Tag: Business Permit

Business Permit Fees vs. Local Taxes: Economic Zone Tax Exemptions and Regulatory Powers

The Supreme Court ruled that entities within special economic zones are not automatically exempt from paying business permit fees to local government units, even if they enjoy tax exemptions. Business permit fees are regulatory in nature, stemming from a local government’s police power, rather than being taxes for revenue generation. Therefore, tax-exempt entities cannot claim exemption from these fees, which are necessary for regulatory oversight and public welfare.

Baguio City’s Authority vs. Economic Zone Incentives: Who Regulates Businesses in Camp John Hay?

This case revolves around a dispute between the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) and John Hay Management Corporation (JHMC) against the City Government of Baguio. The central question is whether businesses operating within the John Hay Special Economic Zone are exempt from securing business permits and paying corresponding fees to Baguio City. The BCDA and JHMC argued that Republic Act No. 7916, also known as the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, provides tax exemptions to establishments operating within special economic zones, and Republic Act No. 9400, moreover, categorically granted tax exemptions to the John Hay Special Economic Zone. On the other hand, the Baguio City government argued that business permit fees are regulatory in nature and thus fall under its police power, from which no entity is exempt.

The legal framework governing this case involves an interplay of laws and proclamations. Republic Act No. 7227, or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992, created the BCDA to develop former U.S. military bases. Camp John Hay was one such base, and the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, later renamed JHMC, was created as a subsidiary of BCDA to manage it. Proclamation No. 420 designated a portion of Camp John Hay as a special economic zone, granting it the same tax incentives as the Subic Special Economic Zone, created under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227.

However, this landscape was altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, which nullified the portion of Proclamation No. 420 that granted tax exemptions to businesses in the John Hay Special Economic Zone. The Court emphasized that tax exemptions must be explicitly stated in the law. In response, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9399, providing a one-time tax amnesty, and Republic Act No. 9400, which aimed to clarify and reinforce the tax incentives available to the John Hay Special Economic Zone, aligning them with those provided under Republic Act No. 7916.

The Baguio City government, exercising its authority, issued Administrative Order No. 102, series of 2009, which created the John Hay Special Economic Zone Task Force to implement City Tax Ordinance No. 2000-001. This ordinance required all establishments within Baguio City, including those within the John Hay Special Economic Zone, to secure business permits and pay the corresponding fees. This led to the conflict at the heart of the case, with the BCDA and JHMC arguing that their locators were exempt from such fees due to the special economic zone’s tax incentives.

At the heart of the dispute lies the distinction between taxes and regulatory fees. The Supreme Court has consistently held that taxes are enforced contributions for the purpose of defraying public expenses, while fees are payments for specific services rendered by public officers. In the context of local government, this distinction is crucial because local government units derive their power to tax from the Constitution and the Local Government Code, while their authority to impose fees stems from their police power, which is the power to regulate activities for the promotion of public welfare.

Building on this principle, the Court emphasized that the nomenclature used in a statute is not determinative of whether an exaction is a tax or a fee. Instead, the purpose of the charge is the key factor. If the primary purpose is revenue generation, it is a tax; if it is regulation, it is a fee. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that tax exemptions are construed strictly against the claimant, especially when it comes to local taxes, due to Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which withdraws tax exemption privileges unless otherwise provided.

The Court examined whether the fees required by Baguio City’s ordinance were primarily for revenue generation or for regulation. It noted that the fees were relatively minimal and were intended to defray the expenses of regulatory activities. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the issuance of business permits is an exercise of police power, aimed at ensuring compliance with laws and ordinances, and promoting the general welfare. Thus, the fees were deemed regulatory in nature, and the tax exemptions granted to establishments in the John Hay Special Economic Zone did not extend to these regulatory fees.

