In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed that land reserved for public use remains inalienable unless explicitly declared otherwise by the government. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the Regalian doctrine, which presumes that all lands not privately owned belong to the State. The Court emphasized that for public land to become private, a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or legislative act, is required to reclassify it as alienable and disposable. This case serves as a reminder of the stringent requirements for land registration and the protection of public domain lands.

Can a Presidential Directive Trump Public Land Reservations?

Central Mindanao University (CMU) sought to overturn a Court of Appeals decision that nullified its claim to parcels of land in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon. These lands were originally reserved for CMU’s school site under Proclamation No. 476, issued by President Carlos P. Garcia in 1958. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), argued that the land remained inalienable public domain because the Solicitor General did not sign the petition for compulsory registration and there was no explicit declaration that the land was alienable and disposable. The central legal question was whether a directive from the President authorizing the Director of Lands to file a petition for compulsory registration could be considered a declaration that the land was alienable and disposable.

CMU relied on a previous case, Republic v. Judge De la Rosa, where a presidential directive was deemed equivalent to such a declaration. However, the Supreme Court distinguished the present case, noting key factual differences. In De la Rosa, the land was reserved for settlement purposes and later reverted to public agricultural land, whereas the CMU land remained reserved for educational purposes. Building on this distinction, the Court emphasized that for a presidential directive to suffice, the land must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes at the time the directive is issued. As the CMU land was still reserved for educational use, the directive could not be interpreted as a declaration of alienability.

The Court underscored the importance of the Regalian doctrine, which posits that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This doctrine presumes that all lands not clearly under private ownership are State property, placing the burden of proof on the applicant to demonstrate alienability. To prove that land is alienable, the applicant must establish a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, or legislative act. In the absence of such proof, the land remains part of the inalienable public domain and cannot be registered under the Torrens system.

Section 88 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, states that reserved lands are non-alienable until declared otherwise:

Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President.

The Court referenced Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, clarifying that reserved lands remain public domain until positively declared converted to patrimonial property. This principle reinforces the State’s role in managing and protecting public lands for the benefit of its citizens. The State can choose to remove it from the public domain and make it available for disposition in the manner provided by law.

The Court also cited its previous rulings in CMU v. DARAB and CMU v. Executive Secretary, which affirmed the inalienable character of the CMU land reservation. These cases emphasized that the land was dedicated for CMU’s use in scientific and technological research in agriculture and had ceased to be alienable public land from the moment President Garcia designated it for that purpose. This historical context further supported the Court’s decision to deny CMU’s petition.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the authority of the President to declare lands alienable and disposable is limited by Section 8 of C.A. No. 141, which specifies the types of lands that can be opened for disposition or concession:

Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.

This provision reinforces the requirement that the land must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes to be declared open for disposition. CMU failed to provide sufficient evidence that the land reservations had been reclassified as alienable and disposable. In essence, the university only presented a series of endorsements regarding the filing of the application for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land and the said directive from the President. In the end, the Court found that those were not enough to prove that the government declared the said lands alienable and disposable.

As elucidated in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, a positive act declaring land alienable and disposable is required to overcome the presumption of State ownership. In the case, the Supreme Court explained what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain and stated that CMU failed to meet the requirements for it.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The main issue was whether a presidential directive authorizing the Director of Lands to file a petition for compulsory registration could be considered a declaration that the land was alienable and disposable, despite being reserved for public use.
What is the Regalian doctrine?	The Regalian doctrine states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and any claim to private ownership must be derived from the State.
What kind of evidence is needed to prove land is alienable?	To prove that land is alienable, there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports, or a legislative act.
What does Section 88 of C.A. No. 141 say about reserved lands?	Section 88 of C.A. No. 141 states that reserved lands are non-alienable until declared otherwise by the Public Land Act or by proclamation of the President.
How did the Court distinguish this case from Republic v. Judge De la Rosa?	The Court distinguished this case because in De la Rosa, the land had ceased to be reserved for public use, whereas, in the CMU case, the land remained reserved for educational purposes.
What was the significance of Proclamation No. 476?	Proclamation No. 476 reserved the land for CMU’s school site, which meant the land was withdrawn from sale and settlement, and could not be alienated without a further declaration.
What happened to the titles issued to CMU?	The Court declared the titles issued to CMU as null and void and ordered the land reverted to the public domain due to the lack of proof that the land was alienable and disposable.
What happens to reserved lands that are no longer needed for public use?	Reserved lands remain property of the public dominion until withdrawn from public or quasi-public use by an act of Congress or proclamation of the President, or positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property.

The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the importance of adhering to established legal principles regarding land ownership and registration. The ruling underscores that simply possessing land or obtaining a directive for registration does not automatically grant ownership, especially when the land is reserved for public use. The decision emphasizes the need for a clear and positive act by the government to declare public land as alienable and disposable before it can be registered in the name of a private entity.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY vs. REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 195026, February 22, 2016