ASG Law

Category: Election Law

  • Election Disqualification: Upholding Division Rulings When the COMELEC En Banc Deadlocks

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Legaspi v. COMELEC clarified the process when the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc cannot reach a majority decision on a motion for reconsideration. The Court held that if the en banc fails to secure the necessary votes, the ruling of the COMELEC division stands. This means that the initial decision made by the division remains valid, ensuring a resolution to the election dispute. This ruling reinforces the authority of COMELEC divisions and prevents the paralysis that could result from the en banc’s inability to reach a consensus. Ultimately, this decision safeguards the integrity and efficiency of the election process by ensuring that election cases are resolved without unnecessary delays or complications arising from deadlocked votes at the highest level of the COMELEC.

    When Vote-Buying Allegations Meet a Divided COMELEC: Who Decides the Election?

    The case revolves around the intertwined fates of Feliciano Legaspi, Alfredo D. Germar, and Rogelio P. Santos, Jr., all candidates in the 2013 elections in Norzagaray, Bulacan. Legaspi accused Germar and Santos of engaging in massive vote-buying. The COMELEC Special First Division initially ruled in favor of Legaspi, disqualifying Germar and Santos. However, the case took a turn when the COMELEC en banc, while reviewing the motion for reconsideration, failed to reach the constitutionally required majority vote to either affirm or reverse the division’s decision.

    This deadlock led to a critical question: What happens when the highest electoral body cannot reach a consensus? The Supreme Court, in this instance, revisited its previous stance on how to interpret Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which addresses scenarios where the COMELEC en banc is equally divided or lacks the necessary majority. The Court recognized that its prior interpretation, established in Mendoza v. COMELEC, had unintended consequences, potentially undermining the authority of the COMELEC divisions and circumventing the constitutional requirement for a majority vote.

    The Court acknowledged that the Mendoza doctrine deviated from the 1987 Constitution. Specifically, the Court stated:

    This voting threshold, however, is easily rendered illusory by the application of the Mendoza ruling, which virtually allows the grant of a motion for reconsideration even though the movant fails to secure four votes in his or her favor, in blatant violation of Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution.

    To rectify this, the Supreme Court re-evaluated the nature of a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It determined that such a motion is an “incidental matter.” This classification is crucial because, under Section 6, Rule 18, if the COMELEC en banc is deadlocked on an incidental matter, the motion is denied. Critically, this means that the original ruling of the COMELEC division stands affirmed.

    The Court drew a parallel between Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which governs procedure in the Supreme Court. The Court noted the similarity in language and emphasized the need for consistent interpretation. The Court stated, “Interpretare et cocordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus.” This principle underscores that laws should be construed to harmonize with each other, forming a coherent legal system.

    The practical effect of this decision is significant. It reinforces the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC divisions. Their decisions are capable of attaining finality, without needing any affirmative or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court emphasized that while the Constitution requires motions for reconsideration to be resolved by the COMELEC en banc, it also mandates that four votes must be reached to render a valid ruling.

    This clarified interpretation of Section 6, Rule 18 avoids paradoxical scenarios where a COMELEC division ruling could be overturned without a clear majority decision by the en banc. Now, a failure to muster four votes to sustain a motion for reconsideration is understood as the COMELEC en banc finding no reversible error in the division’s ruling. The division’s decision, therefore, ought to be affirmed, not reversed or vacated. This approach ensures that the COMELEC divisions retain their constitutional authority and that election cases are resolved efficiently.

    The decision underscores the importance of adhering to constitutional principles and ensuring that the COMELEC’s processes are both fair and effective. By categorizing a motion for reconsideration as an “incidental matter,” the Supreme Court provided a clear path forward when the COMELEC en banc is unable to reach a majority decision. The Supreme Court concluded:

    Hence, when the private respondents failed to get the four-vote requirement on their motion for reconsideration, their motion is defeated and lost as there was NO valid ruling to sustain the plea for reconsideration. The prior valid action – the COMELEC Special First Division’s October 3, 2013 Resolution in this case – therefore subsists and is affirmed by the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

    In essence, this ruling strengthens the role of COMELEC divisions and streamlines the election dispute resolution process. It clarifies the effects of a deadlocked vote, ensuring that election cases are not unduly prolonged or left in a state of uncertainty. It also safeguards against potential manipulation of the system, preventing parties from relying on abstentions or inhibitions to achieve a favorable outcome without securing the necessary votes.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining the effect of a deadlocked vote in the COMELEC en banc on a motion for reconsideration of a COMELEC division’s ruling in an election disqualification case. The Court needed to clarify the proper interpretation of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
    What is Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure? This rule outlines the procedure to follow when the COMELEC en banc is equally divided in opinion or lacks the necessary majority to decide a case. It specifies different outcomes depending on whether the case was originally commenced in the COMELEC, is an appealed case, or involves incidental matters.
    What did the COMELEC Special First Division initially decide? The COMELEC Special First Division initially ruled to disqualify Alfredo D. Germar and Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. from their respective positions as Mayor and Councilor of Norzagaray, Bulacan due to allegations of vote-buying. This decision was based on the evidence presented by petitioner Feliciano Legaspi.
    Why did the case reach the Supreme Court? The case reached the Supreme Court because the COMELEC en banc failed to reach a majority vote on the motion for reconsideration filed by Germar and Santos. This deadlock left the original decision of the COMELEC division in question, prompting Legaspi to seek recourse from the Supreme Court.
    How did the Supreme Court classify a motion for reconsideration in this context? The Supreme Court classified a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc as an “incidental matter.” This classification is critical because it triggers the third effect under Section 6, Rule 18: the motion is denied, and the original decision of the COMELEC division stands.
    What was the significance of the Mendoza v. COMELEC case? Mendoza v. COMELEC was the leading pronouncement on the interpretation of Section 6, Rule 18. However, the Supreme Court found that its application could undermine the authority of COMELEC divisions and circumvent the constitutional requirement for a majority vote in the COMELEC en banc.
    How does this ruling affect future election cases? This ruling provides clarity and stability to the election dispute resolution process. It ensures that COMELEC division rulings are not easily overturned without a clear majority decision from the en banc, reinforcing the divisions’ adjudicatory powers and streamlining the process.
    What happens if a COMELEC division’s decision is tainted with irregularities? Even with this ruling, if there are indeed irregularities, there are other legal remedies available to correct the situation, as the ruling only pertains to situations where the en banc is deadlocked and the division ruling does not automatically imply that irregularities can now be perpetuated. The Supreme Court still has the final say on any ruling.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Legaspi v. COMELEC establishes a clear framework for resolving election disputes when the COMELEC en banc is unable to reach a majority decision. By categorizing a motion for reconsideration as an “incidental matter,” the Court ensures that the rulings of COMELEC divisions are upheld, thereby promoting efficiency and stability in the election process.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Feliciano Legaspi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216572, April 19, 2016

  • CIBAC Party-List Representation: Resolving Disputes Over Authority and Jurisdiction in Electoral Contests

    The Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging the representation of the Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) Party-List in Congress, affirming the authority of the CIBAC National Council to nominate representatives. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to established party structures and the constitutional jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in resolving election disputes. This ruling clarifies the roles of different party factions and the appropriate venues for resolving disputes over party representation, ensuring stability and legitimacy in the party-list system.

