The Supreme Court has affirmed that re-filing an information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does not automatically require a new preliminary investigation if the core offense remains the same, and only the manner of committing it is modified. This ruling clarifies that changing the specific way a public officer is alleged to have violated the anti-graft law—either by causing undue injury or by giving unwarranted benefits—does not constitute a new offense necessitating a fresh preliminary investigation, especially when the underlying facts and the accused remain the same.

From Undue Injury to Unwarranted Benefit: Did the Shift Warrant a New Probe?

This case revolves around Quintin B. Saludaga, a former Municipal Mayor, and SPO2 Fiel E. Genio, a police officer, who were initially charged with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for causing undue injury to the government. The original charge stemmed from their alleged involvement in awarding contracts without a competitive public bidding. The first information was dismissed due to the prosecution’s failure to prove actual damages to the government. Subsequently, the Ombudsman re-filed the information, this time alleging that the accused gave unwarranted benefits to a private party. The petitioners argued that this change in the mode of committing the offense necessitated a new preliminary investigation, a request that was denied by the Sandiganbayan. This denial led to the present petition before the Supreme Court, questioning whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to order a new preliminary investigation.

The heart of the legal matter lies in interpreting Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which prohibits public officers from causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their official functions. The Supreme Court has clarified that the use of the disjunctive term “or” means that either act—causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits—constitutes a violation of Section 3(e).

R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term “or” connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.

Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that the offense remains the same even if the mode of commission changes. There was no substitution of information because the core offense—violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019—remained consistent. Only the specific manner in which the offense was allegedly committed was modified. It is vital to differentiate a change in the mode of committing the crime from a change in the crime itself.

The petitioners argued that the shift from alleging undue injury to alleging unwarranted benefits constituted a substantial amendment requiring a new preliminary investigation. However, the Court dismissed this argument, pointing out that the Information was founded on the same transaction as the first Information: the Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers. Therefore, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remained essentially the same. The case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, which the petitioners cited, was deemed inapplicable because, in that case, there was indeed a substantial alteration in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged.

Regarding the petitioners’ claim of newly discovered evidence, specifically the affidavit of COA Auditor Carlos G. Pornelos, the Court found that this evidence did not meet the requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. The affidavit was executed prior to the re-filing of the case and was already considered during the preliminary investigation. Therefore, it could not be considered as newly found evidence.

Furthermore, the Court reiterated that the determination of probable cause against public officers during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed or not, and the Court cannot interfere in the exercise of this power without good and compelling reasons. The Court emphasized that it may only review the Ombudsman’s action upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law. In this case, there was no indication that the Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness, whim, or caprice. The Court found no error in the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to order a new preliminary investigation, as there was neither a modification of the nature of the offense charged nor a new allegation.

In summary, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion for a new preliminary investigation. The re-filing of the information with a modified mode of commission did not necessitate a new investigation because the core offense remained the same, and the petitioners had already participated in a full-blown preliminary investigation. This decision reinforces the principle that the Ombudsman has broad discretion in determining probable cause and that courts should not interfere absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the re-filing of an information under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, with a change in the mode of committing the offense, required a new preliminary investigation. The petitioners argued that a new preliminary investigation was necessary due to the shift from alleging “undue injury” to alleging “unwarranted benefits”.
What is Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019?	Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, prohibits public officers from causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their official functions. Either act constitutes a violation of this section.
What constitutes grave abuse of discretion?	Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law. It implies that the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.
Why did the Sandiganbayan deny the motion for a new preliminary investigation?	The Sandiganbayan denied the motion because the re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged but merely modified the mode by which the accused committed the offense. The court found that this modification did not necessitate a new preliminary investigation.
What are the requisites for newly discovered evidence?	Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (or investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.
Does a change in the mode of committing an offense require a new preliminary investigation?	Not necessarily. The Supreme Court clarified that if the core offense remains the same and only the mode of commission is modified, a new preliminary investigation is not automatically required. It depends on whether the change is substantial and affects the nature of the offense.
What is the role of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations?	The Office of the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. The determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman.
When can the Court interfere with the Ombudsman’s decisions?	The Court can only interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s decisions when there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.

This case underscores the importance of understanding the nuances of anti-graft laws and the procedural requirements in prosecuting public officials. It clarifies that not every change in the allegations necessitates a complete restart of the legal process, particularly when the underlying facts and the accused remain the same. This decision ensures that the prosecution of graft cases remains efficient and effective, while still protecting the rights of the accused.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184537, April 23, 2010