In the case of Mark Reynald Marasigan v. Reginald Fuentes, the Supreme Court clarified the threshold for establishing intent to kill in attempted murder cases. The Court ruled that the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the attack and the concerted actions of the assailants, can demonstrate intent to kill, even if the victim’s injuries are not life-threatening. This decision emphasizes that the intent to kill does not solely rely on the severity of the injuries sustained but also on the actions and behavior of the attackers, clarifying the burden of proof required in attempted murder cases in the Philippines.

Hollow Blocks and Homicidal Intent: When Does an Assault Constitute Attempted Murder?

This case revolves around an incident on December 20, 2006, in Laguna, where Mark Reynald Marasigan was attacked by Reginald Fuentes, Robert Calilan, and Alain Delon Lindo. Marasigan alleged that after a verbal altercation, Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo assaulted him, with Fuentes attempting to strike him on the head with a hollow block. The legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the actions of the respondents constituted attempted murder, considering the nature of the assault and the evidence presented.

The initial investigation led to varying conclusions. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause only for less serious physical injuries against Fuentes and Calilan, while the Department of Justice Undersecretary initially directed the filing of attempted murder charges against all three respondents. Subsequently, the Secretary of Justice reversed this decision, absolving Fuentes and Lindo, and deeming that Calilan could only be charged with less serious physical injuries. This variance in findings led to Marasigan filing a Petition for Certiorari, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court, which had to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Secretary of Justice’s decision.

The Supreme Court, in its analysis, emphasized the distinction between errors of jurisdiction and errors of judgment. Errors of jurisdiction, which involve acts without or in excess of authority, are correctable by certiorari. Errors of judgment, on the other hand, are mistakes made within the court’s jurisdiction and are reversible only by appeal. The Court clarified that its role was to assess whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined if the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in her evaluation of the case.

The Court identified exceptions to the general rule that factual findings are binding, noting instances where the appellate court’s findings may be overturned, such as when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts or when the tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically. It found that both the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice had misapprehended the facts, leading to a grave abuse of discretion. The Court noted the Secretary’s error in requiring “clear and convincing evidence” during the preliminary investigation, instead of the appropriate standard of probable cause. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, requires only such facts as are sufficient to create a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty.

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

The Court disagreed with the Secretary of Justice’s conclusion that the evidence was equivocal regarding the respondents’ intent to kill, highlighting the improper emphasis on the physical evidence. The Court cited Rivera v. People, where it was held that superficial wounds do not negate the liability for attempted murder if the actions indicate intent to kill. Here, the assault involved multiple assailants and attempts to strike Marasigan’s head with stones, indicating a clear intent to cause serious harm or death.

Moreover, the Court considered the principle of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance for murder. Witnesses’ testimonies indicated that the respondents took advantage of their numerical superiority and employed means to weaken Marasigan’s defense. This, coupled with the intent to inflict serious harm, provided ample basis for pursuing prosecution for murder in its attempted stage. It is discernible that respondents took advantage of their superior strength or otherwise employed means to weaken petitioner’s defense. With this qualifying circumstance, there is ample basis for pursuing respondents’ prosecution for murder, albeit not in its consummated stage.

The Court also addressed the issue of conspiracy, noting that it may be inferred from the acts of the perpetrators. The coordinated actions of Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo, particularly Calilan and Lindo holding Marasigan while Fuentes attempted to strike him, indicated a common design. This shared objective suggested a conspiracy to commit the crime. As People v. Amodia explains:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.

The Court further clarified the distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies, referring to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and Rivera v. People, the elements of an attempted felony include:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.

The actions of the respondents in assaulting Marasigan and attempting to strike him on the head constituted the commencement of the felony by overt acts. The fact that they were unable to inflict fatal blows was due to the arrival of neighbors, not their own desistance, thus characterizing the crime as attempted, not frustrated, murder.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the actions of the respondents constituted attempted murder, considering their intent and the nature of the assault on the petitioner. The Supreme Court had to determine if there was sufficient basis to prosecute the respondents for attempted murder rather than just less serious physical injuries.
What is the legal standard for establishing probable cause?	Probable cause requires such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty. It does not require “clear and convincing evidence” but is based on reasonable belief and opinion.
Can intent to kill be inferred from the actions of the accused?	Yes, intent to kill can be inferred from the actions of the accused, such as the nature of the attack, the use of weapons, and the coordinated behavior of the assailants. The totality of the circumstances is considered, not just the severity of the injuries sustained.
What is the significance of abuse of superior strength in this case?	Abuse of superior strength is a qualifying circumstance for murder. The court considered the respondents’ numerical superiority and their coordinated efforts to weaken the petitioner’s defense as evidence of this circumstance.
How does the court define conspiracy in this context?	Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, such as the coordinated actions of the perpetrators.
What is the difference between attempted and frustrated murder?	Attempted murder occurs when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution. Frustrated murder occurs when the offender performs all the acts of execution that would produce the felony but does not achieve the result due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will.
What role did the testimonies of witnesses play in the court’s decision?	The testimonies of witnesses, such as Marcelo Maaba, Lauro Agulto, and Gregoria Pablo, provided critical details about the assault, including the coordinated actions of the respondents and their intent to cause serious harm. These testimonies helped establish the elements of attempted murder.
Why did the Supreme Court reinstate the DOJ Undersecretary’s resolution?	The Supreme Court found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion by misapprehending the facts and applying an incorrect legal standard. Reinstating the DOJ Undersecretary’s resolution ensured that the respondents would be prosecuted for the appropriate crime, based on the evidence presented.

This case underscores the importance of evaluating the totality of circumstances when determining intent in criminal cases, especially in instances of attempted crimes. It serves as a reminder that the assessment of intent is not solely based on physical injuries but also on the actions, behavior, and coordinated efforts of the accused.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: MARK REYNALD MARASIGAN Y DE GUZMAN, PETITIONER, VS. REGINALD FUENTES ALIAS “REGIE,” ROBERT CALILAN ALIAS “BOBBY,” AND ALAIN DELON LINDO, RESPONDENTS., G.R. No. 201310, January 11, 2016