Tag: certiorari

Judgment in Absentia: Balancing Due Process and Timely Justice in Philippine Law

The Supreme Court, in Efren S. Almuete v. People of the Philippines, affirmed the validity of judgment promulgation in absentia (in the absence of the accused) under specific conditions, while also modifying the imposed penalty to align with the Revised Penal Code. This ruling underscores the court’s commitment to upholding procedural rules while ensuring penalties are justly applied. Despite the accused’s absence during the initial judgment, the Court found no violation of due process, clarifying the circumstances under which such judgments are permissible. Ultimately, the decision balances the accused’s right to be present with the need for efficient judicial proceedings.

Can a Prior Acquittal Bar Reinstatement of a Conviction? The Almuete Case

The case began when Efren Almuete, along with Johnny Ila and Joel Lloren, faced charges for violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, concerning illegal logging. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted them despite their absence during the promulgation of judgment, citing insufficient justification for their failure to appear. Almuete and his co-accused filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

Instead of appealing, they filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which initially acquitted Almuete. The People of the Philippines then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, which reversed Almuete’s acquittal and reinstated the RTC’s conviction. The Supreme Court emphasized that the CA had overstepped its bounds by reviewing the trial court’s factual findings in a certiorari proceeding, which should only address errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.

The Supreme Court addressed the validity of the judgment promulgated in Almuete’s absence. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows for such promulgation if the accused’s absence is without justifiable cause. The Court found that Almuete’s reason for not attending—stress, anxiety, and a recommendation for rest—did not constitute a justifiable excuse. Therefore, the RTC’s decision to proceed with the promulgation was deemed valid.

Furthermore, Almuete’s motion for repromulgation of the judgment was correctly denied by the RTC. Administrative Circular No. 16-93 explicitly discontinues the practice of requiring convicts to appear before trial courts for the promulgation of appellate court judgments affirming or modifying convictions. This administrative measure aims to streamline the process and avoid unnecessary expenses and security concerns.

The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of whether Almuete could still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision. It was determined that his right to appeal had already prescribed. By initially filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of a direct appeal, Almuete pursued the wrong legal remedy. The Court stated that errors of judgment are correctable only by appeal by writ of error, not by certiorari. This procedural misstep resulted in the loss of his opportunity to appeal the conviction on its merits.

Building on this principle, the Court clarified that the CA’s initial acquittal of Almuete was a nullity due to the appellate court’s grave abuse of discretion in reviewing factual findings beyond its certiorari jurisdiction. Consequently, Almuete could not claim double jeopardy based on that void decision. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a void judgment cannot be the basis for a claim of double jeopardy.

Despite upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court found that the penalty imposed by the RTC was erroneous. The RTC had applied Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes penalties two degrees higher for qualified theft, but the circumstances of Almuete’s case did not warrant the application of this provision. The proper penalty should have been based on Article 309, which applies to simple theft. The court emphasized the importance of accurately applying the correct provisions of the Revised Penal Code to ensure that the penalty aligns with the nature of the crime committed.

In light of the correct provision, the Supreme Court modified the penalty to align with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL). The ISL requires imposing a minimum and maximum term of imprisonment, with the minimum being one degree lower than the prescribed penalty. For Almuete, the Court imposed an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This adjustment reflects a more accurate application of the law to the specific facts of the case.

The Court acknowledged the principle that final judgments are generally immutable but invoked exceptions based on compelling circumstances and the need to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. Given that Almuete faced a significantly excessive penalty due to the trial court’s error, the Court deemed it necessary to suspend the rules in the interest of substantial justice. The Court has consistently held that it has the power to suspend its own rules when the purposes of justice require it.

The Supreme Court also clarified that modifying the penalty does not entail reopening the case or suggesting an error in the original judgment. The modification was solely to correct the very substance of the penalty to make it conform to the law. Furthermore, the Court extended the benefit of the modified penalty to Almuete’s co-accused, even though they did not appeal, pursuant to Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states that a favorable judgment applies to all accused, regardless of appeal.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the promulgation of judgment in absentia was valid and whether the penalty imposed was correct under the Revised Penal Code. The Court also addressed the effect of a prior acquittal by the Court of Appeals and whether it barred the reinstatement of a conviction by the Supreme Court.
What does “promulgation in absentia” mean?	Promulgation in absentia refers to the reading and recording of a judgment in a criminal case even when the accused is not present. This is allowed under certain conditions, such as when the accused’s absence is without justifiable cause.
Was Almuete’s absence during the judgment considered justifiable?	No, the Court did not consider Almuete’s reasons (stress, anxiety, and a recommendation for rest) as justifiable. Therefore, the promulgation of the judgment in his absence was deemed valid.
Why was Almuete’s motion for repromulgation denied?	The motion was denied because Administrative Circular No. 16-93 discontinued the practice of requiring convicts to appear for the promulgation of appellate court judgments. This measure aims to streamline the process and avoid unnecessary expenses.
Why couldn’t Almuete appeal the RTC decision?	Almuete lost his right to appeal because he initially filed a Petition for Certiorari instead of a direct appeal. The Court clarified that errors of judgment are correctable only by appeal by writ of error, not by certiorari.
What was the error in the original penalty imposed?	The RTC erroneously applied Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code (qualified theft) instead of Article 309 (simple theft). The circumstances of Almuete’s case did not warrant the higher penalty prescribed under Article 310.
How did the Supreme Court modify the penalty?	The Supreme Court modified the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This was based on the correct application of Article 309 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Did the modification of the penalty affect Almuete’s co-accused?	Yes, the favorable modification of the penalty was also applied to Almuete’s co-accused, even though they did not appeal. This is in accordance with Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
What is the significance of this case?	The case clarifies the rules regarding judgment in absentia, emphasizes the importance of following the correct procedural steps for appeals, and highlights the Court’s power to correct penalties even in final judgments to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

In conclusion, the Almuete v. People case provides critical guidance on the procedural aspects of criminal judgments and the application of penalties. The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirms its commitment to ensuring both due process and justice in the Philippine legal system.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: EFREN S. ALMUETE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT, G.R. No. 179611, March 12, 2013

March 12, 2013

Procedural Rules vs. Substantial Justice: Navigating the Appeal Process in Philippine Courts

In Indoyon v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reiterated the importance of adhering to procedural rules in filing appeals. The Court emphasized that failure to comply with these rules, even if seemingly technical, can lead to the dismissal of a case. This decision underscores that while substantial justice is a guiding principle, it cannot override the mandatory nature of procedural requirements, especially when a litigant demonstrates a pattern of disregarding such rules.