    CIBAC’s Battle: Who Holds the Reins in Party-List Representation?

    This case revolves around a power struggle within the Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) Party-List, specifically concerning the legitimacy of its representation in the House of Representatives. Two factions emerged, each claiming the right to nominate representatives for CIBAC: one led by the CIBAC National Council and the other by the CIBAC Foundation, Inc. The central legal question is which entity possesses the authority to represent CIBAC in the party-list system and, consequently, which nominees should be recognized by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

    The petitioners, Bibiano C. Rivera and Luis K. Lokin, Jr., representing the CIBAC Foundation, argued that the CIBAC National Council had become defunct after CIBAC’s registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock foundation. They contended that the CIBAC Foundation’s Board of Trustees (BOT) should rightfully exercise the authority to nominate party-list representatives. This argument was challenged by the respondents, representing the CIBAC National Council, who maintained that the council remained the legitimate governing body of CIBAC, empowered to formulate policies and nominate representatives.

    The Supreme Court, in its decision, emphasized the significance of adhering to the established structure and constitution of CIBAC. The Court underscored that the CIBAC National Council, as the COMELEC-registered governing body, holds the authority to formulate policies, plans, and programs, and to issue binding decisions. Justice Reyes, writing for the Court, stated:

    Petitioners cannot draw authority from the [BOT] of the SEC-registered entity, because the Constitution of CIBAC expressly mandates that it is the National Council, as the governing body of CIBAC, that has the power to formulate the policies, plans, and programs of the Party, and to issue decisions and resolutions binding on party members and officers.

    Building on this principle, the Court affirmed that the CIBAC National Council alone can authorize the party’s participation in party-list elections and the submission of its nominees. The registration of CIBAC Foundation with the SEC does not, in itself, override the evidentiary requirement under Republic Act No. 7941 (the Party-List System Act) that nominees must be bona fide members of the party. This legal framework ensures that the individuals representing a party-list organization are genuinely affiliated with and authorized by the legitimate governing body.

    Furthermore, the Court addressed the issue of jurisdiction, particularly concerning the quo warranto petition filed by CIBAC Foundation. The Court highlighted the constitutional mandate granting the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) the sole authority to judge contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states:

    The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members, x x x.

    Because the nominees of the CIBAC National Council, Sherwin N. Tugna and Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales, had already assumed their seats in Congress, the Court found that the HRET held exclusive jurisdiction over any challenges to their qualifications. This jurisdictional principle prevents conflicting decisions from different bodies and respects the separation of powers inherent in the Philippine government.

    In a concurring opinion, Justice Velasco, Jr. emphasized the applicability of res judicata, specifically the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. The Court had previously resolved the issue of which entity, CIBAC Foundation or CIBAC National Council, is authorized to field nominees for the party-list elections in G.R. No. 193808. Therefore, the petitioners were estopped from re-litigating the same issue in the present case. This doctrine promotes judicial efficiency and prevents the relitigation of issues already decided by a competent court.

    This decision reinforces the established legal principle that, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken their oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests ends, and the HRET’s jurisdiction begins. This principle was affirmed in the case of Reyes v. COMELEC, et al., where the Court held that the HRET’s jurisdiction is triggered upon the fulfillment of these conditions. This jurisdictional boundary is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the electoral process and the separation of powers.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was determining which entity, the CIBAC National Council or the CIBAC Foundation, had the authority to nominate representatives for the CIBAC Party-List in the House of Representatives. The Court ultimately affirmed the authority of the CIBAC National Council.
    What is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)? The HRET is a constitutional body with the sole authority to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Its jurisdiction begins once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken their oath, and assumed office.
    What is res judicata? Res judicata is a legal doctrine that prevents the relitigation of issues that have already been decided by a competent court. It includes the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, which means that a fact or question settled by a final judgment binds the parties and cannot be litigated again in future actions.
    What is the significance of COMELEC registration? COMELEC registration establishes the legitimacy of a political party or organization and its right to participate in elections. In this case, the CIBAC National Council’s COMELEC registration was a key factor in the Court’s decision to recognize its authority to nominate representatives.
    What is the Party-List System Act (R.A. No. 7941)? The Party-List System Act governs the election of party-list representatives to the House of Representatives. It requires that nominees be bona fide members of the party and that the party adheres to certain requirements to ensure representation of marginalized sectors.
    What was the basis for the Court’s decision on jurisdiction? The Court based its decision on the constitutional mandate granting the HRET exclusive jurisdiction over contests related to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Because the CIBAC nominees had already assumed their seats, the HRET had jurisdiction.
    What is a quo warranto petition? A quo warranto petition is a legal action filed to challenge a person’s right to hold a public office. In this case, the CIBAC Foundation filed a quo warranto petition to challenge the right of the CIBAC National Council’s nominees to represent CIBAC in Congress.
    What is the role of a party’s constitution and by-laws? A party’s constitution and by-laws define its structure, governance, and decision-making processes. In this case, the Court relied on CIBAC’s constitution to determine that the National Council had the authority to nominate representatives.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case provides clarity on the authority to represent party-list organizations and reinforces the jurisdictional boundaries between the COMELEC and the HRET. By affirming the importance of adhering to established party structures and respecting constitutional mandates, the Court has helped ensure the stability and legitimacy of the party-list system in the Philippines.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Rivera vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210273, April 19, 2016

  • Citizenship and Candidacy: Dual Citizens Barred from Local Office

    The Supreme Court has affirmed that dual citizens are ineligible to run for any elective local position in the Philippines. This landmark ruling emphasizes that such ineligibility exists from the moment a dual citizen files their certificate of candidacy, rendering it void from the start. Consequently, any votes cast for an ineligible dual citizen are considered stray, and the candidate with the next highest number of votes among eligible contenders is rightfully entitled to the office. This decision reinforces the stringent requirements for holding public office, ensuring that elected officials meet all qualifications at the time of their candidacy.

    Challenging a Councilor’s Seat: Citizenship Questioned in Manila’s Fourth District

    Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua, after winning a seat as Councilor for the Fourth District of Manila in the 2013 elections, faced a legal challenge questioning her eligibility. Imelda E. Fragata filed a petition arguing that Chua, a dual citizen with residency in the United States, did not meet the qualifications for the position. Krystle Marie C. Bacani, who received the next highest number of votes, intervened, seeking to be proclaimed the rightful Councilor should Chua be disqualified. The central question before the Supreme Court was whether Chua’s dual citizenship disqualified her from holding office and whether Bacani should be proclaimed in her stead.

    Fragata initially filed a petition to declare Chua a nuisance candidate and to deny due course or cancel her Certificate of Candidacy. Chua countered that the petition was filed beyond the allowed period and that she was a natural-born Filipino citizen. She claimed residency in Sampaloc, Manila, since 2008. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) determined that Fragata’s petition was indeed a disqualification case, which was filed within the prescribed period, as it was filed on the same date that Chua was proclaimed Councilor. The COMELEC then focused on the issue of Chua’s dual citizenship, finding that while Chua had taken an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 2011, she had failed to execute a sworn and personal renunciation of her American citizenship, as required by Section 5(2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. This led to the COMELEC’s decision to annul Chua’s proclamation and to proclaim Bacani as the new Councilor.

