The Supreme Court ruled that a person cannot be convicted for drug use under Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, unless they were first apprehended or arrested. This decision clarifies that a positive drug test alone, without prior apprehension or arrest, is insufficient for conviction under this specific provision. This ruling safeguards individual rights by ensuring that criminal liability for drug use is only imposed when the legal requirements of prior apprehension or arrest are met, preventing potential overreach in the enforcement of drug laws.

Random Drug Tests and Rights: When Does a Positive Result Lead to Criminal Charges?

This case revolves around PO1 Johnny K. Sullano, a police officer who tested positive for methamphetamine in a random drug test ordered by his superior. He was subsequently charged with violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The central legal question is whether a positive drug test, conducted as part of a random screening process without any prior arrest or apprehension, is sufficient grounds for conviction under this provision of the law. The lower courts granted Sullano’s demurrer to evidence, dismissing the case against him, a decision that reached the Supreme Court for final review.

The Supreme Court anchored its decision on a strict interpretation of the law, emphasizing the importance of the phrase “a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165. The Court stated that the provision is unambiguous: the phrase “apprehended or arrested” immediately qualifies the subject person. Therefore, only individuals who have been apprehended or arrested and subsequently test positive for drug use can be prosecuted under this section.

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. — A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act.

Building on this principle, the Court invoked the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, which means that the express mention of one thing excludes all others. By explicitly stating that the provision applies to “apprehended or arrested” persons, Congress intended to limit the scope of liability under Section 15 to those specific circumstances.

The prosecution argued that Section 15 should be read in conjunction with Section 36, Article III of R.A. No. 9165, which mandates random drug testing for certain employees, including police officers. However, the Court rejected this argument, noting that the information filed against Sullano only cited Section 15 and made no reference to Section 36. To include Section 36 at this stage would violate Sullano’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

To further understand the nuances, consider the contrasting viewpoints presented in this case:

Prosecution’s Argument	Defense’s Argument
Section 15 applies to anyone who tests positive for drug use after a mandatory drug test under Section 36, regardless of arrest.	Section 15 only applies to those who are apprehended or arrested and then test positive for drug use.
A narrow interpretation of Section 15 would create an absurd situation where individuals testing positive in mandatory tests could not be penalized.	Expanding Section 15 violates the accused’s right to be informed of the charges and could lead to double jeopardy.

The Court also addressed the prosecution’s concern that a strict interpretation of Section 15 would render Section 36 meaningless. The Court clarified that even with a narrow reading of Section 15, the rehabilitation requirement outlined in that section could still apply to individuals who test positive for drug use through random drug tests under Section 36. This interpretation aligns with the law’s intent to prioritize rehabilitation over prosecution for drug users.

Moreover, the Court emphasized fundamental principles of criminal law. The principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, meaning no crime and no punishment without law, dictates that there must be a specific law defining and punishing an act before it can be considered a crime. Similarly, the principle of in dubiis reus est absolvendus, which states that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, reinforces the need for strict construction of penal laws.

These concepts mean that courts must not interpret laws to include cases not clearly embraced by the statute. Any ambiguity in a criminal law must be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused. The Court cited the case of Centeno v. Judge Villalon-Pornillos to underscore this point:

For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations… Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment.

Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s attempt to expand the coverage of Section 15 was impermissible. Because the information against Sullano only alleged a violation of Section 15, the Court could not consider Section 36 or any other provision to broaden the scope of the charges.

The Court also cited its previous ruling in Dela Cruz v. People, which addressed the interpretation of the phrase “a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15. In Dela Cruz, the Court clarified that this phrase does not apply to every person arrested for any crime, but rather to those arrested for specific offenses related to drug use or possession under Article II of R.A. 9165. Extending the application of Section 15 to all persons arrested for any crime would be tantamount to mandatory drug testing, which the Court has previously deemed unconstitutional.

Finally, the Supreme Court noted that granting the petition would expose Sullano to double jeopardy. All the elements of double jeopardy were present in this case and the dismissal of the case and grant of demurrer were not attended with grave abuse of discretion. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the dismissal of the case against Sullano.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a person can be convicted of drug use under Section 15 of R.A. 9165 based solely on a positive drug test, without prior apprehension or arrest.
What does Section 15 of R.A. 9165 state?	Section 15 penalizes the use of dangerous drugs by a person apprehended or arrested, who is found positive for drug use after a confirmatory test. The penalty is a minimum of six months rehabilitation for the first offense.
What is the meaning of “expressio unius est exclusion alterius”?	This legal principle means that the express mention of one thing excludes all others. In this case, the explicit mention of “apprehended or arrested” persons limits the application of Section 15 to those individuals.
Why didn’t the Court consider Section 36 of R.A. 9165?	The Court didn’t consider Section 36 because the information filed against the respondent only cited Section 15. Including Section 36 would violate the respondent’s right to be informed of the charges.
What is the significance of “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”?	This principle means “no crime, no punishment without law.” It requires that an act must be clearly defined as a crime by law before a person can be punished for it.
How does the principle of “in dubiis reus est absolvendus” apply here?	This principle states that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. Since there was ambiguity in the interpretation of Section 15, the Court resolved it in favor of the respondent.
What did the Court say about double jeopardy in this case?	The Court noted that granting the petition would expose the respondent to double jeopardy, as he had already been acquitted by the lower courts and there was no grave abuse of discretion in their decisions.
What was the ruling in the case of Dela Cruz v. People?	In Dela Cruz, the Court clarified that the phrase “a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 applies only to those arrested for specific drug-related offenses under Article II of R.A. 9165.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case underscores the importance of adhering to the specific requirements of the law when prosecuting individuals for drug use. It reinforces the principle that criminal liability must be based on clear legal standards and that the rights of the accused must be protected throughout the legal process. By requiring prior apprehension or arrest for a conviction under Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the Court has ensured that individuals are not unfairly penalized based solely on the results of a drug test.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. PO1 JOHNNY K. SULLANO, RESPONDENT., G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018