In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the primacy of freedom of expression, ruling that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot unduly restrict citizens’ political speech during elections. The Court declared COMELEC’s size restrictions on election posters unconstitutional, protecting the right of individuals and organizations to voice their opinions on candidates and issues without unreasonable limitations. This decision safeguards the ability of the electorate to engage in meaningful political discourse, reinforcing the fundamental principle that sovereignty resides in the people.

When a Tarpaulin’s Size Sparks a Free Speech Showdown

The case of The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015) arose when the Diocese of Bacolod posted a tarpaulin on its private property listing candidates as either “Team Buhay” (Anti-RH Law) or “Team Patay” (Pro-RH Law) based on their stance on the Reproductive Health Law. COMELEC issued a notice to remove the tarpaulin, citing its oversized dimensions as a violation of election regulations. The Diocese challenged this order, arguing it infringed on their fundamental right to freedom of expression.

The Supreme Court, in its ruling, emphasized that the COMELEC’s authority to regulate election propaganda applies primarily to candidates and political parties, not to private citizens or organizations expressing their views. The Court recognized that the Diocese, in posting the tarpaulin, was engaging in protected political speech aimed at influencing public opinion on a matter of significant social concern. The decision highlighted the importance of safeguarding the electorate’s right to participate in political debates, free from unwarranted government restrictions.

The Court addressed several procedural issues before delving into the substantive merits. It clarified its jurisdiction over COMELEC cases, emphasizing that Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is applicable when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion, especially concerning fundamental rights. The Court asserted that the COMELEC’s notice and letter had a chilling effect on free speech, justifying direct resort to the Supreme Court. It found that the case involved genuine issues of constitutionality and transcendental importance, warranting immediate resolution to protect the electorate’s political speech.

Building on this procedural foundation, the Court addressed the substantive issues at the heart of the case. It examined whether COMELEC had the legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens, ultimately concluding that it did not. The Court analyzed relevant constitutional provisions, laws, and jurisprudence, emphasizing that these provisions primarily pertained to candidates and political parties, not to private citizens expressing their views. Citing Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, the Court noted that COMELEC’s power to supervise or regulate franchises and permits aims to ensure equal opportunity for public information campaigns among candidates. Similarly, Section 9 of the Fair Election Act on the posting of campaign materials only mentions “parties” and “candidates.”

The Court underscored the importance of protecting the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression, enshrined in Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution. This protection extends not only to verbal communication but also to conduct and symbolic speech. The Court recognized that the form of expression, including the size of the tarpaulin, is integral to the message being conveyed, as it enhances efficiency in communication, underscores the importance of the message, and allows for more extensive articulation of ideas. The Court also delved into various theories supporting freedom of expression, including the right to participate in public affairs, the concept of a marketplace of ideas, self-expression enhancing human dignity, expression as a marker for group identity, protection against majoritarian abuses, and the safety valve theory.

The court addressed the argument that the tarpaulin was election propaganda. This argument failed since it found that the tarpaulin was not paid for, and there was no agreement between the speaker and the candidate or his or her political party. The message of the petitioner is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. The high court stated:

The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally — will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.

Acknowledging that not all speech is treated the same, the Court distinguished between political and commercial speech, recognizing the higher degree of protection afforded to political speech. It emphasized that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Turning to the issue of whether the regulation was content-based or content-neutral, the Court found it reasonably considered as either, and ruled respondents failed to justify the regulation. The Court also noted that the regulation in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations, because it lacks the third requisite. The Comelec’s act has the effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences, as the restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations.

Beyond freedom of expression, the Court also addressed the right to property. It ruled that COMELEC’s intrusion into petitioners’ property rights was an impermissible encroachment, emphasizing that election laws and regulations must be reasonable and acknowledge a private individual’s right to exercise property rights. COMELEC sought to do that which is prohibited in the Constitution. The high court said:

Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.

Finally, the Court determined that the tarpaulin and its message were not religious speech, despite their connection to Catholic dogma. It emphasized that not all acts by religious figures constitute religious expression and that the enumeration of candidates on the tarpaulin indicated its nature as speech with political consequences. For all these reasons, the Court ruled for the Diocese.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether COMELEC’s restrictions on the size of election posters violated the Diocese of Bacolod’s right to freedom of expression. The Court had to determine if COMELEC’s actions were a permissible regulation or an unconstitutional infringement on protected speech.
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Diocese, declaring COMELEC’s size restrictions on election posters unconstitutional. The Court held that the restrictions infringed on the right to freedom of expression, as applied to private citizens expressing their views on political issues.
Why did the Court side with the Diocese of Bacolod?	The Court sided with the Diocese because it found that COMELEC’s restrictions were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Court determined that COMELEC’s actions effectively curtailed the Diocese’s right to engage in meaningful political discourse.
Does this ruling mean anyone can post any size poster during elections?	No, the ruling primarily protects the speech of private citizens and organizations expressing their views. COMELEC still has the authority to regulate campaign materials of candidates and political parties to ensure fair and orderly elections.
What is the difference between content-based and content-neutral regulations?	Content-based regulations restrict speech based on the message it conveys, while content-neutral regulations regulate the time, place, or manner of speech without regard to its content. Content-based regulations are subject to stricter scrutiny by the courts.
What is the intermediate scrutiny test?	The intermediate scrutiny test is used to evaluate content-neutral regulations, requiring the government to show that the regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and that the incident restriction on alleged freedom of speech and expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Did the Supreme Court address the separation of church and state in this case?	Yes, the Court addressed the issue of separation of church and state, clarifying that not all acts by religious figures constitute religious expression. In this case, the Court found that the tarpaulin was primarily political speech, not religious speech.
What is the significance of this ruling for future elections?	This ruling reinforces the importance of protecting the electorate’s right to engage in political discourse during elections. It clarifies the limits of COMELEC’s regulatory powers, ensuring that private citizens can express their views without unreasonable restrictions.

The Supreme Court’s decision in The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC serves as a crucial reminder of the importance of safeguarding freedom of expression, especially during election periods. By preventing undue restrictions on political speech, the Court has affirmed the right of citizens and organizations to participate in meaningful political discourse, contributing to a more informed and engaged electorate.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015