Category: Family Law

Safeguarding Marital Property: The Indispensable Consent in Conjugal Dispositions

This Supreme Court case clarifies that a spouse’s consent is absolutely necessary when dealing with conjugal properties. Without this consent, any mortgage or sale of the property is considered void, protecting the rights of the non-consenting spouse. The ruling emphasizes the importance of both spouses’ agreement in managing and disposing of assets acquired during their marriage. While the unauthorized mortgage may be nullified, the underlying loan obligation can still be recovered from the conjugal partnership and, if insufficient, from the separate properties of both spouses. This ensures that while marital property rights are protected, valid debts are still honored.

When a Forged Signature Unravels a Conjugal Mortgage: Whose Consent Really Matters?

In Philippine National Bank vs. Venancio C. Reyes, Jr., the Supreme Court was tasked with determining the validity of a real estate mortgage on conjugal properties, where the husband’s consent was allegedly obtained through forgery. This case highlights the critical importance of spousal consent in transactions involving properties acquired during marriage. The central legal question revolves around whether a mortgage can be enforced when one spouse’s signature is proven to be a forgery, and what the implications are for the involved parties, including the lending bank and the conjugal partnership.

The facts of the case reveal that Venancio C. Reyes, Jr. was married to Lilia Reyes in 1973. During their marriage, they acquired three parcels of land in Bulacan, registered under both their names. Lilia Reyes later mortgaged these properties to Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan. When the couple failed to meet their loan obligations, PNB foreclosed the properties. Venancio, however, contested the foreclosure, arguing that his consent to the mortgage was never obtained and that his signature on the relevant documents had been forged. He claimed he had no knowledge of the loan his wife undertook.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Venancio, annulling the real estate mortgage and the certificate of sale. The RTC found that Venancio’s signature was indeed forged and, therefore, his consent was absent. This decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), leading PNB to appeal to the Supreme Court. PNB argued that Venancio had knowledge of the loan and mortgage and that the conjugal partnership should be held liable for the debt. They also claimed that Venancio’s cause of action was barred by laches, or unreasonable delay in asserting his rights.

The Supreme Court, in its decision, emphasized the critical importance of spousal consent as mandated by the Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code explicitly states that the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property requires the written consent of both spouses. The Court noted that since the Reyes Spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, their property regime is the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, making Article 124 applicable. This provision underscores that any transaction affecting conjugal property without the consent of both spouses is void.

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

The Court relied heavily on the factual findings of the lower courts, which had established, through expert testimony, that Venancio’s signature on the mortgage documents was forged. The handwriting expert, Efren B. Flores, from the National Bureau of Investigation, compared the signatures on the loan documents with Venancio’s standard signatures and concluded that they were not written by the same person. Flores pointed out discrepancies in the pen pressure, stroke coordination, and structural pattern of letter formation, convincing the courts that the signatures were indeed forged. The Supreme Court reiterated that it is not a trier of facts and generally defers to the factual findings of the lower courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Addressing PNB’s argument that the conjugal partnership should be held liable for the loan, the Supreme Court clarified the application of Article 122 of the Family Code. This article states that personal debts contracted by either spouse during the marriage can be charged to the conjugal partnership only if they redounded to the benefit of the family. The Court emphasized that while the mortgage itself was void due to the lack of consent, the principal loan obligation remained valid. Since the loan was used as additional working capital for respondent’s printing business, the law presumes that it redounded to the benefit of the family. Therefore, the conjugal partnership could be held liable for the loan amount.

The Supreme Court also addressed PNB’s contention that Venancio’s action was barred by laches. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to assert a right, warranting a presumption that the party has abandoned it. The Court found that Venancio had filed the complaint for annulment within the prescribed period to redeem a mortgaged property. Thus, his action was not barred by laches. A delay within the prescriptive period sanctioned by law is not considered an unreasonable delay that would bar relief.

Building on this, the Supreme Court clarified the extent of liability for the unpaid loan. If the conjugal partnership’s assets are insufficient to cover the loan, the spouses are solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. This means that PNB could recover the remaining balance from either Venancio or Lilia’s individual assets. This ruling underscores the principle that while the lack of spousal consent invalidates the mortgage, it does not extinguish the debt, and the creditors can still pursue recovery from the appropriate parties.

The legal implications of this decision are significant for both lending institutions and married couples. For banks, it reinforces the need to ensure that both spouses provide their explicit consent to any mortgage or loan agreement involving conjugal properties. Failure to obtain this consent can render the mortgage void, potentially jeopardizing the bank’s security for the loan. For married couples, the case highlights the importance of transparency and mutual agreement in managing conjugal assets. It also serves as a reminder that one spouse cannot unilaterally encumber or dispose of conjugal property without the other’s consent.

This ruling also underscores the importance of due diligence in financial transactions. Banks and other lending institutions must verify the authenticity of signatures and ensure that both spouses are fully aware of and consent to the terms of any loan or mortgage agreement. This may involve requiring the personal appearance of both spouses at the bank, obtaining independent legal advice for each spouse, or conducting thorough background checks to verify the validity of the documents presented. The consequences of failing to exercise such diligence can be severe, as demonstrated by the PNB case.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Philippine National Bank vs. Venancio C. Reyes, Jr. reaffirms the fundamental principle that spousal consent is indispensable for the valid disposition or encumbrance of conjugal properties. While the mortgage was deemed void due to the forged signature, the underlying debt remained valid and could be recovered from the conjugal partnership and, if necessary, from the separate properties of the spouses. This case serves as a crucial reminder of the legal protections afforded to marital property and the importance of ensuring both spouses’ involvement in financial transactions affecting these assets.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a real estate mortgage on conjugal property was valid when one spouse’s signature was forged, thus lacking consent. The court had to determine the validity of the mortgage and the liability for the loan.
What is conjugal property?	Conjugal property refers to assets acquired by a husband and wife during their marriage under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. These assets are owned jointly by both spouses.
What does the Family Code say about conjugal property?	The Family Code requires the written consent of both spouses for any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property. Without such consent, the transaction is void.
What evidence did the court consider to determine forgery?	The court considered expert testimony from a handwriting expert from the National Bureau of Investigation. The expert compared the contested signature with known samples and identified significant discrepancies.
Is the debt still valid even if the mortgage is void?	Yes, even if the mortgage is void due to lack of consent, the underlying loan obligation remains valid. The creditor can still pursue recovery of the debt.
Who is liable for the debt if the mortgage is void?	The conjugal partnership is primarily liable for the debt if the loan benefited the family. If the conjugal assets are insufficient, the spouses are solidarily liable with their separate properties.
What is laches, and does it apply in this case?	Laches is the unreasonable delay in asserting a right, which can bar relief. In this case, laches did not apply because the husband filed the complaint within the prescribed period to redeem a mortgaged property.
What should banks do to prevent similar issues?	Banks should ensure that both spouses provide explicit consent to any mortgage or loan agreement involving conjugal properties. They should also verify the authenticity of signatures and exercise due diligence in their transactions.

