The Supreme Court held that an attempt to defraud, even if unsuccessful due to intervention, constitutes attempted estafa. The Court emphasized that the intent to cause damage, rather than the actual damage suffered, is sufficient for conviction when the offender is prevented from completing the fraudulent act by external factors, such as apprehension by authorities. This ruling reinforces the importance of proving intent in fraud cases and clarifies the application of penalties for attempted crimes under Philippine law.
Cavite Dream or Criminal Scheme? Unmasking Intent in Real Estate Deals
This case revolves around Elvira Lateo, Francisco Elca, and Bartolome Baldemor, who were charged with attempted estafa for allegedly trying to defraud Eleonor Lucero. The prosecution argued that the accused misrepresented themselves as having the authority to transfer ownership of a property in Cavite, inducing Lucero to part with her money. The defense countered that Lucero was aware of the property’s status and that they were merely seeking funds to facilitate its titling. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted the accused of attempted estafa, a decision affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals (CA). The Supreme Court (SC) was then tasked to determine whether the evidence supported the conviction and whether the correct penalty was imposed.
At the heart of this case lies Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which defines estafa as swindling committed through false pretenses or fraudulent acts. The elements of estafa include a false pretense, made prior to or simultaneously with the fraud, reliance by the offended party on the false pretense, and resulting damage to the offended party. However, because the crime was only attempted, the element of actual damage was not present. The critical issue was whether the accused demonstrated a clear intent to defraud Lucero, even if the fraudulent scheme was interrupted.
The Supreme Court reviewed the factual findings of the lower courts, emphasizing that it is not a trier of facts and generally defers to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility. The Court noted that the transaction involving the Cavite property was a continuation of a previous, fraudulent transaction involving land in Muntinlupa. When Lucero discovered the falsity of Elca’s titles over the Muntinlupa property, Elca offered the Cavite property as a substitute, asking for an additional P2,000,000.00. This offer, according to the Court, constituted a false pretense because Elca did not fully own the Cavite property at the time, holding only an inchoate right derived from his application to purchase friar lands. The Court highlighted the significance of Elca’s letter to Lucero:
This is with reference to the advances we had obtained from you in the total amount of P4.7 million, more or less. It was agreed that the said advances shall be due and demandable upon the release of titles over my parcels of land situated in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila of which we are presently working out with appropriate government agencies. Your current demand fro[m] us to pay the aforesaid amount plus your unilaterally imposed interests is therefore premature and baseless.
However, with regards to your alternative demand that you be given a total of 5 hectares (2 has. upon signing of an agreement assigning my rights and additional 3 has. upon complete release of the remaining 14 hectares) please be informed that I am now amenable, provided that an additional P2.0 million will be paid to me to take care of my other personal commitments. These 5 hectares are situated in Malipay, Bacoor, Cavite with a portion of Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs-04213-000441-D. I am expecting the title of said property early next year. The current market [valuation] of real estate properties in that area is P450.00 per square meter and hence, the property will be more [than] sufficient to cover our obligates (sic).
The Court found that Elca’s misrepresentation of his ownership status, coupled with the demand for additional funds, constituted fraud and deceit. Quoting Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the broad definition of fraud:
[F]raud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
Building on this principle, the Court affirmed the lower courts’ conclusion that the accused had commenced the commission of estafa but were prevented from completing the act due to their apprehension by authorities. Because the crime was only attempted, the penalty was adjusted. The original sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years was deemed excessive. The Court of Appeals modified it to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
The Supreme Court further modified the penalty, explaining that the penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. If the crime had been consummated, Lucero would have been defrauded in the amount of P100,000.00. The applicable penalty under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) would have been prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the first P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty should not exceed twenty years.
Since what was established was only attempted estafa, the applicable penalty was two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony, pursuant to Article 51 in relation to Article 61(5) of the RPC. This would result in arresto mayor in its medium period to arresto mayor in its maximum period, or an imprisonment term ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. The court also considered the incremental penalty for amounts exceeding P22,000.00. However, recognizing the inequity of imposing the full incremental penalty on an attempted crime, the Court sentenced the petitioners to imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor.
FAQs
What is attempted estafa? | Attempted estafa is the act of trying to commit fraud where the offender does not perform all the acts of execution due to some cause other than their spontaneous desistance. The offender must have the intent to cause damage, even if the damage does not actually occur. |
What are the elements of estafa? | The elements of estafa are: (1) a false pretense or fraudulent act, (2) the pretense or act is made before or during the commission of fraud, (3) the offended party relies on the false pretense, and (4) the offended party suffers damage. In attempted estafa, the fourth element (damage) is not required. |
What is the significance of intent in this case? | Intent is crucial because the crime was only attempted. The prosecution needed to prove that the accused had the intent to defraud Lucero, even though they were apprehended before the transaction could be completed. |
How did the Court define fraud in this context? | The Court defined fraud broadly as anything calculated to deceive, including acts, omissions, and concealment that breach a legal or equitable duty, resulting in damage or undue advantage over another. It includes false suggestions, suppression of truth, tricks, and cunning. |
What was the original penalty imposed by the RTC? | The RTC sentenced the accused to imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, which was later deemed excessive by the appellate courts. |
How did the CA modify the penalty? | The CA modified the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum. |
What was the final penalty imposed by the Supreme Court? | The Supreme Court further modified the penalty to imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor, considering the crime was only attempted and the inequity of imposing the full incremental penalty. |
What does the Revised Penal Code say about penalties for attempted crimes? | Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code states that the penalty for an attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. This was a key basis for the Supreme Court’s modification of the penalty. |
Why was the initial offer of the Muntinlupa property relevant? | The initial offer of the Muntinlupa property was relevant because it established a pattern of fraudulent behavior and demonstrated the accused’s willingness to deceive Lucero. The Cavite property offer was seen as a continuation of this initial scheme. |
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarifies the elements of attempted estafa and emphasizes the importance of proving intent in fraud cases. The Court’s careful consideration of the penalty also highlights the principle of proportionality in sentencing, ensuring that the punishment fits the crime, even in cases of attempted offenses.
For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.
Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ELVIRA LATEO Y ELEAZAR, FRANCISCO ELCA Y ARCAS, AND BARTOLOME BALDEMOR Y MADRIGAL, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161651, June 01, 2011
Leave a Reply