The petitioners also argued that they had an income-sharing arrangement with Baguio City, wherein a portion of their gross income was remitted to the city. They claimed that this arrangement should preclude the city from imposing business taxes. The Court rejected this argument, pointing out that Republic Act No. 7916 mandates that 5% of the gross income of businesses within economic zones be remitted to the national government. Of this, only a small percentage is allocated for the local government unit. The additional financial assistance voluntarily provided by the BCDA to Baguio City did not waive the city’s right to collect regulatory fees.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the Baguio City government’s authority to require business permits and collect fees from establishments within the John Hay Special Economic Zone. The Court clarified that the tax exemptions granted to these establishments do not extend to regulatory fees imposed under the city’s police power. This decision reinforces the principle that local government units have the power to regulate businesses within their jurisdictions, even within special economic zones, to promote public welfare and ensure compliance with local laws.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether businesses within the John Hay Special Economic Zone are exempt from paying business permit fees to the City Government of Baguio. The case hinged on the distinction between taxes and regulatory fees.
Are businesses in economic zones automatically exempt from local taxes?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that tax exemptions typically apply only to taxes levied for revenue generation, not to regulatory fees imposed under a local government’s police power. The court emphasized that local government units retain the power to regulate businesses within their jurisdictions, even within special economic zones, to promote public welfare and ensure compliance with local laws.
What is the difference between a tax and a regulatory fee?	A tax is an enforced contribution to defray public expenses, while a regulatory fee is a payment for specific services rendered by public officers or for the regulation of an activity. Taxes are primarily for revenue generation, while fees are for regulation and promotion of public welfare.
What is ‘police power’ in the context of this case?	Police power is the inherent authority of a government to enact laws and regulations that promote public order, health, safety, morals, and the general welfare of society. In this case, it allows Baguio City to regulate businesses through permits, ensuring they comply with local laws and standards.
What did Republic Act No. 9400 change for the John Hay Special Economic Zone?	Republic Act No. 9400 aimed to reinforce the tax incentives available to the John Hay Special Economic Zone, aligning them with those provided under Republic Act No. 7916. However, the act did not exempt businesses from regulatory fees imposed under the local government’s police power.
Does PEZA registration affect the need for a Baguio City business permit?	The court noted that only businesses registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) are entitled to the tax and duty exemption privileges under Republic Act No. 7916 and Republic Act No. 9400. Businesses not registered with PEZA are still required to obtain business permits and pay the necessary fees to the Baguio City government.
What was the significance of the John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim case?	This case nullified the portion of Proclamation No. 420 that granted tax exemptions to businesses in the John Hay Special Economic Zone, emphasizing that tax exemptions must be explicitly stated in the law. This ruling prompted Congress to enact Republic Act No. 9400.
Did Baguio City waive its right to collect fees due to its revenue-sharing agreement?	No, the Court clarified that the financial assistance and revenue-sharing agreements between BCDA/JHMC and Baguio City did not constitute a waiver of the city’s right to collect regulatory fees. These were considered voluntary contributions and did not alter the city’s authority to impose regulatory measures.

This case underscores the balance between promoting economic development through special economic zones and preserving the regulatory powers of local government units. While economic zones offer incentives to attract investment, they are not entirely exempt from local oversight necessary for public welfare. Therefore, businesses operating within these zones must comply with both national and local regulations.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND JOHN HAY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, G.R. No. 192694, February 22, 2023

February 22, 2023

Official Inaction and Anti-Graft Law: When Delay Becomes Discrimination

In Lacap v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a municipal mayor for violating Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The mayor was found guilty of neglecting to act on a business permit application due to personal animosity towards the applicant, a political rival. This decision underscores that public officials must act promptly and impartially on matters before them, and that deliberate inaction motivated by personal bias constitutes a violation of anti-graft laws.

License to Discriminate? When a Mayor’s Delay Violates Anti-Graft Laws

This case revolves around Corazon M. Lacap, then the Municipal Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, and Fermina Santos, a local business owner and political competitor. Santos applied for a Mayor’s Permit to operate her variety store, but Lacap failed to act on the application, allegedly due to a personal grudge. The prosecution argued that Lacap’s inaction was a deliberate attempt to discriminate against Santos, stemming from previous legal disputes between their families. The central legal question is whether Lacap’s failure to act on the permit application constituted a violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

At the heart of this case is Section 3(f) of RA 3019, which prohibits public officials from:

Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

The Sandiganbayan, and later the Supreme Court, had to determine whether Lacap’s actions met all the elements of this provision. The Supreme Court emphasized that public office is a public trust, and officials must be accountable, responsible, and efficient. The Court noted that when an application for a business permit is filed, the procedure is fairly standard: submit required documents and pay the assessed fees. Failure to comply justifies disapproval, while compliance warrants approval. Any inaction or refusal to act runs counter to public service.

Lacap argued that she did not refuse to act on Santos’ application, claiming she referred the matter to her lawyer due to pending cases filed by Santos against her. She contended that this referral was a “positive and categorical act” demonstrating her intent to respond appropriately. However, the Court rejected this argument, agreeing with the Sandiganbayan that Lacap’s referral to her lawyer was unjustified and a mere delaying tactic. The Court emphasized that the matter did not require legal expertise; Lacap simply needed to check if the documents were complete and then act on the application.

The Supreme Court highlighted the duty of public officials to act expeditiously on matters before them. Citing Nessia v. Fermin, the Court reiterated that officials must act either by signifying approval or disapproval to allow the public to continue the administrative process. Official inaction brings the administrative process to a standstill and leaves the public in uncertainty. This duty is particularly important in the context of business permits, as delays can significantly impact a business’s ability to operate.

The Court also addressed Lacap’s claim that she lacked criminal intent to discriminate against Santos. The Sandiganbayan found that Lacap’s motive could be deduced from her admission that Santos had filed cases against her, as well as evidence showing prior administrative and criminal cases filed against Lacap’s husband. Moreover, the testimony of another local businessman, Andres T. Onofre, Jr., revealed that he had operated his business for years without a permit, suggesting that Lacap’s strictness towards Santos was discriminatory. The Court agreed with the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that Lacap’s inaction was willful and deliberate, motivated by a desire to discriminate against Santos.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court further clarified that the mayor’s authority to issue licenses and permits is discretionary, not ministerial. However, this discretion must be exercised according to law and ordinance. The Court cited Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor, emphasizing that while a mayor has the power to issue, suspend, or revoke licenses, this power is not absolute and must be exercised within legal limits. In Lacap’s case, her failure to act on Santos’ application, coupled with evidence of discriminatory intent, constituted an abuse of discretion and a violation of anti-graft laws.