This case underscores the judiciary’s commitment to protecting the rights of spouses in marital property. It also highlights the necessity for financial institutions to exercise caution and diligence when dealing with married individuals to avoid similar disputes. The principles elucidated in this case provide clear guidelines for future transactions involving conjugal properties.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Philippine National Bank vs. Venancio C. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 212483, October 05, 2016

July 24, 2017

Deprivation of Liberty: Minor’s Detention and the Boundaries of Consent

In People v. Fabro, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Zenaida Fabro for Serious Illegal Detention, emphasizing that the unlawful deprivation of a minor’s liberty does not require physical restraint. The ruling clarifies that even if a child is not physically confined, taking them to an unfamiliar place against their will constitutes illegal detention. The Court underscored the vulnerability of minors and the presumption of their inability to give informed consent, reinforcing protections against those who exploit that vulnerability.

When a ‘Favor’ Becomes a Felony: Examining the Illegal Detention of a Minor

The case began with an Information dated March 6, 2006, accusing Zenaida Fabro of Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The charge stemmed from the events of March 2, 2006, when Zenaida Fabro allegedly took a 9-year-old girl, AAA, from her school, XXX Elementary School in YYY, and detained her in Nueva Ecija until March 5, 2006. The prosecution presented evidence that Fabro, purportedly AAA’s aunt, fetched her from school, but instead of taking her home, she transported her to Nueva Ecija against her will, ignoring her pleas to return home and her parents’ phone calls. Fabro claimed she had the consent of AAA’s mother and teacher, but the court found her guilty, a decision later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

At the heart of this case is Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Specifically, the law states:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The elements of the crime are clear: the offender must be a private individual who kidnaps or detains another, thereby depriving them of their liberty. The act must be illegal, and the victim must be a minor. The Court found that all these elements were present in Fabro’s actions. Crucially, the duration of the detention is immaterial when the victim is a minor, underscoring the heightened protection afforded to children under the law. This legislative approach reflects the State’s commitment to safeguarding the welfare of children, recognizing their vulnerability and the potential for exploitation.

Fabro argued that AAA was not deprived of her liberty because she was not physically restrained and was free to interact with others. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, citing established jurisprudence that curtailment of liberty does not require physical restraint. As the Court stated in People v. Bisda, the victim’s liberty can be compromised even without physical barriers:

…to accept a child’s desire for food, comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the context of kidnapping would render the concept meaningless.

In this context, the court emphasized the psychological and emotional control exerted by the abductor over the child. The court illustrated this point by noting that AAA was taken to an unfamiliar place where she did not know the way home, effectively placing her freedom at the mercy and control of Fabro. The court also referenced People v. Acosta, stating that “because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back home, he was then and there in a way deprived of his liberty.”

The defense further challenged AAA’s credibility, pointing to inconsistencies between her sworn statement and her testimony. However, the Court dismissed this argument, stating that discrepancies between affidavits and court testimonies are common and do not necessarily discredit a witness. The court, citing People v. Dayaday, emphasized that ex parte affidavits are often incomplete and considered inferior to testimony given in open court. Any inconsistencies, the court argued, serve to strengthen the witness’s credibility by dispelling any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Ultimately, the essence of kidnapping lies in the deprivation of liberty and the intent to effect such deprivation, both of which were evident in Fabro’s actions.

The Court also rejected Fabro’s claim that she had the consent of AAA’s mother, citing the immediate police report and the mother’s plea for AAA’s return as evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, the Court stated that the consent of a minor is irrelevant in cases of illegal detention, as minors are presumed incapable of giving informed consent. This legal principle underscores the protective stance of the law towards children, recognizing their vulnerability and the potential for exploitation.

Fabro’s defense of denial was also deemed insufficient by the court. Denial is considered a weak defense, particularly when faced with the credible testimony of prosecution witnesses who have no apparent motive to lie. The Court highlighted that AAA’s testimony was consistent and corroborated by the circumstances of the case, further undermining Fabro’s defense.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding Fabro guilty of Serious Illegal Detention and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, the Court adjusted the monetary awards, reducing moral damages to PhP75,000 and adding a civil indemnity of PhP75,000 and exemplary damages of PhP75,000, all subject to a six percent interest rate per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid. This adjustment reflects the Court’s commitment to ensuring adequate compensation for the victim while aligning the awards with prevailing jurisprudence.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Zenaida Fabro unlawfully deprived a minor, AAA, of her liberty, constituting serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The court examined whether the absence of physical restraint negated the element of deprivation of liberty.
What are the elements of serious illegal detention?	The elements include: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) they kidnap or detain another, depriving them of liberty; (3) the act is illegal; and (4) the victim is a minor. If the victim is a minor, the duration of detention is immaterial.
Did the court consider AAA’s consent to going with Fabro?	No, the court did not consider AAA’s supposed consent as valid because, as a minor, she was presumed incapable of giving informed consent. The law presumes a lack of consent when the victim is a minor.
Why were discrepancies in AAA’s statements not fatal to the prosecution’s case?	The court explained that discrepancies between affidavits and court testimonies are common and often due to the incomplete nature of affidavits. Such discrepancies do not automatically discredit a witness, especially when their testimony remains consistent in essential details.
What was the significance of Fabro taking AAA to an unfamiliar place?	Taking AAA to Nueva Ecija, a place unfamiliar to her, was significant because it effectively placed her freedom under Fabro’s control. The court noted that being in an unfamiliar location where she did not know the way home constituted deprivation of liberty.
What was Fabro’s defense, and why did it fail?	Fabro’s defense was that she had AAA’s mother’s consent and that AAA was not physically restrained. This defense failed because the court found no credible evidence of the mother’s consent and emphasized that physical restraint is not required for illegal detention.
What penalty did Fabro receive?	Fabro was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, which is imprisonment for life. She was also ordered to pay moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary damages to the victim.
How did the court address the issue of intent in this case?	The court stated that the specific intent in kidnapping or illegal detention is to deprive the victim of their liberty. The prosecution established that Fabro intended to deprive AAA of her freedom, as well as her parents’ custody of her, by taking her to Nueva Ecija against her will.

This case reinforces the importance of protecting children from exploitation and unlawful detention. The ruling serves as a reminder that depriving a minor of their liberty, even without physical restraint, is a serious offense with severe consequences. The court’s decision reaffirms the principle that the welfare of children is paramount and that their vulnerability must be safeguarded by the full force of the law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: People of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Fabro or Zenaida Manalastas y Viñegas, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017

July 17, 2017

Separation of Church and State: Clarifying Civil Court Jurisdiction over Marital Disputes in the Philippines

The Supreme Court clarified that civil courts in the Philippines have jurisdiction over petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, even when the marriage was solemnized in a church. This ruling emphasizes that while the state recognizes the sanctity of marriage, the civil and legal consequences of marriage are governed by the Family Code, and the principle of separation of church and state does not preclude civil courts from ruling on the validity of a marriage contract under civil law.

When Worlds Collide: Can Civil Courts Judge Church Marriages?

The case of Jerrysus L. Tilar v. Republic of the Philippines arose from a petition filed by Jerrysus Tilar seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage based on his wife’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition, asserting it lacked jurisdiction over church marriages, citing the principle of separation of church and state. This prompted Tilar to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court, questioning whether civil courts could indeed rule on the validity of a marriage solemnized within the Catholic Church.