When Technicalities Trump: Can Substantial Justice Save a Flawed Appeal?

Ebrencio F. Indoyon, Jr., the municipal treasurer of Lingig, Surigao del Sur, found himself in hot water after a Commission on Audit (COA) examination revealed a significant cash shortage. Facing both administrative and criminal charges, Indoyon navigated a complex legal landscape. Initially, the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF-DOF) found him guilty of simple neglect of duty, but the Ombudsman later imposed a harsher penalty: dismissal from service for serious dishonesty and grave misconduct. Seeking to overturn the Ombudsman’s decision, Indoyon filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the CA dismissed his petition due to several procedural infirmities, prompting him to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing that substantial justice should prevail over technical rules.

The Supreme Court, however, was unsympathetic to Indoyon’s plea. The Court emphasized that procedural rules are not mere technicalities but are essential for the orderly administration of justice. It noted that Indoyon had availed himself of the wrong remedy by filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Citing Supreme Court Circular 2-90, the Court reiterated that an appeal taken through an inappropriate mode warrants outright dismissal. This circular specifically warns counsels to meticulously follow the requisites prescribed by law for appeals, cautioning that any error or imprecision may be fatal to the client’s cause.

The Court also highlighted Indoyon’s repeated disregard for technical rules, noting that the CA had already dismissed his earlier petition for similar procedural lapses. This demonstrated a pattern of indifference to the rules, making his plea for leniency less persuasive. As the Supreme Court stated, the invocation of substantial justice is not a magic potion to automatically set aside technical rules, especially when a litigant consistently disregards them. The Court emphasized that a writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, not demandable as a matter of right, and is only warranted when there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Moreover, the Supreme Court scrutinized the specific procedural defects in Indoyon’s petition before the CA. These included the absence of an Affidavit of Service, a violation of Supreme Court Revised Circular Nos. 1-88 and 19-91, and Section 13 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The Court stated,

“Effective September 15, 1991, henceforth, a petition or motion for extension filed before this Court shall be dismissed/ denied outright if there is no such proof of service in accordance with Sections 3 and 5 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court attached to the petition/motion when filed.”

Additionally, the Court found that the Office of the Ombudsman was improperly impleaded as a nominal party, contrary to Section 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Finally, the Court observed that the caption of the petition lacked the Court of Origin, Case Number, and Title of the action, violating Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91. These cumulative errors underscored the CA’s justification for dismissing the petition.

“1. Caption of petition or complaint. The caption of the petition or complaint must include the docket number of the case in the lower court of quasi-judicial agency whose order or judgment is sought to be reviewed.

The Supreme Court also addressed Indoyon’s choice of remedy, noting that he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, rather than a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. This strategic decision, the Court suspected, was an attempt to circumvent the shorter 15-day reglementary period for appeals under Rule 45, as Rule 65 provides for a longer 60-day period. The Court reaffirmed that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, quoting the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92 (2000), stating that, “certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy.”

In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision in Indoyon v. Court of Appeals serves as a stark reminder that adherence to procedural rules is paramount in the Philippine legal system. While the pursuit of substantial justice is a noble goal, it cannot justify the wholesale disregard of established procedures. Litigants and their counsels must exercise diligence in complying with these rules to ensure that their cases are heard on the merits. The case underscores the importance of seeking proper legal advice to navigate the complexities of appellate procedure, as errors in this process can have dire consequences, potentially leading to the loss of one’s case.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Indoyon’s Petition for Review on Certiorari due to non-compliance with the Rules of Court and Supreme Court circulars.
Why was Indoyon’s petition dismissed by the Court of Appeals?	The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to several procedural infirmities, including the lack of an Affidavit of Service, improper impleading of the Ombudsman, and failure to indicate the Court of Origin, Case Number, and Title of the action in the caption.
What was the main procedural error committed by Indoyon?	Indoyon availed himself of the wrong remedy by filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
What is the significance of Supreme Court Circular 2-90?	Supreme Court Circular 2-90 provides guidelines for appeals and states that an appeal taken through an inappropriate mode warrants outright dismissal.
Can substantial justice override procedural rules in the Philippines?	While substantial justice is a guiding principle, it cannot justify the wholesale disregard of established procedural rules, especially when a litigant demonstrates a pattern of indifference to such rules.
What was the Ombudsman’s decision regarding Indoyon?	The Ombudsman found Indoyon guilty of serious dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Why did Indoyon choose to file a Rule 65 petition instead of a Rule 45 petition?	The Court suspected that Indoyon filed a Rule 65 petition to circumvent the shorter 15-day reglementary period for appeals under Rule 45, as Rule 65 provides for a longer 60-day period.
What is the main takeaway from the Indoyon v. Court of Appeals case?	The main takeaway is that adherence to procedural rules is paramount in the Philippine legal system, and litigants must exercise diligence in complying with these rules to ensure that their cases are heard on the merits.

This case serves as a critical reminder to legal practitioners and litigants alike: mastery of procedural rules is as vital as a strong substantive argument. The Supreme Court’s firm stance underscores the necessity of meticulous compliance with these rules to ensure access to justice through proper legal channels.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

March 12, 2013

Certiorari vs. Appeal: Choosing the Right Legal Remedy in the Philippines

In the Philippine legal system, understanding the proper remedies for appealing court decisions is crucial. The Supreme Court in Villamar-Sandoval v. Cailipan clarifies that certiorari and appeal are mutually exclusive remedies, meaning a party cannot pursue both simultaneously or successively. If an appeal is available, certiorari is not an option, and filing an appeal renders a pending certiorari petition moot. This decision underscores the importance of selecting the correct legal avenue to avoid procedural errors and ensure a case is properly heard.

Navigating Legal Avenues: When Does an Appeal Supersede a Certiorari Petition?

The case arose from a damages complaint filed by Irene Villamar-Sandoval against Jose Cailipan and others, alleging libel. During the trial, a series of procedural missteps occurred, including the late filing of an answer and the failure of the respondents’ counsel to attend a pre-trial conference. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the respondents in default, a decision they challenged through a certiorari petition in the Court of Appeals (CA). Simultaneously, they filed a notice of appeal with the CA, leading to a situation where both remedies were being pursued concurrently. This procedural overlap raised the central question of whether the appeal rendered the certiorari petition moot.

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the respondents’ petition for certiorari was an improper remedy or had become moot due to the RTC’s decision and the subsequent appeal. The Court emphasized the fundamental principle that appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive. As the Court stated:

It is well-settled that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. The simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.

