When Does a Term Not Count? Understanding the Three-Term Limit for Local Officials in the Philippines

TLDR: Philippine law limits local officials to three consecutive terms. But what happens when a mayor is initially proclaimed winner, serves for a while, and then is unseated due to an election protest? The Supreme Court clarified in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC that if a mayor’s proclamation is later nullified and they are unseated, that period of service does NOT count towards the three-term limit. This case highlights that only service based on a valid election counts towards term limits, ensuring fairness and the people’s will.

G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999

INTRODUCTION

The concept of term limits is crucial in democracies to prevent the excessive concentration of power and encourage fresh leadership. In the Philippines, the Constitution and the Local Government Code impose a three-consecutive-term limit for local elective officials like mayors. This rule is designed to promote broader participation and prevent political dynasties. However, the application of this rule isn’t always straightforward, especially when election results are contested. The Supreme Court case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC provides essential clarification on how to count terms when a proclaimed winner is later unseated due to election protests, ensuring that the spirit of term limits is upheld without unfairly penalizing officials in complex electoral scenarios.

This case revolves around Romeo Lonzanida, who sought to run for mayor again after serving multiple terms. The central question was: Did Lonzanida’s assumption of office after the 1995 election, which was later nullified due to an election protest, count as one term towards the three-term limit? The COMELEC said yes, disqualifying him. But the Supreme Court disagreed, setting a vital precedent for term limit calculations in the Philippines.

LEGAL CONTEXT: THE THREE-TERM LIMIT RULE

The legal basis for term limits is enshrined in the Philippine Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

“Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This provision is echoed in Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which similarly prohibits local elective officials from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position. The intent behind these provisions is to prevent the monopolization of political power at the local level, encourage a wider pool of leaders, and give voters more choices. The framers of the Constitution aimed to balance the need for experienced leaders with the democratic principle of preventing entrenched political dynasties.

Key to understanding the term limit rule is the phrase “service of a term.” The Supreme Court in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998) clarified that term limits are tied to both the right to be elected and the right to serve. The Court emphasized that the term served must be one “for which the official concerned was elected.” This implies that only service based on a valid election victory counts towards the term limit. The term limit is not simply about physical occupation of the office but about legitimate, electorally-mandated service. The exception to the continuity rule—voluntary renunciation not being considered an interruption—further underscores that the focus is on continuous elected service.

CASE BREAKDOWN: LONZANIDA’S JOURNEY THROUGH THE COURTS

Romeo Lonzanida had already served two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, prior to the 1995 elections. He ran again in 1995 and was proclaimed the winner. He assumed office and began his duties. However, his victory was immediately contested by his opponent, Juan Alvez, who filed an election protest. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially declared a failure of elections in January 1997, essentially nullifying the 1995 mayoral election results. Both Lonzanida and Alvez appealed to the COMELEC.

The COMELEC, on November 13, 1997, ruled in favor of Alvez after a recount, declaring him the duly elected mayor. The COMELEC ordered Lonzanida to vacate his post, which he did in February 1998, and Alvez assumed office to serve the remainder of the term.

Undeterred, Lonzanida filed his candidacy again for the May 1998 elections. His opponent this time, Eufemio Muli, promptly filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida, arguing that his 1995-1998 stint as mayor—even though contested and ultimately overturned—should count as his third term, barring him from running again.

Here’s a step-by-step breakdown of the legal proceedings:

1. May 1995 Elections: Lonzanida proclaimed winner and assumes office.
2. Election Protest Filed: Juan Alvez contests Lonzanida’s victory.
3. January 1997, RTC Decision: Declares failure of elections.
4. Appeal to COMELEC: Both parties appeal the RTC decision.
5. November 13, 1997, COMELEC Decision: Declares Alvez the duly elected mayor.
6. February 27, 1998, Writ of Execution: Lonzanida ordered to vacate, Alvez assumes office.
7. April 21, 1998, Disqualification Petition: Muli files to disqualify Lonzanida for 1998 elections.
8. May 13, 1998, Proclamation (Again): Lonzanida proclaimed winner in 1998 elections.
9. May 21, 1998, COMELEC First Division Resolution: Grants Muli’s petition, disqualifying Lonzanida.
10. August 11, 1998, COMELEC En Banc Resolution: Affirms First Division, upholds disqualification.
11. Petition to Supreme Court: Lonzanida elevates the case to the Supreme Court.