    Chua argued that since she was already proclaimed, the Commission on Elections should have respected the voice of the people. She also argued that any vacancy should be filled by succession as per the Local Government Code. The COMELEC, however, maintained that Chua’s dual citizenship disqualified her from running and that the votes cast in her favor should be disregarded. This ultimately led to the Supreme Court, where the pivotal issues were whether Fragata’s petition was correctly identified as a petition for disqualification and whether the rule on succession should apply.

    In its decision, the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the same code, as well as Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The Court emphasized that while both remedies address a candidate’s qualifications, they differ in grounds and periods for filing. A Section 78 petition is based on false material representation in the certificate of candidacy, while a disqualification petition raises grounds specifically listed in the election laws, such as dual citizenship or residency in a foreign country. The Court found that Fragata’s petition was indeed a petition for disqualification, as it questioned Chua’s citizenship and status as a permanent resident of the United States, aligning with Section 40 of the Local Government Code.

    The Supreme Court underscored the importance of adhering to the specific requirements for reacquiring Filipino citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Section 5(2) of this Act requires those seeking elective public office to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship at the time of filing their certificate of candidacy. According to the Court, simply taking an Oath of Allegiance is insufficient. The oath of allegiance and the sworn and personal renunciation of foreign citizenship are separate requirements, the latter being an additional requirement for qualification to run for public office. Chua’s failure to execute this renunciation meant she was a dual citizen when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy, rendering her disqualified under Section 40 of the Local Government Code.

    The Supreme Court further clarified the inapplicability of the rule on succession under Section 45 of the Local Government Code in this case. According to the Court, the rule on succession applies when vacancies arise from valid certificates of candidacy that are subsequently cancelled due to events occurring after the filing. However, when a certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, as in the case of a dual citizen, the votes cast are considered stray, and the candidate with the next highest number of votes among eligible candidates is rightfully entitled to the office. In this case, private respondent Bacani is legally entitled to the position of Councilor, having garnered the sixth highest number of votes among the eligible candidates. The Supreme Court cited Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, emphasizing that election laws require certain qualifications to be met before one even becomes a candidate. Even the will of the electorate cannot cure a defect in the qualifications of a candidate.

    Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Commission on Elections did not gravely abuse its discretion in disqualifying Chua, annulling her proclamation, and proclaiming Bacani as the duly elected Councilor. The Court emphasized that adherence to election laws is paramount and that the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates must be strictly observed to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a dual citizen who had not renounced their foreign citizenship was eligible to run for and hold a local elective position.
    What is the difference between a petition to deny due course and a petition for disqualification? A petition to deny due course targets false material representations in a certificate of candidacy, while a petition for disqualification raises specific grounds listed in election laws, such as dual citizenship.
    What does the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 require? The Act requires those seeking elective office to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any foreign citizenship at the time of filing their certificate of candidacy, in addition to taking an oath of allegiance.
    Why was the rule on succession not applied in this case? The rule on succession does not apply when a candidate’s certificate of candidacy is void from the beginning (ab initio) due to a pre-existing disqualification, such as dual citizenship.
    What happens to votes cast for a disqualified candidate? Votes cast for a disqualified candidate whose certificate of candidacy is void ab initio are considered stray and are not counted.
    Who assumes the position when a disqualified candidate’s votes are considered stray? The candidate with the next highest number of votes among the eligible candidates is entitled to the position.
    What was the basis for Fragata’s petition against Chua? Fragata’s petition was based on Chua’s alleged dual citizenship and permanent residency in the United States, which Fragata argued disqualified her under Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
    What did Chua argue in her defense? Chua argued that Fragata’s petition was filed out of time, that she was a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that any vacancy should be filled by succession, respecting the voice of the people.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Chua v. COMELEC underscores the importance of adhering to election laws and meeting all qualifications for public office. It reinforces that dual citizens must strictly comply with renunciation requirements to be eligible for local elective positions, ensuring that those who hold office are fully committed to the interests of the Philippines. The ruling serves as a vital reminder to all candidates of the necessity of fulfilling all legal requirements before seeking public office.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IMELDA E. FRAGATA, AND KRYSTLE MARIE C. BACANI, G.R. No. 216607, April 05, 2016

  • DILG’s Duty vs. COMELEC’s Authority: Defining Contempt in Election Law

    In Panadero v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court ruled that officials of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) were not guilty of indirect contempt for implementing an Ombudsman decision to dismiss a local mayor, even though the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had previously allowed the mayor to run for office. The Court clarified that the COMELEC’s decision on a candidate’s qualifications for an election is distinct from the Ombudsman’s authority to enforce administrative penalties. This decision highlights the importance of respecting the separate jurisdictions of different government bodies.

    When Duty Calls: Did DILG Officials Show Contempt or Simply Follow Orders?

    The case originated from conflicting decisions by the Ombudsman and the COMELEC regarding Mohammad Exchan Gabriel Limbona, the Municipal Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. The Ombudsman found Limbona guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from public service. Meanwhile, the COMELEC, in a separate case, allowed Limbona to run for office, citing the Aguinaldo doctrine. The DILG, under Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero and Regional Director Rene K. Burdeos, implemented the Ombudsman’s decision, leading to Limbona’s removal from office. The COMELEC then cited the DILG officials for indirect contempt, arguing that they had violated the COMELEC’s resolution.

    The COMELEC argued that the DILG officials’ actions constituted a “violation of the final and executory resolution of the [COMELEC].” However, the Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the COMELEC’s resolution in the disqualification case and the Ombudsman’s decision in the administrative case involved two distinct issues. The COMELEC was primarily concerned with Limbona’s qualifications to run for office in the 2013 elections. The Ombudsman’s decision focused on Limbona’s administrative liability for actions committed during a prior term.

    The Court underscored that the COMELEC’s decision to allow Limbona’s candidacy did not disregard the Ombudsman’s decision. Instead, the COMELEC recognized the fact of Limbona’s conviction in the administrative case but determined that no removal had transpired during Limbona’s prior tenure as a public official. Moreover, the Ombudsman’s decision carried sanctions beyond dismissal from public service, including the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government service. These penalties, the Court noted, could not be rendered ineffective simply by the COMELEC’s decision in the disqualification case.

    The Court also noted that the DILG officials acted in good faith. The DILG sought clarification from the Ombudsman regarding the applicability of the Aguinaldo doctrine in Limbona’s case. Furthermore, the Ombudsman reiterated the instruction to implement the decision in the administrative case. Disobeying the Ombudsman’s directive could have resulted in disciplinary action against the DILG officials. As the Supreme Court stated:

    The Honorable Secretary, [DILG] with respect to respondents Mayor Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (a.k.a. Lai) and [Limbona], x x x are hereby directed to implement this DECISION immediately upon receipt thereof pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of [Ombudsman Rules of Procedure] in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2006 dated 11 April 2006 and to promptly inform this Office of the action taken hereon.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the DILG officials were not guilty of indirect contempt. The Court found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions citing the DILG officials for contempt. The Court emphasized the importance of intent and good faith in contempt cases. Because the DILG was merely implementing the Ombudsman’s order, the Court ruled that the COMELEC’s finding of contempt lacked factual and legal justification. The Court’s ruling reinforces the principle that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised with caution and restraint.