Building on this principle, the Court explained that the availability of an appeal generally precludes the use of certiorari. The reason for this is that certiorari is designed to address grave abuses of discretion where no other adequate remedy exists. Once an appeal is filed, it provides a means to correct errors made by the lower court, making a separate certiorari petition unnecessary.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted that an appeal renders a pending petition for certiorari superfluous, mandating its dismissal. In Enriquez v. Rivera, the Supreme Court articulated this rule clearly:

Appeal renders superfluous a pending petition for certiorari, and mandates its dismissal. In the light of the clear language of Rule 65 (1), this is the only reasonable reconciliation that can be effected between the two concurrent actions: the appeal has to be prosecuted, but at the cost of the petition for certiorari, for the petition has lost its raison d’etre. To persevere in the pursuit of the writ would be to engage in an enterprise which is unnecessary, tautological and frowned upon by the law.

In the case at bar, the Supreme Court found that the respondents’ January 11, 2011 petition for certiorari was rendered superfluous by their January 22, 2011 appeal. Even though the respondents initially filed the certiorari petition before the RTC’s decision was received, their subsequent appeal nullified the need for the certiorari action. The proper course of action would have been to either withdraw the certiorari petition or consolidate it with the appealed case.

The Court also addressed the issue of mootness. The respondents’ petition for certiorari had become moot due to the RTC’s January 11, 2011 decision. Granting the petition for certiorari on procedural matters would not provide any practical relief because a decision had already been rendered on the main case. As such, the Court found no reason to dwell further on the issue of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the default orders, as that matter could be properly ventilated on appeal.

The Supreme Court cited several cases to support its position, including Magestrado v. People and Balindong v. Dacalos, reinforcing the principle that appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive. The Court emphasized that allowing the simultaneous pursuit of both remedies would be a procedural aberration, allowing parties to benefit from their own neglect or omission.

The decision provides clarity on the procedural requirements for seeking legal remedies in the Philippines. It serves as a reminder that choosing the correct legal avenue is critical, and that pursuing multiple remedies simultaneously can lead to the dismissal of a case. Litigants must carefully consider their options and ensure that they comply with the procedural rules to protect their rights.

The Court also acknowledged that exceptional circumstances exist where certiorari may be available even if an appeal is possible. These exceptions include cases where public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate, or where the orders complained of were found to be completely null and void. However, these exceptions were not applicable in the present case.

In summary, the Supreme Court’s decision in Villamar-Sandoval v. Cailipan reinforces the principle that certiorari and appeal are mutually exclusive remedies. Litigants must choose the correct legal avenue to avoid procedural errors and ensure that their case is properly heard. The filing of an appeal renders a pending petition for certiorari moot, and parties must either withdraw the certiorari petition or consolidate it with the appealed case. The decision also highlights the importance of complying with procedural rules and seeking legal advice to protect one’s rights.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a petition for certiorari was rendered moot by the filing of a subsequent appeal, given that these remedies are generally mutually exclusive. The Supreme Court clarified the proper procedure when both remedies are pursued.
What is the difference between certiorari and appeal?	Certiorari is a remedy used to correct grave abuses of discretion by a lower court when there is no other adequate remedy, while an appeal is a process to review and correct errors of judgment made by a lower court. Certiorari is generally available only when an appeal is not possible.
Can a party file both a certiorari petition and an appeal at the same time?	No, the remedies of certiorari and appeal are mutually exclusive and cannot be pursued simultaneously. Filing an appeal renders a pending petition for certiorari superfluous and subject to dismissal.
What should a party do if they have filed a certiorari petition and then decide to appeal?	The party should either withdraw the certiorari petition or file a motion to consolidate the certiorari case with the appealed case. Failure to do so may result in the certiorari petition being dismissed.
What happens if a court declares a party in default?	A declaration of default means that the defaulting party loses the right to present evidence and participate in the trial. The court may then proceed to hear the case ex parte based on the evidence presented by the non-defaulting party.
What is the significance of a pre-trial conference?	A pre-trial conference is a crucial step in the litigation process where parties and their lawyers meet with the court to discuss and simplify the issues, explore settlement possibilities, and prepare for trial. Failure to attend or file a pre-trial brief can have significant consequences, such as being declared in default.
What does the term “moot” mean in legal terms?	A case becomes moot when it no longer presents a live controversy or when the issues have become academic or settled. In such cases, courts generally decline to rule on the merits because no practical relief can be granted.
Are there exceptions to the rule that certiorari is not available when an appeal is possible?	Yes, there are exceptions, such as when public welfare and the advancement of public policy so dictate, or when the orders complained of were found to be completely null and void. However, these exceptions are narrowly construed and rarely applied.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Villamar-Sandoval v. Cailipan serves as a vital reminder of the importance of understanding and adhering to procedural rules in Philippine litigation. By clarifying the mutually exclusive nature of certiorari and appeal, the Court has provided clear guidance for litigants and legal practitioners alike. Careful consideration of available remedies and strict compliance with procedural requirements are essential to ensure a fair and efficient resolution of legal disputes.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

March 4, 2013

SEP Clearance: PCSD’s Role and the Limits of Certiorari

In Villanueva v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD), the Supreme Court clarified that the PCSD’s issuance of a Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) Clearance is not a quasi-judicial function subject to certiorari. This means that challenging an SEP Clearance requires an ordinary civil action, not a special action like certiorari, as the PCSD’s role is primarily administrative, facilitating permit applications rather than adjudicating rights. The ruling emphasizes that administrative bodies must have explicit statutory authority to exercise quasi-judicial powers, ensuring their actions align with legislative intent and due process.

Palawan’s Environment: Can Courts Review Mining Clearances?

This case revolves around the Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan, enacted through Republic Act (RA) No. 7611, aimed at balancing development with environmental protection. The law established the Environmentally Critical Areas Network (ECAN), categorizing areas based on their environmental sensitivity: core zones (strictly protected), controlled use areas (allowing controlled logging and mining), and multiple use areas (open for development). The Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) was tasked with implementing the ECAN and issuing SEP Clearances for proposed projects within Palawan.

The dispute arose when PCSD granted an SEP Clearance to Patricia Louise Mining and Development Corporation (PLMDC) for a small-scale nickel mining project in Barangay Calategas, Narra, Palawan. Residents, including Salvacion Villanueva and others, opposed the clearance, arguing that the mining site was a core zone and that the clearance violated RA 7611 and PCSD regulations. They filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify the SEP Clearance, leading to a legal battle over the PCSD’s authority and the appropriate legal remedy.