The COMELEC, both in its First Division and En Banc resolutions, sided with Muli, arguing that Lonzanida’s assumption of office in 1995, regardless of the subsequent election protest outcome, constituted service for a full term. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the COMELEC’s decision.

Justice Gonzaga-Reyes, writing for the Supreme Court, emphasized two critical points. First, Lonzanida was not duly elected in the 1995 elections, as ultimately determined by the COMELEC itself. The Court stated, “His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all.”

Second, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 term. He was involuntarily removed from office due to the COMELEC decision. The Court clarified, “Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.” Since Lonzanida’s removal was involuntary and before the term’s end, it constituted an interruption.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: WHAT THIS MEANS FOR LOCAL POLITICS

The Lonzanida vs. COMELEC decision offers crucial guidance on the three-term limit rule, particularly in situations involving election protests and nullified proclamations. It clarifies that not every assumption of office counts as a term. Only service based on a valid, uncontested election or a victory upheld in a protest counts towards the three-term limit. This ruling prevents a situation where a candidate who initially wins but is later proven to have lost through due legal process is unfairly penalized under term limit rules.

For local officials, this means that if their election is genuinely contested and ultimately overturned, the period they served before being unseated will generally not be counted as a term. This is crucial for maintaining fairness in the application of term limits and ensuring that officials are not penalized for the delays and complexities inherent in the election protest system. It also reinforces the principle that public office is based on the will of the electorate as definitively determined through valid elections.

Key Lessons from Lonzanida vs. COMELEC:

• Valid Election is Key: Only service based on a valid election and proclamation counts towards the three-term limit. A proclamation later nullified is considered void from the beginning.
• Involuntary Severance Interrupts Term: Involuntary removal from office due to legal processes (like losing an election protest) interrupts the continuity of service and prevents that period from being counted as a full term.
• Focus on Intent of Term Limits: The three-term limit is designed to prevent prolonged monopolization of power. It should not be applied in a way that punishes officials whose initial victories are legitimately contested and overturned.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs) about Term Limits and Election Protests

Q1: Does serving a partial term due to succession count as a full term for term limits?

A: Generally, yes. If a vice-mayor succeeds to the mayoralty due to death or resignation of the incumbent and serves more than half of the term, it usually counts as a full term. However, specific circumstances and jurisprudence may apply, as seen in the Borja vs. COMELEC case, which provides nuances to this rule.

Q2: What if an official voluntarily resigns before the end of their term? Does that break the term limit?

A: No. Voluntary resignation does not interrupt the continuity of service for term limit purposes. The Constitution and Local Government Code explicitly state that voluntary renunciation does not count as an interruption.

Q3: What is the difference between de jure and de facto service in relation to term limits?

A: Lonzanida vs. COMELEC clarifies that for term limits, the focus is on de jure service – service based on a valid election. Even if someone serves de facto (in fact) because of an initial proclamation, if that proclamation is later invalidated, that service generally won’t count towards term limits.

Q4: If an election protest takes years to resolve, does the initially proclaimed winner’s time in office count towards term limits?

A: According to Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, if the initial proclamation is eventually nullified, the time served during the protest period should not count towards term limits. The key is the final, definitive outcome of the election protest.

Q5: Can an official run for the same position after a term hiatus if they’ve reached the three-term limit?

A: Yes. The three-term limit is for consecutive terms. After sitting out one full term, an official who has served three consecutive terms is eligible to run for the same position again.

Q6: What is the remedy if someone believes a candidate is violating term limits?

A: A disqualification case can be filed with the COMELEC before the election. If the election has already occurred, a quo warranto petition in the regular courts may be appropriate to challenge the eligibility of the elected official.

Q7: Does this ruling apply to all local government positions?

A: Yes, the three-term limit and the principles clarified in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC apply to all elective local officials except barangay officials, including governors, vice-governors, mayors, vice-mayors, councilors, etc.

ASG Law specializes in election law and local government regulations. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.