The Supreme Court has ruled that issuing postdated checks as a guarantee for a loan does not constitute estafa (fraud) under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, unless there is clear evidence of deceit or fraudulent intent at the time the checks were issued. In People of the Philippines vs. Rica G. Cuyugan, the Court acquitted the accused of estafa charges, emphasizing that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the checks were issued with the intent to defraud the complainant. This decision clarifies that a mere failure to pay a debt, even when guaranteed by a check that subsequently bounces, does not automatically give rise to criminal liability for estafa. Instead, the focus is on whether the issuance of the check was the primary reason the lender parted with their money, and whether the issuer acted in bad faith.

From Friendship to Finance: When Does a Bounced Check Become Fraud?

The case revolves around Rica G. Cuyugan, who was accused of three counts of estafa for issuing checks to Norma and Rodrigo Abagat that were later dishonored. The Abagats claimed that Cuyugan defrauded them by issuing the checks knowing that her account was closed or had insufficient funds. The prosecution argued that these checks were issued simultaneously with Cuyugan receiving cash from the Abagats, leading them to believe they were secure. The defense, however, countered that the checks were merely guarantees for a partnership transaction related to supplying materials to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Cuyugan asserted that the Abagats were aware of her financial situation and that the checks were postdated as a form of security, not as immediate payment.

The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether Cuyugan’s actions met the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes fraud committed by issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender has insufficient funds or has closed the account. The Court had to determine whether Cuyugan acted with fraudulent intent when she issued the checks, or whether the transaction was simply a loan agreement where the checks served as a guarantee. The decision hinged on whether the prosecution could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cuyugan’s primary intention was to deceive the Abagats.

The Supreme Court emphasized that for estafa to exist, the act of issuing the check must be the direct cause of the defrauded party parting with their money or property. In other words, the offended party must have been induced to give something of value because of the issuance of the check. The Court quoted:

To constitute estafa under this provision the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of a check whether postdated or not. That is, the latter would not have parted with his money or other property were it not for the issuance of the check.

In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to prove that the issuance of the checks was the primary reason the Abagats gave money to Cuyugan. The testimonies of the Abagats themselves indicated that the checks were intended as guarantees for the eventual repayment of the money, not as a form of immediate payment that induced them to part with their funds.

Norma Abagat, during cross-examination, admitted that the checks were merely guarantees for the payment of the loan. Similarly, Rodrigo Abagat testified that he intended to charge a monthly interest rate of 5% on the amount lent, further suggesting that the transaction was a loan agreement rather than a fraudulent scheme. The Supreme Court noted that the Abagats were motivated by a desire to help Cuyugan, who was related to Norma, and by the expectation of earning interest on the loan.

The Court observed that the transaction was essentially a loan of money to be used by Cuyugan in her business, with the checks serving as collateral for the repayment. While Cuyugan had an obligation to repay the loan, the absence of fraudulent intent meant that her failure to do so constituted a civil obligation rather than a criminal offense under the Revised Penal Code.

The Court underscored the importance of proving fraud beyond a reasonable doubt in estafa cases. It is not enough to show that a check was issued and subsequently dishonored; the prosecution must also demonstrate that the issuer acted with deceit or fraudulent intent. In this case, the trial court’s conviction of Cuyugan was based on a general allegation that all the elements of estafa were proven, without providing specific evidence of the alleged fraud.

The Court also clarified that Cuyugan could not be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the Bouncing Checks Law, because she was not properly charged with this offense. The informations filed against her were for estafa under the Revised Penal Code, and the earlier BP 22 cases related to the same checks had been provisionally dismissed. The Supreme Court cited the constitutional right of an accused person to be informed of the accusations against them, ensuring they have an opportunity to prepare a defense.

The Court highlighted the distinction between estafa and violations of BP 22. Estafa, defined under the Revised Penal Code, is considered malum in se, meaning it is inherently wrong due to its fraudulent nature. On the other hand, BP 22 is a special law that punishes the issuance of bouncing checks, regardless of fraudulent intent. It is considered malum prohibitum, meaning it is wrong because it is prohibited by law. These are distinct offenses with different elements. The fact that the informations filed with the regional trial court were for three counts of estafa meant she may not be convicted for violation of BP 22 without trenching on fundamental fairness.

Although Cuyugan was acquitted of estafa charges, the Supreme Court acknowledged that she still had a civil obligation to repay the outstanding balance of the loan to the Abagats. The Court noted that Cuyugan had already paid P425,000 out of the total indebtedness of P855,000. Therefore, the Court ordered Cuyugan to pay the remaining balance of P430,000, along with interest at a rate of 12% per annum from the time the obligation became due until fully paid, in accordance with Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the issuance of postdated checks that were later dishonored constituted estafa (fraud) when the checks were given as a guarantee for a loan.
What is estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code?	Estafa under this provision involves defrauding someone by issuing a check in payment of an obligation, knowing that the issuer has insufficient funds or has closed the account. The act of issuing the check must be the primary reason the other party parted with their money or property.
What did the Supreme Court decide in this case?	The Supreme Court acquitted Rica G. Cuyugan of estafa, ruling that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted with fraudulent intent when she issued the checks. The Court found that the checks were given as guarantees for a loan, not as a means of defrauding the Abagats.
What is the difference between estafa and a violation of BP 22?	Estafa, under the Revised Penal Code, requires proof of fraudulent intent, while BP 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) punishes the issuance of a bouncing check regardless of intent. Estafa is considered malum in se (inherently wrong), while BP 22 is malum prohibitum (wrong because it is prohibited by law).
Why couldn’t the accused be convicted of violating BP 22 in this case?	The accused was not charged with violating BP 22; the informations filed against her were for estafa under the Revised Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that convicting her of a crime she was not charged with would violate her constitutional right to be informed of the accusations against her.
What civil obligation did the accused have in this case?	Despite being acquitted of estafa, the accused still had a civil obligation to repay the outstanding balance of the loan to the Abagats. The Supreme Court ordered her to pay the remaining balance of P430,000, plus interest at 12% per annum.
What evidence supported the claim that the checks were guarantees for a loan?	The testimonies of the complainants themselves indicated that the checks were intended as guarantees for the repayment of the money, not as a form of immediate payment. Also, the fact that Rodrigo Abagat testified that he intended to charge a monthly interest rate of 5% on the amount lent further supported this notion.
What happens when a debtor incurs in delay of payments?	Per the Supreme Court, where the debtor incurs in delay, he has to pay interest by way of damages, in conformity with our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

The Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Cuyugan serves as a reminder that not every bounced check leads to criminal liability for estafa. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the issuer acted with fraudulent intent, and that the issuance of the check was the primary reason the other party parted with their money or property. This ruling protects individuals from being unjustly penalized for what may simply be a civil obligation arising from a loan agreement.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. RICA G. CUYUGAN, G.R. Nos. 146641-43, November 18, 2002