The petitioners argued that the PCSD acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the SEP clearance, claiming violations of RA 7611 and PCSD Resolution No. 05-250. They contended that the proposed mining site was within a core zone, where mining activities are prohibited. The respondents, PCSD and PLMDC, countered that the area was a controlled use zone and that the SEP clearance was properly issued. The RTC initially denied motions to dismiss, asserting that the PCSD exercised a quasi-judicial function based on its procedures for issuing clearances, which included public hearings and document reviews.

However, the RTC later reversed its decision, dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, aligning with the argument that only the Court of Appeals (CA) could hear certiorari petitions against quasi-judicial bodies. The petitioners then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising the central issue of whether the PCSD’s issuance of an SEP clearance constituted a quasi-judicial function reviewable by certiorari. This required the Court to examine the powers of the PCSD, the nature of the SEP clearance, and the appropriate legal avenues for challenging administrative actions.

The Supreme Court’s analysis centered on whether the PCSD’s issuance of an SEP Clearance constituted a quasi-judicial function. Citing existing jurisprudence, the Court emphasized that an administrative body must have an explicit grant of quasi-judicial power from its enabling statute. In this case, RA 7611, which created the PCSD, did not expressly confer quasi-judicial powers related to adjudication or decision-making affecting the rights of adversarial parties. The Court scrutinized Section 19 of RA 7611, which outlines the PCSD’s powers and functions, concluding that these powers primarily involve policy formulation, coordination, and enforcement rather than adjudication.

The Court also addressed the procedure outlined in PCSD Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, which the trial court had deemed indicative of an adjudicatory process. This procedure includes document review, field validation, public consultations, and evaluation based on ecological sustainability and social acceptability. However, the Supreme Court clarified that PCSD AO 6 could not confer quasi-judicial power that the enabling statute withheld. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the procedure did not involve adjudication, as the SEP clearance did not determine the rights and obligations of adverse parties with finality.

“In issuing an SEP Clearance, the PCSD does not decide the rights and obligations of adverse parties with finality. The SEP Clearance is not even a license or permit. All it does is to allow the project proponent to proceed with its application for permits, licenses, patents, grants, or concessions with the relevant government agencies.”

The Court highlighted that the SEP clearance merely allows a project proponent to proceed with further applications to other government agencies, rather than conferring any enforceable rights. The decision emphasized the distinction between investigatory functions and adjudication, noting that the PCSD’s actions were primarily investigatory, aimed at determining the truth behind the project proponent’s claims, rather than resolving disputes between parties. This distinction is crucial because the power to investigate does not equate to the power to adjudicate.

The Court also addressed the petitioners’ argument that the public consultations conducted by the PCSD indicated a quasi-judicial function. The Court clarified that these consultations were designed to gather facts, address concerns, and ensure community involvement, rather than to adjudicate the rights of contending parties through an adversarial process. The purpose of these consultations aligned with RA 7611’s policy of encouraging public participation in natural resource management, rather than resolving legal disputes.

Beyond the lack of quasi-judicial function, the Court noted an additional flaw in the petition for certiorari. The grounds for challenging the SEP Clearance—violations of RA 7611 and PCSD Resolution No. 05-250—were more appropriately addressed through an ordinary action for nullification. This ordinary action would allow for a full litigation of factual issues, such as the zoning classification of the mining site, which certiorari, limited to questions of jurisdiction, could not resolve. The availability of an ordinary action precluded the use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, as it provided a plain, speedy, and adequate alternative.

The Court also dismissed the Petition for Mandamus, which sought to compel the PCSD to comply with RA 7611. The success of this petition depended on a prior finding that the PCSD had violated RA 7611 in issuing the SEP Clearance. With the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari, there could be no such finding, rendering the Mandamus petition unsustainable. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the RTC’s dismissal, albeit on the grounds that certiorari was an improper remedy.

The decision in Villanueva v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development has significant implications for environmental governance and administrative law in the Philippines. It clarifies the scope of PCSD’s authority and the appropriate legal remedies for challenging its decisions. The ruling underscores the importance of adhering to statutory frameworks when exercising administrative powers, and it guides future litigants on the correct procedural avenues for addressing environmental concerns related to SEP Clearances. By emphasizing the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial functions, the Supreme Court ensures that administrative bodies remain within their legally defined roles, promoting accountability and adherence to due process.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the PCSD’s issuance of an SEP Clearance is a quasi-judicial function reviewable by certiorari. The Supreme Court ruled it is not, as the PCSD does not adjudicate rights in issuing such clearances.
What is an SEP Clearance?	An SEP Clearance is a requirement for proposed projects in Palawan, allowing proponents to apply for permits and licenses with other government agencies. It assesses the project’s environmental impact and compliance with the Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan.
What is the Environmentally Critical Areas Network (ECAN)?	The ECAN is a graded system of protection and development control over Palawan, categorizing areas into core zones, controlled use areas, and multiple use areas. It serves as the main strategy for implementing the SEP, balancing environmental protection with development.
What is the role of the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD)?	The PCSD is responsible for implementing the SEP, including establishing the ECAN and issuing SEP Clearances. Its functions primarily involve policy formulation, coordination, and enforcement, rather than adjudicating disputes.
Why did the petitioners file a Petition for Certiorari?	The petitioners believed that the PCSD had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the SEP Clearance to PLMDC. They argued that the mining project violated RA 7611 and PCSD regulations.
What was the Supreme Court’s decision?	The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the petition, ruling that certiorari was an improper remedy. It held that the PCSD’s issuance of the SEP Clearance was not a quasi-judicial function and that an ordinary action for nullification was the appropriate remedy.
What is the difference between certiorari and an ordinary action for nullification?	Certiorari is a special civil action limited to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, while an ordinary action for nullification allows for a full litigation of factual issues. The Court emphasized that questions of fact are not reviewable in certiorari proceedings.
What is the significance of this ruling?	This ruling clarifies the scope of PCSD’s authority and the appropriate legal remedies for challenging its decisions. It ensures that administrative bodies remain within their legally defined roles and that litigants pursue the correct procedural avenues for addressing environmental concerns.

In conclusion, the Villanueva v. PCSD case underscores the importance of understanding the boundaries of administrative power and the correct legal procedures for challenging administrative actions. The Supreme Court’s decision provides valuable guidance for future environmental disputes involving SEP Clearances and administrative functions.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Villanueva v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, G.R. No. 178347, February 25, 2013

February 25, 2013

Certiorari vs. Appeal: Choosing the Right Path in Labor Disputes

In Roberto Bordomeo, Jayme Sarmiento and Gregorio Barredo vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Secretary of Labor, and International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and cannot replace a regular appeal if the latter provides an adequate means of redress. This ruling emphasizes the importance of choosing the correct legal remedy and adhering to procedural rules in labor disputes.