    The case provides a valuable clarification on the scope of the COMELEC’s authority and the responsibilities of other government agencies in implementing administrative decisions. It also serves as a reminder of the importance of due process and the need for clear and unambiguous orders in contempt proceedings.

    The Supreme Court’s decision highlights the delicate balance between respecting the authority of different government agencies and ensuring that administrative decisions are properly implemented. It also underscores the importance of acting in good faith and seeking clarification when faced with conflicting directives.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether DILG officials were in contempt of the COMELEC for implementing an Ombudsman decision to dismiss a mayor, despite the COMELEC having previously allowed the mayor to run for office.
    What is indirect contempt? Indirect contempt is conduct outside the direct presence of the court that tends to degrade or obstruct the administration of justice. It involves disobedience to a lawful order or interference with court proceedings.
    What is the Aguinaldo doctrine? The Aguinaldo doctrine, established in Aguinaldo v. Santos, states that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term if they are re-elected, as the re-election implies condonation of the past misconduct.
    Why did the COMELEC cite the DILG officials for contempt? The COMELEC cited the DILG officials for contempt because it believed they violated a COMELEC resolution by implementing the Ombudsman’s decision to dismiss Limbona, whom the COMELEC had allowed to run for mayor.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling? The Supreme Court ruled that the DILG officials were not guilty of indirect contempt. The Court held that the COMELEC’s decision on Limbona’s qualifications was distinct from the Ombudsman’s authority to enforce administrative penalties.
    What was the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision? The Supreme Court based its decision on the distinct jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the Ombudsman. The COMELEC decides on qualifications to run for office, while the Ombudsman enforces administrative penalties.
    What is the significance of this ruling? The ruling clarifies the scope of the COMELEC’s authority and the responsibilities of other government agencies in implementing administrative decisions. It also underscores the importance of good faith in contempt proceedings.
    What penalties can be imposed for indirect contempt? Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the penalty for indirect contempt is a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (Php 1,000.00) or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both, at the discretion of the Commission.

    This case emphasizes the importance of understanding the distinct roles and responsibilities of different government agencies. It serves as a reminder that government officials should act in good faith and seek clarification when faced with conflicting directives.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 215548, April 05, 2016

  • Foundlings’ Citizenship: High Court Affirms Right to Run for President, Upholds Constitutional Principles

    Before a candidate can be disqualified, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) must have an established reason grounded in law, especially when it involves questions of citizenship and residency. This ruling underscores the primacy of constitutional rights and limits the COMELEC’s discretionary powers, preventing potential disenfranchisement of the electorate and upholding the integrity of electoral processes.

    Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares: A Foundling’s Fight for Presidential Eligibility

    This case revolves around Senator Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, a foundling, and the COMELEC’s decision to disqualify her from running for President in the 2016 elections. The central legal question was whether Poe, as a foundling, met the constitutional requirements of natural-born citizenship and ten years of residency, qualifications essential for holding the highest office in the Philippines.

    The Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, ruled in favor of Senator Poe, effectively affirming that foundlings are entitled to the presumption of natural-born citizenship unless proven otherwise. The Court also held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying Poe based on a narrow interpretation of residency requirements, which disregarded her long-term ties and intent to remain in the Philippines.

    The Court’s decision rested on several key pillars. First, the Constitution does not explicitly exclude foundlings from citizenship; existing laws favor an inclusive interpretation. Second, customary international law principles mandate states to provide nationality to prevent statelessness, supporting the presumption of citizenship for foundlings. Third, the court held that Poe presented substantial evidence to prove her residency, demonstrating a clear intention to make the Philippines her permanent home.

    The Solicitor General offered compelling statistical data from the Philippine Statistics Authority, indicating that from 1965 to 1975, a staggering 99.83% of children born in the Philippines were natural-born Filipinos. This was compelling evidence to demonstrate that one should presume that petitioner’s parents were Filipinos. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings based merely on a theoretical chance that they might be children of foreigners, is, according to the Solicitor General, downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. Given this statistical certainty, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright.

    As a matter of law, the High Court found, foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language that would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. It found no language in any Constitution permitting discrimination against foundlings.

    Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. These domestic laws on adoption, along with all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings, were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded, “We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations.”

    In disposing of the issue of whether the petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has before and until May 9, 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, the Court determined that it was true. As the constitution only requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years’ residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the elections were held on May 9, 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to May 9, 2016 for ten (10) years. And in answer to the requested information of “Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016,” she put in “10 years 11 months” which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.

    To be sure, when petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: (1) Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

    The petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include the petitioner’s former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she traveled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner’s family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner’s husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).

    Having said that, the Supreme Court held that by the power vested to them by the Constitution the Court grants the petition and declared that the COMELEC gravely abused their discretion, and annuls and sets aside the previous COMELEC resolutions and declares that petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares from running for President based on questions about her citizenship and residency.
    What is a foundling and how does it relate to citizenship? A foundling is a deserted or abandoned infant whose parents are unknown, and their citizenship becomes a complex legal question, often relying on the laws of the country where they were found.
    What is the significance of jus sanguinis in this case? Jus sanguinis, the “law of blood,” determines citizenship based on parentage. The challenge was whether Poe, as a foundling with unknown parents, could claim citizenship under this principle.
    What is the legal test for residency in Philippine election law? Philippine election law equates “residence” with “domicile,” requiring not only physical presence but also the intent to remain permanently (animus manendi) and abandon one’s previous domicile (animus non revertendi).
    Why did the COMELEC disqualify Poe? The COMELEC concluded that Poe made false material representations in her COC, particularly regarding her natural-born citizenship and her length of residency in the Philippines.
    How did the Supreme Court rule on the citizenship issue? The Supreme Court affirmed that there was no basis to not grant the presumption of natural-born citizen ship to Poe. The Court did not discount that there was sufficient evidence that she is the child of Filipino parents and is therefore entitled to be treated as such.
    What evidence did Poe present to prove her intent to reside in the Philippines? Poe presented evidence like her children’s school records, property ownership, tax identification, and the sale of properties in the United States to show her intent to establish permanent residence in the Philippines.
    What was the Supreme Court’s final ruling? The Supreme Court granted Poe’s petitions, annulling the COMELEC’s resolutions and declaring her qualified to run for President in the 2016 National Elections.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in the Poe-Llamanzares case is a pivotal moment in Philippine legal history, especially as it concerns foundlings. By affirming the right to a nationality and the presumption of natural-born citizenship, the Court strengthened protections for a vulnerable sector and upheld principles of fairness and inclusivity in electoral processes. This decision safeguards the rights of foundlings while re-affirming the need to be vigilant when it comes to elections.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission On Elections And Estrella C. Elamparo, G.R. Nos. 221698-700, March 08, 2016

  • Foundlings’ Citizenship: Statistical Probabilities vs. Constitutional Text

    The Supreme Court ruled that Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares, a foundling, was eligible to run for President, annulling COMELEC’s decision to cancel her Certificate of Candidacy. The Court held the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, emphasizing that foundlings, as a class, are natural-born citizens. This decision clarifies the rights of foundlings in Philippine elections, ensuring they are not unjustly excluded from seeking the highest office.

    From Abandoned Infant to Presidential Hopeful: Can a Foundling Claim Natural-Born Citizenship?

