Tag: BANAT Formula

Party-List Proportionality: Supreme Court Clarifies ‘One Person, One Vote’ in Seat Allocation

The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7941, particularly Section 11(b), which governs the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations in the Philippine House of Representatives. The court rejected claims that the existing formula violates the ‘one person, one vote’ principle and the equal protection clause. This decision reinforces the legislative prerogative in setting parameters for party-list representation, balancing proportional representation with the goal of broader inclusivity.

Does ‘One Person, One Vote’ Apply to Party-List Seat Allocation?

The core legal question in ANGKLA: Ang Partido ng mga Marinong Pilipino, Inc. v. COMELEC revolves around the interpretation of proportional representation within the party-list system. Petitioners argued that the allocation of additional seats under Republic Act No. (RA) 7941, specifically Section 11(b), violates the ‘one person, one vote’ policy, thereby infringing on the equal protection clause. They contended that votes already counted for guaranteed seats should not be considered again when allocating additional seats. This, according to the petitioners, leads to a double counting of votes, diluting the weight of votes for non-two-percenters—those parties not initially guaranteed a seat.

The challenged proviso reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

x x x x

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. (emphasis and underscoring added)

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, upholding the constitutionality of the provision and affirming the Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) application of the existing allocation formula, known as the BANAT formula. This formula, established in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), involves a two-round process. The first round guarantees one seat to each party-list garnering at least 2% of the total votes. The second round allocates additional seats based on the proportion of votes received. Petitioners proposed an alternative formula that would deduct votes used for the guaranteed seat before allocating additional seats.

The Court’s decision rested on several key points. First, the Court clarified that the principle of ‘one person, one vote’ does not mandate absolute proportionality in the party-list system. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution gives Congress wide latitude in formulating the allocation of party-list seats. The Court emphasized that the Constitution does not prescribe absolute proportionality in distributing seats to party-lists, organizations, or coalitions. Instead, Congress is granted discretion in setting the parameters for determining the actual volume and allocation of party-list representation.

Second, the Court pointed to existing mechanisms within RA 7941, such as the three-seat cap and the two-tiered seat allocation, which inherently deviate from absolute proportionality. These mechanisms serve to broaden representation and prevent any single party-list from dominating the system. These mechanisms, which include the three-seat limit and the two-tiered seat allocation, are disadvantageous to the two-percenters and beneficial to non-two-percenters. Essentially, these mechanisms offset the advantage given to two-percenters in the first round of seat allocation in the form of a guaranteed seat.

Moreover, the Court noted that petitioners themselves had previously benefited from the application of the BANAT formula in past elections. In fact, in a prior case, Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP), one of the petitioners, defended the COMELEC’s adherence to the BANAT formula. Given their prior endorsement and benefit from the existing system, the Court found their current challenge inconsistent.

Third, the Court found that the BANAT formula aligns with the intent and language of RA 7941. The Court reasoned that the two-round allocation system reflects the statute’s intent to prioritize parties exceeding the 2% threshold, allowing them to participate in the second round of seat allocation with their full vote count. Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe keenly noted that the first round is based on the first sentence of Section 11(b), while the second round is based on the first proviso that follows in sequence.

The Court rejected the argument that allowing two-percenters to participate in the second round with their full votes constitutes double counting. According to the Court, all votes are counted and considered in both rounds, but for different purposes. The first round establishes a threshold for guaranteed seats, while the second ensures compliance with the constitutional requirement that 20% of House members come from the party-list system.

As correctly argued by the OSG, the system of counting pertains to two (2) different rounds and for two (2) different purposes: the first round is for purposes of applying the 2% threshold and ensuring that only party-lists with sufficient constituencies shall be represented in Congress, while the second round is for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the constitutional fiat that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall be elected via a party-list system, thus, seats are computed in proportion to a party-list’s total number of votes.

The Supreme Court underscored that imposing a 2% penalty against two-percenters in the second round would contradict the statute’s language and intent. Further, the Court clarified that it cannot impose a formula not explicitly provided in RA 7941, as this would amount to judicial legislation. If petitioners wish to modify the seat allocation formula, the proper recourse is to seek legislative amendments to RA 7941.

The dissenting opinions, while advocating for alternative allocation methods, were ultimately unpersuasive to the majority. The Court emphasized that its role is to interpret and apply existing laws, not to create new ones based on subjective notions of fairness. Until RA 7941 is amended, Section 11(b), as interpreted through the BANAT formula, remains the operative law.

