The Supreme Court ruled that land validly reclassified from agricultural to residential use by a local government unit (LGU) before June 15, 1988, is exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This decision emphasizes the authority of LGUs in land use decisions and protects property owners who acted in accordance with local ordinances prior to the implementation of CARP. The ruling reinforces the principle that a single valid reclassification is sufficient for exemption, clarifying the roles of different government agencies in determining land use.

From Coconut Farm to Residential Zone: When Zoning Laws Shield Land from Agrarian Reform

This case, Noel L. Ong, Omar Anthony L. Ong, and Norman L. Ong v. Nicolasa O. Imperial, et al., revolves around a parcel of land in Camarines Norte owned by the Ongs. The land, initially covered by a Notice of Coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), became the subject of a dispute when the Ongs claimed it was exempt due to its reclassification as residential land prior to the effectivity of CARL. This dispute reached the Supreme Court, requiring a determination of whether a local government’s reclassification of land prior to June 15, 1988, could exempt it from CARP coverage, and the extent of the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) authority over such reclassified lands.

The facts of the case are straightforward. The Ongs, registered owners of a 40.5-hectare property, received a Notice of Coverage from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO). They protested, arguing that the land was a grazing area, and its size was below the threshold for CARP coverage. The MARO countered that the land was used for coconut production, not grazing. The Ongs then applied for exemption, presenting certifications indicating the land was reclassified as residential by the municipality of Daet. This application was initially denied by the DAR, but later approved by the Office of the President, leading to the Court of Appeals reversing the Office of the President’s decision.

At the heart of this case lies Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657, which defines agricultural land. According to this law, it refers to land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. Section 4 further specifies the scope of CARP, covering all public and private agricultural lands. Therefore, land that is not agricultural is outside the scope of CARP. The critical question, then, becomes who has the authority to classify land, and when does that classification take effect?

The Supreme Court pointed to local government units, stating that the power to reclassify land is granted by law to the local government. The court emphasizes that a single valid reclassification of land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect, is sufficient for exemption. This principle had been established in earlier rulings, such as Buklod Nang Magbubukid set Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc, where it was unequivocally held that lands previously converted by government agencies to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL are outside its coverage.

The court also referenced the DAR Handbook for CARP Implementors, recognizing the LGU’s authority to reclassify lands under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code. This acknowledges the role of local governance in land use planning and the need for coordination between national and local policies. This approach contrasts with a centralized model, allowing LGUs to respond to local needs and development priorities.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court addressed the Court of Appeals’ concern about discrepancies between certifications from the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The Court of Appeals had deemed these discrepancies significant enough to overturn the Office of the President’s decision. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the certifications, when considered together, demonstrated substantial compliance with the requirements for exemption. This approach emphasizes substance over form, recognizing that minor inconsistencies should not invalidate an otherwise valid reclassification.

The Supreme Court underscored the principle that the power of local governments to convert or reclassify lands is not subject to the approval of the DAR. The Court quoted Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals stating that municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. The appellate court also stated that the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR].

Further clarifying the sequence of events, the Supreme Court addressed the timing of the HLURB’s involvement. It noted that City Ordinance No. 1313, enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. Since there was no HLURB at that time, approval by its predecessor agency, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), was sufficient. This historical perspective is crucial, as it acknowledges the evolution of regulatory bodies and their respective roles in land use planning.

The Court also discussed the retrospective application of laws, stating that neither the Ministry of Human Settlements nor the HSRC could have exercised its power of review retroactively absent an express provision to that effect in Letter of Instructions No. 729 or the HSRC Charter, respectively. Citing Article 4 of the Civil Code, the Court emphasized that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. This principle protects vested rights and ensures predictability in legal application.

The ruling has significant implications for property owners and agrarian reform beneficiaries. For property owners, it provides assurance that valid reclassifications made by LGUs prior to June 15, 1988, will be respected, shielding their properties from CARP coverage. For agrarian reform beneficiaries, it clarifies the scope of CARP, ensuring that it applies to truly agricultural lands, not those already designated for other uses.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a local government’s reclassification of land from agricultural to residential use before June 15, 1988, exempts the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court ruled that a valid reclassification by a local government unit (LGU) prior to June 15, 1988, does exempt the land from CARP coverage, emphasizing the authority of LGUs in land use decisions.
Who has the authority to reclassify land?	The power to reclassify land is granted by law to the local government units (LGUs). This authority is recognized under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code.
When must the reclassification have occurred to be exempt?	To be exempt from CARP, the reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural use must have occurred before June 15, 1988, when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect.
What if there are discrepancies in the certifications?	The Supreme Court ruled that minor inconsistencies should not invalidate an otherwise valid reclassification, emphasizing substance over form.
Does the DAR have authority over reclassified lands?	The power of local governments to convert or reclassify lands is not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
What is the role of the HLURB in land reclassification?	The HLURB’s role is to oversee and approve local land use plans and zoning ordinances. In cases where there was no HLURB yet, its predecessor agency, the HSRC, could have been involved.
Is there a retrospective application of laws?	The Supreme Court held that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, protecting vested rights and ensuring predictability in legal application.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case reaffirms the balance between national agrarian reform goals and the autonomy of local governments in land use planning. By prioritizing local zoning decisions made prior to the implementation of CARP, the ruling protects property rights and encourages orderly land development. It also serves as a reminder of the importance of clear and consistent documentation in land use matters.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Noel L. Ong, et al. v. Nicolasa O. Imperial, et al., G.R. No. 197127, July 15, 2015