found that Takenaka filed its administrative claim timely but filed its judicial claim with the CTA 184 days after the deadline. The Court clarified that the two-year prescriptive period refers to the administrative claim, not the judicial claim, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the 120-day period for the CIR’s decision and the subsequent 30-day period for filing a judicial claim. This non-compliance meant that the CTA lacked jurisdiction over Takenaka’s appeal. Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to address the substantive issue of the evidence presented.

    Even though the judicial claim was filed late, the CTA still addressed the issue regarding the lack of official receipts. The CTA pointed out that official receipts are required, not just sales invoices. In determining whether or not Takenaka had zero-rated sales of services to PIATCO through the presentation of official receipts, the Court looked at the distinction between a receipt and an invoice. In Northern Mindanao Power Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue the court reiterated the distinction.

    Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997 provides that a VAT invoice is necessary for every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, while a VAT official receipt properly pertains to every lease of goods or properties; as well as to every sale, barter or exchange of services.

    The Court has in fact distinguished an invoice from a receipt in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining Corporation:

    A “sales or commercial invoice” is a written account of goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices charged therefor or a list by whatever name it is known which is used in the ordinary course of business evidencing sale and transfer or agreement to sell or transfer goods and services.

    A “receipt” oh the other hand is a written acknowledgment of the fact of payment in money or other settlement between seller and buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or person rendering services and client or customer.

    The Court emphasized that a VAT invoice serves as the seller’s best proof of the sale of goods or services, while a VAT receipt is the buyer’s best evidence of payment for those goods or services. Thus, sales invoices were deemed insufficient to substantiate the claim for a VAT refund based on zero-rated sales of services. The Court highlighted that even with VAT Ruling No. 011-03 stating that Takenaka’s sales of services to PIATCO were subject to zero-percent VAT, compliance with substantiation requirements was still essential.

    In a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not only entitlement to the grant of the claim under substantive law. It must also show satisfaction of all the documentary and evidentiary requirements for an administrative claim for a refund or tax credit. Hence, the mere fact that petitioner’s application for zero-rating has been approved by the CIR does not, by itself, justify the grant of a refund or tax credit. The taxpayer claiming the refund must further comply with the invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by the NIRC, as well as by revenue regulations implementing them.

    The Court’s decision clarifies that fulfilling the documentary requirements is as crucial as having the substantive right to a VAT refund. The failure to present official receipts, as opposed to sales invoices, proved fatal to Takenaka’s claim, regardless of the zero-rating approval. Taxpayers must ensure meticulous compliance with all invoicing and accounting regulations to successfully claim VAT refunds or credits.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Takenaka’s sales invoices were sufficient to prove its zero-rated sale of services to PIATCO, entitling it to a refund of excess input VAT for the taxable year 2002.
    Why was Takenaka’s claim for a VAT refund denied? Takenaka’s claim was denied because it submitted sales invoices instead of official receipts to support its claim for zero-rated sales of services.
    What is the difference between a sales invoice and an official receipt? A sales invoice documents the sale of goods or services, while an official receipt acknowledges the payment for those goods or services. The NIRC requires official receipts for claiming VAT refunds on services.
    What are the timeframes for filing administrative and judicial claims for VAT refunds? An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated sales were made. If the CIR does not act within 120 days, a judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days of the 120-day period’s expiration.
    Did the VAT Ruling No. 011-03 guarantee Takenaka’s refund? No, the VAT Ruling stating that Takenaka’s sales were subject to zero-percent VAT did not automatically guarantee a refund. The taxpayer still needed to comply with all substantiation requirements, including providing official receipts.
    Why did the Court emphasize the importance of substantiation requirements? The Court emphasized that even with a substantive right to a VAT refund, taxpayers must also meet all documentary and evidentiary requirements for an administrative claim. Compliance with invoicing and accounting regulations is crucial.
    What was the effect of Takenaka filing their judicial claim late? Because Takenaka filed their judicial claim late, the CTA did not acquire jurisdiction over their appeal.
    What does the Court mean by zero-rated sales? Zero-rated sales are sales of goods and services that are subject to a VAT rate of 0%. Although the rate is 0%, these sales are still subject to VAT, meaning that the business can claim input tax credits on purchases related to these sales.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling for businesses in the Philippines? The practical implication is that businesses must meticulously maintain and submit the correct documentation, particularly official receipts, when claiming VAT refunds for zero-rated sales. Failure to do so can result in denial of the refund, regardless of zero-rating approval.

    In conclusion, the Takenaka case serves as a reminder of the stringent requirements for claiming VAT refunds in the Philippines. Taxpayers must ensure timely filing of claims and meticulous compliance with documentary requirements, particularly the submission of official receipts for services rendered.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Takenaka Corporation-Philippine Branch vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 193321, October 19, 2016

  • Good Faith vs. Fencing: When a Notarized Affidavit Protects Purchasers

    In Mariano Lim v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Mariano Lim for violating the Anti-Fencing Law, Presidential Decree No. 1612. The Court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Lim knew or should have known that the Komatsu Road Grader he purchased was stolen. This decision highlights the importance of establishing all elements of fencing beyond a reasonable doubt and underscores the significance of a notarized affidavit of ownership in demonstrating a purchaser’s good faith.

    Unraveling Intent: Did a Road Grader Sale Constitute Fencing?

    The case began when Mariano Lim, proprietor of Basco Metal Supply, purchased a Komatsu Road Grader for P400,000.00. The grader, owned by the Second Rural Road Improvement Project (SRRIP) PMO-DPWH, was allegedly stolen. Lim was subsequently charged with violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Lim, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The central legal question was whether the prosecution had sufficiently proven that Lim knew or should have known the grader was stolen, an essential element of fencing.