Moreover, the Court found it telling that the letter from Lacap’s lawyer suggested that Santos should re-apply, despite the fact that all necessary documents were already with the Mayor. This was seen as a ploy to mask the refusal to act. Furthermore, the Supreme Court looked skeptically at the justification that Santos was trying to “harass” the Mayor. The Court stated that even if this were the case, as a public official, Lacap needed to “rise above personal conflicts and political rivalries and act pursuant to the applicable law and ordinance.”

It is clear that this ruling reinforces that a mayor cannot use the power of her office to disadvantage political rivals. Instead, her conduct “should have been above board and circumspect to forestall any complaint from Fermina of political vendetta.” In this case, the Court found that Lacap had not followed this standard and that this justified the conviction under the Anti-Graft law.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Mayor Corazon Lacap violated Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by neglecting to act on Fermina Santos’ business permit application due to personal animosity.
What is Section 3(f) of RA 3019?	Section 3(f) prohibits public officials from neglecting or refusing to act on matters pending before them, without sufficient justification, for the purpose of obtaining a benefit or discriminating against another party.
Why did the Sandiganbayan convict Mayor Lacap?	The Sandiganbayan convicted Lacap because she failed to act on Santos’ application despite due demand, and her inaction was found to be motivated by a desire to discriminate against Santos due to personal and political conflicts.
What was Mayor Lacap’s defense?	Lacap argued that she referred the application to her lawyer due to pending cases filed by Santos against her, and that this referral constituted a proper response.
How did the Supreme Court rule on Mayor Lacap’s defense?	The Supreme Court rejected Lacap’s defense, finding that the referral to her lawyer was unjustified and a delaying tactic, and that she should have acted on the application directly.
What is the duty of public officials regarding applications?	Public officials have a duty to act expeditiously on matters pending before them, either by approving or disapproving applications, to ensure the smooth functioning of administrative processes.
Is a mayor’s power to issue permits ministerial or discretionary?	A mayor’s power to issue permits is discretionary, but this discretion must be exercised according to law and ordinance, and not arbitrarily or with discriminatory intent.
What was the significance of the testimony of Andres T. Onofre, Jr.?	Onofre’s testimony showed that he was allowed to operate his business for years without a permit, suggesting that Lacap’s actions toward Santos were discriminatory.
What is the penalty for violating Section 3(f) of RA 3019?	The penalty includes imprisonment and perpetual disqualification from public office. In this case, Lacap was sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six years and one month to ten years, with perpetual disqualification from public office.

This case serves as a crucial reminder to public officials that their duties extend beyond mere compliance with procedural requirements. They are expected to act with utmost responsibility, integrity, and efficiency, especially when dealing with matters affecting the public. Any deviation from this standard, particularly when motivated by personal animosity or political considerations, will be met with the full force of the law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Lacap v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017

January 22, 2018

Mandamus Unveiled: Discretionary Power in Business Permit Issuance

The Supreme Court in Abraham Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., held that a mayor’s duty to issue business permits involves discretionary powers, not subject to a writ of mandamus. This decision clarifies the extent of local executives’ authority in granting or denying business permits, emphasizing that such actions are an exercise of delegated police power. It underscores that the judiciary cannot compel a mayor to issue a business permit, reinforcing the principle that mandamus applies only to ministerial duties, not discretionary ones. The ruling reaffirms the importance of administrative discretion in local governance and limits judicial intervention in matters within the executive’s purview, thereby safeguarding the balance of power between the branches of government at the local level.

Emission Impossible: Can Courts Force a Mayor’s Hand?

This case arose from a dispute between Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. and Abraham Rimando, the mayor of Naguilian, La Union. The corporation sought a writ of mandamus to compel Mayor Rimando to issue a business permit. The mayor refused, citing that the corporation needed to execute a contract of lease with the municipality since its business operated on land allegedly owned by the local government. The central legal question was whether the court could compel the mayor to issue the permit through a writ of mandamus.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially sided with the mayor, reasoning that the municipality owned the land and the mayor had the discretion to deny the permit. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, finding that the tax declaration was insufficient to prove ownership and that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution imposing rental fees was invalid. Despite declaring the case moot due to the lapse of the period for which the permit was sought, the CA still ruled in favor of the corporation.

The Supreme Court (SC), however, agreed with the CA on the mootness of the case but disagreed with the dispositive portion of its decision. The SC emphasized that the core issue—the issuance of a business permit for a past period—no longer presented a justiciable controversy. The Court highlighted that even if a writ of mandamus were issued, it would have no practical effect since the permit’s validity period had already expired. This underscores the principle that courts generally refrain from resolving moot issues.

Building on this principle, the SC delved into the nature of a mayor’s power to issue business permits. It cited Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, which elucidated that the power to issue licenses and permits is a manifestation of delegated police power. As such, it is not a purely ministerial function that can be compelled by mandamus. The Court quoted Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:

SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans, program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agroindustrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
x x x x
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.

This provision empowers the mayor to issue, suspend, or revoke licenses and permits based on compliance with laws and ordinances, indicating a level of discretion. This discretion stems from the **general welfare clause** embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, which delegates police power to local government units. The exercise of police power, including the issuance of permits, is inherently discretionary and aimed at promoting the well-being of the community.