Navigating Legal Pathways: Did These Workers Choose the Right Court?

The case revolves around a labor dispute at International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI), where the IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union) and the management reached a bargaining deadlock in 1989, leading to a strike and lockout. Over time, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued several orders to resolve the dispute, including decisions on December 26, 1990, and December 5, 1991. These orders addressed issues like the union’s bargaining agent status, unfair labor practice claims, and the reinstatement of certain employees with backwages.

However, the journey to execute these orders was far from smooth. The Union, along with individual employees, encountered numerous obstacles. These included challenges to the orders themselves and disputes over the computation and distribution of monetary awards. Regional Director Alan M. Macaraya of DOLE Region VII issued a Notice of Computation/Execution on April 12, 1995, directing IPI to pay P43,650,905.87 to 962 employees. Later, Assistant Regional Director Jalilo dela Torre issued writs of execution for specific amounts in favor of different groups of employees.

IPI contested these writs, and at one point, Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes even recalled the May 24, 1995 writ of execution. This decision was later reversed by DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, who reinstated the writ. Despite these legal maneuvers, some employees received payments and executed quitclaims. However, disputes continued regarding the full execution of the DOLE orders and the amounts still owed to various employees. The legal wrangling culminated in DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas affirming previous orders and declaring the case closed, a decision that prompted the petitioners to seek relief from the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court, in its analysis, focused on the procedural aspect of the case, particularly the remedy chosen by the petitioners. The Court emphasized that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy used to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available. The Court cited Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez, stating:

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.

The Court found that the petitioners had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law – an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This remedy would have allowed them to raise questions of law before the Supreme Court. By choosing certiorari, the petitioners bypassed the proper procedural route, leading to the dismissal of their petition.

Building on this principle, the Court reiterated the requirements for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, emphasizing that the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court noted that jurisprudence recognizes situations where certiorari may be proper, such as preventing irreparable damage or addressing issues of public interest. However, the petitioners failed to demonstrate that their case fell under any of these exceptions.

The Court also addressed the petitioners’ claim that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court stated:

In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not a merely reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order.

The Court found no evidence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA. It agreed with the CA’s assessment that the decisions and incidents concerning the case had long attained finality, and that the writs of execution had already been granted and executed.

Moreover, the Court refuted the petitioners’ claim that the writs of execution were only partially satisfied. It highlighted that the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado, including the petitioners, received their portion of the award, leading them to execute a satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release. The Court noted that the petitioners’ demand for separation pay and backwages beyond March 15, 1995, lacked legal basis, as the possibility of their reinstatement had terminated by that date. The court emphasized that the computation of separation pay and backwages should not extend beyond the date when employees were deemed actually separated from employment or when reinstatement became impossible.

The Court also clarified the distinction between backwages and separation pay, citing Golden Ace Builders v. Talde:

The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the petitioners properly availed themselves of the remedy of certiorari to challenge the Court of Appeals’ decision, or whether they should have pursued an appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
*What is certiorari, and when is it appropriate?*	Certiorari is an extraordinary legal remedy used to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. It is not a substitute for a regular appeal.
What is the difference between separation pay and backwages?	Separation pay is granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations between the employer and employee. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected due to unjust dismissal.
Why did the Supreme Court dismiss the petition?	The Supreme Court dismissed the petition because the petitioners had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—an appeal by petition for review on certiorari. They did not demonstrate that certiorari was necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or do substantial justice.
What was the significance of the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release?	The satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release executed by the employees, including the petitioners, after receiving their portion of the award, served as the basis for the DOLE Secretary to declare that the full satisfaction of the writ of execution completely closed and terminated the case.
Why were the petitioners’ claims for separation pay and backwages beyond March 15, 1995, rejected?	The claims were rejected because the possibility of their reinstatement had terminated by March 15, 1995. The computation of separation pay and backwages should not extend beyond the date when employees were deemed actually separated from employment or when reinstatement became impossible.
What should the petitioners have done differently?	The petitioners should have filed an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within the prescribed period, raising questions of law before the Supreme Court, instead of resorting to certiorari.
What is the practical implication of this ruling?	This ruling reinforces the principle that parties must choose the correct legal remedy and adhere to procedural rules. Failing to do so may result in the dismissal of their case, regardless of the merits of their underlying claims.

This case serves as a reminder of the importance of understanding the nuances of procedural law and selecting the appropriate remedy when seeking legal redress. The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the principle that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal and that parties must demonstrate the inadequacy of other remedies before resorting to this extraordinary writ.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Roberto Bordomeo, Jayme Sarmiento and Gregorio Barredo, Petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Secretary of Labor, and International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Respondents., G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013

February 20, 2013

Judicial Accountability vs. Erroneous Judgments: Protecting Judicial Independence in the Philippines

The Supreme Court, in this administrative case, ruled that judges and justices cannot be held administratively liable for every erroneous decision made in good faith. The complainants sought to hold Court of Appeals Justices liable for grave misconduct for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. This decision reinforces the principle that judicial officers must have the freedom to exercise their judgment without fear of reprisal for honest mistakes, ensuring the independence of the judiciary.

NADECOR’s Boardroom Battle: Can Justices Be Held Liable for Injunction Decisions?

This case arose from a dispute within the Nationwide Development Corporation (NADECOR), involving competing factions vying for control of the company’s gold-copper mining concession. The central issue revolves around whether Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. can be held administratively liable for grave misconduct in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction related to this corporate struggle. The complainants alleged that the Justices acted with grave misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and manifest partiality. This administrative complaint underscores the delicate balance between ensuring judicial accountability and preserving the independence required for judges to make impartial decisions.

The controversy stemmed from a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, wherein Justice Bato, acting as senior member of the Special 14th Division of the CA, granted a writ of preliminary injunction in four consolidated petitions. These petitions, CA-G.R. Nos. 122782, 122784, 122853, and 122854, involved disputes over the validity of NADECOR’s August 15, 2011 stockholders’ meeting. The complainants, Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson, and Angel S. Ong, who were elected to NADECOR’s Board of Directors, argued that Justice Bato “usurped” the office of ponente, which had been previously assigned to Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion. They further claimed that the injunction was granted without proper notice and hearing, and that the respondent Justices exhibited manifest partiality.