    The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the lower courts’ assessment. The Court emphasized that in criminal cases, every circumstance favoring the accused must be considered. It meticulously examined the evidence presented and found critical deficiencies in the prosecution’s case. The Court underscored that the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that a theft had even occurred. This failure hinged on the fact that the prosecution’s primary witness, Engr. Gulmatico, relied heavily on hearsay evidence. His testimony regarding the theft was based on information received from third parties, none of whom testified in court.

    “Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that witnesses can testify only with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge; otherwise, their testimonies would be inadmissible for being hearsay.”

    Furthermore, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the DPWH’s ownership of the Komatsu Grader. While Engr. Gulmatico presented a Memorandum Receipt, it lacked crucial details like the date of acquisition and property number. This undermined the claim that the DPWH rightfully owned the equipment. The Court noted that even assuming a theft had occurred, the prosecution failed to prove that Lim knew or should have known the grader was stolen. This element of knowledge is critical for a conviction under the Anti-Fencing Law.

    The Court addressed the lower courts’ reliance on the presumption that possession of stolen goods implies knowledge. It found that Lim had successfully rebutted this presumption by presenting a duly notarized Affidavit of Ownership from the seller, Petronilo Banosing. The affidavit, being a notarized document, carries a presumption of regularity. It serves as prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated within it.

    “It is well settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution.” (Ocampo v. Land Bank of the Philippines)

    The Court noted the lack of conclusive evidence from the prosecution that would overturn this presumption. The Court also found that Section 6 of PD 1612, which requires a clearance or permit for selling used second-hand articles, was inapplicable in this case. This section applies specifically to stores or establishments engaged in the business of buying and selling goods obtained from unlicensed dealers and offering them for sale to the public. The prosecution failed to establish that Lim was engaged in such a business or that he intended to sell the grader to the public.

    Additionally, the Court raised concerns about a violation of Lim’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information charged Lim with knowing that the grader was stolen. However, the trial court convicted him on the basis that he should have known, a different standard not explicitly stated in the Information. This discrepancy was deemed a violation of his due process rights.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to prove essential elements of the crime of fencing beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized the importance of concrete evidence and the protection afforded by a notarized affidavit in demonstrating a purchaser’s good faith. This ruling reinforces the principle that the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

    FAQs

    What is the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979? It’s a law (Presidential Decree No. 1612) that penalizes individuals who buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell, or dispose of items they know to be derived from theft or robbery. The law aims to deter the disposal of stolen goods by making it risky for individuals to deal with such items.
    What are the essential elements of fencing? The elements include a crime of robbery or theft, the accused not being a principal or accomplice in the robbery or theft, the accused buying or possessing items from the crime, the accused knowing or should have known the items were from the crime, and the accused having intent to gain. All these elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a conviction.
    What is the significance of a notarized affidavit of ownership? A notarized affidavit of ownership is a public document that carries a presumption of regularity. It serves as prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated within it, including the seller’s claim of ownership. In this case, it helped rebut the presumption that Lim knew the grader was stolen.
    When is a clearance or permit required for selling used second-hand articles? A clearance or permit is required under Section 6 of PD 1612 for stores or establishments engaged in the business of buying and selling goods obtained from unlicensed dealers and offering them for sale to the public. The prosecution must prove that the accused meets these criteria for the provision to apply.
    What is hearsay evidence? Hearsay evidence is testimony or evidence offered in court that relies on statements made out of court by someone who is not present to testify. It is generally inadmissible because the person who made the original statement cannot be cross-examined.
    What does it mean to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation? This is a constitutional right that requires the Information to clearly state the specific offense the accused is charged with, including all essential elements of the crime. The accused must be properly informed to prepare a defense and prevent conviction based on uncharged offenses.
    What was the value of the grader? The trial court assessed the value of the grader at P100,000 due to missing parts. However, Lim testified that he paid P400,000 for it. The value disparity supported Lim’s claim of good faith, as it indicated he believed in the seller’s representations.
    What was the outcome of the case? The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and acquitted Mariano Lim. The acquittal was based on the prosecution’s failure to prove the essential elements of fencing beyond a reasonable doubt.

    This case serves as a crucial reminder of the stringent burden on the prosecution to establish every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also underscores the protective role of a notarized affidavit in demonstrating good faith in commercial transactions. The ruling emphasizes that assumptions or presumptions cannot substitute for concrete evidence, especially when an individual’s liberty is at stake.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Mariano Lim v. People, G.R. No. 211977, October 12, 2016

  • Securities Deposit Immunity: Protecting Policyholders’ Interests in Insurance Contracts

    The Supreme Court has affirmed that security deposits made by insurance companies are exempt from levy or execution by judgment creditors. This ruling ensures that these funds remain available to protect all policyholders and beneficiaries in case the insurance company becomes insolvent. The decision emphasizes the Insurance Commissioner’s duty to safeguard these deposits for the collective benefit of the insuring public, preventing individual claimants from seizing funds meant to cover widespread liabilities. This protection is vital for maintaining the integrity of insurance contracts and ensuring equitable distribution of assets among all claimants.