The Supreme Court anchored its decision on Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which underscores the inviolable nature of marriage as a social institution. The Court emphasized that marriage, under Philippine law, is not merely a civil contract but also a foundational element of the family and, consequently, the nation. The State, therefore, has a vested interest in protecting and maintaining the sanctity of marriage.

To further expound on this, the Court quoted Article 1 of the Family Code, which defines marriage as:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This provision highlights that while marriage is a contract, its terms are not solely dictated by the parties involved but are also governed by law. The Family Code lays down the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, and any failure to meet these requirements can render the marriage void. The Court also noted that the Family Code provides the legal framework for resolving marital disputes, including grounds for annulment or declaration of nullity.

The Supreme Court clarified the interplay between civil and religious aspects of marriage. While a marriage solemnized in the Catholic Church is considered a sacrament, it also carries civil and legal consequences governed by the Family Code. A declaration of nullity by a civil court, based on the Family Code, does not necessarily equate to an annulment in the eyes of the Church, and vice versa. The Court stressed that the petition before it sought to nullify the marriage contract as defined by Philippine law, a matter distinct from any religious or ecclesiastical proceedings.

To illustrate the separation, consider this scenario: A couple married in a church obtains a civil annulment based on psychological incapacity. Despite the civil annulment, the Church may still recognize the marriage as valid unless a separate annulment is granted by a Church tribunal. This distinction underscores that the state and religious institutions operate within their respective spheres of authority.

The Court then referred to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which explicitly grants Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Therefore, the RTC’s dismissal of Tilar’s petition for lack of jurisdiction was deemed erroneous.

In sum, the Supreme Court concluded that the principle of separation of church and state does not preclude civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Family Code provides the legal framework for resolving marital disputes, and civil courts are empowered to apply these provisions, irrespective of where the marriage was solemnized.

In light of the clarification, the Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the RTC to proceed with resolving the case based on the evidence presented.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether civil courts in the Philippines have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a church marriage in a petition for declaration of nullity under the Family Code.
What did the RTC rule initially?	The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition, reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction over church marriages due to the principle of separation of church and state.
What was the Supreme Court’s decision?	The Supreme Court reversed the RTC’s decision, holding that civil courts do have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriages under the Family Code, regardless of whether the marriage was solemnized in a church.
What is the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision?	The Court based its decision on the Family Code, the Constitution’s provision on the sanctity of marriage, and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which grants RTCs exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving marriage and marital relations.
Does this ruling mean that church annulments are now unnecessary?	No, this ruling pertains to civil annulments. Church annulments are governed by Canon Law and remain separate and distinct from civil proceedings.
What is psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?	Psychological incapacity refers to a mental condition that renders a party unable to comply with the essential marital obligations, even if the condition becomes apparent only after the marriage.
How does the separation of church and state apply in this case?	The Court clarified that the principle does not prevent civil courts from ruling on the civil aspects of marriage as defined by the Family Code, even if the marriage was a religious ceremony.
What is the practical implication of this ruling?	Parties seeking to nullify their marriage under the Family Code can now be assured that civil courts have the authority to hear their cases, irrespective of the religious nature of their marriage ceremony.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Tilar v. Republic reinforces the state’s role in regulating and resolving marital disputes within the framework of the Family Code, irrespective of the religious aspect of the marriage. This clarifies the jurisdictional boundaries between civil and religious authorities in matters of marriage, ensuring that individuals have access to legal remedies under Philippine law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

July 12, 2017

Protecting the Vulnerable: The Duty of Moral Ascendancy in Familial Rape Cases

In People v. Alex Amar y Montano, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a father for the rape of his minor daughter, emphasizing that in cases involving familial relationships, the moral ascendancy of the offender can substitute for physical force or intimidation. This ruling underscores the special vulnerability of children within their own families and the heightened responsibility of parents. It serves as a stark reminder that the law protects children from abuse, even when the abuser is a figure of authority within the family.

A Father’s Betrayal: When Moral Ascendancy Becomes a Weapon of Abuse

Alex Amar y Montano was accused of repeatedly raping his minor daughter, AAA. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City found him guilty, a decision affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals (CA). Amar appealed, claiming the daughter’s testimony lacked credibility and he denied all charges, relying on an alibi. The Supreme Court (SC) was called upon to review the lower court decisions and determine whether the evidence supported the conviction for rape. The court considered the specific dynamics of familial abuse, where the perpetrator’s position of authority over the victim can replace traditional elements of force.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight. These findings underscored that Amar had indeed committed the crime of rape against his daughter. The court highlighted the importance of according respect to the trial court’s evaluation of witness credibility, recognizing that the lower court had the advantage of directly observing the demeanor of the witnesses. This deference to the trial court’s assessment forms a crucial aspect of the appellate review process, ensuring that factual determinations are not lightly overturned.

In this case, the crime was defined by Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC):

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed:

1)

By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation[.]

The elements of rape under this provision are: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) the act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. However, the court clarified that in cases of rape committed by a close relative, actual force or intimidation is not always necessary. Instead, the moral influence or ascendancy of the offender over the victim can suffice.

The Court emphasized the credibility of AAA’s testimony, stating that it was delivered in a straightforward and convincing manner. It referenced established jurisprudence that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself and her family to shame, especially when the accusation could lead to the imprisonment of her own father. The Court noted the absence of any improper motive on AAA’s part to falsely accuse Amar of such a grave offense. The credibility of the victim’s testimony is a cornerstone in rape cases, particularly when the victim is a minor and the accused is a close relative. The court’s reliance on this principle underscores the protective stance of the judiciary towards vulnerable individuals.

The court also dismissed Amar’s defense that AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents was inconsistent with the behavior of a typical rape victim. It recognized that different individuals react differently to traumatic events, and that there is no standard form of reaction for a rape victim. The workings of the human mind under emotional stress are unpredictable, and reactions can range from shouting to insensibility. This acknowledgment of the varied responses to trauma highlights the court’s understanding of the psychological impact of sexual abuse and its sensitivity towards the victim’s experience.

The Court found Amar’s defenses of denial and alibi unconvincing. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, carries little weight in law. Alibi is considered one of the weakest defenses because it is easily fabricated and difficult to verify. In this case, Amar’s alibi was insufficient to overcome the positive identification by his daughter, who had no apparent motive to lie. The court reiterated that these defenses are inherently weak and cannot prevail against credible and consistent testimony from the victim.

Furthermore, the Court addressed the appropriate penalty and damages. While Article 266-B of the RPC prescribes the death penalty when the victim is under 18 and the offender is a parent, ascendant, or other close relative, Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. Instead, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is imposed. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the qualifying circumstances of minority and the familial relationship between the offender and the victim were proven beyond reasonable doubt, justifying the imposition of reclusion perpetua.