    This case, Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections and Estrella C. Elamparo, consolidated petitions challenging the COMELEC’s resolutions to cancel Mary Grace Poe’s COC for the 2016 presidential elections. The COMELEC based its decision on Poe’s alleged false representations regarding her citizenship and residency. This raised critical questions about foundlings’ rights and the COMELEC’s authority to determine a candidate’s qualifications.

    The legal battle hinged on whether Poe, as a foundling, could claim natural-born citizenship under the 1935 Constitution. This required examining historical context, international law, and the intent of the Constitution’s framers. The case also scrutinized the ten-year residency requirement for presidential candidates, questioning when Poe’s residency began given her previous status as a U.S. citizen. The Supreme Court ultimately determined that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion by improperly assessing the evidence and misinterpreting legal standards.

    The Supreme Court’s decision to grant Poe’s petitions rested on two key conclusions. First, the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction by ruling on Poe’s intrinsic qualifications, a power reserved for electoral tribunals after elections. Second, even if the COMELEC had the authority to examine Poe’s qualifications, it abused its discretion by ignoring substantial evidence of her intent to reside permanently in the Philippines and misinterpreting the legal standards for foundlings’ citizenship.

    To fully understand the court’s ruling, it’s necessary to delve into the history of Philippine citizenship laws. Initially, the Philippines followed a mix of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth) and jus sanguinis (citizenship by blood). The 1935 Constitution shifted towards a predominately jus sanguinis regime, granting citizenship to those with Filipino fathers or mothers. However, this created a legal ambiguity for foundlings whose parentage was unknown. The Court had to consider whether the framers of the 1935 Constitution intended to exclude foundlings, and whether international laws could be invoked to support their citizenship claims.

    The Court examined the debates of the 1934 Constitutional Convention, finding no clear intent to deny citizenship to foundlings. It also considered international law principles, noting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasize the right to a nationality and protection against statelessness. Although not automatically granting citizenship, these principles underscored the importance of ensuring that no child is left without a nationality.

    A crucial part of the Court’s analysis involved the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (RA 9225), which allows former natural-born Filipino citizens to regain their citizenship. The COMELEC argued that Poe’s repatriation under RA 9225 did not restore her natural-born status. However, the Court disagreed, citing jurisprudence that repatriation results in the recovery of original nationality, whether naturalized or natural-born.

    In addressing the residency issue, the Court considered the three requisites for acquiring a new domicile: physical presence, intention to remain, and intention to abandon the old domicile. It determined that Poe had presented substantial evidence demonstrating her intent to abandon her U.S. domicile and relocate permanently to the Philippines, including her children’s enrollment in local schools, the sale of her U.S. home, and the relocation of her personal belongings.

    The COMELEC, however, focused on Poe’s 2012 COC for Senator, where she stated a shorter period of residency. The Court found that the COMELEC gave undue weight to this prior statement, disregarding the overwhelming evidence of her intent and actions to reestablish her residence in the Philippines long before she ran for President. Furthermore, the court clarified that the requirement for residence is linked to the intent to be familiar with the electorate’s needs and not related to the need for pure blood or that former citizenship in a foreign country automatically disqualifies someone.

    Notably, the decision involved vigorous dissenting opinions that challenged the majority’s interpretation of the Constitution and the COMELEC’s actions. These dissents underscored the complexity of the issues at stake and the strong divisions within the Court.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Poe-Llamanzares case provides valuable insights into the interpretation of citizenship and residency requirements for public office. It reaffirms the rights of foundlings under international law and sets a high bar for challenging a candidate’s eligibility. The ruling serves as a reminder of the delicate balance between enforcing election laws and upholding fundamental rights.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central legal issue was whether a foundling with unknown parentage could meet the natural-born citizenship and residency requirements to run for President of the Philippines. This involved complex questions of constitutional law and statutory interpretation.
    Who were the key parties in the case? The petitioner was Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares, a foundling and a presidential candidate. Respondents included the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and private citizens who questioned Poe’s qualifications.
    What did the COMELEC decide? The COMELEC cancelled Poe’s Certificate of Candidacy, ruling that she misrepresented her citizenship and residency. They stated she wasn’t a natural-born citizen and hadn’t met the ten-year residency requirement.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling? The Supreme Court reversed the COMELEC’s decision, ruling that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court found that Poe was qualified to run for President.
    What is a foundling, and how did it impact this case? A foundling is a deserted or abandoned infant with unknown parents. Poe’s status as a foundling raised questions about her ability to prove natural-born citizenship, which traditionally requires tracing lineage to a Filipino parent.
    What is the difference between jus sanguinis and jus soli? Jus sanguinis grants citizenship based on blood relation to a citizen parent. Jus soli grants citizenship based on place of birth. The Philippines primarily follows jus sanguinis.
    What is grave abuse of discretion? Grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. It’s a standard used to determine if a tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction.
    What is the residency requirement for the Philippine President? The Constitution requires a presidential candidate to be a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the election. This residency is interpreted as domicile, which requires physical presence and intent to remain.
    What was the significance of Poe’s U.S. citizenship? Poe’s naturalization as a U.S. citizen triggered legal questions about when she reestablished Philippine residency, impacting her eligibility for the presidency. The Court looked at when she abandoned her US domicile to determine compliance.
    What is the role of ‘intent’ in false material representation? To cancel a certificate of candidacy based on false material representation, there must be an intention to mislead or misinform. Poe’s actions from the selling of her house in the US, moving her children to school here all showed her intent for the Philippines to be her home.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, [G.R. Nos. 221698-700], March 08, 2016

  • Untangling Election Protests: The Decisive Role of Proclamation Dates

    In the Philippines, the timeliness of filing an election protest is critical, as emphasized in Garcia v. COMELEC. This case clarifies that the 10-day period to contest a local election begins from the actual proclamation date, not necessarily from when a candidate receives formal notice. The Supreme Court prioritized the official manual Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation (COCP) over a printed version with a differing date, underscoring the importance of verifying the correct proclamation date. This ruling ensures that election protests are promptly addressed, preventing unnecessary delays and upholding the mandate of the electorate. It also highlights the responsibility of candidates to diligently monitor election results and act within the prescribed legal timeframe to protect their rights.

    Election Timelines: Did a Mayor’s Protest Miss the Deadline?

    The case of Maria Angela S. Garcia v. Commission on Elections and Jose Alejandre P. Payumo III revolves around a disputed mayoral election in Dinalupihan, Bataan. After the May 13, 2013 elections, Maria Angela S. Garcia was proclaimed the winner, garnering 31,138 votes against Jose Alejandre P. Payumo III’s 13,202. Payumo, however, filed an election protest, alleging fraud and irregularities. The central legal issue emerged when Garcia claimed that Payumo’s protest was filed beyond the mandatory ten-day reglementary period, which, according to her, began on May 14, 2013, the actual date of proclamation. Payumo contended that since the printed Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (COCP) indicated May 15, 2013, he acted timely. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially sided with Garcia, dismissing Payumo’s protest, but the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) reversed this decision, leading Garcia to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

    At the heart of the legal debate lies the interpretation of Rule 2, Section 12 (c) in relation to Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, also known as the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials. These provisions are crucial as they define the timeline for filing election protests:

    Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests. – The court shall summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds:
    (c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
    Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. – The election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of proclamation.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that this 10-day reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Thus, filing an election protest beyond this period deprives the court of jurisdiction. The Court acknowledged the conflicting dates presented by both parties, with Garcia asserting May 14, 2013, and Payumo relying on May 15, 2013, as indicated in the printed COCP. The RTC, after conducting a motion hearing, gave credence to Garcia’s assertion based on the testimonies of the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) and the manual COCP.