The Court’s decision affirms that the Constitution does not require absolute proportional representation in the party-list system. It recognizes the wide discretion granted to Congress in formulating the allocation of party-list seats. Moreover, it highlights that the existing allocation system is constitutional despite its deviations from perfect proportionality. This decision emphasizes that the existing mechanisms that offset the advantages afforded to two-percenters were essentially agreed to by the petitioners in their concurrence with the distribution of party-list seats in two rounds using two different formulas and their proposal that the three-seat limit under the law should still be observed.

FAQs

What is the core issue in this case?	The core issue is whether the method of allocating additional seats in the party-list system under Section 11(b) of RA 7941 violates the ‘one person, one vote’ principle and the equal protection clause.
What is the BANAT formula?	The BANAT formula is the method established by the Supreme Court for allocating seats in the party-list system, involving a two-round process: first, guaranteeing a seat to parties with at least 2% of votes, and second, allocating additional seats proportionally.
What is the ‘one person, one vote’ principle?	It is the principle that each person’s vote should have equal weight in electing representatives; however, the court clarified this does not mandate absolute proportionality in the party-list system.
What did the petitioners argue?	The petitioners argued that votes used to secure a guaranteed seat should not be counted again for additional seats, which they claimed leads to double counting and dilutes the voting power of those who voted for parties that did not obtain the 2% threshold.
How did the Supreme Court rule on the double counting claim?	The Supreme Court ruled that there is no double counting because votes are counted once in each of the two rounds, each round serving distinct purposes: establishing threshold and ensuring the 20% constitutional allocation.
Why did the Court uphold the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of RA 7941?	The Court upheld the law because it found that Congress has wide discretion in setting the parameters for party-list representation and the existing mechanisms already deviate from absolute proportionality and the formula is consistent with the intent of the law.
What did the Court say about imposing a new formula?	The Court stated that it cannot impose a new formula for seat allocation not explicitly provided in RA 7941, as doing so would constitute judicial legislation, emphasizing that any changes must come through legislative amendments.
What was the effect of the mechanisms, such as the three-seat cap, on the advantage given to the two percenters?	The mechanisms essentially offset the advantage given to two-percenters in the first round of seat allocation in the form of a guaranteed seat.

The Supreme Court’s decision in ANGKLA v. COMELEC solidifies the current framework for party-list representation in the Philippines. While the decision may not fully resolve ongoing debates about proportionality and representation, it reaffirms the boundaries of judicial review in electoral matters.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ANGKLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246816, December 7, 2021

December 7, 2021

One Vote, Unequal Weight: Dissecting Party-List Seat Allocation and Equal Protection in Philippine Elections

In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act (RA) 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act, affirming the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations based on their total number of votes, even if they already secured a guaranteed seat. The Court reasoned that all votes are counted equally, and the advantage given to two-percenters (parties garnering at least 2% of votes) reflects their broader mandate, thus not violating the equal protection clause. This decision clarifies the balance between proportional representation and the constitutional limits on the party-list system, setting the stage for future electoral contests.

Double-Counting Controversy: Does Party-List Seat Allocation Violate Equal Protection?

This case, ANGKLA: ANG PARTIDO NG MGA PILIPINONG MARINO, INC. (ANGKLA), AND SERBISYO SA BAYAN PARTY (SBP) VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, revolves around a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of RA 7941. Petitioners ANGKLA and SBP, along with AKMA-PTM, argued that the allocation of additional seats based on a party-list’s total votes leads to double-counting, as the same votes securing a guaranteed seat are considered again for additional seats. The petitioners claimed this violates the equal protection clause, seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from double-counting votes and proposing a framework where the 2% votes are excluded before allocating additional seats. They argued that the system gives undue advantage to two-percenters while disenfranchising other voters.

The petitioners anchored their arguments on the premise that each vote should carry equal weight, and that the retention of the 2% votes in the second round of seat allocation was unconstitutional. They asserted a violation of the “one person, one vote” principle, citing a dissenting opinion in Aquino III v. COMELEC, which emphasized equality in voting power. In response, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the COMELEC, contended that there is no double-counting of votes, as the system involves two different rounds for distinct purposes: ensuring representation for parties with sufficient constituencies and complying with the constitutional mandate of 20% party-list representation.

