The Supreme Court affirmed the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against a mayor for violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This case underscores that local officials cannot disregard existing ordinances, even if permits are traditionally granted, and reinforces the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate potential abuses of power. The decision clarifies the scope of due process rights during preliminary investigations, emphasizing that the right to examine evidence is primarily focused on the complainant’s submissions, not those of co-respondents.

When a Firecracker Permit Ignites Legal Scrutiny: Did a Mayor Abuse His Authority?

This case revolves around Edwin Granada Reyes, then mayor of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, who approved a permit allowing the sale of firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market from December 21, 2009, to January 1, 2010. This action occurred despite the existence of Municipal Ordinance No. 357, which prohibited the “storing, displaying, selling, and blowing up (‘pagpabuto’) of those pyrotechnics products allowed by law, commonly called ‘firecrackers’ or ‘pabuto’ within the premises of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public Market.” Subsequently, a fire damaged the public market on December 27, 2009. Paul Jocson Arches filed a complaint against Reyes, alleging that the mayor’s permit violated the ordinance and caused the fire.

The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Reyes, along with Rita Potestas Domingo, Solomon Anore de Castilla, and Gil C. Andres, for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This section penalizes public officials who, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, cause undue injury to any party, including the government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The Ombudsman argued that Reyes and his co-respondents, in their respective positions, gave unwarranted benefits to firecracker vendors by issuing a permit that contravened the existing municipal ordinance.

Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion by finding probable cause without sufficient basis. He claimed there was no bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, and that the permit was based on a long-standing practice. Reyes also alleged a violation of his right to due process, arguing that he was not furnished with an affidavit from co-respondent Andres, which the Ombudsman relied upon. The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in determining the existence of probable cause against Reyes.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, reinforcing the principle that it generally does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings of probable cause. The Court cited Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, emphasizing the wide latitude granted to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to act on criminal complaints against public officials. The Court reiterated that the determination of probable cause is an executive function based on facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the accused is guilty. The Ombudsman, with its power to investigate, is in a better position to assess the evidence.

As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees.

The Court clarified that disagreement with the Ombudsman’s findings does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion requires a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to a lack of jurisdiction or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Reyes failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation met this threshold. Probable cause, as defined by the Court, is the existence of facts and circumstances that would lead a person of ordinary caution to suspect that the person charged is guilty, implying probability of guilt but requiring less than evidence that would justify a conviction.

The Court found that the Ombudsman properly performed its duty in determining probable cause for a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Ombudsman demonstrated that Reyes was a public officer, that the issuance of the permit gave unwarranted benefit to firecracker vendors, and that the action was tainted with bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The Court referenced the Ombudsman’s explanation that “unwarranted” means lacking adequate or official support, and that the permit violated both a municipal ordinance and the Fire Code of the Philippines. Furthermore, the Ombudsman’s resolution explained the finding of bad faith, referencing the respondents’ awareness of Municipal Ordinance No. 357 and the lack of a Fire Safety Inspection Certificate (FSIC) for the vendors.

Addressing Reyes’ claim that his right to due process was violated, the Supreme Court emphasized that preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is only conducted to establish probable cause. Citing Webb v. De Leon, the Court stated that the decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions lies solely with the investigator, and a clarificatory hearing is unnecessary if the evidence on hand already establishes probable cause. The rights of a person during preliminary investigation are limited to those provided by procedural law.

Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.

The Court highlighted that Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court grants a respondent the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant but does not extend this right to evidence submitted by co-respondents. This principle was further clarified in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, which explicitly stated that there is no law or rule requiring the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of co-respondents. The Court emphasized that the respondent was able to file a counter-affidavit to explain his side, thus fulfilling the essence of due process, which is simply an opportunity to be heard.

This case reinforces the importance of public officials adhering to existing laws and ordinances. The ruling underscores the significant authority of the Ombudsman in investigating and prosecuting potential violations of anti-graft laws. Furthermore, the decision clarifies the scope of due process rights during preliminary investigations, ensuring that the process remains efficient while still protecting fundamental rights. For local government officials, this case serves as a reminder to prioritize compliance with legal frameworks and to exercise their authority with due diligence and good faith.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict Mayor Reyes for violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This stemmed from his issuance of a firecracker sales permit despite a local ordinance prohibiting such sales.
What is Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?	Section 3(e) penalizes public officials who, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, cause undue injury to any party or give unwarranted benefits to a private party. It is aimed at preventing corruption and abuse of power in government.
What does “probable cause” mean in this context?	Probable cause refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime. It requires more than a mere suspicion but less than the evidence needed for a conviction.
Did Mayor Reyes have the right to see the affidavit of his co-respondent?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that during a preliminary investigation, a respondent has the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant, but not necessarily the evidence submitted by co-respondents. This is because preliminary investigations are not part of the trial itself.
What is the role of the Ombudsman in this case?	The Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body responsible for investigating and prosecuting public officials for corruption and other offenses. In this case, the Ombudsman determined that there was probable cause to indict Mayor Reyes.
What was the main argument of Mayor Reyes in his defense?	Mayor Reyes argued that he did not act with bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence and that the permit was based on a long-standing practice. He also claimed his right to due process was violated because he did not receive a copy of his co-respondent’s affidavit.
How did the Supreme Court rule on the issue of due process?	The Supreme Court held that Mayor Reyes was not denied due process because he had the opportunity to file a counter-affidavit and present his side of the story. The Court emphasized that preliminary investigations have less stringent due process requirements than trials.
What is the practical implication of this ruling for local government officials?	The ruling serves as a reminder to local government officials to strictly adhere to existing laws and ordinances, even when granting permits or licenses based on past practices. It reinforces the importance of exercising due diligence and acting in good faith to avoid potential anti-graft violations.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case affirms the Ombudsman’s authority to investigate potential abuses of power by public officials and clarifies the procedural rights of respondents during preliminary investigations. Local government officials must be mindful of their obligations to uphold existing laws and ordinances and avoid actions that could be construed as granting unwarranted benefits to private parties.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Edwin Granada Reyes vs. The Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 208243, June 05, 2017