    Can a Creditor Touch an Insurer’s Security Blanket? Exploring the Limits of Liability

    In Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., the central legal question revolved around whether the securities deposited by an insurance company, as mandated by Section 203 of the Insurance Code, could be subjected to levy by a creditor. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. sought to recover unpaid billings from Vilfran Liner, Inc. and obtained a favorable judgment from the Regional Trial Court (RTC). To enforce the decision, Del Monte attempted to garnish Capital Insurance’s security deposit held with the Insurance Commission. This move was challenged by Capital Insurance, arguing that Section 203 of the Insurance Code explicitly protects these deposits from such levies. The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, requiring a definitive interpretation of the scope and purpose of this statutory protection.

    The legal framework for this case centers on Section 203 of the Insurance Code, which mandates that domestic insurance companies invest a portion of their funds in specific securities, depositing them with the Insurance Commissioner. The core of the dispute lies in the interpretation of the provision stating that “no judgment creditor or other claimant shall have the right to levy upon any securities of the insurer held on deposit.” The Court of Appeals (CA) had previously ruled that these securities were not absolutely immune from liability and could be used to satisfy legitimate claims against the insurance company. This interpretation was based on the premise that Section 203 aims to ensure the faithful performance of contractual obligations, not to shield insurers from valid claims. However, this view was contested by Capital Insurance, leading to the Supreme Court’s intervention.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, emphasized the importance of protecting the interests of all policyholders and beneficiaries. The Court highlighted that the security deposit serves as a contingency fund to cover claims against the insurance company, particularly in cases of insolvency. Allowing a single claimant to seize these funds would create an unfair preference, potentially depleting the deposit to the detriment of other policyholders with equally valid claims. The Court quoted Section 203 of the Insurance Code to underscore the exemption from levy:

    Every domestic insurance company shall, to the extent of an amount equal in value to twenty-five per centum of the minimum paid-up capital required under section one hundred eighty-eight, invest its funds only in securities…

    Except as otherwise provided in this Code, no judgment creditor or other claimant shall have the right to levy upon any securities of the insurer held on deposit under this section or held on deposit pursuant to the requirement of the Commissioner.

    Building on this statutory foundation, the Supreme Court referenced its earlier ruling in Republic v. Del Monte Motors, Inc., emphasizing that the security deposit is “answerable for all the obligations of the depositing insurer under its insurance contracts” and is “exempt from levy by any claimant.” The Court reasoned that permitting garnishment would impair the fund, reducing it below the legally required percentage of paid-up capital, and create an unwarranted preference for one creditor over others.

    Furthermore, the Court clarified the role and responsibilities of the Insurance Commissioner. Citing Sections 191 and 203 of the Insurance Code, the Court affirmed the Commissioner’s duty to hold the security deposits for the benefit of all policyholders. The Court noted that the Insurance Commissioner has been given a wide latitude of discretion to regulate the insurance industry to protect the insuring public, and that custody of the securities has been specifically conferred upon the commissioner. Therefore, the Insurance Commissioner is in the best position to determine if and when it may be released without prejudicing the rights of other policy holders.

    The Court contrasted its interpretation with that of the CA, stating that the CA’s simplistic view ran counter to the statute’s intent and the Court’s prior pronouncements. The Supreme Court stated that denying the exemption would potentially pave the way for a single claimant, like the respondent, to short-circuit the procedure normally undertaken in adjudicating the claims against an insolvent company under the rules on concurrence and preference of credits. It would also prejudice the policy holders and their beneficiaries and annul the very reason for which the law required the security deposit.

    The Supreme Court also addressed the validity of the counterbond issued by Capital Insurance. While the petitioner disputed the validity of CISCO Bond No. 00005/JCL(3) on several grounds, namely, the amount of the coverage of the purported CISCO BOND NO. JCL(3)00005 is beyond the maximum retention capacity of CISCO which is P10,715,380.54 as indicated in the letter of the Insurance Commissioner dated August 5, 1996, the court did not give merit to this assertion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the company cannot evade liability by hiding behind its own internal rules, because the one who employed and gave character to the third person as its agent should be the one to bear the loss. Likewise, the petitioner’s argument that the counterbond was invalid because it was unaccounted for and missing from its custody was implausible, since honesty, good faith, and fair dealing required it as the insurer to communicate such an important fact to the assured, or at least keep the latter updated on the relevant facts.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the security deposit of an insurance company, mandated by Section 203 of the Insurance Code, could be levied upon by a judgment creditor. The court had to determine if this security deposit was exempt from such levies to protect the interests of all policyholders.
    What does Section 203 of the Insurance Code say about security deposits? Section 203 requires insurance companies to deposit securities with the Insurance Commissioner. It explicitly states that these securities are exempt from levy by judgment creditors, ensuring they remain available to cover obligations to policyholders.
    Why are these security deposits protected from levy? The protection ensures that the funds are available to cover claims against the insurance company, especially in cases of insolvency. Allowing individual creditors to seize the deposits would deplete the fund, harming other policyholders.
    What role does the Insurance Commissioner play in this? The Insurance Commissioner has the duty to hold the security deposits for the benefit of all policyholders. They must ensure that the deposits are used to protect the insuring public and not unduly depleted by individual claims.
    What did the Court rule about the counterbond in this case? While the insurance company tried to argue the counterbond was invalid, the Court held it liable because as between the company and the insured, the one who employed and gave character to the third person as its agent should be the one to bear the loss.
    How does this ruling affect policyholders? This ruling safeguards the interests of policyholders by ensuring that insurance companies maintain sufficient funds to cover their obligations. It prevents individual creditors from depleting these funds to the detriment of other claimants.
    Can a single creditor claim the entire security deposit? No, a single creditor cannot claim the entire security deposit. The deposit is meant to cover all obligations of the insurance company, ensuring equitable distribution among all policyholders and beneficiaries.
    What was the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision? The Supreme Court based its decision on the clear language of Section 203 of the Insurance Code, prior rulings, and the need to protect the insuring public. The court highlighted the importance of preventing preferential treatment of individual creditors.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Capital Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. reinforces the protective intent of Section 203 of the Insurance Code. By upholding the immunity of insurance companies’ security deposits from levy, the Court ensures that these funds remain available to safeguard the interests of all policyholders, maintaining the stability and reliability of the insurance system.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: CAPITAL INSURANCE AND SURETY CO., INC. VS. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., G.R. No. 159979, December 09, 2015

