The Supreme Court ruled that an individual cannot be held criminally liable for libelous Facebook posts made before the enactment of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The Court emphasized that penal laws cannot be applied retroactively if they are unfavorable to the accused. This decision clarifies the scope of cyber libel and ensures that individuals are only prosecuted for actions that were criminalized at the time they were committed, aligning with the fundamental principle of legality in criminal law.

From Facebook Post to Legal Battle: When Does Online Speech Become a Crime?

This case arose from a Facebook post made by Jannece C. Peñalosa in 2011, which Jose A. Ocampo, Jr. claimed was libelous. Ocampo, Jr. filed a complaint, leading to an Information for libel being filed against Peñalosa. However, the Department of Justice later directed the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information, arguing that there was no law penalizing “Internet Libel” at the time of the post. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) agreed and dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed, holding that the post was punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Peñalosa then appealed to the Supreme Court, questioning whether her actions could be retroactively penalized.

The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the CA erred in ruling that Peñalosa’s Facebook post, made before the Cybercrime Prevention Act, could be prosecuted under Article 355 of the RPC. The Court had to determine if online libel could be considered a “similar means” of committing libel under the RPC and whether applying the Cybercrime Prevention Act retroactively would violate fundamental principles of criminal law.

The Supreme Court began its analysis by addressing the procedural errors in the case. It emphasized that the proper remedy against a court order granting a motion to withdraw information is an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. The Court cited Rule 122, Section 1 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that an appeal is the remedy against a judgment or final order. Certiorari is only appropriate when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available. The Court pointed out that an order granting a motion to withdraw information is a final order because it disposes of the case, leaving nothing for the court to do, as established in Santos v. Orda, Jr. The Court noted that Ocampo, Jr. should have filed an appeal, but instead, erroneously availed himself of a petition for certiorari.

Moreover, the Court found that Ocampo, Jr. lacked the legal personality to file the petition questioning the RTC’s order. Citing People v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the doctrine that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the private complainant’s interest is limited to the civil liability. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. As Ocampo, Jr.’s petition focused on Peñalosa’s criminal liability rather than civil damages, he had no standing to bring the petition without the prosecution’s concurrence.

Turning to the substantive issue, the Supreme Court considered whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting the Motion to Withdraw Information. The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting to an evasion of a positive duty. The Supreme Court emphasized that judges must make an independent assessment of the lack of probable cause and the consequent withdrawal of the information.

The Court contrasted the RTC’s actions with the perfunctory grant of a motion to withdraw information in Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. In this case, Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali made an exhaustive and independent assessment of Peñalosa’s Motion to Quash and the prosecution’s Motion to Withdraw Information. Judge Capco-Umali explicitly noted that on August 3, 2011, when the alleged libelous statements were posted, there was no law yet penalizing Internet Libel. The Cybercrime Prevention Act, which criminalized such acts, was only approved on September 12, 2012. The court’s order underscored the fundamental principle of Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, which means there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.

The Supreme Court addressed the apparent conflict with its earlier ruling in Disini v. Secretary of Justice, where it stated that “cyber libel is not a new crime.” However, the Court clarified that even if an allegedly libelous Facebook post could be prosecuted under the RPC, applying it retroactively would be unfavorable to the accused, violating Article 22 of the RPC. The Court emphasized that criminal laws should be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

The Supreme Court delved into the interpretation of Article 355 of the RPC, which addresses libel by means of writings or similar means. The Court applied the statutory construction rule of noscitur a sociis, which states that the meaning of an ambiguous word or phrase can be clarified by considering the company of words with which it is associated. In Article 355, the associated words include “writing,” “printing,” “lithography,” “engraving,” “radio,” “phonograph,” “painting,” “theatrical exhibition,” and “cinematographic exhibition.” These terms clearly exclude “computer systems or other similar means which may be derived in the future,” which were specifically added in Article 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

To further illustrate this point, the Court presented a side-by-side comparison of Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 4(c)(a) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act in the following table:

The Court reasoned that if Article 355 already included libel made through computer systems, there would have been no need for Congress to legislate Article 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. This legislative action demonstrates that cyber libel is an additional means of committing libel, punishable only under the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

The Supreme Court clarified that its ruling does not leave Ocampo, Jr. without recourse. He could still pursue a civil action for damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code for any harm inflicted upon him by defamatory falsehoods. In civil actions, the complainant has full control of the case, unlike in criminal actions, where the complainant must defer to the prosecution.

FAQs

This case reinforces the principle that criminal laws cannot be applied retroactively if they are unfavorable to the accused. It clarifies the boundaries of cyber libel and provides a framework for understanding when online speech becomes a crime. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that individuals are only prosecuted for actions that were criminalized at the time they were committed, upholding fundamental principles of justice and fairness.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: JANNECE C. PEÑALOSA v. JOSE A. OCAMPO, JR., G.R. No. 230299, April 26, 2023