In the case of Leyaley v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court addressed the legality of disbursing public funds for ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ (piecework) projects during the election period, despite the projects having undergone public bidding. The Court ruled that public bidding does not exempt ‘takay’ projects from the prohibition on releasing public funds during the 45-day period before an election. This decision reinforces the Omnibus Election Code’s intent to prevent the use of government resources to influence election outcomes, providing clarity on the restrictions applicable to public works projects during critical electoral periods. The ruling has implications for government officials and contractors involved in infrastructure projects during election periods, emphasizing strict adherence to election laws.

Campaign Funds and Infrastructure: When Public Works Meet Election Laws

The legal question revolves around whether public works projects awarded after a public bidding, but implemented using the ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ system, are exempt from the prohibition against the release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds during the election period as defined in Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code. Engineer Leonardo C. Leyaley was charged with violating this section of the Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) directed that criminal information be filed against Leyaley, leading to this petition for certiorari.

Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any public official from releasing or disbursing public funds for any kind of public works during the 45 days before a regular election and 30 days before a special election. There are specific exceptions to this prohibition. One key exception is for “work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day period before election.” However, the law explicitly states that “work for the purpose of this section undertaken under the so called ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ system shall not be considered as work contract.”

The COMELEC emphasized that merely conducting a public bidding before awarding the projects does not change the nature of work performed under the ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ system. The critical point is that if the actual work arrangement falls under the ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ system, it is not considered a work contract under the election code, irrespective of the bidding process. To reiterate, if public funds are released during a ban period for such type of project implementation, this constitutes a violation, as confirmed by COMELEC and affirmed by the Court.

The petitioner argued that projects completed before the campaign period should be considered “ongoing public works projects” and thus be exempt from the election ban. The COMELEC, however, rejected this argument. The COMELEC pointed out that the public works projects were already completed before the campaign period. Hence, the exemption for ongoing projects was not applicable. It’s crucial to note that exemptions from election bans are construed strictly, and the burden of proving eligibility for such exemptions lies with the party claiming it.

The petitioner claimed that the COMELEC-CAR granted an exemption from the public works ban, thereby protecting the disbursement of funds. However, the COMELEC clarified that the exemption granted was specifically from the public works ban under Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code. The petitioner was charged under Section 261(v), concerning the disbursement of public funds, which is a separate offense with distinct requirements and potential exemptions. The COMELEC-CAR exemption did not extend to the prohibition against releasing or expending public funds, which was the core of the charge against the petitioner.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the COMELEC’s decisions would only be interfered with if it was shown that there was a grave abuse of discretion. For a writ of certiorari to prosper, there must be proof that the public respondent exercised its power capriciously, arbitrarily, and whimsically. The Court found no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC. It reiterated the principle that certiorari is a remedy for correcting errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. The issues raised involved possible errors of judgment by the COMELEC, but they did not question the jurisdiction of the COMELEC itself. As such, certiorari was not the appropriate remedy.

Following the COMELEC’s decision, criminal informations were filed against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Supreme Court cited the rule that once a complaint or information is filed in court, the disposition of the case rests within the sound discretion of the court. This means that any further action regarding the case, including dismissal or conviction, is the court’s prerogative. The court has original jurisdiction over what happens in that action. Since the criminal action against the petitioner had commenced with the filing of informations, the petition before the Supreme Court became moot, as the proper disposition of the criminal cases was now within the RTC’s jurisdiction.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	Whether public bidding exempts ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ projects from the election ban on releasing public funds.
What is the ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ system?	It is a piecework system where payment is based on the amount of work completed rather than hourly wages. The Omnibus Election Code explicitly states that this system cannot be considered a ‘work contract’.
What does Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibit?	It prohibits public officials from releasing or disbursing public funds for public works during the 45 days before a regular election and 30 days before a special election.
Are there exceptions to Section 261(v)?	Yes, one exception is for work undertaken by contract through public bidding held before the election period, unless the work is performed under the ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ system.
Was an exemption granted in this case?	Yes, but the exemption granted by the COMELEC-CAR was specifically for the public works ban under Section 261(w) and not for the prohibition against the release of public funds under Section 261(v).
What is the significance of filing the criminal information with the RTC?	Once the criminal information is filed, the disposition of the case, including whether to dismiss or convict, rests with the RTC, making the Supreme Court petition moot.
What was the final ruling of the Supreme Court?	The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the COMELEC’s decision to file criminal charges against Engineer Leyaley.
Can this ruling affect ongoing public works projects?	Yes, it provides clarity that no matter when contracts may have been awarded and bidded, the actual nature of a project when it uses funds to pay by “takay” method is one subject to a spending ban, particularly with infrastructure initiatives nearing the election period.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Leyaley v. COMELEC serves as a stern reminder of the importance of upholding election laws and ensuring transparency in the disbursement of public funds, particularly during election periods. The decision clarifies that conducting a public bidding does not automatically exempt projects from the restrictions imposed by the Omnibus Election Code and underscores the necessity for government officials and contractors to strictly adhere to these regulations. For this, consultation and proactive guidance are advised.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ENGINEER LEONARDO C. LEYALEY, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. NO. 160061, October 11, 2006