    The testimonies of the MBOC members were pivotal in determining the actual date of proclamation. During the hearing, each member testified unequivocally that Garcia was proclaimed the winner on May 14, 2013. Municipal treasurer Lani Penaflor, the vice-chairperson of the MBOC, provided a detailed explanation for the discrepancy between the manual and printed COCPs. She testified that on May 14, 2013, at around 5:00 PM, Garcia was proclaimed winner after 98.75% of the votes had been canvassed. The proclamation was made after determining that the remaining uncounted votes would not affect the election outcome, a decision approved by the Regional Election Director. This process aligns with COMELEC Resolution No. 9700, which allows the manual preparation of a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidates even if not all results have been received, provided the standing of the candidates will not be affected.

    The Court clarified that the manual COCP is the official document when canvassing thresholds are lowered, as provided in COMELEC Resolution No. 9700. The printed COCP, according to the resolution, is primarily for transmitting results to the next level of canvassing and not for proclaiming winning candidates in cases where the canvassing threshold has been lowered. Payumo’s reliance on the printed COCP was, therefore, deemed misplaced. The Supreme Court noted that the date on the printed COCP, May 15, 2013, reflected the date of its generation, which could not be modified by the MBOC.

    Payumo also sought to apply the precedent set in Federico v. COMELEC, arguing that the 10-day prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date he received notice of the proclamation rather than the actual date of proclamation. However, the Supreme Court distinguished the present case from Federico, emphasizing that the latter involved unique circumstances, including a surreptitious second proclamation. In Federico, the Court considered the fact that there were two different proclamations, and the second one was made without notice to the affected party. In contrast, the Garcia case involved a single, publicly announced proclamation.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that Payumo could not claim good faith in relying on the printed COCP because he was represented during the canvassing proceedings by Fernando Manalili. Notice to an agent is considered notice to the principal, implying that Payumo was aware of the May 14, 2013 proclamation date. The Court also pointed out that under COMELEC rules, a losing candidate is not entitled to be furnished with a copy of the COCP, reinforcing the expectation that candidates should actively monitor election results.

    The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC’s resolutions were in error. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the established rule that the reglementary period for instituting an election protest begins from the actual date of proclamation, not from when a candidate receives notice. The alleged omissions by the MBOC regarding the posting and service of COCP copies did not invalidate Garcia’s proclamation or extend the filing period, as Payumo was deemed aware of the results through his representatives.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the election protest was filed within the mandatory ten-day period from the proclamation date, as required by election rules. The dispute centered on which date—May 14 or May 15, 2013—should be considered the official proclamation date.
    Why was the manual COCP considered more important than the printed one? The manual COCP was deemed more important because it was prepared following COMELEC Resolution No. 9700, which allows for manual certification when the canvassing threshold is lowered. This resolution stipulates that the manual COCP serves as the basis for the proclamation.
    How did the testimony of the MBOC members affect the court’s decision? The MBOC members’ testimonies were critical as they unanimously confirmed that Garcia was proclaimed the winner on May 14, 2013. This testimony supported the validity of the manual COCP and contradicted Payumo’s claim that the proclamation occurred on May 15.
    What was Payumo’s argument for claiming the protest was filed on time? Payumo argued that since the printed COCP indicated May 15, 2013, as the proclamation date, he had ten days from that date to file his protest. He asserted that he acted in good faith by relying on the official document provided to him.
    Why did the Supreme Court distinguish this case from Federico v. COMELEC? The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Federico v. COMELEC because Federico involved unique circumstances, including a surreptitious second proclamation. In contrast, the Garcia case involved a single, publicly announced proclamation, making the Federico precedent inapplicable.
    How did Payumo’s representation during canvassing affect the decision? Payumo’s representation during the canvassing proceedings was critical because the Court attributed knowledge of the proclamation date to him through his agent, Fernando Manalili. Notice to an agent is considered notice to the principal, thereby negating Payumo’s claim of unawareness.
    What is the significance of COMELEC Resolution No. 9700 in this case? COMELEC Resolution No. 9700 is significant because it outlines the procedure for proclaiming winning candidates when the canvassing threshold is lowered. It clarifies that the manual COCP serves as the basis for the proclamation in such instances.
    Why is the 10-day period to file an election protest considered mandatory? The 10-day period is considered mandatory because it is a jurisdictional requirement. Filing an election protest beyond this period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the case, ensuring that election disputes are promptly addressed and resolved.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcia v. COMELEC reinforces the importance of adhering to strict timelines in election protests and verifying official proclamation dates. The ruling serves as a reminder for candidates to remain vigilant and proactive in monitoring election results to protect their legal rights. It also underscores the crucial role of the manual COCP in specific circumstances outlined by COMELEC Resolution No. 9700.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015

  • Electoral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction: Examining Challenges to Election Results and Nuisance Candidates

    The Supreme Court affirmed the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET) decision to dismiss Wigberto “Toby” R. Tañada, Jr.’s election protest. The HRET correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to declare Alvin John S. Tañada a nuisance candidate, a power belonging to the COMELEC. Additionally, Tañada’s procedural errors, such as filing a prohibited motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC and a late petition, were fatal to his case. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to strict procedural rules in election disputes and clarifies the distinct jurisdictions of the COMELEC and HRET in resolving electoral issues.

    When Surnames Confuse: Did a Nuisance Candidate Sabotage an Election?

    The case of Wigberto “Toby” R. Tañada, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal arose from the 2013 elections for the Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Quezon Province. Wigberto Tañada, Jr., running under the Liberal Party, contested the victory of Angelina “Helen” D. Tan of the Nationalist People’s Coalition. Central to the dispute was Alvin John S. Tañada, who also ran for the same position under Lapiang Manggagawa. Wigberto alleged that Alvin John was a nuisance candidate, maliciously fielded to confuse voters and sabotage his candidacy. This claim led to legal battles before the COMELEC and eventually the HRET, raising critical questions about the jurisdiction of electoral bodies and the procedural requirements for challenging election results.

    Wigberto initially filed petitions with the COMELEC to cancel Alvin John’s Certificate of Candidacy (COC) and declare him a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC First Division dismissed these petitions, but the COMELEC En Banc later granted the cancellation of Alvin John’s COC based on material misrepresentations concerning his residency. However, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the COMELEC First Division’s ruling that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate. Despite the COC cancellation, Alvin John’s name remained on the ballot, garnering 7,038 votes. Wigberto then sought to have these votes credited to him, arguing that Alvin John’s candidacy was fraudulent. The Quezon Provincial Board of Canvassers denied this request, leading to further legal challenges.

