The Supreme Court held that private individuals can be held liable for conspiring with public officers in violating Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This ruling clarifies that the law’s reach extends beyond public officials to include private actors who participate in corrupt practices detrimental to the government. The Court emphasized that the key is the conspiracy between a public officer and a private individual to enter into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government that is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the state.

NAIA III Deal: Can a Private Citizen Be Liable for Graft?

This case revolves around the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) project. After the Supreme Court declared the contracts related to the project as null and void in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), a complaint was filed against several individuals, including Henry T. Go, the Chairman and President of PIATCO, and Vicente C. Rivera, the then-DOTC Secretary. Go was charged with violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 for allegedly conspiring with Rivera to enter into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) that was disadvantageous to the government.

Go argued that as a private individual, he could not be charged under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, which penalizes a public officer who enters “on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same.” He maintained that he was not a public officer and could not enter into a contract on behalf of the government. The Sandiganbayan denied Go’s motion to quash the information, leading him to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, in its decision, emphasized the policy of RA 3019, as stated in Section 1:

SEC. 1. Statement of policy. — It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

This provision makes it clear that the law is intended to cover both public officers and private persons who engage in corrupt practices. The Court cited Luciano v. Estrella, where it was established that Section 3(g) of RA 3019 applies to both public officers and private persons.

Moreover, Section 9 of RA 3019, which prescribes the penalties for violation of the Act, explicitly mentions that “any public officer or private person” committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Act shall be punished. This further supports the interpretation that the law extends to private individuals who conspire with public officers to commit graft or corrupt practices.

The Supreme Court addressed Go’s argument that one of the elements of Section 3(g) is that the accused is a public officer, stating that this does not preclude the application of the provision to private persons who conspire with public officers. The Court cited Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, where a private person was charged with violating Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 in connection with behest loans granted by the Philippine National Bank. In that case, the Court held that the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against the private individual.

The Court also cited Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, where a private individual was convicted of violating Section 3(h) of RA 3019 for acting as a dummy for a municipal mayor in a business transaction with the municipality. Despite the fact that the first element of Section 3(h) requires that the accused be a public officer, the Court affirmed the conviction of the private individual, as well as the mayor, because they acted in conspiracy with one another.

The Supreme Court distinguished the present case from Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, where former First Lady Imelda Marcos was acquitted of violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 because she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not as a public officer. The Court noted that in the Marcos case, the public officer with whom she had allegedly conspired had already been acquitted. In contrast, Go was being charged in conspiracy with Rivera, who was a public officer at the time of the alleged offense.

Regarding the allegation of conspiracy, the Court held that the specific acts of Go in the alleged conspiracy with Rivera need not be set forth in the Information, as these are evidentiary matters to be shown and proved during the trial on the merits. The Court emphasized that to establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission of the crime, which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design.

The Court found that the Information complied with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the complaint or information state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The Court held that the facts alleged in the Information, if admitted hypothetically, established all the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 vis-à-vis Go.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed Go’s petition and affirmed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, holding that there exists probable cause against him for violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a private individual could be held liable for violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 by conspiring with a public officer. The Court addressed whether the requirement that the accused be a public officer precluded holding a private individual accountable for the offense.
What is Section 3(g) of RA 3019?	Section 3(g) of RA 3019 penalizes a public officer who enters, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. This provision aims to prevent corrupt practices in government transactions.
Can a private person be charged under Section 3(g) of RA 3019?	Yes, according to the Supreme Court’s ruling, a private person can be charged under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with a public officer to commit the offense. The Court emphasized that the anti-graft law is intended to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike.
What is needed to establish conspiracy in this context?	To establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony is not necessary. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, or after the commission of the crime, which, when taken together, reveal a community of criminal design.
How did the Court distinguish this case from Marcos v. Sandiganbayan?	The Court distinguished this case from Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, where former First Lady Imelda Marcos was acquitted because she signed the subject lease agreement as a private person, not as a public officer, and the public officer she allegedly conspired with had already been acquitted. In the present case, Go was being charged in conspiracy with a public officer, Rivera.
What was the basis for the Sandiganbayan’s finding of probable cause against Go?	The Sandiganbayan made its own determination of probable cause based on the records before it, including the information and other documents. It concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of probable cause against Go.
What is the significance of Section 1 of RA 3019?	Section 1 of RA 3019 states that it is the policy of the Philippine Government to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices. This provision emphasizes the broad scope of the law and its intent to cover both public and private actors.
What elements must be present to be indicted of the offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019?	The elements that must be present are: that the accused is a public officer; that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

This case underscores the importance of ethical conduct in both the public and private sectors and reinforces the government’s commitment to combating corruption in all its forms. This decision serves as a reminder to private individuals that they cannot escape liability for corrupt practices simply because they are not public officers, especially when they conspire with public officials to defraud the government.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: HENRY T. GO, VS. THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 172602, April 13, 2007