  • Letters of Credit: Correspondent Bank’s Right to Reimbursement in Dishonored Transactions

    In Marphil Export Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, the Supreme Court ruled that a negotiating bank in a letter of credit transaction has the right to debit the exporter’s account when the issuing bank dishonors the draft, provided the exporter agreed to reimburse the negotiating bank in such an event. This decision clarifies the obligations and recourse available to banks involved in international trade financing and sets a precedent for how banks can manage risks associated with letter of credit transactions. It underscores the importance of clear agreements between exporters and negotiating banks in managing potential losses.

    Navigating Letters of Credit: Who Pays When International Deals Go Wrong?

    Marphil Export Corporation, engaged in exporting agricultural products, obtained a credit line from Allied Banking Corporation to finance its operations. This credit line was used to fund the purchase and export of cashew nuts to Intan Trading Ltd. in Hong Kong. Nanyang Commercial Bank issued irrevocable letters of credit (L/Cs) with Marphil as the beneficiary and Allied Bank as the correspondent bank. A letter of credit is a financial instrument used in international trade where an issuing bank guarantees payment to a seller (beneficiary) on behalf of a buyer (applicant), provided that the seller meets certain conditions, such as presenting conforming documents.

    Two L/Cs were involved: L/C No. 22518 and L/C No. 21970. While the first transaction under L/C No. 22518 proceeded smoothly, the second, covered by L/C No. 21970, faced complications. Allied Bank credited Marphil’s account with the peso equivalent of US$185,000.00, but Nanyang Bank later refused to reimburse Allied Bank due to discrepancies in the shipping documents. Consequently, Allied Bank debited Marphil’s account for P1,913,763.45. This led to a legal battle, with Marphil arguing that Allied Bank, as a confirming bank, should bear the loss.

    The Supreme Court addressed several critical issues, primarily focusing on the validity of Allied Bank’s debit memo and whether it constituted a new obligation for Marphil. The Court examined the role of Allied Bank in the L/C transaction, referencing the functions assumed by a correspondent bank as elucidated in Bank of America, NT & SA v. Court of Appeals:

    In the case of [Bank of America], the functions assumed by a correspondent bank are classified according to the obligations taken up by it. In the case of a notifying bank, the correspondent bank assumes no liability except to notify and/or transmit to the beneficiary the existence of the L/C. A negotiating bank is a correspondent bank which buys or discounts a draft under the L/C. Its liability is dependent upon the stage of the negotiation. If before negotiation, it has no liability with respect to the seller but after negotiation, a contractual relationship will then prevail between the negotiating bank and the seller. A confirming bank is a correspondent bank which assumes a direct obligation to the seller and its liability is a primary one as if the correspondent bank itself had issued the L/C.

    The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals (CA) and Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) findings that Allied Bank was not a confirming bank. A confirming bank assumes a direct obligation to the seller, as if it had issued the letter of credit itself. Instead, the Court determined that Allied Bank acted as a negotiating bank, which buys or discounts drafts under the L/C, giving it recourse against the exporter in case of dishonor by the issuing bank. This right of recourse is critical for banks engaging in international trade financing, as it provides a mechanism to recover funds when transactions fail.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized the significance of the Letter Agreement between Marphil and Allied Bank, which stipulated that Marphil would reimburse Allied Bank in case of non-payment. This agreement created an independent obligation for Marphil, separate from the obligations under the L/C itself. The Court cited Velasquez v. Solidbank Corporation to underscore this point, noting that such an undertaking is a separate contract with its own consideration—the promise to pay the bank if the draft is dishonored:

    The letter of undertaking of this tenor is a separate contract the consideration for which is the promise to pay the bank the value of the sight draft if it was dishonored for any reason. The liability provided is direct and primary, without need to establish collateral facts such as the violation of the letter of credit connected to it.

    The Court also addressed whether Allied Bank was justified in debiting Marphil’s account. Referencing Associated Bank v. Tan, the Court affirmed the principle of legal compensation, which allows a bank to debit a client’s account for the value of a dishonored check or draft. The conditions for legal compensation under Article 1279 of the Civil Code were met in this case, as both Allied Bank and Marphil were principal debtors and creditors of each other, with debts consisting of sums of money that were due, liquidated, and demandable.

    The Court modified the legal interest imposed by the CA in conformity with Nacar v. Gallery Frames. The amount of P1,913,763.45 shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the time of judicial demand, i.e., from the date of the filing of the counterclaim in the Declaratory Relief Case on May 7, 1990, until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from such finality of judgment until its satisfaction.

    The Court also dismissed the claim of forum shopping, which Marphil alleged occurred when Allied Bank filed a separate collection case against the surety, Ireneo Lim. Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, all substantially founded on the same transactions and facts. The Court found no forum shopping because the parties and causes of action in the two cases (the declaratory relief case and the collection case) were different. The collection case against Lim was based on his surety obligations, which are independent of Marphil’s loan obligations.