The Court further elaborated that the remedy for questioning the validity of the mayor’s exercise of power lies in a writ of certiorari, not mandamus. Certiorari is appropriate when questioning whether a public official acted with grave abuse of discretion, while mandamus is limited to compelling the performance of a ministerial duty. Here is a table summarizing the key differences:

Feature	Mandamus	Certiorari
Purpose	To compel performance of a ministerial duty	To review acts with grave abuse of discretion
Nature of Duty	Ministerial (clear and specific duty)	Discretionary (involving judgment)
Grounds for Issuance	Refusal to perform a clear legal duty	Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

The Supreme Court thus concluded that the petition for mandamus was an improper remedy to compel the mayor to issue the business permit. The Court reinstated the RTC’s decision, emphasizing that the mayor’s duty to issue business permits involves discretionary powers inherent in delegated police power.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a mayor could be compelled by a writ of mandamus to issue a business permit. The court needed to determine if the issuance of a business permit is a ministerial duty or a discretionary act.
What is a writ of mandamus?	A writ of mandamus is a court order compelling a government official or body to perform a specific ministerial duty. It is issued when there is a clear legal right to the performance of the duty and no other adequate remedy is available.
What does ‘moot and academic’ mean in legal terms?	A case becomes moot and academic when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy, meaning the issue has been resolved or circumstances have changed such that a court ruling would have no practical effect. Courts generally decline to resolve moot issues.
What is the ‘general welfare clause’ in the Local Government Code?	The general welfare clause, found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, grants local government units the power to exercise powers necessary for efficient governance and promoting the general welfare of their inhabitants. This includes the exercise of police power.
What is ‘delegated police power’?	Delegated police power refers to the authority granted to local government units by the national legislature to enact and enforce laws and regulations for the protection of the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. It includes the power to regulate businesses and issue permits.
Why did the Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision?	The Supreme Court set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision because, despite acknowledging that the case was moot, the CA still reversed the RTC’s decision. The SC held that the CA should have dismissed the case entirely due to its mootness.
What is the difference between mandamus and certiorari?	Mandamus compels the performance of a ministerial duty, while certiorari reviews acts performed with grave abuse of discretion. Mandamus is appropriate when there is a clear legal duty, while certiorari is used to correct jurisdictional errors or acts beyond the scope of authority.
What was the significance of the Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor case?	The Roble Arrastre case established that the issuance of business permits by a mayor is an exercise of delegated police power and is therefore discretionary, not ministerial. This precedent was crucial in determining that mandamus was not the proper remedy in the Rimando case.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Abraham Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc. reaffirms the principle that the issuance of business permits by local executives is a discretionary function rooted in delegated police power. This ruling underscores the limits of mandamus as a legal remedy and reinforces the importance of administrative discretion in local governance.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Abraham Rimando v. Naguilian Emission Testing Center, Inc., G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012

July 23, 2012

Local Government Authority: Discretion vs. Mandamus in Business Permit Issuance

The Supreme Court, in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Altagracia Villaflor, affirmed that a municipal mayor’s power to issue business permits involves discretionary authority, not merely a ministerial duty. This means a mayor can exercise judgment based on law and ordinances when granting or denying permits. The decision clarifies the limits of mandamus, a legal remedy to compel a public official to perform a ministerial duty, emphasizing that it cannot be used to control discretionary powers.

Hilongos Port Impasse: Can a Mayor’s Discretion Override a Business Permit Application?

The case revolves around Roble Arrastre, Inc., a cargo handling service operator, and its application for a business permit renewal with the Municipal Mayor of Hilongos, Leyte, Altagracia Villaflor. The mayor denied the application, citing a municipal resolution that prohibited entities operating shipping lines from also engaging in arrastre services at the local port, due to a potential conflict of interest. Roble Arrastre, Inc., owned by Roble Shipping Lines, then filed a Petition for Mandamus, arguing that the mayor’s role in issuing permits was purely ministerial and that the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) had sole authority over port operations. The central legal question is whether the mayor’s denial was a valid exercise of discretionary power or an unlawful neglect of a ministerial duty.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially sided with Roble Arrastre, asserting the PPA’s exclusive authority over port operations and deeming the mayor’s refusal unlawful. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the mayor’s duty involved official discretion under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code. This section grants municipal mayors the authority to issue, suspend, or revoke licenses and permits based on law or ordinance. The Court of Appeals emphasized that local chief executives are vested with the authority to exercise police power, implying a necessary degree of discretion to serve their constituents effectively. This reasoning underscored the core conflict between the perceived ministerial duty to issue permits and the discretionary power to regulate businesses for the public good.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal of Roble Arrastre’s petition. The court noted that the specific permit sought for 1994 was moot due to the passage of time. However, it proceeded to clarify the legal principles involved, particularly concerning the nature of mandamus and the scope of a mayor’s authority in issuing business permits. The Court reiterated that mandamus is only appropriate to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, not to control the exercise of discretion. A ministerial duty is one where a public officer performs a prescribed task in a given set of facts, without needing to exercise personal judgment.

The Court turned to the Local Government Code of 1991 to determine the nature of the mayor’s power. Section 444(b)(3)(iv) grants mayors the power to issue licenses and permits and to suspend or revoke them for violations of the conditions upon which they were issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. This power is linked to Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause, which delegates police power to local governments. Police power allows local government units (LGUs) to enact regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents, and to maintain peace and order.

