The Supreme Court ruled that a spouse convicted of adultery is not automatically disqualified from sharing in conjugal property, especially when a voluntary separation agreement has been made. This means that despite a conviction for adultery, a spouse may still be entitled to a share of the conjugal property if the couple has entered into a legally sound agreement, subject to the rights of creditors and other parties with a pecuniary interest. The decision underscores the importance of voluntary agreements and their impact on property rights in the context of marital disputes, even when infidelity is a factor.

Dividing Assets After a Fall From Grace: Can an Adulterous Spouse Still Claim a Share?

Virgilio and Dita Maquilan’s marriage took a turn when Virgilio discovered Dita’s affair, leading to her conviction for adultery. Subsequently, Dita filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage based on Virgilio’s alleged psychological incapacity. During pre-trial, they entered into a Compromise Agreement to partially settle their conjugal partnership of gains. Virgilio later sought to repudiate this agreement, arguing that Dita’s adultery disqualified her from sharing in the conjugal property. The central legal question is whether Dita’s conviction for adultery automatically barred her from receiving a share of the conjugal property under a voluntary separation agreement.

The court addressed whether a spouse convicted of adultery can still share in the conjugal partnership. The petitioner argued that the Compromise Agreement should be voided because it goes against the law that prohibits a guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal property. The petitioner cites Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code, stating that because the respondent was convicted of adultery, her share should be forfeited in favor of their common child. Moreover, the petitioner argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void, citing Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the cited provisions were inapplicable. Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code apply to cases of subsequent marriages terminated by the reappearance of an absent spouse and the effects of legal separation decrees, respectively, which do not apply in this situation. Likewise, Article 2035 of the Civil Code does not apply here because the Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation.

The Court emphasized that existing law and jurisprudence do not impose a disqualification on a spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal properties, especially when a voluntary separation agreement is in place. Article 143 of the Family Code allows separation of property voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. However, the Court stressed that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.

The petitioner claimed that the proceedings before the RTC were void due to the absence of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor. Article 48 of the Family Code states:

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x

x x x x

(e) Where no defaults allowed.– If the defending party in action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

The Court noted that the purpose of the Public Prosecutor or Solicitor General’s participation is to protect the State’s interest by preventing collusion or fabrication of evidence. However, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not automatically nullify the Compromise Agreement. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that there was no collusion between the parties. At the risk of being repetiti[ve], the compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.

Furthermore, the Court clarified that a conviction for adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code defines civil interdiction as depriving the offender of rights such as parental authority, marital authority, the right to manage property, and the right to dispose of property inter vivos during their sentence.

The penalty for adultery under Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional, which, according to Article 43, carries only suspension from public office and certain disqualifications, but not civil interdiction. Thus, the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

Finally, the Court addressed the petitioner’s claim that he was not intelligently informed of the consequences of the Compromise Agreement. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that negligence of counsel binds the client, as stated in Salonga v. Court of Appeals:

[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners’ counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.

Exceptions exist where reckless or gross negligence deprives the client of due process, but these were not sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

FAQs

What was the main issue in this case?	The main issue was whether a spouse convicted of adultery is automatically disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property, especially when a voluntary separation agreement exists.
What is a compromise agreement in the context of this case?	A compromise agreement is a settlement between the spouses to divide their conjugal properties partially, made during the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
What does the Family Code say about separation of property?	Article 143 of the Family Code allows for separation of property voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval.
Does a conviction for adultery include civil interdiction?	No, a conviction for adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction, which would deprive the person of the right to manage and dispose of property.
What is the role of the Solicitor General in annulment cases?	The Solicitor General’s role is to prevent collusion between parties and ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed in annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage cases.
What happens to conjugal property if a spouse commits adultery?	While adultery is a ground for legal separation, it does not automatically disqualify the spouse from sharing in the conjugal property, particularly if there is a voluntary separation agreement.
What happens to creditors’ rights in a voluntary separation of property?	Voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest, as per Article 136 of the Family Code.
Can a client claim their lawyer’s negligence as a reason to overturn an agreement?	Generally, the negligence of counsel binds the client, unless such negligence deprives the client of due process of law.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision clarifies that a conviction for adultery does not automatically disqualify a spouse from sharing in the conjugal property, especially if there is a voluntary separation agreement. This ruling underscores the significance of such agreements and the rights of creditors and other parties with pecuniary interests.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Virgilio Maquilan v. Dita Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 08, 2007