    Finally, the Court addressed the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment issued against Lim’s property. It was found that the writ had been improperly issued because the allegations of fraud pertained to the execution of the promissory notes by Marphil, not to Lim’s obligations under the surety agreement. Citing Ng Wee v. Tankiansee, the Court emphasized that to justify an attachment based on fraud, the applicant must show that the fraud induced the other party to enter the agreement:

    For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor’s mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.

    Because Allied Bank failed to establish fraud specifically related to Lim’s surety obligations, the Court ordered the dissolution of the writ of preliminary attachment.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Allied Bank, as a negotiating bank in a letter of credit transaction, had the right to debit Marphil’s account when the issuing bank dishonored the draft. The Court also examined if the filing of a collection case against the surety constituted forum shopping.
    What is a letter of credit? A letter of credit is a financial instrument used in international trade where an issuing bank guarantees payment to a seller (beneficiary) on behalf of a buyer (applicant), provided that the seller meets certain conditions. It is a common mechanism to reduce the risk in international transactions.
    What is the role of a correspondent bank? A correspondent bank acts on behalf of another bank, often to facilitate transactions in a foreign country. Depending on the functions assumed, it can act as a notifying, negotiating, or confirming bank, each with different levels of liability.
    What is a confirming bank? A confirming bank assumes a direct obligation to the seller (beneficiary) as if it had issued the letter of credit itself. This means the confirming bank guarantees payment independently of the issuing bank.
    What is a negotiating bank? A negotiating bank buys or discounts a draft under the letter of credit. Its liability depends on the stage of negotiation, but it generally has a right of recourse against the issuing bank and the exporter.
    What is a surety agreement? A surety agreement is a contract where one party (the surety) guarantees the debt or obligation of another party (the principal debtor) to a creditor. The surety is directly and primarily liable for the debt, jointly and solidarily with the principal debtor.
    What is legal compensation? Legal compensation occurs when two parties are debtors and creditors of each other, and their debts are extinguished to the concurrent amount. This requires that both debts are due, liquidated, demandable, and consist of sums of money or consumable things.
    What is a writ of preliminary attachment? A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy where a court orders the seizure of a defendant’s property as security for the satisfaction of a judgment that may be recovered. It is issued based on specific grounds, such as fraud in incurring the obligation.
    What is forum shopping? Forum shopping occurs when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, all substantially founded on the same transactions, facts, and issues. It is prohibited because it vexes the courts and parties and can lead to conflicting decisions.

    The Marphil decision provides crucial guidance on the rights and obligations of parties involved in letter of credit transactions. It highlights the importance of clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of correspondent banks and the significance of independent agreements, such as the Letter Agreement, in managing risks. The ruling also reinforces the need for specific allegations of fraud to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, ensuring the protection of debtors’ rights. This case sets a legal precedent for similar banking and trade finance disputes.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Marphil Export Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 187922, September 21, 2016

  • Balancing Justice: Proportionality in B.P. 22 Penalties and Protecting Individual Liberty

    The Supreme Court ruled that penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22), or the Bouncing Checks Law, must be proportionate to the value of the bounced check and consider the offender’s circumstances. This decision emphasizes that imprisonment should not be the automatic penalty, especially for first-time offenders, and prioritizes fines to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness. This ensures a more equitable application of justice, aligning penalties with the severity of the offense and the individual’s potential for rehabilitation.

    From Jewelry Deals to Jail Time: When a Bounced Check Leads to Disproportionate Punishment

    This case revolves around Bernadette Ida Ang Higa, who was found guilty of fifty-one counts of violating B.P. Blg. 22. The charges stemmed from post-dated checks she issued to Ma. Vicia Carullo, a jewelry seller, which were later dishonored due to a closed account. The lower courts sentenced Higa to one year of imprisonment for each count, totaling 51 years. Higa appealed, arguing that the imposed penalty was excessive given her circumstances and the principles of justice. The Supreme Court then took up the matter to determine whether the penalty imposed was proper, considering the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 and relevant administrative circulars.

    The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the penalty of one year imprisonment for each count of B.P. Blg. 22 violation, totaling 51 years, was appropriate. The Court acknowledged Higa’s guilt but focused on the proportionality and fairness of the sentence. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 outlines the penalties for issuing bad checks, stating:

    Sec. 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

    The Supreme Court referred to Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 12-2000, which provides guidelines on the appropriate penalties for B.P. Blg. 22 violations. This circular emphasizes the importance of considering the offender’s circumstances and prioritizing fines over imprisonment, especially for first-time offenders. The circular aims to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and promote economic usefulness, aligning with the principles of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The Court, citing Vaca v. CA and Lim v. People of the Philippines, reiterated the philosophy of redeeming valuable human material when imposing penalties for B.P. Blg. 22 violations. This approach contrasts with a purely punitive stance, seeking to balance justice with rehabilitation.

    Furthermore, A.C. No. 13-2001 clarified that A.C. No. 12-2000 does not eliminate imprisonment as a possible penalty but establishes a rule of preference. The Court emphasized that it did not intend to decriminalize B.P. Blg. 22 violations or remove imprisonment as an option, but rather to guide judges in applying penalties that consider the offender’s situation and the specific circumstances of the crime. This guidance aims to prevent disproportionate punishment and ensure a more equitable application of the law. The Supreme Court underscored that the alternative penalties under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 include imprisonment, a fine, or both, at the court’s discretion.

