This case clarifies that when applying for land registration, the period of possession before the government declared the land alienable and disposable can be included in calculating the required period of possession, provided the land is already declared as such at the time of application. This ruling enables applicants to demonstrate longer periods of ownership, strengthening their claims for land registration, and emphasizes the importance of the land’s status at the time of application rather than at the beginning of possession.

From Public Domain to Private Claim: When Does Possession Count?

The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) sought to register land in Silang, Cavite, claiming possession since June 12, 1945 through their predecessors. The Republic of the Philippines opposed, arguing that since the land was declared alienable only on March 15, 1982, possession before this date should not count. The central legal question revolves around whether the period before the official declaration of alienability can be included when calculating the length of possession required for land registration.

The legal basis for land registration is found in Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration Decree, which states that those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, may apply for registration. Similarly, Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, provides a parallel provision. These laws set the stage for determining who can claim ownership through possession.

To successfully apply for original registration, an applicant must demonstrate several key elements. First, they need to show open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, either personally or through predecessors-in-interest. Second, the land in question must be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Third, this possession must be under a bona fide claim of ownership. Finally, the possession must date back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. The debate often centers on how to interpret the requirement regarding alienability and the significance of the June 12, 1945 date.

The Supreme Court, in resolving this issue, turned to its prior decisions for guidance. The case of Republic v. Naguit provided a critical interpretation. The court in Naguit clarified that Section 14(1) should be understood to include possession before the land was declared alienable, as long as it is already alienable at the time of the application. This interpretation avoids the impracticality of requiring all lands to have been declared alienable before June 12, 1945.

“Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.”

This ruling emphasizes the state’s intent to relinquish its rights over the property once it has been classified as alienable and disposable.

However, the Republic cited Republic v. Herbieto, which seemed to contradict Naguit by stating that possession before the declaration of alienability cannot be included in the computation. This apparent conflict necessitated further clarification from the Supreme Court. To address this conflict, the Supreme Court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines explicitly favored the interpretation in Naguit over Herbieto. The court emphasized that Herbieto lacked precedential value regarding Section 14(1).

“The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.”

This clarification firmly established Naguit as the prevailing precedent.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court underscored that the date June 12, 1945, serves only to qualify the required period of possession, not to impose a condition that the land must have been declared alienable by that date. What truly matters is that the land is alienable at the time the application for registration is filed. This interpretation ensures that individuals who have possessed land for a significant period under a good faith belief of ownership are not unfairly penalized simply because the formal declaration of alienability came later. The court’s reasoning also acknowledged that a possessor can indeed hold land in the concept of an owner even before the land’s official classification as alienable.

In the case at hand, the AFP-RSBS demonstrated that the land was declared alienable on March 15, 1982, well before their application for registration in 1997. Moreover, they presented compelling evidence, including testimonies and tax declarations, to establish that their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land since before 1945. This evidence was crucial in satisfying the requirements for original registration. For example, Emilia Amadure testified that her family had resided on the land since her birth in 1917, and her father, Maximo Amadure, had been the previous owner. Her testimony, along with that of Rogelio Amadure, Maximo’s grandson, corroborated the long-standing possession and cultivation of the land by the family.

The Republic also argued that as a government-owned corporation, AFP-RSBS could not acquire title through acquisitive prescription. However, the court dismissed this argument, clarifying that AFP-RSBS was not acquiring the land through acquisitive prescription but rather through the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Furthermore, the constitutional prohibition against private corporations acquiring public land did not apply, as AFP-RSBS is a government corporation. This distinction was crucial in affirming the eligibility of AFP-RSBS to register the land under the existing legal framework. The court then concluded that AFP-RSBS had successfully proven all the necessary requisites for original registration of title.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the period of possession before land is declared alienable and disposable can be included in the calculation for original land registration.
What did the Supreme Court rule?	The Supreme Court ruled that the period of possession before the declaration can be included, provided the land is alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration.
Why is the date June 12, 1945, important?	June 12, 1945, is the date used to qualify the required period of possession, meaning possession must be traced back to this date or earlier to qualify for land registration.
Does this ruling mean anyone can claim land regardless of when it was declared alienable?	No, the land must be officially declared alienable and disposable by the time the application for registration is filed for prior possession to be counted.
What evidence did AFP-RSBS provide to support its claim?	AFP-RSBS presented testimonies from predecessors-in-interest and tax declarations showing continuous possession and ownership dating back before 1945.
Was AFP-RSBS’s status as a government corporation relevant to the decision?	Yes, the Court clarified that as a government corporation, AFP-RSBS was not subject to constitutional restrictions on private corporations acquiring public land.
What happens if the land is not yet declared alienable at the time of application?	If the land is not yet declared alienable and disposable, the application for registration will likely be denied, regardless of how long the applicant has possessed the land.
How does this ruling affect landowners in the Philippines?	This ruling benefits landowners by allowing them to include the period of possession before the land was declared alienable, strengthening their claims for land registration and ownership.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System vs. Republic of the Philippines clarifies a crucial aspect of land registration law, providing a more equitable path for landowners to secure their rights. By allowing the inclusion of possession periods before official declarations of alienability, the ruling acknowledges the realities of land ownership and possession in the Philippines, affirming the rights of those who have long occupied and cultivated the land.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System vs. Republic, G.R. No. 180086, July 2, 2014