In a ruling that underscores the importance of considering the rights of minors in the justice system, the Supreme Court modified the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal, who was convicted of murder alongside Salvador Atizado. While affirming Atizado’s conviction and sentence of reclusion perpetua, the Court recognized that Monreal’s minority at the time of the crime warranted a reduced penalty. This decision highlights the retroactive application of Republic Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, benefiting even those already serving sentences. The Court also adjusted the civil damages awarded to the victim’s heirs, increasing the amounts for death indemnity and moral damages, and adding exemplary damages due to the presence of treachery.

When Does Youth Temper Justice? Examining Criminal Liability and the Juvenile Justice Act

The case of Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal v. People of the Philippines arose from the tragic murder of Rogelio Llona, a Sangguniang Bayan member. Atizado and Monreal, along with a third individual, Danilo Atizado, were charged with conspiracy to commit murder with treachery and evident premeditation. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted both Atizado and Monreal, but acquitted Danilo. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction but modified the damages awarded. The Supreme Court then took up the case, focusing primarily on whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction despite the petitioners’ claims of unreliable eyewitness testimony, and whether Monreal’s age at the time of the crime warranted a modification of his sentence.

The Court emphasized the trial judge’s unique position in evaluating witness credibility, noting that such evaluations, when affirmed by the CA, are binding unless significant facts were overlooked or misinterpreted. The Court found no reason to deviate from this principle, as the positive identification of the petitioners by eyewitness Simeona Mirandilla outweighed their denials and alibis. The Court further affirmed the presence of conspiracy and treachery in the commission of the crime. Conspiracy, in legal terms, exists when two or more individuals agree to commit a felony and decide to execute it.

However, the Court found a critical error in the imposition of the penalty on Monreal, who was a minor at the time of the offense. The RTC and CA failed to appreciate his minority, leading to an incorrect sentence. Despite the absence of a birth certificate, the Court considered various pieces of evidence, including Monreal’s counter-affidavit, police blotter records, and testimonies, all indicating that he was under 18 when the crime occurred. This aligns with Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, which states:

Section 7. Determination of Age – The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

Given Monreal’s age, Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) mandates that the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, the Court determined that Monreal’s appropriate indeterminate penalty was from six years and one day of prision mayor to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal. Furthermore, the Court recognized that Monreal had already been detained for over 16 years, exceeding his revised sentence. The Court cited Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, mandating that the entire period of detention be credited to the service of the sentence. This retroactive application is explicitly provided for in Section 68 of Republic Act No. 9344:

Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. – Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.

In addition to the penalty modification, the Supreme Court also addressed the civil damages awarded to the victim’s heirs. While upholding the solidary liability of both petitioners, the Court adjusted the amounts to align with current jurisprudence. The Court stated:

The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

The Court increased the death indemnity and moral damages to P75,000.00 each, and further awarded exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the presence of treachery. The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 was upheld, as it was supported by evidence in the record.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The primary issue was whether the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal, who was a minor at the time of the crime, should be modified in accordance with the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act. The Court also reviewed the award of civil damages.
Why was Monreal’s sentence modified?	Monreal’s sentence was modified because he was a minor (under 18) when the murder was committed. Under Philippine law, minors are subject to different penalties than adults.
What is the significance of Republic Act No. 9344 in this case?	Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, provides for a different treatment of children in conflict with the law. The Supreme Court applied this law retroactively, reducing Monreal’s sentence.
What evidence did the Court consider to determine Monreal’s age?	The Court considered Monreal’s counter-affidavit, police blotter records, and testimonies, all indicating he was under 18 at the time of the crime, despite the absence of a birth certificate.
What is the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and how was it applied?	The Indeterminate Sentence Law requires courts to impose a minimum and maximum term of imprisonment, rather than a fixed term. This law was applied to Monreal’s case to determine his revised sentence.
What were the modifications to the civil damages?	The Court increased the death indemnity and moral damages to P75,000.00 each and awarded exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the presence of treachery.
What is the effect of treachery on the award of damages?	The presence of treachery, as a qualifying circumstance in the crime, led to the award of exemplary damages, which are intended to compensate the victim’s heirs for the egregious nature of the offense.
What is solidary liability, and how does it apply in this case?	Solidary liability means that each of the accused is liable for the entire amount of damages. The Court held both Atizado and Monreal solidarily liable to pay damages to the victim’s heirs.
Why was Monreal ordered to be released immediately?	Monreal was ordered to be released because he had already served more time in detention than the revised sentence imposed by the Supreme Court.

This case serves as a crucial reminder of the Philippine justice system’s commitment to upholding the rights of minors and ensuring that laws designed to protect them are applied retroactively when appropriate. The Supreme Court’s decision to modify Monreal’s sentence and adjust the civil damages underscores the judiciary’s role in balancing justice, fairness, and the unique circumstances of each case.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal, vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010