    The Court noted that in several cases, it has opted to impose fines rather than imprisonment, especially when the offender is not a habitual delinquent or recidivist. Applying this principle, the Supreme Court found that Higa, with no prior record, should benefit from a more lenient penalty. Additionally, the Court criticized the lower courts for imposing a uniform one-year imprisonment for each count, regardless of the check amount. This approach could lead to unjust outcomes, where a person issuing a check for a small amount receives the same punishment as someone issuing a check for a much larger sum. As the Court noted, “Justice demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed to be commensurate with the offense committed.”

    In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court modified the penalty imposed by the lower courts. The Court deemed the 51-year imprisonment term too harsh, considering Higa’s lack of prior offenses and past instances of fulfilling her payment obligations. The Court stressed that the case involved Higa’s life and liberty, and maintaining the original penalty would be unlawful and disproportionate. The Court then reduced the imprisonment to six months for each count of B.P. Blg. 22 violation. The Court also affirmed that Higa must indemnify Carullo for the total amount of the bounced checks. Lastly, the Court imposed a six percent (6%) per annum interest on the monetary award, effective from the date the decision becomes final until the amount is fully paid, addressing the lower courts’ failure to award interest. The Court reiterated, “An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not.”

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the imposed penalty of one year imprisonment for each of the 51 counts of B.P. Blg. 22 violation was proper and proportionate. The Supreme Court assessed if the penalty aligned with the law’s intent and principles of justice.
    What is Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)? B.P. Blg. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law, penalizes the act of issuing checks without sufficient funds. It aims to ensure stability and reliability in financial transactions by discouraging the issuance of worthless checks.
    What is Administrative Circular No. 12-2000? Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 provides guidelines for judges on imposing penalties for B.P. Blg. 22 violations. It emphasizes prioritizing fines over imprisonment, particularly for first-time offenders, to promote rehabilitation.
    Why did the Supreme Court modify the lower court’s decision? The Supreme Court found the 51-year imprisonment term too harsh and disproportionate, considering Higa’s lack of prior offenses and the principle that penalties should be commensurate with the crime. It also considered the previous A.C. that gives more weight to imposing fines in lieu of imprisonment.
    What was the modified penalty imposed by the Supreme Court? The Supreme Court reduced the imprisonment term to six months for each count of B.P. Blg. 22 violation. Additionally, it ordered Higa to indemnify Carullo for the total amount of the bounced checks, with a 6% annual interest from the finality of the decision.
    What factors did the Supreme Court consider in modifying the penalty? The Court considered that Higa was a first-time offender, the lack of proportionality in the original sentence, and the need to balance justice with the possibility of rehabilitation. It also took into account that the subject involved the life and liberty of the petitioner.
    What is the significance of this ruling? This ruling underscores the importance of proportionality and fairness in sentencing for B.P. Blg. 22 violations. It reinforces the principle that imprisonment should not be the automatic penalty, especially for first-time offenders.
    How does this ruling affect future B.P. Blg. 22 cases? This ruling serves as a precedent for future B.P. Blg. 22 cases, guiding lower courts to consider the offender’s circumstances and the check amount when imposing penalties. It encourages a more nuanced approach to sentencing that balances punishment with rehabilitation.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarifies the application of penalties for B.P. Blg. 22 violations, emphasizing proportionality and individual circumstances. By reducing the imprisonment term and imposing a fine, the Court sought to balance justice with the offender’s potential for rehabilitation. This ruling serves as an essential guide for lower courts in future B.P. Blg. 22 cases, ensuring fairness and preventing excessive punishment.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Bernadette Ida Ang Higa v. People, G.R. No. 185473, August 17, 2016

  • Taxing Times: Unveiling the 20-Lender Rule and Deposit Substitutes in Philippine Bonds

    The Supreme Court clarified the application of the 20-lender rule to government securities, specifically PEACe Bonds, determining when these instruments qualify as deposit substitutes subject to a 20% final withholding tax. The Court emphasized that the number of lenders at the time of the bond’s distribution to final holders, not the issuer’s intent, dictates whether it’s a deposit substitute. This means that if a Government Securities Eligible Dealer (GSED) sells government securities to 20 or more investors, those securities are taxable as deposit substitutes, affecting bondholders’ returns and tax obligations. However, due to reliance on prior BIR rulings, the Court applied this interpretation prospectively, protecting those who acted in good faith based on previous guidance.

    PEACe Bonds Under Scrutiny: Decoding the Fine Print of Tax Law

    The legal saga began when Banco de Oro and other banks challenged the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) rulings that sought to impose a 20% final withholding tax on PEACe Bonds, arguing that these bonds were initially issued to fewer than 20 lenders. The core legal question centered on interpreting Section 22(Y) of the National Internal Revenue Code, specifically the phrase “at any one time” in relation to the 20-lender rule for deposit substitutes. This case highlights the complexities of tax law and its impact on financial instruments, particularly those issued by the government.

    The Supreme Court embarked on a comprehensive review of the relevant laws and precedents. Section 22(Y) of the National Internal Revenue Code defines a **deposit substitute** as:

    an alternative form of obtaining funds from the public (the term ‘public’ means borrowing from twenty (20) or more individual or corporate lenders at any one time), other than deposits, through the issuance, endorsement, or acceptance of debt instruments for the borrower’s own account, for the purpose of re-lending or purchasing of receivables and other obligations, or financing their own needs or the needs of their agent or dealer.

    The Court emphasized that the phrase “at any one time” refers to the point when the securities are distributed to final holders. This interpretation clarified that if a GSED, acting as an agent of the Bureau of Treasury, distributes government securities to 20 or more investors, those securities are then considered deposit substitutes and are subject to the 20% final withholding tax.

