The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s decision convicting Silverina E. Consigna, a municipal treasurer, of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court ruled that Consigna misused her official position to obtain a loan by misrepresenting it was for municipal purposes, thereby causing undue injury to the lender. This case underscores that public office cannot be used as a shield to perpetrate fraudulent schemes and that public officials are accountable for actions taken under the guise of their authority.

Deceit and Dishonor: When a Public Trust Turns Criminal

This case revolves around Silverina E. Consigna, then Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, who, along with Mayor Jaime Rusillon, secured a loan of P320,000 from Emerlina Moleta. Consigna misrepresented that the loan was needed for the municipality’s payroll and gymnasium construction, as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. To guarantee payment, Consigna issued three Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Mayor Rusillon. However, these checks were later dishonored due to insufficient funds and a “Signature Not on File” issue.

Moleta’s attempts to encash the checks proved futile, eventually leading her to discover that the municipality’s account was closed. Consequently, Moleta filed criminal charges against Consigna and Rusillon with the Sandiganbayan, alleging violations of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code (Estafa). The Sandiganbayan found Consigna guilty of both charges, while acquitting Rusillon. The central legal question is whether Consigna’s actions, taken under the color of her public office, constituted a violation of anti-graft laws and estafa.

The heart of the matter lies in the dual nature of the charges against Consigna: violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Estafa under the Revised Penal Code. To fully understand the Supreme Court’s ruling, it is crucial to dissect the elements of each crime and how they apply to Consigna’s actions. Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of their functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.

The Supreme Court emphasized that Consigna, as a municipal treasurer, was undoubtedly a public officer discharging official functions. The court found that Consigna misused her position to acquire a loan from Moleta, who was misled into believing that Consigna was acting in the interest of the municipality. Citing Montilla v. Hilario, the Court clarified that the offense must have a direct, not accidental, relationship with the office:

[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office.

Building on this principle, the Court highlighted that Consigna’s position as municipal treasurer gave her the appearance of authority and trustworthiness, enabling her to transact business with Moleta under the guise of government financial needs. This underscores a critical point: public office should not be used as a vehicle for personal gain or to facilitate fraudulent schemes. The Court’s analysis in Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan provides a crucial insight into understanding violations of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It reiterates the two alternative modes through which a public official can breach this section: causing undue injury to any party, including the government; or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The use of the disjunctive term “or” means that either act qualifies as a violation, thus expanding the scope of liability for public officials.

Moreover, the element of “evident bad faith” was crucial in establishing Consigna’s guilt. According to the Supreme Court, “evident bad faith” implies a palpably fraudulent and dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. The court found that Consigna’s representations to Moleta were outright distortions of the truth, aimed solely at inducing Moleta to hand over the P320,000.00. Adding weight to the prosecution’s case was the fact that Consigna failed to account for the loan proceeds in the municipality’s books, raising serious doubts about its intended use.

Turning to the charge of Estafa under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court affirmed that Consigna’s actions also constituted this crime. This provision punishes anyone who defrauds another by using fictitious names or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions. The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or concealment, are that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; such act must be prior to or simultaneous with the fraud; the offended party must have relied on the false pretense; and as a result, suffered damage. It is important to recognize that criminal liability is not erased simply because the accused is a public official. In this case, the convergence of Consigna’s public role and her fraudulent actions led to a conviction for both violating anti-graft laws and committing estafa.

The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the factual allegations in the Information, rather than the specific designation of the crime. Quoting United States v. Lim San, the Court stated:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth.

This ruling underscores that as long as the Information sufficiently alleges the elements of the crime, the accused can be convicted, even if the Information does not explicitly state the specific provision of law violated.

This approach contrasts with a strict, formalistic reading of criminal charges and ensures that justice is served based on the substance of the accusations. The Court also rejected Consigna’s argument that Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 applies only to officers charged with granting licenses or concessions. Citing Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, the Court clarified that the last sentence of Sec. 3(e) is not a restrictive requirement but rather a clarification to include officers of government corporations who might not ordinarily be considered “public officers.” This broader interpretation reinforces the anti-graft law’s reach and prevents public officials from escaping liability by narrowly defining their roles.

FAQs

What was the central issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a municipal treasurer could be convicted of violating anti-graft laws and estafa for misusing her position to obtain a loan for personal purposes.
What is Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019?	Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to any party or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
What are the elements of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC?	The elements are: (1) false pretense, (2) made prior to or simultaneous with the fraud, (3) reliance by the offended party, and (4) resulting damage.
Why was the municipal treasurer found guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019?	She was found guilty because she misused her position to obtain a loan by misrepresenting it was for municipal purposes, thereby causing undue injury to the lender.
How did the Court define “evident bad faith” in this case?	The Court defined it as a palpably fraudulent and dishonest purpose, a conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
Does Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 apply only to officials who grant licenses or concessions?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that the provision applies to all public officials, regardless of whether they are involved in granting licenses or concessions.
What did the Court say about the importance of the Information in criminal cases?	The Court said that the factual allegations in the Information are more important than the specific designation of the crime.
What was the ruling of the Sandiganbayan in this case?	The Sandiganbayan found the municipal treasurer guilty of both violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the RPC, while acquitting the mayor.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision serves as a stern reminder that public office is a position of trust and accountability, not a license to engage in fraudulent activities. Public officials who abuse their authority for personal gain will be held liable under both anti-graft laws and the Revised Penal Code.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Silverina E. Consigna v. People, G.R. No. 175750-51, April 02, 2014