    A critical aspect of the case involved procedural missteps by Wigberto. The Supreme Court noted that Wigberto filed a prohibited motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc’s resolution. According to Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, motions for reconsideration of an en banc ruling are prohibited, except in election offense cases. This procedural lapse rendered the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling final and executory, preventing Wigberto from raising the issue of Alvin John’s nuisance candidacy in subsequent forums. Moreover, Wigberto’s petition was filed beyond the period provided by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 3, Rule 37 stipulates that decisions become final and executory after five days from promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. Thus, Wigberto’s failure to timely challenge the COMELEC En Banc’s resolution before the Supreme Court proved detrimental to his case.

    The HRET’s jurisdiction is constitutionally defined. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that each house of Congress has an electoral tribunal that “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.” The HRET, therefore, has the exclusive authority to resolve disputes concerning the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. However, this authority does not extend to declaring a candidate a nuisance candidate, which falls under the COMELEC’s jurisdiction.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion by declining to determine whether Alvin John was a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC En Banc’s ruling on this matter had long become final and executory. The Court also clarified that its previous directive for Wigberto to seek resolution before the HRET pertained to the conduct of the canvass and Tan’s proclamation, not to the issue of Alvin John’s purported nuisance candidacy.

    Justice Perez, in his concurring opinion, highlighted the limited jurisdiction of the HRET, stating that it only covers election protests and quo warranto cases. An election protest addresses electoral fraud or anomalies, while a quo warranto case challenges the eligibility of a House member. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 24, govern proceedings against nuisance candidates. The COMELEC had already determined that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate, and the HRET lacked the authority to reverse this finding. Justice Perez referenced the case of Codilla Sr. vs. Hon. De Venecia, emphasizing that the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over cases already decided by the COMELEC and under review by the Supreme Court.

    The significance of the COMELEC’s role in determining nuisance candidates is rooted in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code, which empowers the commission to refuse or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it aims to mock the election process, confuse voters, or lacks a bona fide intention to run. This authority is crucial in maintaining the integrity of elections and preventing abuse of the electoral system. Here is the exact text from the code:

    Section 69. Nuisance candidates. – The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

    The Supreme Court’s decision also touched on the requisites for considering an individual a Member of the House of Representatives. As established in Reyes v. COMELEC, these include a valid proclamation, a proper oath, and assumption of office. Alvin John, having received the least number of votes, could not have met these requirements and, therefore, could not be considered a member of Congress. Consequently, the HRET lacked jurisdiction over issues concerning his eligibility.

    Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the HRET’s resolutions, underscoring the importance of adhering to procedural rules and respecting the distinct jurisdictions of electoral bodies. This case serves as a reminder that challenges to election results must be grounded in both substantive merit and procedural compliance.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The main issue was whether the HRET had jurisdiction to declare Alvin John S. Tañada a nuisance candidate and credit his votes to Wigberto Tañada, Jr., in the 2013 elections. The Supreme Court affirmed that the HRET lacked such jurisdiction.
    What is a nuisance candidate according to Philippine election law? A nuisance candidate is someone who files a certificate of candidacy to mock the election process, cause confusion among voters, or lacks a genuine intention to run for office, as defined in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC has the power to declare a candidate a nuisance.
    What is the role of the COMELEC in election disputes? The COMELEC has the authority to cancel certificates of candidacy, declare nuisance candidates, and resolve pre-proclamation disputes. However, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken their oath, and assumed office, jurisdiction over election contests shifts to the HRET.
    What is the jurisdiction of the HRET? The HRET has the exclusive authority to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, as defined in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. This includes election protests and quo warranto cases.
    What procedural errors did Wigberto Tañada, Jr. commit? Wigberto filed a prohibited motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc’s resolution and filed his petition beyond the period provided by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, both of which were fatal to his case. These errors prevented him from successfully challenging the election results.
    What are the requisites for being considered a Member of the House of Representatives? The requisites are a valid proclamation, a proper oath, and assumption of office, as established in Reyes v. COMELEC. These requirements must be met for an individual to be recognized as a member of Congress.
    What is the difference between an election protest and a quo warranto case? An election protest is the proper remedy against acts or omissions constituting electoral fraud or anomalies in contested polling precincts, while a quo warranto case questions the eligibility of a Member of the Lower House. These are the two types of election contests the HRET has jurisdiction over.
    What happens to the votes of a candidate whose COC is cancelled? If a candidate’s COC is cancelled and they are declared a nuisance candidate, their votes may be credited to a bona fide candidate with the same name. However, if the candidate is not declared a nuisance candidate, the votes are considered stray.

    This case clarifies the distinct roles of the COMELEC and HRET in resolving election disputes, particularly regarding nuisance candidates. Understanding these jurisdictional boundaries and adhering to procedural rules are essential for effectively challenging election results.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Tañada, Jr. vs. HRET, G.R. No. 217012, March 01, 2016

  • Election Law: COMELEC’s Authority Over Local Election Officers and Execution Pending Appeal

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the authority to direct its election officers and that its orders take precedence over those of lower courts, except for the Supreme Court. This means local election officers must follow COMELEC’s instructions, even if a lower court has issued a conflicting order. The decision also clarified the timeline for executing judgments pending appeal in election cases, emphasizing that lower courts lose jurisdiction once the case records are transmitted to the COMELEC.

    When Can COMELEC Intervene? Clarifying Authority in Election Disputes

    This case originated from a barangay election dispute between Rolando P. Tolentino and Henry Manalo for the position of Barangay Captain in Barangay Calingcuan, Tarlac City, during the 2013 elections. After a vote recount, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) proclaimed Tolentino the winner. Manalo appealed, and Tolentino sought immediate execution of the MTCC’s decision pending the appeal. The MTCC granted Tolentino’s motion but held the issuance of the writ in abeyance, also giving due course to Manalo’s appeal.

    Manalo then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the COMELEC, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the MTCC’s order. The COMELEC issued a TRO. Subsequently, Tolentino requested the City Election Officer of Tarlac to implement the writ of execution pending appeal, which the Election Officer endorsed to COMELEC’s Law Department. The COMELEC then issued an order advising the Election Officer to await its resolution of the case. Tolentino filed a petition for certiorari questioning COMELEC’s order, arguing that it constituted grave abuse of discretion.

    The Supreme Court dismissed Tolentino’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. The Court emphasized the COMELEC’s authority over its election officers and the precedence of its directives over those of lower courts. The Court pointed out that, as an agent of the Commission, an election officer is under the Commission’s direct and immediate control and supervision.

    Omnibus Election Code
    Article VII
    The Commission on Elections
    Sec. 52 Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. – In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall: x x x

    (f) Enforce and execute its decisions, directives, orders and instructions which shall have precedence over those emanating from any other authority, except the Supreme Court and those issued in habeas corpus proceedings.

    The Court also clarified that the MTCC’s writ of execution pending appeal could not be enforced because it was issued after the MTCC had already lost its residual jurisdiction. The Court explained the rules governing execution pending appeal in election cases. Specifically, the MTCC retains residual jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal while two conditions concur: (1) records of the case have not yet been transmitted to the Commission; and (2) the period to appeal has not yet expired.