    A crucial aspect of the case involved the distinction between the **primary and secondary markets** for bonds. In the primary market, new securities are issued and sold to investors for the first time, with proceeds going to the issuer. On the other hand, the secondary market involves the trading of outstanding securities between investors, with proceeds going to the selling investor, not the issuer. The Court clarified that the 20-lender rule applies when the successful GSED-bidder distributes the government securities to final holders, not in subsequent trading between investors in the secondary market. This distinction ensures that the tax treatment is determined at the initial distribution phase, preventing complexities in tracking ownership changes later on.

    The Court also addressed the role of the **Government Securities Eligible Dealers (GSEDs)** in distributing government securities. GSEDs, particularly primary dealers, act as a channel between the Bureau of Treasury and investors. They participate in auctions and then on-sell the securities to other financial institutions or final investors. This distribution capacity allows the government to access potential investors, making the GSEDs essentially agents of the Bureau of Treasury. Consequently, the Court held that the existence of 20 or more lenders should be reckoned at the time when the GSED distributes the government securities to final holders.

    However, the Court acknowledged the petitioners’ and intervenors’ reliance on prior BIR rulings that provided a different interpretation of the 20-lender rule. The Court cited the principle of **non-retroactivity of rulings**, which is enshrined in Section 246 of the National Internal Revenue Code:

    No revocation, modification, or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding sections or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in cases where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

    Given the ambiguity of the phrase “at any one time” and the petitioners’ reliance on prior BIR opinions, the Court ruled that its interpretation should be applied prospectively. This decision protected the petitioners from being unfairly penalized for acting in good faith based on existing regulatory guidance. The Supreme Court emphasized the need to balance the government’s power to tax with the principles of fairness and due process, ensuring that taxpayers are not prejudiced by sudden changes in legal interpretation.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court ordered the Bureau of Treasury to release the amount of P4,966,207,796.41, representing the 20% final withholding tax on the PEACe Bonds, with legal interest of 6% per annum from October 19, 2011, until full payment. This order underscored the Court’s disapproval of the Bureau of Treasury’s continued retention of the funds despite prior orders and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court. The Bureau of Treasury’s actions were deemed a violation of the petitioners’ rights and warranted the imposition of legal interest.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining when government securities, specifically PEACe Bonds, qualify as deposit substitutes subject to a 20% final withholding tax under Section 22(Y) of the National Internal Revenue Code.
    What is the “20-lender rule”? The “20-lender rule” states that if a debt instrument is offered to 20 or more individual or corporate lenders at any one time, it is considered a deposit substitute and is subject to a 20% final withholding tax.
    How did the Supreme Court interpret the phrase “at any one time”? The Supreme Court interpreted “at any one time” to refer to the moment when the successful GSED-bidder distributes the government securities to final holders, not subsequent transactions in the secondary market.
    What is the role of Government Securities Eligible Dealers (GSEDs) in this process? GSEDs act as intermediaries between the Bureau of Treasury and investors, participating in auctions and then distributing the securities to other financial institutions or final investors, functioning as agents of the Bureau of Treasury.
    Why did the Court apply its ruling prospectively? The Court applied its ruling prospectively because the petitioners and intervenors relied on prior BIR rulings that provided a different interpretation of the 20-lender rule, making a retroactive application prejudicial and unfair.
    What is the significance of classifying bonds as deposit substitutes? Classifying bonds as deposit substitutes triggers the imposition of a 20% final withholding tax on the interest income or yield, affecting the bondholders’ net returns and tax obligations.
    What was the order of the Supreme Court regarding the withheld taxes? The Supreme Court ordered the Bureau of Treasury to release the withheld amount of P4,966,207,796.41, representing the 20% final withholding tax on the PEACe Bonds, with legal interest of 6% per annum from October 19, 2011, until full payment.
    Why was the Bureau of Treasury held liable for legal interest? The Bureau of Treasury was held liable for legal interest because of its unjustified refusal to release the funds to be deposited in escrow, in utter disregard of the orders of the Court, making their actions inequitable.
    Does this ruling affect trading of bonds in the secondary market? No, this ruling primarily affects the initial distribution of government securities to final holders by GSEDs, not subsequent trading between investors in the secondary market.

    This case offers critical insights into the intricacies of tax law and its intersection with government securities. The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies the application of the 20-lender rule, providing guidance for both issuers and investors. The prospective application of the ruling underscores the importance of regulatory stability and the need to protect those who rely on official government guidance. Understanding these principles is crucial for navigating the complexities of the Philippine financial landscape.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: BANCO DE ORO VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 198756, August 16, 2016

  • Interest Rate Agreements: The Necessity of Written Stipulation in Philippine Law

    In IBM Philippines, Inc. v. Prime Systems Plus, Inc., the Supreme Court reiterated the fundamental principle that for interest to be due and demandable on a loan or credit, there must be an express agreement in writing. This ruling protects borrowers by ensuring they are fully aware of the interest rates they are obligated to pay. The absence of a clear, written stipulation regarding the interest rate means that no interest can be charged beyond the legal rate, providing a safeguard against unilateral or ambiguous interest impositions. This ensures transparency and fairness in financial transactions, preventing potential abuse by creditors.

    Unilateral Impositions and Silent Assumptions: When Does an Interest Rate Bind?

    The case revolves around a disagreement between IBM Philippines, Inc. and Prime Systems Plus, Inc. concerning unpaid obligations for automated teller machines (ATMs) and computer hardware. IBM claimed that Prime Systems owed them P45,997,266.22, including a 3% monthly interest on unpaid invoices. Prime Systems disputed this amount, arguing that they had not agreed to such an interest rate and had, in fact, already paid for a significant portion of the purchased ATMs. The central legal question is whether IBM’s letter imposing a 3% monthly interest constituted a valid written agreement under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, thereby obligating Prime Systems to pay that rate.