The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the COMELEC, finding no constitutional violation. While acknowledging the constitutional mandate of equal protection, the Court emphasized that it does not prevent reasonable legislative classifications. The Court stressed that the two-percenters and non-two-percenters have substantial distinctions in terms of the mandate of the electorate, and that Congress has the discretion to formulate the manner of allocating seats to qualified parties. Importantly, the votes were counted once, and the two-percenters are given an advantage justified by the established distinction.

The Court reiterated that the equal protection clause allows reasonable classification based on substantial distinctions. Citing Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, the Court emphasized that the 2% threshold is consistent with the intent of the framers and the essence of representation, mandating a sufficient number of people to enable meaningful representation. This differential treatment, therefore, does not offend the equal protection clause, as it is grounded in the rule of law.

The Court also addressed petitioners’ reliance on its Resolution in BANAT, clarifying that BANAT only declared the 2% threshold as unconstitutional insofar as it makes it the exclusive basis for computing the grant of additional seats, but it did not remove the distinction between two-percenters and non-two-percenters. Crucially, the Court’s exercise of judicial review requires compliance with requisites, including that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Here, the Court found that petitioners, having previously benefited from the BANAT doctrine, failed to raise their constitutional challenge promptly, further weakening their case.

The Supreme Court acknowledged the issue’s transcendental importance, potentially altering the political landscape and steering State policy towards broader party-list representation. While some justices dissented and advocated for alternative formulas for party-list seat allocation, the Court ultimately affirmed its previous rulings, emphasizing that policy determinations are within the domain of the political branches, not the judiciary. Thus, the Supreme Court may only declare what the law is, not what it should be.

However, as the Members of the Court voted 7-3-3-1, this ponencia could hardly be considered a clear victory in favor of respondents. Seven (7) Members of the Court voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7) opined that Section 1 l(b) of RA 7941 vis-a-vis BANAT ought to be partly nullified. Three (3) of these dissenters adopted petitioners’ proposed formula, three others adopted a different formula, and one (1) adopted still another formula. In fine, the dissenters are also dissenting among themselves on the “correct” formula to be adopted should the Court grant the petition.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the allocation of additional seats in the party-list system, based on the total number of votes, violates the equal protection clause by allegedly double-counting votes in favor of parties with at least 2% of the total vote.
What is the equal protection clause?	It is a constitutional guarantee under Section 1, Article III, which mandates that all persons be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
What is the two-percent threshold in the party-list system?	It is a requirement under RA 7941, Section 11(b), where parties, organizations, and coalitions must receive at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system to be entitled to one seat each.
What did the petitioners want the Court to do?	The petitioners wanted the Court to declare unconstitutional the phrase providing additional seats “in proportion to their total number of votes” and to order the COMELEC to exclude the 2% votes before proceeding to the second round of seat allocation.
What was the Court’s ruling on the issue of double counting?	The Court ruled that there was no double counting of votes, as the two rounds of seat allocation serve different purposes and involve different formulas, and all votes are counted and considered only once.
Why did the Court rule that there was no violation of the equal protection clause?	The Court stated that the two-percenters have a clearer mandate of the people, justifying additional rights and benefits to them, as there is a substantial distinction between them and the non-two-percenters.
*What is the BANAT* formula?**	The BANAT formula is the prevailing procedure used for allocating party-list seats, involving two rounds: allocating one guaranteed seat to two-percenters and allocating additional seats to all participants proportional to their total votes.
*Did the Court change the BANAT* formula?**	No, the Court maintained the BANAT formula, finding no reason to deviate from it. However, some Justices offered dissenting opinions proposing alternative formulas to address concerns about proportionality.
What is the practical effect of this ruling?	The ruling maintains the status quo in the party-list system, where parties with at least 2% of the votes gain a distinct advantage in seat allocation, underscoring their broader electoral support compared to those without said threshold.

In summary, the Supreme Court upheld the established method of party-list seat allocation in the Philippines, affirming the legislature’s authority to set the rules within constitutional limits. While challenges persist regarding fairness and proportionality, the Court’s decision underscores the importance of adhering to established legal doctrines. The ruling emphasizes the balance between ensuring broad representation and recognizing the mandate of parties with significant electoral support. To better serve its purpose, the Court suggests a review of the law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

September 15, 2020