    The Court also addressed the argument that Tolentino was not given notice nor the opportunity to be heard, pointing out that the records showed otherwise. The Court noted that Tolentino filed an answer to the petition, moved for reconsideration of the Commission’s TRO, and was even allowed to file memoranda. Finally, the Court admonished Tolentino’s counsel for threatening the City Election Officer with a baseless contempt charge. The Supreme Court warned that Atty. Facun’s actions dangerously lied at the margins of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

    CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

    Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

    The Court emphasized that lawyers must represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. This ruling reinforces the COMELEC’s supervisory power over local election officers and provides clarity on the timeline and conditions for executing judgments pending appeal in election cases. It also serves as a reminder to lawyers to act ethically and avoid threatening election officials.

    FAQs

    What was the central legal issue in this case? The primary issue was whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in advising a local election officer to await its resolution before implementing a writ of execution issued by a lower court. The Court also addressed the issue of when a lower court loses jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal.
    What is the COMELEC’s authority over local election officers? The COMELEC has direct and immediate control and supervision over its election officers. It can issue orders and directives to them, and these orders take precedence over those from any other authority, except the Supreme Court and those issued in habeas corpus proceedings.
    When can a party seek execution of a decision pending appeal in an election case? A prevailing party can move for execution pending appeal. The court may order execution of the decision before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to certain rules.
    When does a lower court lose jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal? A lower court loses jurisdiction when the records of the case have been transmitted to the COMELEC, and the period to appeal has expired. After this point, only the COMELEC can grant execution pending appeal.
    What is the role of the City Election Officer in this case? The City Election Officer is an agent of the COMELEC, subject to its directives and supervision. The Election Officer is expected to comply with COMELEC orders.
    What ethical considerations were raised in this case? The Court admonished the petitioner’s counsel for threatening the City Election Officer with a baseless contempt charge. This conduct was deemed to be at the margins of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to act within the bounds of the law.
    What is the significance of the Omnibus Election Code in this case? The Omnibus Election Code grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and execute its decisions, directives, orders, and instructions, which have precedence over those emanating from any other authority except the Supreme Court.
    Can the COMELEC treat a petition for certiorari as an appeal? Yes, the COMELEC has the prerogative to treat a petition for certiorari as an appeal, especially in the interest of justice, given the liberal spirit pervading the Commission’s rules of procedure.

    This case underscores the importance of understanding the COMELEC’s role in overseeing elections and resolving election disputes. It provides clear guidelines on the timing of execution pending appeal and reinforces the ethical obligations of lawyers in dealing with election officials.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Tolentino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 218536, January 26, 2016

  • Moral Turpitude and Electoral Disqualification: Defining the Boundaries of Public Office Eligibility

    The Supreme Court addressed whether a prior libel conviction involving moral turpitude disqualifies an individual from holding public office. The Court ruled that Philip A. Pichay’s prior conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, disqualified him from serving as a Member of the House of Representatives. This decision underscores the importance of moral integrity for public officials and clarifies the grounds for electoral disqualification under Philippine law, directly impacting who can hold public office.

    When Reputation Bites: Can a Libel Conviction Bar You From Congress?

    This case revolves around the eligibility of Philip A. Pichay to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives, given his prior conviction for libel. Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado challenged Pichay’s eligibility, arguing that his libel conviction involved moral turpitude, thus disqualifying him under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) initially dismissed Ty-Delgado’s petition, finding that Pichay’s libel conviction did not involve moral turpitude. The Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in ruling that Pichay’s conviction did not involve moral turpitude, thereby rendering him eligible for public office.

    At the heart of the matter is Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, which outlines disqualifications for candidates. It states:

    Sec. 12. Disqualifications.— Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

    The key phrase here is “crime involving moral turpitude.” The Supreme Court had to define what constitutes moral turpitude in the context of libel. The Court referenced established jurisprudence defining moral turpitude as anything done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. It also acknowledged the general rule that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not.

    The Court weighed the elements of libel against the definition of moral turpitude. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. Malice, the Court emphasized, is the essence of libel, implying an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Specifically, actual malice requires that the libelous statement be written or published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it is false or not. These considerations led the Court to assert:

    In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be considered as further evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He committed an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow men, or society in general,” and an act which is “contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”

    The Court rejected Pichay’s argument that his role as merely the publisher, rather than the author, of the libelous articles mitigated his culpability. The Revised Penal Code holds publishers responsible for defamations to the same extent as authors. Furthermore, the imposition of a fine, instead of imprisonment, did not diminish the fact that the crime involved moral turpitude.

    Building on the finding that Pichay’s libel conviction involved moral turpitude, the Court examined the implications for his eligibility to hold public office. According to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, the disqualification lasts for five years from the service of the sentence. Since Pichay paid the fine on February 17, 2011, his disqualification extended until February 16, 2016. Consequently, when Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy on October 9, 2012, he misrepresented his eligibility, making his certificate of candidacy void ab initio.

    The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the false representation in Pichay’s certificate of candidacy, citing Section 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74 requires the certificate of candidacy to state that the person filing it is eligible for said office. Section 78 allows for a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on any false material representation.

    Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five, days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

    Given Pichay’s ineligibility at the time of filing, the Supreme Court ruled that the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Therefore, the candidate with the next highest number of valid votes, Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado, was declared the winner. This decision reiterated the principle that a person whose certificate of candidacy is void ab initio is deemed never to have been a candidate at all.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether a prior conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude, disqualified Philip A. Pichay from holding the position of Member of the House of Representatives. The court had to determine if Pichay’s actions met the threshold for moral turpitude as defined by law.
    What is moral turpitude? Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a person owes to fellow citizens or society, contrary to accepted rules of justice, honesty, or good morals. The Supreme Court uses this definition to determine if a crime disqualifies someone from holding public office.
    What is the significance of Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code? Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code outlines the disqualifications for candidates, including those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. This section is critical because it determines who is eligible to run for and hold public office in the Philippines.
    How long does the disqualification under Section 12 last? The disqualification under Section 12 lasts for five years from the date the sentence is served, unless the individual receives a plenary pardon or amnesty. In this case, Pichay’s disqualification was for five years from when he paid the fine for his libel conviction.
    What happens if a candidate makes a false material representation in their certificate of candidacy? If a candidate makes a false material representation, such as falsely claiming eligibility, their certificate of candidacy can be denied or canceled under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. This means the candidate is deemed never to have been a valid candidate.
    What is the consequence of a certificate of candidacy being void ab initio? When a certificate of candidacy is void ab initio (from the beginning), the candidate is considered never to have been a valid candidate, and all votes cast for them are considered stray votes. The candidate with the next highest number of valid votes is then declared the winner.
    Why did the Supreme Court reverse the HRET’s decision? The Supreme Court reversed the HRET because it found that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to recognize that Pichay’s libel conviction involved moral turpitude. This meant that Pichay was ineligible to hold office, and his certificate of candidacy should have been invalidated.
    What was the final outcome of the case? The Supreme Court declared Pichay ineligible to hold the office of Member of the House of Representatives. Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado, the candidate with the next highest number of valid votes, was declared the winner for the position.

    This case clarifies the scope of moral turpitude in electoral law, reinforcing the standards of ethical conduct expected from those seeking public office. It serves as a potent reminder that public officials are expected to adhere to the highest moral standards, and that transgressions can have significant legal and professional consequences. This ruling provides a framework for future cases involving the eligibility of candidates with prior convictions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Philip Arreza Pichay, G.R. No. 219603, January 26, 2016