Regarding damages, the Court modified the award, increasing the amounts for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to Php 100,000.00 each, aligning with prevailing jurisprudence. This increase reflected the moral corruption, perversity, and wickedness of Amar in abusing his own daughter. The court further imposed a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid. The court’s emphasis on exemplary damages serves as a deterrent against similar acts of familial abuse.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the father, Alex Amar y Montano, was guilty of raping his minor daughter, AAA, and whether the moral ascendancy he held over her could substitute for the element of force in the crime of rape.
What is the significance of moral ascendancy in rape cases involving family members?	In cases where the offender is a close relative, the moral ascendancy or influence they hold over the victim can replace the requirement of physical force or intimidation, making it easier to prove the crime of rape.
Why did the Supreme Court uphold the lower court’s decision?	The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision because it found the victim’s testimony credible and consistent, and the father’s defenses of denial and alibi were weak and unsubstantiated. The court also deferred to the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.
What was the penalty imposed on the father?	The father was sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, which is the penalty imposed in lieu of the death penalty due to Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the death penalty.
How did the Supreme Court modify the damages awarded?	The Supreme Court increased the amounts for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to Php 100,000.00 each, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, and imposed a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.
Can a person be convicted of rape based solely on the victim’s testimony?	Yes, in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim if it is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
What is the legal definition of rape according to the Revised Penal Code?	According to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation.
What factors did the court consider when assessing the credibility of the victim’s testimony?	The court considered the victim’s demeanor during testimony, the consistency of her statements, and the absence of any apparent motive to falsely accuse the defendant.
Why was the father’s alibi not considered a valid defense?	The father’s alibi was deemed weak because it was easily fabricated and difficult to check or rebut, and it did not outweigh the positive identification made by the victim.

The Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Alex Amar y Montano reinforces the principle that family members, particularly parents, hold a position of trust and authority that must not be abused. The ruling highlights the severe consequences for those who violate this trust by committing acts of sexual violence against their children, underscoring the law’s commitment to protecting the most vulnerable members of society.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: People of the Philippines vs. Alex Amar y Montano, G.R. No. 223513, July 05, 2017

July 5, 2017

Protecting Children: Credibility of Testimony in Lasciviousness Cases

In Virgilio Labandria Awas v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for acts of lasciviousness against a minor. The Court reiterated that in cases involving crimes against chastity, especially when the victim is a child, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. This decision reinforces the judiciary’s commitment to safeguarding children from sexual abuse and exploitation, emphasizing the weight given to a minor’s testimony in such sensitive cases.

When Silence Speaks Volumes: Examining Child Victim Testimony in Sexual Abuse Cases

This case revolves around Virgilio Labandria Awas, who was accused of rape through sexual abuse for allegedly inserting his finger into the vagina of AAA, a 10-year-old girl. While the initial charge was rape, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Awas guilty of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this conviction. Awas appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly questioning the credibility of the victim’s testimony.

The Supreme Court, however, found no merit in Awas’s appeal. The Court emphasized the established legal principle that the testimony of a child victim is given significant weight in cases involving sexual abuse. The Court highlighted that the absence of force or intimidation is immaterial when the victim is below 12 years of age, underscoring the special protection afforded to children in such cases. This principle acknowledges the vulnerability and potential for manipulation of young children, ensuring that their voices are heard and protected within the justice system.

A central point of contention raised by Awas was the victim’s failure to shout for help or resist during the alleged incident. The Supreme Court addressed this concern by stating that there is no standard behavior for victims of crimes against chastity, especially children. The Court recognized that a child’s reaction to such a traumatic event may vary, and that silence or submission does not necessarily indicate consent or lack of abuse. Behavioral psychology suggests varied responses to trauma, and the court acknowledged the possibility of AAA’s submissive reaction due to her young age and the circumstances of the assault.

The Court also noted the importance of the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. Trial judges have the unique opportunity to observe witnesses firsthand, allowing them to assess their demeanor and truthfulness. The Supreme Court generally defers to the trial court’s findings on credibility, recognizing the trial court’s superior position in evaluating the evidence presented. In this case, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be credible, and the Supreme Court saw no reason to overturn that finding.

Furthermore, the Court dismissed Awas’s claim that the charges were fabricated by the victim’s mother due to a grudge. The Court deemed this argument a desperate attempt to evade responsibility, asserting that no mother would subject her young daughter to the trauma and scrutiny of a public trial without genuine cause. The Court also cited People v. Ortoa, stating:

No mother would contemplate subjecting her very young daughter to the humiliation, disgrace, exposure, anxiety and tribulation attendant to a public trial for a crime against chastity that in all likelihood would result in the incarceration of the accused unless she was motivated solely by the honest and sincere desire to have the person responsible apprehended and punished.

The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) the act is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex. The acts are punished as sexual abuse under Republic Act No. 7610, specifically Section 5, which requires: (1) the accused commits acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years of age.

Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as:

The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

The Supreme Court then addressed the penalty imposed by the lower courts. While it affirmed the conviction, the Court found errors in the indeterminate sentence and the imposition of a fine. As the victim was under 12, the law mandates a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period. The Court corrected the indeterminate sentence to a minimum of 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal to a maximum of 15 years, six months, and 21 days of reclusion temporal. Furthermore, the Court deleted the fine imposed by the lower courts, stating that neither Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code nor Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes any fine for acts of lasciviousness.

The Court also ordered the petitioner to pay interest of 6% per annum on the civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages, reckoned from the finality of the decision until full payment. This serves as an additional measure of justice for the victim, compensating for the delay in receiving the awarded damages.

FAQs

What was the central issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Virgilio Awas committed acts of lasciviousness against a minor, and whether the victim’s testimony was credible enough to support a conviction.
Why was the victim’s failure to shout for help not considered a sign of innocence?	The Court recognized that there is no standard reaction for victims of sexual abuse, especially children. Silence or submission can be a result of fear, shock, or the victim’s young age, and does not necessarily indicate consent.
What is the legal basis for considering the testimony of a child victim as credible?	The youth and immaturity of the victim are generally badges of truth that the courts cannot justly ignore. The law recognizes the vulnerability of children and affords them special protection, giving weight to their testimony in cases of sexual abuse.
What are the elements of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code?	The elements are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) the act is done under specific circumstances, such as using force, or when the victim is under 12; and (3) the offended party is another person.
What is the penalty for acts of lasciviousness when the victim is under 12 years of age?	The penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, which ranges from 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months, as per Republic Act No. 7610.
Why was the fine imposed by the lower courts deleted by the Supreme Court?	The Supreme Court deleted the fine because neither Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code nor Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 prescribes any fine for acts of lasciviousness. The court cited the principle of nullum poenum sine lege (there is no penalty without a law imposing it).
What civil liabilities were imposed on the petitioner?	The petitioner was ordered to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to the victim. Additionally, the Supreme Court imposed an interest of 6% per annum on these damages from the finality of the decision until full payment.
What does Republic Act No. 7610 aim to protect?	Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, aims to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, and discrimination.

