In Robert P. Guzman v. Commission on Elections, Mayor Randolph S. Ting, and Salvacion Garcia, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code, specifically regarding the disbursement of public funds and the undertaking of public works during the election period. The Court ruled that while the purchase of land for a public cemetery does not constitute ‘public works’ under the election code, the issuance of a treasury warrant for such a purchase during the prohibited period does violate the law. This distinction is critical for public officials to understand to avoid potential election offenses.

Election Ban: When Buying Land Isn’t ‘Public Works,’ But Issuing Payment Can Still Be Illegal

This case arose from a complaint filed by Robert P. Guzman against Mayor Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion Garcia of Tuguegarao City. The complaint alleged that Mayor Ting and Treasurer Garcia violated Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code. These sections prohibit disbursing public funds and undertaking public works during the 45-day period before an election. The specific instance in question involved the purchase of land intended for conversion into a public cemetery, with payment made via treasury warrant during the election ban period. The COMELEC dismissed Guzman’s complaint, leading to this appeal before the Supreme Court.

The primary issues before the Supreme Court were threefold: first, whether the petition was premature due to the lack of a prior motion for reconsideration; second, whether the acquisition of the land constituted “public works” in violation of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code; and third, whether the issuance of the treasury warrant violated Section 261(w) of the same code. The Court first addressed the procedural issue of prematurity. Generally, a motion for reconsideration must be filed before seeking certiorari. However, the Court recognized exceptions to this rule, including cases involving purely legal questions. The Court determined that the case at bar fell under this exception, as it involved interpreting provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, therefore a prior motion for reconsideration was not necessary.

Turning to the substantive issues, the Court analyzed whether purchasing land for a public cemetery qualified as “public works.” The Court looked into the definition of “public works” relying on the Local Government Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, particularly concerning the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The Court emphasized that public works typically involve fixed infrastructures or facilities owned and operated by the government for public use, such as roads, bridges, and public buildings. The Court also invoked the principle of ejusdem generis, which states that when general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are construed to include only items similar to those specifically mentioned. Therefore, the Court concluded that merely acquiring land, without any construction or adaptation, did not constitute “public works” as contemplated under Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code.

However, the Court reached a different conclusion regarding the issuance of the treasury warrant. Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits both the construction of public works (with certain exceptions) and the issuance of treasury warrants or similar devices during the prohibited period. The Court emphasized that the use of the disjunctive “or” in the provision indicates that these are two distinct and separate prohibited acts. The prohibition against issuing treasury warrants is not contingent upon whether the funds are intended for public works. Here is the provision:

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices.– During the period of forty five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who: (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds.

The Court found that the COMELEC had gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint because it overlooked the independent prohibition against issuing treasury warrants during the election ban. The Court stated that:

There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code was violated when City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 during the election ban period.

Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the COMELEC resolution, and ordered the COMELEC to file the appropriate criminal information against Mayor Ting and Treasurer Garcia for violating Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the purchase of land intended for a public cemetery and the issuance of a treasury warrant for that purchase during the election period violated the prohibitions under the Omnibus Election Code. The Court differentiated between the definition of “public works” and the specific prohibition against issuing treasury warrants during the election ban period.
Does the purchase of land constitute “public works” under the Omnibus Election Code?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that the mere purchase of land, without any construction or adaptation, does not fall within the definition of “public works” as contemplated under Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code. This is because “public works” generally involves fixed infrastructures or facilities owned and operated by the government for public use.
Is the issuance of treasury warrants during the election ban period always prohibited?	Yes, the issuance, use, or availment of treasury warrants or any similar device undertaking future delivery of money, goods, or other things of value chargeable against public funds is strictly prohibited during the 45-day period before a regular election and 30 days before a special election, as stated in Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code. This prohibition is separate from the restrictions on public works.
What is the significance of the word “or” in Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code?	The disjunctive “or” in Section 261(w) signifies that the prohibition against undertaking construction of public works and the prohibition against issuing treasury warrants are two distinct and independent prohibitions. This means that violating either provision constitutes a separate offense.
What was the COMELEC’s error in this case?	The COMELEC erred by focusing solely on whether the purchase of land constituted “public works” and failing to recognize the independent prohibition against issuing treasury warrants during the election ban period, regardless of whether the funds were intended for public works. This oversight constituted grave abuse of discretion.
What was the outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision?	The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the COMELEC’s resolution, and ordered the COMELEC to file the appropriate criminal information against Mayor Ting and Treasurer Garcia for violating Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code.
What is the principle of ejusdem generis, and how was it applied in this case?	Ejusdem generis is a rule of statutory construction which states that when general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are construed to include only items similar to those specifically mentioned. In this case, it was used to interpret “public works” by relating it to specific examples like highways and flood control systems, thus excluding the mere purchase of land.
Why was a motion for reconsideration not required before elevating the case to the Supreme Court?	A motion for reconsideration was not required because the case involved a purely legal question – the interpretation of the Omnibus Election Code. The Supreme Court recognizes exceptions to the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration when only legal issues are raised.

This case underscores the importance of strict compliance with election laws, particularly concerning the disbursement of public funds. Public officials must be aware of the specific prohibitions outlined in the Omnibus Election Code to avoid potential legal repercussions. The distinction between the actual construction of public works and the issuance of financial instruments related to such projects is a crucial one for ensuring fair and honest elections.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ROBERT P. GUZMAN, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MAYOR RANDOLPH S. TING AND SALVACION GARCIA, G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009