The Supreme Court ruled that criminal cases against corporate officers for violations of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) cannot be suspended simply because the corporation has filed for suspension of payments or is undergoing rehabilitation. The Court clarified that B.P. 22 cases are not considered ‘claims’ against the corporation within the meaning of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, which governs corporate rehabilitation. This means corporate officers cannot avoid criminal liability for issuing bad checks by claiming the corporation’s financial distress.

When Corporate Shields Crumble: Bouncing Checks and Personal Accountability

This case arose from a dispute between Tiong Rosario, the proprietor of TR Mercantile (TRM), and Alfonso Co, the Chairman and President of Modern Paper Products, Inc. (MPPI). MPPI purchased paper products from TRM, and Co issued checks on behalf of MPPI as payment. However, several of these checks were dishonored due to either stopped payment or insufficient funds. Consequently, Rosario filed criminal charges against Co for violating B.P. Blg. 22. Meanwhile, MPPI filed a petition for suspension of payments with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which issued an order suspending all actions for claims against MPPI. Co then sought to suspend the criminal proceedings against him, arguing that the SEC’s order covered the B.P. 22 cases. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) sided with Co, leading Rosario to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The central legal question was whether a criminal case against a corporate officer for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 could be suspended due to the pendency of the corporation’s petition for suspension of payments. The Supreme Court addressed this by examining the scope of Section 6(c) of P.D. No. 902-A, which allows the SEC to suspend “all actions for claims against corporations…under management or receivership.” The Court had to determine whether a criminal prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22 constituted an “action for claim” as contemplated in P.D. No. 902-A.

The Supreme Court emphasized the definition of “claim” as it is used in the context of corporate rehabilitation. As the Court stated in Finasia Investment and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the term “claim” refers to “debts or demands of a pecuniary nature and the assertion of a right to have money paid.” This definition, focusing on monetary obligations, is consistent with the purpose of corporate rehabilitation, which is to allow a distressed company to reorganize its finances and pay off its debts in an orderly manner. Suspending actions for claims prevents creditors from gaining an unfair advantage and disrupting the rehabilitation process.

However, the Court distinguished criminal prosecutions from civil claims, noting that the primary purpose of a criminal action is to punish the offender and deter others from committing similar offenses. As the Supreme Court quoted in Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 421 (1986):

It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The Court emphasized that B.P. Blg. 22 aims to protect public order by penalizing the issuance of worthless checks, which can damage trade, commerce, and banking. While a conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 might result in restitution to the offended party, this is merely an incidental consequence of the criminal prosecution, the overriding goal of which is to uphold the law and deter future offenses. The Court clarified the dual purpose of criminal action by stating:

A criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused.

The ruling also addressed the timing of the suspension of actions against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation. The Court cited Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, emphasizing that the suspension takes effect only upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body. In this case, there was a period between the dishonor of the checks and the SEC’s order suspending claims, during which Co could have made good the checks. The Court said that the provisions of Sec. 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A should not interfere with the prosecution of a case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, even if restitution, reparation or indemnification could be ordered.

The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that allowing the suspension of criminal proceedings based solely on a corporation’s rehabilitation would create an absurd situation where individuals could escape punishment for criminal conduct simply by filing for corporate rehabilitation. The Court acknowledged the trend towards giving administrative bodies like the SEC more power to resolve specialized issues, but it also cautioned against allowing administrative agencies to encroach upon the judicial power to decide criminal cases. By emphasizing that criminal actions serve a different purpose than civil claims, the Supreme Court ensured that corporate officers cannot use corporate rehabilitation as a shield against personal criminal liability.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether criminal proceedings against a corporate officer for violating B.P. 22 could be suspended due to the corporation’s petition for suspension of payments.
What is B.P. 22?	B.P. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law, penalizes the making and issuing of checks that are dishonored due to insufficient funds or other reasons.
What is P.D. 902-A?	P.D. 902-A grants the SEC the power to appoint a management committee or rehabilitation receiver for distressed corporations and to suspend actions for claims against those corporations.
What is the definition of “claim” in the context of corporate rehabilitation?	In corporate rehabilitation, a “claim” refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature, such as the assertion of a right to have money paid.
Why did the Supreme Court rule that B.P. 22 cases are not “claims” under P.D. 902-A?	The Court reasoned that the primary purpose of a criminal action under B.P. 22 is to punish the offender and protect public order, not to collect a debt.
When does the suspension of actions for claims against a corporation take effect?	The suspension of actions takes effect upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body by the SEC.
Can a corporate officer be held liable for B.P. 22 even if the corporation is undergoing rehabilitation?	Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that criminal proceedings against a corporate officer for violating B.P. 22 cannot be suspended solely because the corporation is undergoing rehabilitation.
What is the main takeaway from this case?	Corporate officers cannot hide behind corporate rehabilitation to avoid criminal liability for issuing bad checks; they are still personally accountable for their actions.

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case reinforces the principle that individuals are responsible for their actions, even when acting on behalf of a corporation. By clarifying the distinction between civil claims and criminal prosecutions, the Court has ensured that corporate officers cannot use corporate rehabilitation as a shield against personal criminal liability. This decision upholds the integrity of commercial transactions and protects the public from the harmful effects of bouncing checks.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Tiong Rosario v. Alfonso Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008