This case serves as a reminder of the paramount importance of protecting children and giving weight to their testimonies in cases of sexual abuse. The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the judiciary’s commitment to ensuring that perpetrators of such heinous crimes are brought to justice. It also reinforces the principle that a child’s silence or lack of resistance does not equate to consent, recognizing the unique vulnerabilities and potential for trauma in child victims.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Virgilio Labandria Awas v. People, G.R. No. 203114, June 28, 2017

June 28, 2017

Protecting Children: Identifying and Punishing Sexual Abuse Under R.A. 7610

The Supreme Court held that Richard Escalante was guilty of child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610, specifically Section 5(b), which addresses sexual abuse. The Court clarified that even if the initial charge cited a different section of the law, the facts presented warranted conviction under the correct provision due to the sexual nature of the abuse. This ruling emphasizes the importance of protecting children from sexual exploitation and ensures that perpetrators face appropriate penalties, reinforcing the state’s commitment to safeguarding children’s rights and dignity.

When a Kiss Turns Criminal: Did Escalante’s Actions Warrant a Stiffer Sentence?

Richard Escalante was accused of sexually abusing a 12-year-old boy, AAA, in 2006. The incident allegedly occurred in a comfort room at Divine School in Valenzuela City, where Escalante purportedly pulled down AAA’s shorts and committed acts of lasciviousness. Escalante denied the charges, claiming he was celebrating Christmas Eve at a neighbor’s house. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially found Escalante guilty under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, but the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision. Escalante appealed, arguing he was not positively identified, leading the Supreme Court to review the case and clarify the specific legal provision applicable to his actions.

The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of Escalante’s identification. Escalante argued that AAA merely pointed to his picture and that the photograph’s authenticity was questionable. However, the Court emphasized that the identification occurred in open court, supervised by the trial judge. AAA was presented with several pictures and asked to identify his abuser. The Court noted that no objections were raised regarding the identification process, especially since Escalante failed to appear in court for identification despite notice. This manner of identification was deemed sufficient, as the focus was on ensuring an objective and credible identification process.

Furthermore, the Court dismissed Escalante’s alibi. For an alibi to succeed, the accused must prove they were elsewhere when the crime occurred and that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene. In People v. Ramos, the Court stated:

However, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that she was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for her to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. She must demonstrate that she was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.

Escalante admitted that his neighbor’s house was only a 30-minute ride from the crime scene, making it entirely possible for him to be present. The Court also noted that Escalante’s witnesses did not account for his whereabouts the entire time. Building on this principle, the Court found that Escalante failed to prove physical impossibility, thereby weakening his defense.

The Supreme Court then addressed a crucial legal point: the correct provision of R.A. No. 7610 under which Escalante should be convicted. The RTC had convicted Escalante under Section 10(a), which pertains to general acts of child abuse. However, the Supreme Court clarified that Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 specifically addresses acts of sexual abuse. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 reads:

Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: xxx

Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, on the other hand, states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development —

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

The Court emphasized that Section 5(b) applies specifically to sexual abuse, whereas Section 10(a) covers other forms of child abuse not explicitly defined elsewhere in the law. This distinction is critical because Section 5(b) carries a higher penalty. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, as outlined in People v. Larin, are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years of age.

The Supreme Court found that all these elements were present in Escalante’s case. His actions constituted lascivious conduct against a child. The Court also noted the age disparity between Escalante (20 years old) and AAA (12 years old) as an indicator of coercion. In Caballo v. People, the Court considered such age differences as indicia of coercion or influence, stating:

As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a “child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their development.

Even if the Information did not explicitly state Section 5(b), the facts alleged within it were sufficient to charge Escalante under that provision. The Information described acts of kissing the victim’s neck down to his sex organ and forcing the victim to insert his sex organ into Escalante’s anus. The Court reinforced that it’s the factual recital in the Information, not its title, that determines the offense charged. This aligns with the principle that an accused must be informed of the nature of the accusation against them.

Thus, the Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals’ decision, finding Escalante guilty under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The Court imposed a higher penalty, reflecting the severity of the sexual abuse committed. This decision underscores the judiciary’s commitment to protecting children from sexual exploitation and ensuring that the penalties align with the gravity of the offense.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether Richard Escalante was correctly convicted of child abuse under the appropriate provision of Republic Act No. 7610, specifically clarifying whether his actions constituted general child abuse or sexual abuse.
Under what law was Escalante initially convicted, and why was it changed?	Escalante was initially convicted under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, which addresses general acts of child abuse; however, the Supreme Court modified the conviction to Section 5(b) of the same act, which specifically penalizes sexual abuse, because the facts of the case involved lascivious conduct against a minor.
What is the difference between Section 5(b) and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610?	Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 pertains specifically to acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct against a child, whereas Section 10(a) covers other forms of child abuse, cruelty, or exploitation not covered by other provisions of the law, each carrying different penalties.
How did the Court address the issue of Escalante’s identification?	The Court affirmed that the identification process was valid because it occurred in open court under the supervision of the trial judge, where the victim identified Escalante from a selection of photos, and the defense did not object to the procedure.
Why was Escalante’s alibi rejected by the Court?	Escalante’s alibi was rejected because he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene, as he admitted that the location he claimed to be at was only a short distance away from where the abuse occurred.
What elements are necessary to prove sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610?	The elements are: (1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years of age.
What was the significance of the age disparity between Escalante and the victim?	The age disparity (Escalante was 20, and the victim was 12) was considered an indicium of coercion or influence, indicating that Escalante was in a position of power over the victim, influencing the Court’s determination of sexual abuse.
What was the final penalty imposed on Escalante by the Supreme Court?	The Supreme Court sentenced Escalante to an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, along with ordering him to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and a fine.

This case clarifies the application of R.A. No. 7610 in cases of child sexual abuse, emphasizing the importance of correctly identifying the applicable provision to ensure appropriate penalties. The decision reinforces the State’s commitment to protecting children from all forms of abuse and exploitation, sending a clear message that such acts will be met with the full force of the law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Richard Escalante v. People, G.R. No. 218970, June 28, 2017

June 28, 2017

Rape Conviction Upheld: Clarifying the Application of Force and Intimidation in Sexual Assault Cases

In People v. Tubillo, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Nicolas Tubillo for simple rape, emphasizing the critical role of force and intimidation in establishing the crime. The Court clarified that when an act of sexual assault involves both elements of rape under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, the focus should be on whether the prosecution’s evidence highlights specific force or intimidation. This decision reinforces the importance of protecting victims of sexual violence and ensuring perpetrators are held accountable under the appropriate legal framework.

Knife’s Edge: How Force Determines Guilt in Child Rape Cases

The case revolves around Nicolas Tubillo’s appeal against the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) decision, which found him guilty of raping HGE, a 13-year-old minor. The Court of Appeals (CA) initially affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty, suggesting that Tubillo should be penalized under R.A. No. 7610 instead of the RPC. This discrepancy raised a significant legal question: Under what circumstances should a perpetrator be charged with rape under the RPC versus child abuse under R.A. No. 7610, particularly when the victim is a minor?

The Supreme Court addressed this issue by examining the elements of both crimes. According to Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, rape is defined as the act of carnal knowledge committed through force or intimidation, or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the victim is under twelve years of age. This definition emphasizes the lack of consent and the presence of coercion.

