The Supreme Court, in Angel Celino, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, clarified the circumstances under which a person charged with both violating the COMELEC gun ban and illegal possession of firearms can be prosecuted for both offenses. The Court ruled that a prior conviction for another crime is necessary before the prohibition against prosecuting illegal possession of firearms takes effect. This means that the mere accusation of violating the gun ban does not automatically bar prosecution for illegal possession; a conviction must first be secured for the other crime.

Caught in the Crossfire: Gun Ban or Illegal Firearm Possession?

The case stemmed from two separate informations filed against Angel Celino, Sr., charging him with violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban) and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8294 (illegal possession of firearm). The central legal question was whether being charged with violating the COMELEC gun ban precluded prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm under R.A. 8294. The petitioner argued that he could not be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms if he was also charged with violating the COMELEC gun ban based on the same set of facts.

The pivotal issue revolves around the interpretation of the proviso in R.A. 8294, which states that the penalty for illegal possession of high-powered firearms applies, “Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.” To understand the Supreme Court’s stance, it is crucial to examine the exact wording of the law.

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. ” x x x.

“The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

The Supreme Court clarified that the word “committed” in the proviso implies a prior determination of guilt through a final conviction or a voluntary admission, aligning it with the Constitutional presumption of innocence. The Court stated:

The word “committed” taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.

Building on this interpretation, the Supreme Court distinguished the present case from previous rulings such as Agote v. Lorenzo and People v. Ladjaalam, where the accused were acquitted of illegal possession charges due to their conviction for other crimes. In those cases, the ‘other crime’ had already been proven. Here, Celino was merely accused of violating the COMELEC gun ban, and accusation does not equate to guilt.

The Court contrasted the current scenario with cases where a conviction for another crime had already been secured. In situations where an individual has been convicted of another offense, the illegal possession of firearms is either considered an aggravating circumstance or absorbed as an element of the other crime, as outlined in R.A. 8294. However, in Celino’s case, the absence of a prior conviction for the gun ban violation meant that the illegal possession charge could proceed independently.

Moreover, the Supreme Court highlighted that the COMELEC gun ban violation is not among the offenses enumerated in R.A. 8294 that would preclude a separate charge for illegal possession of firearms. The Court echoed its earlier pronouncements in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses and People v. Valdez, which emphasized that cases involving illegal possession should continue to be prosecuted if no other crimes expressly indicated in R.A. 8294 are involved.

In essence, the Supreme Court delineated a clear distinction: if the ‘other offense’ falls under those specified in R.A. 8294 (like homicide or rebellion), the illegal possession charge is either absorbed or becomes an aggravating circumstance. However, if the ‘other offense’ is not listed in R.A. 8294, a separate case for illegal possession can proceed. This decision reinforces the principle that the presumption of innocence remains until proven otherwise.

Furthermore, the Court pointed out a procedural misstep by the petitioner. Instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within the prescribed period, Celino filed a petition under Rule 65, which is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The Court emphasized that certiorari is only appropriate when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available. While the Court can sometimes treat a petition for certiorari as one filed under Rule 45, it found no justification for doing so in this case.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether being charged with violating the COMELEC gun ban automatically barred prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm under Republic Act No. 8294.
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court ruled that a prior conviction for another crime is necessary before the prohibition against prosecuting illegal possession of firearms takes effect. The mere accusation of another crime is not sufficient.
What does “committed” mean in R.A. 8294?	In the context of R.A. 8294, “committed” means a prior determination of guilt, either through a final conviction or a voluntary admission, aligning with the Constitutional presumption of innocence.
How does this case differ from Agote v. Lorenzo and People v. Ladjaalam?	In Agote and Ladjaalam, the accused were already convicted of other crimes, leading to the dismissal of illegal possession charges. In this case, Celino had only been accused of violating the gun ban, not convicted.
What happens if the “other offense” is listed in R.A. 8294?	If the “other offense” is listed in R.A. 8294 (e.g., homicide, rebellion), the illegal possession charge is either absorbed into the other crime or considered an aggravating circumstance.
What happens if the “other offense” is NOT listed in R.A. 8294?	If the “other offense” is not listed in R.A. 8294 (e.g., violating the COMELEC gun ban), a separate case for illegal possession of firearms can proceed.
What was the procedural issue in this case?	The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 within the prescribed period, which is not a proper substitute for a lost appeal.
What is the general rule when a motion to quash is denied?	Generally, the accused should proceed to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, appeal in the manner authorized by law.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Celino v. Court of Appeals provides valuable clarity on the interplay between illegal possession of firearms charges and other offenses. The ruling underscores the importance of a prior conviction before the proviso in R.A. 8294 can be invoked to bar prosecution for illegal possession. By requiring a prior determination of guilt, the Court safeguards the presumption of innocence and ensures a fair application of the law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ANGEL CELINO, SR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 170562, June 29, 2007