A party who willingly enters into a contract and benefits from it cannot later avoid their obligations by claiming irregularities in the contract’s execution. This principle was affirmed in a case involving a mortgaged property with restrictions on its title. The Supreme Court emphasized that such restrictions do not automatically invalidate a mortgage agreement, especially when the property owner willingly used the property as collateral and availed themselves of the loan. This decision reinforces the importance of honoring contractual commitments and clarifies the limits of property restrictions in mortgage agreements.

Borrower Beware: Can Restrictions on Property Titles Nullify a Mortgage?

The case of Florante Vitug versus Evangeline A. Abuda revolves around a loan secured by a real estate mortgage. Florante Vitug (Vitug) mortgaged his property to Evangeline A. Abuda (Abuda) as security for a loan. The property’s title contained a restriction imposed by the National Housing Authority (NHA), requiring NHA’s consent before any encumbrance or disposal of the property. Vitug later argued that the mortgage was invalid because he did not obtain the NHA’s consent. The central legal question is whether the restriction on Vitug’s title invalidated the mortgage contract, thus relieving him of his obligations.

The factual backdrop of the case begins with Abuda lending P250,000.00 to Vitug and his wife in March 1997. As collateral, Vitug mortgaged his property, which was under a conditional Contract to Sell with the NHA. By November 1997, the parties executed a restructured mortgage contract for P600,000.00, encompassing the original loan and subsequent credit accommodations, with a 5% monthly interest. Vitug failed to repay the loan, leading Abuda to file a foreclosure complaint.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Abuda, ordering Vitug to pay the debt or face foreclosure. Vitug appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing fraud and lack of consent due to the NHA restriction. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but modified the interest rate to 1% per month or 12% per annum, deeming the original rate unconscionable. Vitug then appealed to the Supreme Court, raising the NHA’s lack of consent and the property’s status as a family home exempt from execution.

The Supreme Court addressed whether Vitug could raise these issues, even though they were initially presented in his Motion for Reconsideration at the CA. The Court acknowledged that Vitug had mentioned these issues in his Answer and Pre-trial Brief at the trial court level. Thus, the Supreme Court allowed the discussion of the issue. The Court then delved into the core elements of a valid mortgage contract, referencing Article 2085 of the Civil Code, which states:

Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to contracts of pledge and mortgage:
(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.

The Court found that all elements were present, including Vitug’s ownership and voluntary execution of the mortgage. The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts found no evidence supporting Vitug’s claim of being tricked into signing the mortgage contract. It reiterated that its role is not to re-evaluate factual findings of lower courts unless exceptions apply, which Vitug failed to demonstrate. The Court highlighted that Vitug’s undisputed title gave him the right to encumber the property, subject to legal limitations.

The Court addressed the restriction clause imposed by the NHA, stating that while it limited Vitug’s jus disponendi (right to dispose), it did not strip him of ownership. This restriction, the Court clarified, merely served as a notice to the world that the NHA retained certain claims over the property. Violations of such restrictions do not automatically render contracts void ab initio. The Court cited Municipality of Camiling v. Lopez to highlight that not all acts against the law are void from the beginning; some are merely voidable.

Building on this principle, the Court explained that the mortgage contract was, at most, voidable at the NHA’s option, not Vitug’s. Only the NHA, as the party for whose benefit the restriction was created, could seek annulment. Without the NHA’s action, the mortgage remained enforceable between Vitug and Abuda. Furthermore, the Court noted that the NHA had issued a Permit to Mortgage, demonstrating substantial compliance with the consent requirement. The mortgage contract also referenced the conditions set by the NHA, showing an intent to comply. The Court emphasized that Vitug could not use his own failure to fully comply with the NHA conditions as a basis to invalidate the contract.

Even if the mortgage were deemed illegal or wrongful, the Court invoked the principle of in pari delicto, enshrined in Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code. This principle prevents parties equally at fault from seeking legal remedies against each other. The Court emphasized that it will not aid parties in illegal acts, citing cases such as Batarra v. Marcos and Bough v. Cantiveros. The Court found that Vitug was aware of the NHA restrictions when he voluntarily entered into the mortgage contract. He cannot now use the contract’s alleged invalidity as a defense, as he benefited from the loan. The Court also clarified that applying the in pari delicto principle would not violate any law, morals, good customs, or public policy in this case.

Addressing Vitug’s claim that the property was a family home exempt from execution, the Court cited Article 155 of the Family Code. This article explicitly exempts debts secured by mortgages from the protection against execution of a family home. Since Vitug voluntarily used the property as security for the loan, it was subject to execution.

The Court addressed the unconscionable interest rates stipulated in the loan contracts. While parties have the freedom to stipulate interest rates, Article 1306 of the Civil Code limits this freedom to ensure public morals, safety, and welfare. The Court affirmed the CA’s decision to reduce the interest rate to 1% per month or 12% per annum, deeming the original rates iniquitous. The Court also referenced Nacar v. Gallery Frames to modify the interest rates further, reducing it to 6% per annum from July 1, 2013, until full satisfaction.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a restriction on a property title, requiring consent from the National Housing Authority (NHA) before mortgaging, invalidated the mortgage contract when the property owner did not obtain that consent.
What is ‘jus disponendi’?	Jus disponendi is the right of an owner to dispose of their property, including the right to sell, encumber, or mortgage it. This right is subject to limitations established by law or contract.
What is the principle of ‘in pari delicto’?	The principle of in pari delicto means that when two parties are equally at fault in an illegal act, neither party can seek legal remedies against the other; the court will leave them as they are.
When is a contract considered voidable?	A contract is considered voidable when it contains all the elements of a valid contract but is subject to conditions or limitations in favor of one party; that party has the option to annul the contract.
Are family homes exempt from execution in the Philippines?	Family homes are generally exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for certain debts, including those secured by mortgages on the premises before or after the constitution of the family home.
What is the legal interest rate in the Philippines if not stipulated?	In the absence of a written stipulation, the legal interest rate for loans or forbearance of money is 6% per annum, computed from the time of default (judicial or extrajudicial demand).
What does Article 1306 of the Civil Code state?	Article 1306 states that contracting parties may establish stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
What was the Court’s ruling on the stipulated interest rates?	The Court found the stipulated interest rates of 5% to 10% per month unconscionable and reduced them to 1% per month (12% per annum), and eventually to 6% per annum from July 1, 2013, until full satisfaction.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision underscores the importance of honoring contractual obligations and clarifies the effect of property restrictions on mortgage agreements. The ruling serves as a reminder that parties who voluntarily enter into contracts and benefit from them cannot later escape their obligations by citing technicalities or restrictions of which they were aware. The Court balanced the need to protect borrowers from unconscionable interest rates with the principle of upholding valid contracts.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: FLORANTE VITUG VS. EVANGELINE A. ABUDA, G.R. No. 201264, January 11, 2016