In contrast, Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 addresses acts of sexual abuse against children, particularly those exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. The elements of this provision include: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. Importantly, this section also covers situations where children are induced into such acts through coercion or influence.

The Court referenced Quimvel v. People, where it was clarified that the term “coercion and influence” in R.A. No. 7610 is broad enough to encompass “force and intimidation.” This interpretation highlights the overlap between the two legal provisions. The Supreme Court noted:

Black’s Law Dictionary defines coercion as compulsion; force; duress, while undue influence is defined as persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will. On the other hand, force refers to constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end; while jurisprudence defines intimidation as unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. As can be gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously.

This overlap raises a critical question: How should courts determine which law applies when an act could potentially fall under both the RPC and R.A. No. 7610?

The Supreme Court found guidance in previous cases, such as People v. Abay, which addressed similar circumstances. The Court in Abay harmonized the provisions, stating:

Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced.

Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that the specific facts presented and proven by the prosecution are crucial in determining the appropriate charge. In cases where the evidence focuses on the specific force or intimidation used by the offender, a conviction for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is appropriate. However, if the evidence highlights the broader concept of coercion or influence, a conviction under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 may be warranted. This approach contrasts with a strict reading of the law, which might prioritize the age of the victim over the specific acts committed.

In Tubillo’s case, the prosecution presented compelling evidence that Tubillo forcibly entered HGE’s home, threatened her with a knife, and then sexually assaulted her. The Court noted that the prosecution’s evidence unequivocally focused on the force and intimidation employed by Tubillo, aligning the crime squarely within the definition of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC. This finding led the Court to uphold Tubillo’s conviction for rape.

The Court also addressed the issue of damages, modifying the amounts awarded to align with established jurisprudence. Citing People v. Jugueta, the Court established that where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the minimum indemnity and damages are as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. This modification ensures consistency in the application of damages in similar cases.

Moreover, the Court was keen to highlight the consistency and credibility of the victim’s testimony. The court noted that:

Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being.

This observation underscores the court’s recognition of the trauma associated with sexual assault and the improbability of false accusations. Furthermore, the ruling serves as a deterrent to potential offenders, signaling that acts of sexual violence against children will be met with severe legal consequences.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Tubillo provides critical clarity on the application of legal provisions in cases of sexual assault against minors. By emphasizing the importance of force and intimidation in determining the appropriate charge, the Court reinforces the protection of vulnerable individuals and ensures that justice is served.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Nicolas Tubillo should be convicted of rape under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, given that the victim was a minor and the act involved both sexual assault and potential coercion.
What are the elements of rape under the RPC?	The elements of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation, or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the victim is under twelve years of age.
What are the elements of child abuse under R.A. No. 7610?	The elements of child abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
How did the Court reconcile the RPC and R.A. No. 7610 in this case?	The Court reconciled the two laws by examining the evidence presented by the prosecution. If the evidence focused on the specific force or intimidation used by the offender, a conviction for rape under the RPC is appropriate. If the evidence highlighted the broader concept of coercion or influence, a conviction under R.A. No. 7610 may be warranted.
Why was Tubillo ultimately convicted of rape under the RPC?	Tubillo was convicted of rape under the RPC because the prosecution’s evidence focused on the force and intimidation he employed against the victim, including breaking into her home and threatening her with a knife.
What damages were awarded to the victim in this case?	The Court awarded the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, consistent with jurisprudence for cases involving reclusion perpetua.
What is the significance of the victim’s testimony in this case?	The Court emphasized the consistency and credibility of the victim’s testimony, noting that it is unlikely a child would fabricate such a traumatic experience and subject themselves to public scrutiny unless they were genuinely a victim of sexual assault.
What is the penalty for rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC?	The prescribed penalty for rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC is reclusion perpetua.

The People v. Tubillo case clarifies the interplay between rape under the Revised Penal Code and child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610, particularly when force and intimidation are present. This ruling reinforces the need for a careful examination of the evidence to ensure the appropriate charges are filed and that justice is served for victims of sexual assault.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

June 21, 2017

Spousal Consent in Property Sales: Protecting Marital Rights in the Philippines

In the Philippines, the sale of conjugal property requires the written consent of both spouses. The Supreme Court in Dolores Alejo v. Spouses Ernesto Cortez and Priscilla San Pedro, G.R. No. 206114, June 19, 2017, reiterated that without this written consent, the sale is void. This ruling underscores the importance of protecting the rights of both spouses in marital property, ensuring that neither party can unilaterally dispose of assets acquired during the marriage. The decision highlights the need for explicit written consent, preventing ambiguity and potential disputes arising from verbal agreements or implied consent.

When a Handshake Isn’t Enough: Upholding Written Consent in Conjugal Property Sales

This case revolves around a parcel of land co-owned by Spouses Jorge and Jacinta Leonardo. Jacinta entered into an agreement, a Kasunduan, to sell the property to Dolores Alejo without Jorge’s written consent. Dolores made partial payments and took possession of the land. Later, Jorge and Jacinta sold the same property to Spouses Ernesto Cortez and Priscilla San Pedro. Dolores filed a case to annul the second sale and assert her rights under the Kasunduan.

The core legal question is whether the Kasunduan, lacking Jorge’s written consent, is a valid and binding contract. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially ruled in favor of Dolores, finding that Jorge had acquiesced to the sale through his actions. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, declaring the Kasunduan void due to the absence of Jorge’s written consent. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision, emphasizing the explicit requirement of written consent under Article 124 of the Family Code.

The Family Code is clear on this matter. Article 124 governs the disposition of conjugal property, stating:

Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court underscored that the absence of written consent renders the disposition void. The Kasunduan, being signed only by Jacinta, was therefore invalid from the start. The Court acknowledged that the void agreement could be considered a continuing offer, subject to acceptance or rejection by Jorge.

The RTC argued that Jorge’s actions, such as demanding compliance with the Kasunduan, implied his acceptance. However, the CA and the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court noted that Jorge’s subsequent letters to Dolores, which altered the terms of the original agreement (changing the payment deadline and increasing the price), constituted a counter-offer rather than an acceptance.

This approach contrasts with a simple acceptance, which would have mirrored the original terms of the Kasunduan. Because Jorge’s response introduced new conditions, it effectively rejected the initial offer and presented a new one. As the Court stated:

where the other spouse’s putative consent to the sale of the conjugal property appears in a separate document which does not contain the same terms and conditions as in the first document signed by the other spouse, a valid transaction could not have arisen.

Furthermore, the Court dismissed the argument that Jorge’s actions constituted a ratification of the Kasunduan. A void contract, the Court emphasized, cannot be ratified. The requirement for written consent is not a mere formality; it is a fundamental condition for the validity of the sale.

While the Kasunduan was deemed void, the Court addressed the issue of Dolores’s good faith. The Supreme Court held that Dolores acted in good faith when entering the property and introducing improvements. She was led to believe by Ricardo and Jacinta that the sale was legitimate, and she invested money and effort into the property based on this belief. Article 526 of the Civil Code defines a possessor in good faith as someone who is unaware of any defect in their title or mode of acquisition.

