In a forcible entry case, the Supreme Court has clarified the critical importance of adhering to the one-year prescriptive period. This ruling underscores that after one year from the date of alleged unlawful entry, a party can no longer avail of summary proceedings in the municipal trial court. Instead, they must pursue an ordinary action in the regional trial court to recover possession or ownership. This distinction is vital as it impacts the speed and type of legal recourse available to those dispossessed of their land.

Time is of the Essence: Evaluating Entry Claims in Land Disputes

The case of Teresita Bongato v. Spouses Severo A. Malvar and Trinidad Malvar, GR No. 141614, revolves around a dispute over land possession and the crucial issue of whether the action for forcible entry was filed within the allowable one-year period. The central question is whether the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction over a complaint filed more than one year after the alleged unlawful entry. This case highlights the significance of procedural timelines in property disputes and the remedies available once those timelines have lapsed.

The factual background involves a complaint for forcible entry filed by the Malvar spouses against Teresita Bongato, alleging unlawful entry and construction on their land. Bongato contested the MTCC’s jurisdiction, arguing that the complaint was filed beyond the one-year period from the date of the alleged entry. The MTCC initially ruled in favor of the Malvars, which was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, the Court of Appeals (CA) sustained the RTC’s decision, leading Bongato to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

In addressing the issue of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reiterated fundamental principles governing forcible entry cases. First, a key element is that the plaintiff must demonstrate prior physical possession of the disputed property and subsequent deprivation by the defendant through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. This implies that the defendant’s possession was unlawful from the outset, focusing solely on the factual possession (possession de facto) of the property, irrespective of claims of legal possession (possession de jure) or ownership.

Second, the Court addressed the admissibility of evidence from related proceedings. While courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence presented in other cases, exceptions exist when those cases are closely interconnected with the matter in controversy. In this instance, the Court considered evidence from prior criminal cases involving the same property and parties to ascertain the timeliness of the forcible entry complaint. This approach underscores the Court’s willingness to look beyond the immediate record to ensure a just resolution.

Third, the Supreme Court acknowledged the binding nature of factual findings made by lower courts but also identified exceptions. These exceptions include instances where findings are speculative, inferences are mistaken, or relevant facts are overlooked. In this case, the Court found discrepancies and inconsistencies in the lower courts’ findings regarding the date of entry and the location of the disputed property, warranting a re-evaluation of the facts.

The Court noted that the respondents had filed multiple cases against the petitioner, including criminal charges for squatting and violations of building codes. The critical point was the Court’s determination that the property involved in these prior criminal cases was the same as that in the forcible entry case. The Court emphasized that the respondents’ allegation of illegal entry in 1987, as stated in their sworn statement in the criminal case, contradicted their claim in the forcible entry case filed in 1992, which was beyond the one-year prescriptive period.

Evidence from the criminal cases, such as the location of the petitioner’s house, was deemed relevant in determining whether the forcible entry action was timely filed. The Court highlighted that the sketch plan submitted by an engineer indicated that the petitioner’s house was not located on the specific lot claimed by the respondents, further undermining their claim of recent unlawful entry. The Court stated:

“…the hut of Teresita Bongato is not within Lot 10-A as shown in this plan as relocated by the undersigned based [o]n TCT No. RT-1576 of Benjamin Eva, et al. and [o]n TCT No. RT-16200 of Lot 10-A of Severo Malvar.”

Furthermore, the Supreme Court considered the RTC’s finding in one of the criminal cases that the petitioner’s house had been in existence prior to February 1992, the alleged date of illegal entry in the forcible entry complaint. The RTC in Criminal Case No. 5734 opined:

“Firstly, the prosecution has not proven that the accused had constructed or for that matter was constructing the questioned house in February of 1992, since it was never stated that when the complaint was lodged with the City Engineer’s Office, that the house occupied by the accused was under construction or under renovation…that the same was completely erected or constructed before Engr. Burias’ visit, or even for that matter, before the complaint was filed.”

This evidence indicated that the petitioner’s occupation was not a recent unlawful entry but rather a long-standing presence on the property, further supporting the argument that the forcible entry action was time-barred. The Court also highlighted Respondent Severo Malvar’s admission in Criminal Case No. 4659 that he had knowledge of petitioner’s house since January 1987, reinforcing the conclusion that the forcible entry action was filed well beyond the one-year period.

Based on these findings, the Supreme Court concluded that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction over the forcible entry case due to the expiration of the one-year prescriptive period. The Court emphasized that forcible entry is a summary proceeding designed for the speedy recovery of possession, and the strict time limit is crucial to its nature. After the one-year period, a dispossessed party must pursue either an accion publiciana (a plenary action to recover the right of possession) or an accion reivindicatoria (an action to recover ownership as well as possession) in the RTC.

In essence, because the respondents’ cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed, the MTCC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The Supreme Court stressed that even if Severo Malvar was the owner of the land, he could not wrest possession through a summary action for ejectment of the petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one year. The Court thus corrected the CA’s misinterpretation of the law.

The Supreme Court also addressed the procedural issue of whether a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court clarified that, under Section 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings. The Court added that lack of jurisdiction could not be waived by the parties and could be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Court quoted:

“SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;

The Court criticized the MTCC for failing to rule squarely on the issue of jurisdiction and for erroneously deeming the motion to dismiss a prohibited pleading. It underscored that the MTCC should have considered the petitioner’s answer, in which she claimed continuous occupation of the land since birth and inheritance from her ancestors. The Court opined that a hearing should have been conducted to determine whether the court possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter, and if not, the case should have been dismissed.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bongato v. Malvar underscores the critical importance of adhering to procedural timelines in forcible entry cases. It clarifies that the one-year prescriptive period is strictly enforced, and failure to comply deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction. The ruling also highlights the admissibility of evidence from related proceedings to determine the timeliness of the complaint and reinforces the principle that lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction over a forcible entry case filed more than one year after the alleged unlawful entry.
What is the prescriptive period for filing a forcible entry case?	The prescriptive period for filing a forcible entry case is one year from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.
What happens if the one-year prescriptive period has lapsed?	If the one-year prescriptive period has lapsed, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession, or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Can a motion to dismiss be filed in a forcible entry case?	Yes, under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in forcible entry cases.
Can the parties waive the issue of jurisdiction?	No, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.
What is the difference between possession de facto and possession de jure?	Possession de facto refers to the physical or material possession of the property, while possession de jure refers to the juridical possession or the right to possess. Forcible entry cases focus on possession de facto, irrespective of claims of possession de jure or ownership.
What evidence did the Supreme Court consider in this case?	The Supreme Court considered evidence from prior criminal cases involving the same property and parties, such as sworn statements, sketch plans, and decisions, to ascertain the timeliness of the forcible entry complaint and the location of the disputed property.
What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case?	The Supreme Court ruled that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction over the forcible entry case because the complaint was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period. The Court annulled and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the complaint for forcible entry.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bongato v. Malvar serves as a reminder of the importance of understanding and adhering to the specific timelines and procedures governing property disputes. The failure to act within the prescribed period can result in the loss of legal recourse and the inability to protect one’s property rights through summary proceedings.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Teresita Bongato, vs. Spouses Severo A. Malvar and Trinidad Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, August 14, 2002