The factual backdrop involves a power struggle between two groups of stockholders: one led by Jose G. Ricafort and the other by Conrado T. Calalang. After the August 15, 2011 stockholders’ meeting, the Ricafort group sought to annul the meeting, alleging lack of proper notice. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City ruled in favor of the Ricafort group, declaring the stockholders’ meeting null and void. This decision prompted the filing of four separate petitions for certiorari in the CA by members of the new Board and NADECOR, each seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

Initially, the 15th Division of the CA denied the application for TRO, while the 11th Division granted a TRO in a related petition, highlighting the divergent views within the appellate court. This TRO ordered the preceding Board, elected in August 2010 (Old Board), to take over the company in a hold-over capacity. Subsequently, the four CA petitions were consolidated, leading to the assailed Resolution of the Special 14th Division, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction. Critically, this Resolution enjoined the Old Board from acting as a hold-over Board and allowed the New Board to continue acting as the Board of Directors, effectively altering the status quo.

The complainants argued that Justice Bato acted irregularly by penning the Resolution despite not being the assigned ponente and that the injunction was issued without proper notice and hearing, violating Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. They also contended that the effect of the injunction was not merely to preserve the status quo but to dispose of the main case on the merits. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing the procedural context and the authority of Justice Bato to act in his capacity as acting senior member of the Division.

The Supreme Court addressed the authority of Justice Bato, highlighting his valid designation as acting senior member of the 14th Division. The Court underscored that the designation was transparent and regular, evidenced by Office Order No. 201-12-ABR. This order authorized Justice Bato to act on all cases submitted to the 14th Division for final resolution and/or appropriate action, “except ponencia.” The Court clarified that a preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an interlocutory order, intended to preserve the status quo pending the resolution of the main case.

Further, the Supreme Court cited Section 4, Rule VI of the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA), which states that the requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the issuance of a resolution requiring the party sought to be enjoined to comment on the application within 10 days from notice. The Court found that the respondents had already been ordered to comment on the application and that the so-called “new and substantial matters” raised in the urgent motions were not previously unknown to them. The CA Special 14th Division was justified in dispensing with a separate hearing, given the urgency of the matter and the prior opportunity for the respondents to present their case.

The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of the complainants’ standing to challenge the injunctive writ. Citing Section 1 of Rule 19 and Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court emphasized that a person who is not a party to the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ or maintain an action for certiorari. The complainants, having failed to intervene in the CA petitions, lacked the requisite legal interest to assail the injunctive writ.

The Court reaffirmed the principle that a magistrate cannot be held administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous order issued in good faith. The decision referenced Cortes v. Sandiganbayan, which held that acts of a judge in a judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action unless tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. The remedy for an aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision to a higher court for review, not to file an administrative complaint, unless there is evidence of malice or dishonesty.

The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, reinforcing the importance of judicial independence and the need to protect judges from undue harassment for actions taken in good faith. This decision underscores that judicial accountability must be balanced with the need to allow judges to exercise their judgment freely and without fear of reprisal for honest mistakes. This ruling ensures the judiciary can operate effectively, making impartial decisions based on the law and evidence presented.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Court of Appeals Justices could be held administratively liable for grave misconduct for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction deemed erroneous by the complainants. The Supreme Court examined the balance between judicial accountability and independence.
What is a writ of preliminary injunction?	A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It is an ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are decided.
Why did the complainants file an administrative case?	The complainants believed the CA Justices acted with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and manifest partiality in issuing the preliminary injunction. They alleged that the Justices favored one side in the corporate dispute and disregarded proper procedure.
What is the significance of Justice Bato’s designation?	Justice Bato was designated as the acting senior member of the CA division while the regular senior member was on leave. This designation authorized him to act on cases submitted to the division, except for rendering a ponencia (main decision) in cases where he was not the assigned writer.
Did the CA Justices violate procedure in issuing the injunction?	The Supreme Court found that the CA Justices did not violate procedure. They were justified in dispensing with a separate hearing because the respondents had already been given an opportunity to comment on the application.
What does it mean to be a ‘ponente’ in a legal case?	The ponente is the justice or judge assigned to write the main decision in a case. The complainants argued that Justice Bato usurped the role of ponente, but the Supreme Court clarified that issuing a preliminary injunction is not the same as rendering a final decision.
Why did the Supreme Court dismiss the complaint?	The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint because the complainants lacked the legal standing to challenge the injunctive writ. They were not parties to the original CA petitions, and judges cannot be held liable for erroneous decisions made in good faith.
What is the ‘good faith’ doctrine in relation to judicial decisions?	The ‘good faith’ doctrine protects judges from liability for erroneous decisions rendered honestly and without malice or corrupt intent. This doctrine ensures that judges can exercise their judgment freely without fear of reprisal.
Can someone file an administrative case instead of an appeal?	Generally, an administrative case against a judge cannot substitute for an appeal. The proper remedy for an aggrieved party is to seek review of the decision by a higher court, unless there is evidence of fraud, malice, or dishonesty.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case safeguards judicial independence by clarifying that judges cannot be held administratively liable for good-faith errors in judgment. This ruling reinforces the principle that judicial accountability must be balanced with the need to allow judges to exercise their judgment freely and without fear of reprisal, thereby upholding the integrity and effectiveness of the Philippine judiciary.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 55597, February 19, 2013

February 19, 2013

Certiorari Limitations: When Can Courts Review Administrative Decisions?

The Supreme Court clarified the scope of certiorari in reviewing administrative decisions. The Court emphasized that certiorari is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors, not mere errors of judgment correctable by appeal. This means that appellate courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of administrative bodies unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, lack of jurisdiction, or excess of jurisdiction.

GSIS vs. Tesoro: Did the CA Overstep Its Certiorari Authority?

This case revolves around the administrative charges filed by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) against Rudy C. Tesoro, its Senior Vice-President of the Field Operations Group (SVP-FOG), regarding alleged irregularities in the award of a construction contract for the GSIS Iloilo City Field Office (GSIS-ICFO) building. The controversy began when Winston F. Garcia, then GSIS President and General Manager, reassigned Tesoro shortly after Tesoro approved the disbursement voucher for the mobilization fee of Embrocal Builders, Inc., the contractor chosen for the project. Embrocal had submitted the highest bid. Losing bidders protested, leading to an investigation revealing non-compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act.

Consequently, Tesoro was charged with gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct. Dissatisfied, Tesoro filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the legality of the formal charge and his preventive suspension. While the administrative proceedings continued, the GSIS found Tesoro guilty and dismissed him from service. The CA, however, modified the GSIS decision, finding Tesoro guilty only of simple neglect of duty and ordering his reinstatement with backwages. The GSIS, under Garcia, then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA had overstepped its authority in a certiorari proceeding.