As a possessor in good faith, Dolores was entitled to certain protections. The Court affirmed the CA’s decision that Dolores should be reimbursed for the PhP300,000 she paid, with legal interest. Additionally, the Spouses Leonardo were given the option to either indemnify Dolores for the cost of the improvements she made or pay the increase in value that the property gained due to those improvements. Dolores also has the right to retain possession of the land until she receives this indemnity.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The primary issue was whether a sale of conjugal property is valid without the written consent of both spouses, as required by Article 124 of the Family Code.
What does “conjugal property” mean?	Conjugal property refers to assets acquired by a husband and wife during their marriage, which are owned jointly by both spouses.
What happens if one spouse sells conjugal property without the other’s written consent?	According to the Family Code and as reinforced in this case, the sale is void, meaning it has no legal effect from the beginning.
Can a void sale of conjugal property be ratified later?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that a void contract cannot be ratified, meaning subsequent actions cannot make it valid.
What is a “continuing offer” in the context of this case?	The law treats the agreement as an ongoing offer from the consenting spouse, which can become a binding contract if the other spouse accepts it before the offer is withdrawn.
What rights does a buyer have if they purchased conjugal property in good faith but the sale is void?	The buyer is considered a possessor in good faith and is entitled to reimbursement for payments made and compensation for improvements introduced on the property.
What options does the selling spouse have regarding improvements made by the buyer?	The selling spouse can choose to either pay for the cost of the improvements or pay the increase in the property’s value resulting from those improvements.
What is the significance of written consent in selling conjugal property?	Written consent is crucial as it protects the rights of both spouses and prevents unilateral decisions that could negatively impact the marital partnership. It ensures mutual agreement and informed consent.

This case serves as a clear reminder of the importance of adhering to the legal requirements for selling conjugal property in the Philippines. The need for written consent is not merely a formality but a fundamental protection for marital rights. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces this principle, providing clarity and guidance for future transactions involving conjugal assets.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Dolores Alejo v. Spouses Ernesto Cortez and Priscilla San Pedro, G.R. No. 206114, June 19, 2017

June 19, 2017

Protecting the Vulnerable: Upholding Conviction in Child Sexual Abuse Cases in the Philippines

In a crucial decision concerning the protection of children, the Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the conviction of Rodel Bolo y Maldo for qualified rape through sexual assault against his four-year-old daughter. This case underscores the court’s commitment to prioritizing the credibility of a minor’s testimony in cases of sexual abuse, especially when committed by a parent. Despite the absence of explicit physical evidence, the consistent and straightforward testimony of the victim, along with the accused’s admitted relationship to the child, played a decisive role in the conviction, reinforcing the state’s duty to shield children from harm and ensure justice for victims of sexual violence.

A Father’s Betrayal: Can a Child’s Testimony Alone Secure Justice in a Rape Case?

The case of People of the Philippines vs. Rodel Bolo y Maldo revolves around the harrowing experience of a four-year-old girl, AAA, who accused her father, Rodel Bolo, of inserting his finger into her vagina. The incident allegedly occurred near her maternal aunt’s house on April 9, 2007. The prosecution built its case primarily on AAA’s testimony, supported by medical findings and the accused’s own admissions. The defense, in contrast, relied on a simple denial, claiming he was engaged in a drinking session at the time of the alleged assault and suggesting the charges were fabricated by his mother-in-law. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Bolo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, a decision later affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals (CA). The core legal question centered on the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly the victim’s testimony, to secure a conviction in the absence of corroborating physical evidence and the proper application of qualifying circumstances.

At the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision lies the credibility of the victim’s testimony. Philippine jurisprudence places great weight on the testimony of the victim in rape cases, especially when the crime is committed in private. The Court has consistently held that if the victim’s testimony is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing, it can be the sole basis for conviction. In this case, both the RTC and CA found AAA’s testimony to be straightforward and coherent. The victim clearly narrated the events of the assault, providing details that convinced the courts of her veracity. The Supreme Court saw no reason to deviate from these findings, emphasizing the importance of according great weight and respect to the trial court’s conclusions on witness credibility.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court addressed the appellant’s argument that the Information filed against him was defective. The appellant contended that the Information failed to specify the exact nature of the charge against him, violating his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation. However, the Court, aligning with the CA’s reasoning, clarified that the character of the crime is not determined by the specification of law but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances of the case. Since the Information clearly alleged that the appellant, through force and intimidation, inserted his finger into the victim’s vagina, thereby enumerating all the essential elements of the crime, the appellant was considered sufficiently apprised of the charge against him.

The Court further addressed the significance of proving the victim’s age and the familial relationship between the victim and the accused. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code stipulates that rape by sexual assault is punishable by prision mayor, but the penalty is increased to reclusion temporal if committed with any of the ten aggravating/qualifying circumstances. One such circumstance arises when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim. In this case, the appellant admitted to being the father of the victim, which was deemed conclusive proof of their relationship. While the prosecution did not present the victim’s birth certificate, the Court took judicial notice of the victim’s age, as she was alleged to be four years old at the time of the offense and five years old when she testified.

Despite the guidelines set forth in People v. Pruna, which specifies that the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth, the Court considered the totality of evidence presented. Several documents presented in court indicated the victim’s young age, including her sworn statement, the request for genital examination, the Sexual Crime (Protocol) Form, and the Initial Medico-Legal Report. The Medico-Legal Report, prepared by a government physician, carried the presumption of regularity in the performance of her functions. Furthermore, the accused failed to controvert the victim’s age during the trial. The Court, therefore, agreed with the lower courts that the victim’s minority was duly established by the evidence on record.

The imposition of the appropriate penalty was also a key aspect of the decision. Given the established facts, the crime committed was qualified rape through sexual assault, as the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the crime and the appellant was her father. The Court referenced several documents to reinforce the age, including Sinumpaang Salaysay, Request for Genital Exam, Sexual Crime Protocol Form, the Medico-Legal Report, and the testimony of the victim herself. With these things considered, the Court was able to correctly identify the crime as qualified rape through sexual assault. The proper penalty to be imposed should be reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and noting the absence of mitigating or other aggravating circumstances, the Court determined the appropriate penalty range. The imposed sentence was an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In terms of damages, the Court affirmed the CA’s award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, aligning with prevailing jurisprudence. The Court reiterated that in rape cases, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the commission of rape, moral damages are automatically awarded without the need to prove mental and physical suffering, and exemplary damages are imposed as an example for the public good and to protect minors from all forms of sexual abuse. All damages awarded were set to earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the Decision until full payment.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to convict the accused of qualified rape through sexual assault, particularly concerning the victim’s testimony and the proof of her age. The Court affirmed the conviction, highlighting the weight given to the victim’s credible testimony and the admissibility of various documents to establish her minority.
What is the significance of the victim’s testimony in rape cases?	The victim’s testimony is of utmost importance, especially when the crime is committed in private. If the testimony is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing, it can be the sole basis for conviction, emphasizing the court’s reliance on the victim’s account of the events.
What evidence is required to prove the age of the victim?	The best evidence to prove the age of the victim is an original or certified true copy of the birth certificate. In the absence of a birth certificate, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificates and school records can suffice, and in their absence, the testimony of qualified family members or the victim, combined with other evidence, may be considered.
What are the qualifying circumstances in this case?	The qualifying circumstances are that the victim was under 18 years of age at the time of the crime and the accused was her father. These circumstances elevate the crime to qualified rape through sexual assault, which carries a heavier penalty.
What is the penalty for qualified rape through sexual assault?	The penalty for qualified rape through sexual assault is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court imposed an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
What types of damages are awarded in rape cases?	In rape cases, the court awards civil indemnity to compensate for the crime, moral damages to address mental and physical suffering, and exemplary damages to serve as an example for the public good and to protect minors. All damages awarded earn interest at the legal rate.
How does this case impact the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases in the Philippines?	This case reinforces the importance of child testimony in child sexual abuse cases in the Philippines. It clarifies the admissibility of evidence of the victim’s age and emphasizes the state’s commitment to protecting children from harm.
Can courts take judicial notice of a victim’s age?	Yes, the Court can take judicial notice of a victim’s age when the age is very young. Additionally, the Court will consider other evidence, like documents, to take everything into account.

The Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Bolo serves as a landmark ruling, solidifying the protection of children against sexual abuse and affirming the value of a child’s testimony in court. The case underscores the need for stringent enforcement of laws protecting minors and the importance of ensuring justice for victims of sexual violence. By upholding the conviction, the Court sends a clear message that such crimes will not be tolerated, and perpetrators will be held accountable.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: People of the Philippines vs. Rodel Bolo y Maldo, G.R. No. 217024, August 15, 2016

June 19, 2017

Father’s Betrayal: Establishing Guilt in Qualified Statutory Rape Cases

In People v. Blas Gaa y Rodriguez, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for two counts of Qualified Statutory Rape, emphasizing the importance of the victim’s credibility and the sufficiency of slight penetration to constitute the crime of rape. The Court underscored that in cases involving minors, the law presumes a lack of consent, and the testimony of the victim, if deemed credible, is sufficient for conviction. This decision reinforces the protection of children against sexual abuse and highlights the grave consequences for offenders, especially those in positions of trust.

When Trust is Broken: A Father’s Crime and the Law’s Response

The case of People v. Blas Gaa y Rodriguez revolves around accusations of qualified statutory rape brought against a father by his daughter. The incidents allegedly occurred on multiple occasions, with the father exploiting his position of authority and trust. The legal question at the heart of the case is whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of statutory rape beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly the relationship between the accused and the victim, and whether the acts committed constituted rape under the law. This analysis delves into the specifics of the case, the legal framework applied, and the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision.

Accused-appellant Blas Gaa was charged with two counts of Qualified Statutory Rape under separate Informations. According to the prosecution, in April 2001, Blas Gaa took advantage of his daughter, AAA, who was then 9 years old, by asking her to remove her clothes and attempting to insert his penis into her vagina. Although full penetration was not achieved, his penis touched the “bokana” of her vagina, and he inserted his fingers inside her vagina. A similar incident occurred in March 2003 when AAA was 11 years old, during which Blas Gaa threatened her with a bolo while forcing his penis against her vagina. The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, denying the allegations and suggesting that the accusations were a result of marital issues with his wife.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified statutory rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole in each of the two counts of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. The case then reached the Supreme Court, where the accused-appellant raised two primary errors: first, that the prosecution failed to prove the relationship between the victim and the accused-appellant; and second, that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court anchored its decision on the provisions of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), which defines rape, and Article 266-B, which prescribes the penalties, emphasizing that when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age, the act constitutes statutory rape. The court highlighted that in statutory rape cases, proof of force, intimidation, or consent is unnecessary. To secure a conviction, the prosecution must prove (a) the age of the complainant, (b) the identity of the accused, and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant. The Court stressed that the victim’s credibility is paramount, and a conviction can be based solely on her credible testimony.

In addressing the first error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ finding that the prosecution had sufficiently proved that the accused-appellant is AAA’s father. The Court cited accused-appellant’s admissions on several occasions that he is the father of AAA. Furthermore, AAA’s birth certificate also shows that Blas Rodriguez Gaa is her father. Therefore, the Court rejected the accused-appellant’s claim that he is not AAA’s father, dismissing it as a futile attempt to remove the qualifying circumstance of the rape to lower his penalty.

Regarding the second error, the accused-appellant argued that the testimony of AAA did not establish that he was able to insert his penis into her vagina, however slight. The Court was not convinced and emphasized that full penetration of the female genital organ is not indispensable. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. The Court highlighted that AAA’s testimony established the fact that accused-appellant’s penis penetrated the lips of her vagina.

The Supreme Court also considered the credibility of the victim’s testimony. Citing jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that the trial court’s observations and conclusions regarding the credibility of witnesses are given great respect and finality. The Court noted that the RTC found AAA’s testimony straightforward, candid, and convincing. Given that the elements of minority of AAA and the relationship of the accused-appellant with AAA were alleged in the two Informations and sufficiently proven by the prosecution, the Supreme Court agreed with the CA that accused-appellant is guilty of two counts of Qualified Statutory Rape. The CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.

The Supreme Court modified the amounts awarded to AAA in view of recent jurisprudence imposing a minimum amount of Php 100,000 as civil indemnity; Php 100,000 as moral damages; and Php 100,000 as exemplary damages. Thus, the Court increased the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to the prescribed amounts. Additionally, a legal interest of 6% per annum will be imposed on the total amount of damages awarded to AAA, counted from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. This decision serves as a reminder of the importance of protecting children and the severe consequences for those who violate their trust and innocence.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the prosecution successfully proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed qualified statutory rape against his daughter, focusing on the elements of the crime and the credibility of the victim’s testimony.
What is statutory rape?	Statutory rape is defined as sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 12, regardless of consent. The law presumes that a child under 12 lacks the capacity to give informed consent.
What are the elements needed to prove statutory rape?	To prove statutory rape, the prosecution must establish the age of the complainant, the identity of the accused, and that sexual intercourse occurred between them.
Is full penetration required to prove rape?	No, full penetration is not required. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, is sufficient to constitute rape.
What is qualified statutory rape?	Qualified statutory rape occurs when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
What is the penalty for qualified statutory rape in this case?	The penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, due to the accused being the father of the victim and the prohibition of the death penalty under Republic Act No. 9346.
What was the basis for the Court’s decision on the accused’s relationship to the victim?	The Court relied on the accused’s own admissions that he was the victim’s father, as well as the victim’s birth certificate, to establish the familial relationship.
What damages were awarded to the victim in this case?	The victim was awarded Php 100,000 as civil indemnity, Php 100,000 as moral damages, and Php 100,000 as exemplary damages, plus a legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of the judgment until fully paid.

This case underscores the grave consequences of qualified statutory rape and the importance of protecting vulnerable individuals, especially children. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the principle that the testimony of a credible victim, combined with other evidence, is sufficient to secure a conviction and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable for their actions.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. BLAS GAA y RODRIGUEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT., G.R. No. 212934, June 07, 2017

June 7, 2017

1)	By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

		a) Through force, threat or intimidation[.]