The Court addressed Roble Arrastre’s argument that any permit suspension or revocation must be based on laws independent of the Local Government Code itself. The Court dismissed this argument, stating that the Code does not distinguish between ‘other’ laws and the Code itself. Therefore, Section 16 of the Local Government Code can indeed be used to define the limits of a mayor’s discretion in issuing permits. While there may have been no specific ordinance explicitly empowering the mayor to deny the permit, the power granted under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) is inherently discretionary, deriving from the delegated police power of the municipality.

The Supreme Court clarified that the Sangguniang Bayan’s resolution, while not an ordinance, still contributed to the context of the mayor’s decision. A municipal ordinance is a law, whereas a resolution is a declaration of sentiment or opinion by the lawmaking body. The appropriate remedy to question the mayor’s decision would have been a writ of certiorari to determine if there was grave abuse of discretion, not mandamus. Certiorari is a legal remedy used to review a lower court’s decision for errors of law or abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the Court affirmed that the mayor’s power to issue permits involves discretionary judgment, tied to the municipality’s police power, and is therefore not subject to a writ of mandamus.

To further clarify, consider the following table of comparative perspectives:

Issue	Roble Arrastre’s Argument	Court’s Reasoning
Nature of Mayor’s Duty	Ministerial: Mayor must issue permit upon compliance with requirements.	Discretionary: Mayor exercises judgment under delegated police power.
Source of Authority	PPA has sole authority over port operations; Mayor’s role is revenue generation only.	Local Government Code grants mayors authority to issue/deny permits under general welfare clause.
Remedy	Mandamus is proper to compel permit issuance.	Certiorari, not mandamus, is appropriate to challenge discretionary actions.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a municipal mayor’s duty to issue business permits is ministerial or discretionary, and whether mandamus could compel the mayor to issue a permit. The Court determined that the duty is discretionary, based on the Local Government Code’s delegation of police power.
What is mandamus?	Mandamus is a legal remedy used to compel a public official to perform a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is a task that an official must perform in a prescribed manner, without exercising personal judgment.
What is the general welfare clause?	The general welfare clause, found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code, delegates the State’s police power to local government units. This clause allows LGUs to enact regulations that protect the health, safety, and welfare of their constituents.
What is the difference between a municipal ordinance and a resolution?	A municipal ordinance is a law with a general and permanent character, requiring a third reading for enactment. A resolution is a declaration of sentiment or opinion, temporary in nature, and does not always require a third reading.
What is the role of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in this case?	While the PPA has authority over port operations, the Supreme Court clarified that the local mayor still has discretionary power to issue or deny business permits within the municipality, based on local laws and ordinances. This power is derived from the Local Government Code, not from the PPA’s mandate.
What was the basis for the mayor’s denial of the permit?	The mayor based the denial on a municipal resolution prohibiting entities operating shipping lines from also engaging in arrastre services at the local port. This was based on a potential conflict of interest.
What is the significance of this case for local businesses?	This case clarifies that local businesses must not only comply with PPA regulations but also with local ordinances and regulations, as the mayor has discretionary power in issuing permits. It means local businesses need to be aware of and adhere to both national and local laws to secure necessary permits.
What is the appropriate legal remedy to question a mayor’s decision to deny a permit?	The appropriate legal remedy is a writ of certiorari, which allows a court to review the mayor’s decision for grave abuse of discretion. Mandamus is not appropriate, as it is only used to compel the performance of ministerial duties.

This decision highlights the delicate balance between national and local authority in regulating business operations. It reinforces the principle that local government officials have a degree of discretion in issuing permits, based on their delegated police power and the need to promote the general welfare of their constituents. This ruling provides valuable guidance for both local government units and businesses operating within their jurisdictions.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Altagracia Villaflor, G.R. No. 128509, August 22, 2006

August 22, 2006

Upholding Due Process: Mayoral Discretion vs. Abuse of Power in Business Permits

The Supreme Court held that while local government executives have discretionary power in issuing business permits, this power cannot be wielded arbitrarily or with grave abuse. Roberto P. Fuentes, Jr., then Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte, was found to have acted with manifest partiality when he refused to issue a mayor’s permit to a ship chandling business based on unverified reports, thereby violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. This ruling underscores the importance of due process and fairness in local governance, ensuring that business owners are not unjustly deprived of their livelihoods.

From Ship Chandler to Courtroom: Did a Mayor Abuse His Power?

The case revolves around Fe N. Valenzuela, who operated Triple “A” Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services in Isabel, Leyte. After years of operation, Mayor Roberto P. Fuentes, Jr. refused to sign her application for a business permit in 2002, allegedly stating, “I will not issue a mayor’s permit to you. Just file any case in any court you wish.” Subsequently, the Mayor issued a memorandum instructing the port manager not to allow Valenzuela to conduct ship chandling transactions, citing reports of harassment, smuggling, and drug involvement. These actions effectively shut down her business. Valenzuela then filed criminal and administrative complaints against Fuentes, alleging violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and abuse of power.

