The Supreme Court has ruled that for the beneficiaries of a seafarer who dies after the termination of their employment contract to receive death benefits, they must present substantial evidence proving that the seafarer’s work caused or increased the risk of the illness that led to death. This standard clarifies the burden of proof for claiming death benefits when the seafarer’s death occurs post-employment, emphasizing the necessity of demonstrating a direct link between the work conditions and the fatal illness.

From the High Seas to the Courtroom: Can a Seafarer’s Cancer Claim Death Benefits After Service?

The case of Daylinda Albarracin v. Philippine Transworld Shipping Corp. (G.R. No. 210791, November 19, 2018) revolves around the claim for death benefits by the widow of Rex Miguelito Albarracin, a seafarer who died of Hepatocellular Carcinoma (HCC) after his employment contract had ended. Albarracin worked as a Second Officer and underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) that revealed abnormalities, yet he was still declared fit for duty. After completing his contract and returning home, he was diagnosed with Hepatitis B and suspected of having HCC, eventually succumbing to the disease. His widow sought death benefits, arguing that his work environment contributed to his illness, but the shipping company denied the claim, stating that his death occurred after his contract expired and the illness was not work-related. The central legal question is whether the widow presented sufficient evidence to prove that her husband’s illness was work-related, entitling her to death benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), despite his death occurring after the contract’s termination.

The Labor Arbiter initially dismissed the complaint, a decision later reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which presumed the illness to be work-related. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) sided with the shipping company, leading to the Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court emphasized that, according to Section 20(A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, death benefits are typically provided if a seafarer dies due to a work-related cause during the term of their contract. In this case, Albarracin’s death occurred after his contract had ended, thus precluding his beneficiary from receiving death benefits under this provision.

Moreover, the Court clarified the application of the presumption of work-relatedness under Section 20(B)(4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, which states that illnesses not explicitly listed are disputably presumed as work-related. This presumption applies when a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness during their contract. However, because Albarracin’s death occurred after his employment contract expired, this presumption did not apply. The Supreme Court then addressed the possibility of compensation for deaths occurring after the contract’s termination, as outlined in Section 32(A) of the POEA-SEC. For compensation to be feasible under this section, the claimant must demonstrate that the seafarer’s work involved specific risks, the disease was contracted due to exposure to these risks, the disease developed within a specific period of exposure, and there was no notorious negligence on the seafarer’s part. Crucially, the claimant must present substantial evidence to support these claims.

Unlike Section 20 (A), Section 32-A of the POEA Contract considers the possibility of compensation for the death of the seafarer occurring after the termination of the employment contract on account of a work-related illness. But, for death under this provision to be compensable, the claimant must fulfill the following:

1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

Building on this, the Court underscored that the burden of proof lies with the claimants, not the employers, to establish their rights to benefits through substantial evidence. The Court cited Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Malicse (G.R. Nos. 200576 & 200626, November 20, 2017) to reinforce this principle, emphasizing that claimants must substantiate their claims by proving the work-relatedness of the illness and its existence during the employment contract.

Therefore, in resolving the death claims of respondent, the CA proceeded from an incorrect legal framework, which this Court must rectify. After all, in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, what we review are the legal errors that the CA may have committed in the assailed decision.

The correct approach in adjudging claims of seafarers for death and disability benefits is to determine whether the claimants have proven the requisites of compensability under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, viz.: (1) the seafarer’s work must have involved the risks described therein; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks; (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such factors necessary to contract it; and (4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

The Court found that the petitioner failed to provide substantial evidence to support her claim. There was no documentation that Albarracin suffered any illness while on board, nor any evidence of a post-employment examination within three days of disembarkation. Furthermore, the petitioner’s argument that Albarracin’s work exposed him to harmful substances lacked a factual basis, as there was no clear demonstration of the specific risks associated with his role as Second Officer that would lead to liver cancer.

Additionally, the Court dismissed the petitioner’s attempt to attribute Albarracin’s HCC to non-viral factors, stating that conclusions cannot be based on guesswork or presumption. Medical discussions without expert testimony to link them to the specific facts of the case were deemed insufficient. The Supreme Court distinguished this case from Nemaria v. Employees Compensation Commission (239 Phil. 160, 166 (1987)), where the petitioner had presented substantial evidence of exposure to hepatic carcinogens during employment. In contrast, Albarracin’s widow failed to demonstrate a connection between her husband’s work conditions and the development or aggravation of his HCC.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the widow of a seafarer who died of liver cancer after his employment contract ended could claim death benefits by proving that his illness was work-related.
What is the POEA-SEC?	The Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) is a standard employment contract for Filipino seafarers working on foreign vessels, outlining the terms and conditions of their employment.
What does substantial evidence mean in this context?	Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla; it must be relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Who has the burden of proof in claiming death benefits?	The claimants of death benefits, not the employers, bear the burden of proving that the seafarer’s illness was work-related and that they are entitled to the benefits.
What if the seafarer died after the contract?	If the seafarer dies after the contract, compensation is possible under Section 32(A) of the POEA-SEC if the claimant proves the illness was work-related and resulted from the seafarer’s work conditions.
How does the presumption of work-relatedness apply?	The presumption of work-relatedness applies when a seafarer suffers an illness during the term of their contract; it does not automatically apply if the death occurs after the contract ends.
Why was the claim denied in this case?	The claim was denied because the widow failed to present substantial evidence proving that the seafarer’s liver cancer was caused or aggravated by his work conditions as a Second Officer.
What evidence would have strengthened the claim?	Documentation of illness while on board, evidence of a post-employment medical examination, and expert testimony linking the work conditions to the development of liver cancer could have strengthened the claim.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Albarracin v. Philippine Transworld Shipping Corp. clarifies the evidentiary requirements for claiming death benefits under the POEA-SEC when a seafarer’s death occurs after the termination of their employment contract. It underscores the necessity of providing substantial evidence to establish a direct link between the seafarer’s work conditions and the illness that led to their death.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Daylinda Albarracin vs. Philippine Transworld Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 210791, November 19, 2018