The Supreme Court agreed with the GSIS, reiterating the limited scope of certiorari. The Court emphasized that certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment but only to address acts performed without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court cited People v. Court of Appeals, emphasizing that an appellate court acts with grave abuse of discretion when it ventures beyond its authority in certiorari proceedings to review perceived errors of the trial court correctable only by appeal by writ of error.

The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by writ of error.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court clarified that as long as the administrative body, in this case, the GSIS, acted within its jurisdiction, any errors committed in the exercise of its discretion would amount to mere errors of judgment, correctable by appeal, not certiorari. The proper recourse for Tesoro was to appeal the GSIS decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which he initially did before withdrawing his appeal. By resolving the merits of the administrative case despite Tesoro’s pending appeal before the CSC, the CA exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court then addressed the procedural issue of the GSIS’s delayed motion for reconsideration before the CA. While the general rule, as established in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson, is that a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period to appeal, the Court acknowledged exceptions in the interest of substantial justice. Citing Barnes v. Padilla, the Court found that the procedural lapse was not entirely attributable to the GSIS’s fault, as the lawyer in charge had a valid reason for the delay due to a family emergency. More importantly, the Court emphasized that a careful study of the merits of the case warranted a suspension of the rules.

The Court also highlighted the importance of exhausting administrative remedies before resorting to judicial intervention. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires parties to seek relief from the administrative agencies tasked with the matter before resorting to the courts. This is because administrative agencies are presumed to have expertise in their respective fields, and allowing them to resolve the issues first promotes judicial efficiency and respect for the administrative process. However, the Court recognized exceptions to this rule, such as when purely legal questions are involved or when there is a violation of due process.

In this case, the Court found that the CA erred in not applying the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Tesoro should have first appealed the GSIS decision to the CSC before seeking judicial intervention. The CA’s decision to resolve the merits of the administrative case, despite the availability of an administrative remedy, was premature and unwarranted.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding by reviewing the merits of an administrative decision and substituting its judgment for that of the administrative body.
What is certiorari and what is its scope?	Certiorari is a special civil action used to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. It is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors, not errors of judgment that can be corrected by appeal.
What is grave abuse of discretion?	Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
What is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies?	This principle requires parties to seek relief from the administrative agencies tasked with the matter before resorting to the courts. It promotes judicial efficiency and respect for the administrative process.
What are the exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies?	Exceptions include cases involving purely legal questions, violations of due process, or when further administrative remedies are futile.
What was the CA’s error in this case?	The CA erred by reviewing the merits of the administrative case and finding Tesoro guilty of a lesser offense, despite the availability of an administrative remedy (appeal to the CSC).
Why was the GSIS’s motion for reconsideration considered despite being filed late?	The Supreme Court suspended the rules of procedure because the delay was due to a valid reason (family emergency) and because the merits of the case warranted a review.
What was the Supreme Court’s ruling?	The Supreme Court ruled that the CA exceeded its certiorari jurisdiction and reinstated the GSIS decision finding Tesoro guilty of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcia v. Court of Appeals and Tesoro serves as a reminder of the limits of certiorari and the importance of adhering to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This case emphasizes that courts should not interfere with administrative decisions unless there is a clear showing of jurisdictional error or grave abuse of discretion. Instead, parties should exhaust all available administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Winston F. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro, G.R. No. 169005, January 28, 2013

January 28, 2013

Judicial Immunity: When Can Judges Be Held Liable for Their Decisions?

The Supreme Court ruled in this case that administrative complaints against judges are not the proper avenue to address alleged errors in their judicial functions. Instead, parties must pursue available judicial remedies, such as appeals or petitions for certiorari. The Court emphasized that disciplinary proceedings should not substitute judicial remedies and can only proceed if there’s evidence of bad faith, dishonesty, or corruption, which was not sufficiently demonstrated in this case.

Challenging Judicial Decisions: Seeking Justice or Undermining the Courts?

The case revolves around an administrative complaint filed by AMA Land, Inc. (AMALI) against Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser, Sesinando E. Villon, and Ricardo R. Rosario. AMALI accused the justices of dishonesty, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, gross misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. This stemmed from a CA decision that favored Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI) by enjoining AMALI’s construction project pending a right-of-way determination. The core legal question is whether an administrative complaint is the correct way to challenge a court’s decision or if AMALI should have exhausted all available judicial remedies before filing an administrative complaint against the justices.

The dispute began when AMALI started constructing a 37-floor building in Mandaluyong City, intending to use Fordham Street, owned by WWRAI, as an access road. WWRAI objected, leading AMALI to file a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig to enforce an easement of right of way. WWRAI countered that AMALI’s project violated zoning ordinances and sought an injunction to halt the construction. The RTC initially granted AMALI’s request to use Fordham Street, but the situation evolved when AMALI faced financial difficulties and sought corporate rehabilitation. WWRAI then attempted to revive its counterclaim for an injunction, which the RTC denied.

Meanwhile, AMALI obtained an amended building permit, but WWRAI continued to challenge the project’s legality through various legal avenues, including a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted WWRAI’s petition and directed the RTC-Pasig to issue an injunctive writ, which led to AMALI’s administrative complaint against the CA justices. The Supreme Court addressed the critical issue of whether errors committed by a judge in their judicial capacity can be corrected through administrative proceedings. The Court has consistently held that judicial remedies, such as appeals, should be exhausted first. This principle prevents disciplinary proceedings from being used as a substitute for judicial review.

“Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies.”

The Supreme Court emphasized that disciplinary actions against judges are not meant to complement or replace judicial remedies. Resorting to administrative measures requires exhausting judicial remedies and obtaining a final ruling. This ensures that the judge’s actions are first assessed through the proper legal channels. Only if the act is deemed incorrect can further measures be considered. The procedural posture of the case was critical. AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the CA justices’ decision, which was still pending before the Supreme Court. Therefore, deciding the administrative case prematurely would be inappropriate.

Even if the CA’s decision was later found to be erroneous, the Supreme Court noted that administrative liability would only arise if the justices acted in bad faith, with dishonesty, or with corrupt motives. The Court stated that these elements were not sufficiently proven in this case. There was no clear indication of bias or partiality, which requires demonstrating arbitrariness or prejudice. The Court held that adverse judgments alone do not imply bad faith or malice, stating:

“Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party.”