The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause against Mayor Fuentes for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to any party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The Ombudsman’s decision was based on the finding that Fuentes acted with manifest partiality when he refused to renew Valenzuela’s business permit based on unsubstantiated reports, effectively prioritizing the interests of her competitors. The Deputy Ombudsman stated:

Here, it appears that respondent acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in his dealings with complainant when he refused to renew complainant’s mayor’s business permit on the basis of the raw reports on complainant’s alleged involvement in prohibited drugs and on grounds of the pendency of his investigation thereon. In the first place, it is unlikely that respondent conducted an investigation on the matter before his refusal.

Fuentes argued that issuing business permits falls under his discretionary powers as mayor, citing Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which empowers municipal mayors to “issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinances.” He claimed he acted in the best interest of his constituents by curbing smuggling and drug proliferation. However, the court emphasized that this discretion is not absolute and must be exercised within legal bounds. The court referenced a prior ruling:

… [T]his Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.

One of the key elements in finding a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is the presence of “undue injury” to the complainant. Fuentes contended that Valenzuela failed to prove she suffered undue injury. However, the Court sided with the Special Prosecutor, asserting that the element of undue injury was met when Valenzuela lost thousands of pesos due to perishable commodities and was denied her right to engage in a legitimate business. The Special Prosecutor argued, and the Supreme Court agreed:

The third element of the offense is satisfied when the questioned conduct causes undue injury to any party, including the government, or gives unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not thus essential; it should be sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit received can be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.

In the case, Valenzuela presented evidence indicating that she had already purchased supplies worth thousands of pesos intended for a specific vessel, and Mayor Fuentes’s memorandum effectively prevented her from delivering these goods, leading to significant financial losses. The court acknowledged that while the exact amount of damage need not be precisely quantified, the injury must be substantial, which was evident in Valenzuela’s case. The Supreme Court ultimately denied Fuentes’s petition, affirming the Ombudsman’s orders. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It emphasized that local executives cannot use their discretionary powers arbitrarily, especially when depriving individuals of their livelihoods based on unsubstantiated claims.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Mayor Fuentes committed grave abuse of discretion by refusing to issue a business permit to Valenzuela, thereby violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
What is Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019?	Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, prohibits public officials from causing undue injury to any party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
What was the basis for Mayor Fuentes’s refusal to issue the permit?	Mayor Fuentes claimed he received reports that Valenzuela was involved in smuggling, drug activities, and harassing competitors.
Did Valenzuela present any evidence to counter these allegations?	Yes, Valenzuela presented a certification from the Chief of Police stating she was not involved in illegal activities, as well as evidence of prior permits and clearances.
What did the Ombudsman decide?	The Ombudsman found probable cause against Mayor Fuentes for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and upheld the decision to file charges against him.
Did Valenzuela have to prove the exact amount of damages she suffered?	No, the Court clarified that while the injury must be substantial, proving the exact amount of damage is not essential.
Can a Mayor deny a business permit based on discretion alone?	No, while Mayors have discretionary power, it must be exercised within legal bounds and cannot be used arbitrarily to deprive individuals of their livelihood based on unsubstantiated claims.
What is the significance of this ruling?	The ruling emphasizes the importance of due process and fairness in local governance, protecting business owners from arbitrary actions by public officials.

This case serves as a significant reminder to public officials regarding the responsible exercise of their discretionary powers. It reinforces the principle that such powers must be exercised judiciously and fairly, grounded in evidence and adherence to due process, rather than on personal whims or unverified allegations, particularly when livelihoods are at stake.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ROBERTO P. FUENTES, JR. VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 164865, November 11, 2005

November 11, 2005

Corporate Practice of Optometry: Defining the Boundaries of Professional Regulation

The Supreme Court held that a corporation employing licensed optometrists for its optical business is not considered to be engaged in the practice of optometry itself. This ruling clarifies that while only licensed individuals can practice optometry, corporations can employ these professionals without it being construed as the corporation practicing the profession. This distinction is crucial for understanding the scope of professional regulation and the permissible business activities of corporations in related fields.

Can Corporations Offer Eye Exams? Demarcating Business from Professional Practice

The case of Doctors Rosa P. Alfafara, et al. v. Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. centers on whether Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.’s hiring of licensed optometrists to conduct eye examinations and prescribe lenses constitutes the illegal corporate practice of optometry. Petitioners, a group of optometrists, sought to enjoin Acebedo from practicing optometry, arguing that the corporation’s actions violated the Optometry Law (R.A. No. 1998) and the Code of Ethics for Optometrists. The central question revolves around whether employing licensed professionals equates to a corporation engaging in the professional practice itself.

The Regional Trial Court initially ruled in favor of the optometrists, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, citing a previous case, Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas, Ilocos Sur-Abra Chapter v. Acebedo International Corporation. This earlier case established that hiring licensed optometrists does not, in itself, constitute the practice of optometry by the corporation. The Court of Appeals found that Acebedo was primarily engaged in selling optical products, not providing optometry services as a professional practice. This position was based on the understanding that R.A. No. 1998 regulates the practice of optometry by individuals, not the employment of optometrists by corporations.

Petitioners argued that the later case of Apacionado v. Professional Regulation Commission should override the previous ruling. In Apacionado, optometrists employed by Acebedo were suspended for unprofessional conduct for participating in promotional advertisements offering free eye consultations. The Supreme Court affirmed the suspension, finding that the optometrists had violated the rules and regulations of the Board of Examiners for Optometry by making optometric examinations outside of their regular clinics and advertising free examinations. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that Apacionado did not find Acebedo itself to be engaged in the practice of optometry. The optometrists were penalized for their actions as individual professionals, not for the corporation’s business activities.

