The Supreme Court, in Fianza v. People, emphasized the judiciary’s crucial role in protecting children from sexual abuse, particularly in cases involving acts of lasciviousness. The Court affirmed the conviction of Christopher Fianza for violating Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” This ruling reinforces the legal principle that adults who exploit their authority over children for sexual gratification will face severe penalties, reflecting the State’s commitment to safeguarding the well-being and innocence of minors.

Exploitation of Innocence: When a Child’s Trust Becomes a Crime

Christopher Fianza was accused of coercing an 11-year-old girl, AAA, into performing lascivious acts on two separate occasions. The case unfolded with AAA testifying that Fianza had lured her to his house under the guise of simple chores before leading her to a secluded area where he committed the abusive acts. Fianza, on the other hand, claimed alibi, stating he was elsewhere during the times the acts were committed. The central legal question revolved around whether Fianza’s actions constituted sexual abuse under the law, considering the age of the victim and the power dynamics involved.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially convicted Fianza, a decision that the Court of Appeals (CA) later upheld, albeit with some modifications to the awarded damages and penalties. The Supreme Court (SC), in its final review, clarified the legal framework applicable to cases of child abuse involving lascivious conduct. This case underscores the importance of distinguishing between simple acts of lasciviousness and those that qualify as sexual abuse under the special protection laws for children. The legal definition of sexual abuse, as it relates to children, includes any lascivious conduct performed on a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

The SC emphasized that when the victim is below twelve years of age, the accused should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for lascivious conduct, but with the penalty heightened as provided under R.A. 7610. The court quoted Section 5 of R.A. 7610, which states:

SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

x x x x

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims [sic] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x.

Building on this principle, the Court explained that for an accused to be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct, the elements of both Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA 7610 must be established. The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex. On the other hand, sexual abuse, as defined under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 has three elements: (a) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) the child is below eighteen (18) years old.

The Court emphasized the definition of “lewd” acts as those that are indecent or obscene, characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. Furthermore, the presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. Lascivious conduct, according to Section 2 (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases), includes the intentional touching of specific body parts with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse sexual desire.

The Court found that Fianza’s acts were attended by coercion or influence, critical components under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. AAA, being only 11 years old at the time of the incidents, was considered a child under the law, and therefore presumed incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act. Additionally, the significant age disparity between Fianza, who was approximately 35 years old, and AAA placed him in a position of authority, which the Court determined he exploited. Case law reinforces that a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

Fianza also raised concerns regarding the specificity of the dates in the information and the lack of explicit mention that the acts were performed on a child exploited or subjected to sexual abuse. The Court clarified that it is unnecessary to state the precise date unless it is a material ingredient of the offense. Moreover, it is sufficient that the information states the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, enabling a person of common understanding to know the charges against them.

The Supreme Court emphasized that in cases involving prosecutions for acts of lasciviousness, force or intimidation is defined as the power, violence, or constraint exerted upon or against a person. The court cited People v. Maceda, stating that:

[I]t is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. The intimidation must be judged in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule.

The Court held that the allegation that Fianza committed lascivious conduct by forcing AAA to masturbate his penis was sufficient to inform him of the nature of the criminal act he was charged with. The information sufficiently alleged the second element of sexual abuse, even if it did not employ the exact language of the law.

The Court referenced Amployo v. People, where it was established that intimidation need not be irresistible, especially in cases involving young girls. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. The court gave significant weight to the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, especially considering the sensitive nature of sexual abuse cases where the victim’s testimony is often crucial.

The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Fianza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. The Court sentenced Fianza to imprisonment for an indeterminate period and modified the awards for civil indemnity and moral damages. The Court ordered Fianza to pay the amounts of P15,000.00 as fine, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P15,000.00 as moral damages, for each count, plus legal interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until full payment.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Christopher Fianza was guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act 7610, considering the age of the victim and the circumstances surrounding the alleged acts. The Court had to determine if the acts constituted sexual abuse as defined under the special protection laws for children.
What is R.A. 7610?	R.A. 7610, also known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” is a law in the Philippines that provides stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. It provides penalties for its violation and aims to safeguard the rights and welfare of children.
What are acts of lasciviousness?	Acts of lasciviousness, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, are lewd or indecent acts committed with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desires. These acts can include intentional touching of private body parts or other actions considered offensive and immoral.
What is the significance of the victim being a minor?	When the victim is a minor, particularly under twelve years of age, the law provides heightened protection. In such cases, the perpetrator is prosecuted under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code for lascivious conduct, with an increased penalty as provided under R.A. 7610.
What is the role of coercion or influence in these cases?	Coercion or influence plays a significant role because it indicates that the child was not acting out of free will but was manipulated or forced into committing the acts. The presence of coercion or influence is a key element in determining whether the act qualifies as sexual abuse under R.A. 7610.
What was the penalty imposed on Fianza?	Fianza was sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. He was also ordered to pay AAA amounts for fine, civil indemnity, and moral damages, plus legal interest.
How did the Supreme Court define ‘lewd’ acts in this context?	The Supreme Court defined ‘lewd’ acts as those that are indecent or obscene, characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
What factors did the court consider in determining Fianza’s guilt?	The court considered several factors, including the age disparity between Fianza and AAA, AAA’s testimony, and the presence of coercion or influence. The court also evaluated whether Fianza’s actions met the elements of both acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under R.A. 7610.
Why is the victim’s testimony so crucial in these cases?	The victim’s testimony is crucial because, due to the intrinsic nature of sexual abuse crimes, only the persons involved can testify as to its occurrence. The court gives significant weight to the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

This case serves as a stark reminder of the judiciary’s dedication to protecting children from sexual abuse and exploitation. The ruling emphasizes the need for a stringent legal framework to address such crimes and ensure justice for the victims. The legal principles clarified in Fianza v. People provide essential guidance for future cases involving similar acts of lasciviousness and abuse against children, highlighting the State’s unwavering commitment to safeguarding the well-being and innocence of its most vulnerable citizens.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Christopher Fianza A.K.A. “TOPEL,” vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218592, August 02, 2017