    The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially ruled in favor of IBM, ordering Prime Systems to pay P46,036,028.42 with a 6% annual interest from March 15, 2006, and attorney’s fees of P1,000,000.00. The RTC deemed IBM’s imposition of a 3% monthly interest appropriate, citing that this rate was applied to all invoices unpaid 30 days after delivery and was allegedly acknowledged by Prime Systems in a Deed of Assignment of Receivables. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified this decision, ordering Prime Systems to pay P24,622,394.72 with a 6% annual interest from the filing of the complaint, and deleting the award of attorney’s fees. The CA emphasized that there was no clear agreement on the 3% monthly interest, and a unilateral imposition by IBM could not bind Prime Systems.

    The Supreme Court (SC) sided with the CA, underscoring the necessity of a written stipulation for the payment of interest. The SC reiterated that two requisites must be met for interest to be due and demandable: there must be an express stipulation for the payment of interest, and the agreement to pay interest must be reduced in writing. Article 1956 of the Civil Code explicitly states:

    “No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.”

    The SC found that IBM’s evidence did not demonstrate Prime Systems’ consent to the 3% monthly interest. IBM argued that Prime Systems’ receipt of a letter imposing the interest, failure to object, request for a reduction, and subsequent agreement for assignment of receivables indicated agreement. However, the SC clarified that these actions did not constitute an express written agreement to the specific interest rate.

    Building on this principle, the SC explained that Prime Systems’ request for a lower interest rate did not imply acceptance of the initial 3% rate. There must be a clear, unequivocal agreement to the specific rate for it to be enforceable. The absence of such clarity leaves room for speculation and undermines the purpose of Article 1956, which is to ensure mutual understanding and awareness of the financial obligations in a contract. Furthermore, the SC dismissed IBM’s reliance on the Deed of Assignment of Receivables, as this document did not explicitly specify the 3% monthly interest rate, and therefore, could not be construed as a written agreement to that rate.

    The Supreme Court referenced Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas MB Circular No. 799, series of 2013, to justify the application of the legal rate of 6% annual interest in the absence of an agreed-upon rate. These guidelines provide that when an obligation does not involve a loan or forbearance of money, interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. The legal interest serves as a default rate when parties fail to explicitly agree on an interest rate in writing.

    Finally, the SC affirmed the CA’s decision to delete the award of attorney’s fees, citing Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. This case emphasizes that attorney’s fees are an exception rather than the rule, and a trial court must provide factual, legal, or equitable justification for awarding them. The failure to discuss the basis for the award in the trial court’s decision renders the award unjustified. The SC stated:

    “[C]urrent jurisprudence instructs that in awarding attorney’s fees, the trial court, must state the factual, legal, or equitable justification for awarding the same, bearing in mind that the award of attorney’s fees is the exception, not the general rule, and it is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate; nor should attorney’s fees be awarded every time a party wins a lawsuit. The matter of attorney’s fees cannot be dealt with only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The text of the decision must state the reason behind the award of attorney’s fees. Otherwise, its award is totally unjustified.”

    This case underscores the importance of clear, written agreements when stipulating interest rates. It protects parties from ambiguous or unilaterally imposed financial obligations and ensures that all contractual terms are explicit and mutually understood. By enforcing Article 1956 of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court promotes transparency and fairness in financial transactions, safeguarding the rights of borrowers and creditors alike.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether a letter from IBM imposing a 3% monthly interest on unpaid invoices constituted a valid written agreement under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, thereby obligating Prime Systems to pay that rate. The Supreme Court found that it did not.
    What does Article 1956 of the Civil Code state? Article 1956 of the Civil Code explicitly states that “No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing,” emphasizing the necessity of a written agreement for interest to be demandable.
    Why did the Court of Appeals reduce the amount Prime Systems had to pay? The Court of Appeals reduced the amount because it found that there was no clear, written agreement between IBM and Prime Systems regarding the 3% monthly interest rate, deeming the unilateral imposition invalid.
    What interest rate applies if there is no written agreement? In the absence of a written agreement specifying the interest rate, the legal interest rate of 6% per annum applies, as per Article 2209 of the Civil Code and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) guidelines.
    What was IBM’s argument for the 3% monthly interest? IBM argued that Prime Systems’ actions, such as receiving the letter without objection, requesting a reduction in the interest rate, and executing a Deed of Assignment of Receivables, implied consent to the 3% monthly interest.
    Why did the Supreme Court reject IBM’s argument? The Supreme Court rejected IBM’s argument because these actions did not constitute an express written agreement to the specific interest rate; a clear and unequivocal agreement is required.
    Why were attorney’s fees not awarded in this case? Attorney’s fees were not awarded because the trial court failed to provide a factual, legal, or equitable justification for the award, as required by prevailing jurisprudence.
    What is the practical implication of this ruling for contracts? The ruling emphasizes the importance of clearly and explicitly stating all terms and conditions, especially interest rates, in written contracts to avoid disputes and ensure enforceability.

    This case serves as a crucial reminder that financial agreements must be clear, explicit, and documented in writing to be legally enforceable. It highlights the importance of mutual understanding and consent in contractual relationships. The ruling safeguards parties from ambiguous or unilaterally imposed financial obligations, promoting transparency and fairness in financial transactions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: IBM PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. PRIME SYSTEMS PLUS, INC., G.R. No. 203192, August 15, 2016