The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ argument, clarifying that only natural persons can be registered as optometrists and engage in the practice of optometry. Corporations, being juridical persons, cannot take the licensure examinations required to practice optometry under R.A. No. 1998. The Court underscored that Acebedo’s business was the sale of optical products, and the employment of optometrists was incidental to this business, not the practice of optometry itself. This distinction is critical in understanding how professional regulations apply to corporations employing licensed professionals.

Petitioners further contended that an optometrist employed by a corporation acts as an agent of the corporation and should not be held personally liable for their actions. They cited Articles 1897 and 1910 of the Civil Code, which pertain to the liability of agents and the obligations of principals. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, stating that while optometrists are employees of Acebedo, their practice of optometry is separate and distinct from the corporation’s business. Optometrists are personally liable for their professional acts, just as the corporation is liable for its business operations. The Board of Optometry and the Professional Regulation Commission regulate the optometrists’ practice, maintaining exclusive original jurisdiction over them.

Furthermore, the Court referred to Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, where the City Mayor of Iligan granted Acebedo a business permit with specific conditions, including that Acebedo could not operate an optical clinic or examine patients without a prescription from an independent optometrist. The Supreme Court held that the City Mayor could not regulate the practice of optometry through a business permit. Acebedo was entitled to a business permit as an optical shop, and the fact that it employed licensed optometrists did not mean it was engaging in the practice of optometry as a corporate body. This ruling reaffirms the principle that corporations can employ professionals without being deemed to be practicing the profession themselves, provided they do not seek a license to engage in the professional practice directly.

In summary, the Supreme Court’s decision hinges on the distinction between the corporate business of selling optical products and the individual practice of optometry. Acebedo’s employment of licensed optometrists does not equate to the corporation illegally practicing optometry. The regulation of professional practice remains with the individual optometrists, who are personally liable for their professional actions. This framework allows corporations to operate related businesses while ensuring that professional standards and regulations are upheld by licensed individuals.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., by employing licensed optometrists, was illegally engaging in the practice of optometry as a corporation, in violation of R.A. No. 1998.
Can a corporation be licensed to practice optometry in the Philippines?	No, only natural persons who have passed the licensure examination and are registered with the Professional Regulation Commission can practice optometry. Corporations cannot be licensed as optometrists.
Did the Supreme Court find Acebedo Optical guilty of illegally practicing optometry?	No, the Supreme Court ruled that Acebedo Optical, by employing licensed optometrists, was not engaging in the illegal practice of optometry. Its primary business was the sale of optical products, and the optometrists’ services were incidental to this business.
Are optometrists employed by corporations personally liable for their professional actions?	Yes, optometrists employed by corporations are personally liable for their actions in the course of their practice. The Board of Optometry and the Professional Regulation Commission regulate their practice.
*What was the significance of the Apacionado v. Professional Regulation Commission* case?**	In Apacionado, optometrists employed by Acebedo were suspended for unprofessional conduct, but the case did not find Acebedo itself to be engaged in the practice of optometry. It underscored that individual optometrists are responsible for adhering to professional standards.
Can a city mayor regulate the practice of optometry through business permits?	No, the Supreme Court held that a city mayor cannot regulate the practice of a profession, such as optometry, through the issuance of a business permit. Business permits primarily regulate the conduct of a business.
What is the main difference between selling optical products and practicing optometry?	Selling optical products is a commercial activity, while practicing optometry involves examining eyes, prescribing lenses, and providing corrective measures. The former can be done by a corporation, while the latter requires individual licensure.
What is the role of the Board of Optometry and the Professional Regulation Commission in this context?	The Board of Optometry and the Professional Regulation Commission regulate the practice of optometry and have exclusive original jurisdiction over licensed optometrists. They ensure that optometrists adhere to professional standards and ethical conduct.

The Alfafara v. Acebedo case remains a key precedent in defining the boundaries between corporate business activities and the practice of regulated professions. It clarifies that corporations can employ licensed professionals without being deemed to be engaging in the professional practice themselves, provided they do not seek to directly provide professional services under a corporate license. This distinction is crucial for balancing business interests with the need to protect professional standards and the public.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Doctors Rosa P. Alfafara, et al. v. Acebedo Optical, Co., Inc., G.R. No. 148384, April 17, 2002

April 17, 2002

Optical Business vs. Optometry Practice: Defining the Limits of Local Authority

The Supreme Court ruled that a city mayor overstepped their authority by imposing conditions on a business permit for an optical company that effectively regulated the practice of optometry, a function exclusively under the Professional Regulation Commission. This decision clarifies the boundaries between local government’s power to regulate businesses and the state’s authority to oversee licensed professions, protecting businesses from overly restrictive local regulations.

When Local Licensing Intrudes on Professional Practice: The Acebedo Optical Story

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. sought a business permit from the City Mayor of Iligan. After local optometrists protested, the City Mayor granted the permit but attached several conditions. These stipulations included prohibitions against Acebedo operating an optical clinic, examining or prescribing eyeglasses, selling eyeglasses without an independent optometrist’s prescription (excluding Ray-Ban), advertising optical lenses, and grinding lenses without an independent optometrist’s prescription. The Samahan ng Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOPI) filed a complaint alleging violations of these conditions. Subsequently, the City Legal Officer investigated and recommended the revocation of Acebedo’s permit, which the City Mayor then executed. Acebedo challenged this decision, arguing the mayor had exceeded his authority and violated due process. The central legal question revolves around the extent to which a local government can regulate a business when it intersects with a regulated profession.

The Supreme Court, in analyzing the case, addressed the scope of police power delegated to local government units. The Court acknowledged that local governments, through the **general welfare clause** of the Local Government Code, possess the authority to enact regulations that promote health, safety, and the general well-being of their constituents. This power extends to the issuance of licenses and permits for businesses operating within their jurisdiction. However, this regulatory authority is not without limits. The Court emphasized that such regulations must be reasonable, non-oppressive, and consistent with existing laws and the Constitution. As stated in Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte:

“x x x While a business may be regulated, such regulation must, however, be within the bounds of reason, i. e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.”

Building on this principle, the Court distinguished between the regulation of a business and the regulation of a profession. A business permit allows an entity to engage in commercial activities, while a professional license grants an individual the authority to practice a specific profession. In Acebedo’s case, the company sought a permit to operate an optical shop, not a license to practice optometry. The Court referenced its prior ruling in Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas vs. Acebedo International Corporation, which established that hiring licensed optometrists does not equate to the corporation itself practicing optometry. This distinction is critical, as it clarifies that a business can employ licensed professionals without the business itself being subjected to the regulations governing that profession.

The Court found that the conditions imposed on Acebedo’s business permit by the City Mayor effectively regulated the practice of optometry, an area under the purview of the Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry. The City Mayor’s actions exceeded his authority, as the power to regulate professions lies with the administrative agencies specifically empowered by law to do so. The Court emphasized that a business permit is intended to regulate the conduct of business, not the practice of a profession. The conditions imposed by the City Mayor encroached upon the regulatory powers of the state-level professional bodies. Moreover, the Court noted the legislative history of Republic Act No. 8050, where Congress deliberately avoided a definitive stance on the prohibition of indirect practice of optometry by corporations, leaving the issue for judicial determination. This further supported the Court’s view that the City Mayor’s actions were premature and overreaching.

The Court also addressed the argument that Acebedo was bound by the conditions of the business permit because it had accepted them, essentially forming a private agreement or contract. The Court rejected this argument, stating that a license or permit is not a contract but a special privilege. As the Court stated in Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank:

“xxx a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms. It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute.”

Therefore, the doctrine of estoppel, which prevents a party from denying a previous representation, did not apply. The conditions imposed by the City Mayor were ultra vires, meaning beyond the scope of his authority, and could not be given effect, regardless of Acebedo’s initial acquiescence. Ultra vires acts are considered null and void from the outset, and no subsequent action can validate them. Finally, the Court clarified that the issuance of business permits is an exercise of police power, not a proprietary function. Municipalities exercise police power as agents of the State, under the general welfare clause, to regulate businesses and promote public welfare. This power must be exercised reasonably and within the bounds of the law, which was not the case here.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a city mayor exceeded their authority by imposing conditions on a business permit that effectively regulated the practice of optometry. The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between regulating a business and regulating a profession.
What did the City Mayor of Iligan do?	The City Mayor imposed conditions on Acebedo Optical’s business permit that restricted their ability to operate like an optical clinic, examine patients, or sell eyeglasses without an independent optometrist’s prescription. These conditions were challenged as an overreach of local authority.
What is the general welfare clause?	The general welfare clause in the Local Government Code grants local government units the power to enact regulations that promote health, safety, and the general well-being of their constituents. However, this power is not unlimited and must be exercised reasonably and within the bounds of the law.
What is the difference between a business permit and a professional license?	A business permit authorizes an entity to engage in commercial activities, while a professional license grants an individual the authority to practice a specific profession. A business can employ licensed professionals without the business itself being subjected to the regulations governing that profession.
Can a corporation hire licensed optometrists?	Yes, the Supreme Court has ruled that hiring licensed optometrists does not equate to the corporation itself practicing optometry, as long as the corporation is not unduly controlling the optometrist’s professional judgment. The corporation’s main purpose must still be a commercial activity related to optometry, rather than the actual practice of optometry itself.
What does ‘ultra vires’ mean in this context?	‘Ultra vires’ means ‘beyond the powers.’ In this case, the conditions imposed by the City Mayor were considered ultra vires because they exceeded the scope of his authority and encroached upon the regulatory powers of state-level professional bodies.
Is a business permit a contract?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that a business permit is not a contract but a special privilege granted by the government. It can be revoked or modified based on violations of law or ordinance, and does not create a contractual obligation.
What is the role of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)?	The PRC is the government agency responsible for regulating and supervising the practice of professions in the Philippines. It has the exclusive authority to oversee professions like optometry, ensuring that practitioners meet certain standards and adhere to ethical guidelines.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals reinforces the principle that local government units must exercise their regulatory powers within the bounds of the law, respecting the boundaries between business regulation and professional oversight. This ruling provides important clarity for businesses operating in regulated fields, ensuring they are not subjected to arbitrary or excessive local restrictions.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

March 31, 2000