The Supreme Court also cautioned against abusing court processes by prematurely resorting to administrative disciplinary actions. Such actions can disrupt the administration of justice and overburden the courts. Litigants must adhere to established legal rules and avoid misusing court processes to pursue their rights. The Court ultimately dismissed the administrative complaint, finding it without merit, and cautioned AMALI against filing similar unfounded actions in the future. This decision reinforces the principle of judicial immunity and underscores the importance of exhausting judicial remedies before pursuing administrative complaints against judges.

The practical implications of this ruling are significant for litigants and the judiciary. It clarifies the boundaries between judicial review and administrative oversight of judicial conduct. It emphasizes that parties aggrieved by a court’s decision must first pursue available judicial remedies before seeking administrative sanctions against the judge. This prevents the misuse of administrative complaints as a tool to harass judges or circumvent the appellate process. It also protects judicial independence by ensuring that judges are not unduly influenced by the threat of administrative action when making decisions.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether an administrative complaint is the proper remedy to challenge a Court of Appeals decision or if judicial remedies must be exhausted first. The Court ruled that judicial remedies must be exhausted before filing an administrative complaint against a judge.
What were the charges against the CA justices?	The charges included dishonesty, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, gross misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. These charges stemmed from their decision in favor of Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.
What was the basis of AMALI’s complaint?	AMALI claimed the CA justices acted with bias and bad faith in granting WWRAI’s petition, which effectively halted AMALI’s construction project. AMALI argued that the CA justices overstepped their jurisdiction and misapplied the law.
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint against the CA justices, finding it without merit. The Court emphasized that AMALI should have pursued judicial remedies before resorting to administrative action.
What is the significance of exhausting judicial remedies?	Exhausting judicial remedies ensures that errors in judicial decisions are first addressed through the appellate process. It prevents the misuse of administrative complaints to harass judges or circumvent judicial review.
When can administrative liability attach to a judge’s actions?	Administrative liability can attach if a judge’s actions are motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, or corruption. Mere errors in judgment are not sufficient grounds for administrative sanctions.
What is the role of judicial independence in this context?	Judicial independence is protected by ensuring that judges are not unduly influenced by the threat of administrative action when making decisions. This allows judges to exercise their judgment freely and impartially.
What was the outcome for AMA Land, Inc.?	AMA Land, Inc.’s administrative complaint was dismissed, and the company was cautioned against filing similar unfounded actions in the future. The Supreme Court emphasized that AMALI must follow proper legal channels to seek redress.

This case underscores the importance of respecting the judicial process and adhering to established legal rules. While litigants have the right to seek redress for perceived injustices, they must do so through the appropriate channels and avoid misusing administrative actions to undermine the integrity of the judiciary.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF AMA LAND, INC. AGAINST HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, ET AL., A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J, January 15, 2013

January 15, 2013

Interlocutory Orders and Certiorari: Understanding the Boundaries of Judicial Review in Election Cases

The Supreme Court has affirmed that interlocutory orders from the COMELEC First Division are not directly appealable via certiorari. This means that parties must await the final decision of the COMELEC en banc before seeking Supreme Court review, ensuring a complete and efficient resolution process. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to established procedural rules in election disputes, preventing piecemeal appeals and streamlining the judicial process.

Can a Technicality Trump the Electoral Process? A Case of Disputed Ballots in Tawi-Tawi

This case revolves around the contested gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial elections in Tawi-Tawi, where losing candidates alleged widespread irregularities and sought a technical examination of election paraphernalia. The petitioners, the proclaimed governor and vice-governor, challenged a COMELEC order allowing this examination, arguing it violated their due process rights and lacked proper legal basis. At the heart of the matter is whether an interlocutory order—a decision on a specific issue within a larger case—can be immediately challenged in the Supreme Court, or if it must first go through the full administrative process within the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

The Supreme Court addressed the procedural question of whether an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC can be directly assailed through a special civil action for certiorari. The Court firmly stated that such a direct challenge is not permissible. It emphasized that the proper recourse is to seek review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the Division’s final decision. This stance is rooted in the constitutional framework that defines the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over election cases. Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution explicitly states that any decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, but this applies to the Commission en banc, not individual divisions.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court clarified this point, emphasizing that its power of review extends only to final orders, rulings, and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The ruling underscores that this decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, not of a division, and certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Court reinforced that it lacks the authority to review, via certiorari, either an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the Commission on Elections.

Furthermore, the Court pointed out that Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is considered a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. The Court also noted that a decision, order, or resolution of a division of the COMELEC must be reviewed by the COMELEC en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.

The petitioners attempted to rely on the case of Kho v. COMELEC to support their claim that the Supreme Court could take cognizance of their petition. However, the Supreme Court distinguished the present case from Kho, explaining that the exception carved out in Kho applies only when a Division of the COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and the subject matter of the controversy does not fall under the instances where the COMELEC en banc should take cognizance. In this instance, the COMELEC First Division had the authority to act on the ex-parte motion for the technical examination of the election paraphernalia, as it had already acquired jurisdiction over the election protests filed by the private respondents.

Addressing the petitioners’ claim of a denial of due process, the Court clarified that the COMELEC is not obligated to notify and direct a party to file an opposition to a motion filed by the other party in election disputes. It is incumbent upon the party concerned to file an opposition within five days from receipt of a copy of the motion, if they deem it necessary, without awaiting a directive from the COMELEC. Section 3, Rule 9 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 clearly outlines this procedure.

The Court emphasized that expediency is a critical factor in election protests, and proceedings should not be hampered by unnecessary procedural delays. The petitioners failed to file a timely opposition to the motion for technical examination, and only raised their objections in a motion for reconsideration after the COMELEC First Division issued its order. The Supreme Court therefore found that the petitioners, not the COMELEC First Division, were responsible for their predicament. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioners were able to present their opposition to the motion for technical examination in their manifestation and motion for reconsideration, which were exhaustively discussed by the COMELEC First Division in its resolution.

Regarding the technical examination of election paraphernalia, the petitioners argued that the COMELEC First Division could not order such an examination because there was no specific published rule authorizing it. The Court acknowledged that Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 does not expressly authorize the conduct of technical examination of election paraphernalia. However, the Court emphasized that the absence of such a specific rule does not mean that the COMELEC First Division lacks the power to order the conduct of such technical examination.

The power of the COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination of election paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from its “exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials”. This constitutional grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election protests inherently includes the grant of all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly granted. The exclusive original jurisdiction conferred upon the COMELEC to settle election protests includes the authority to order a technical examination of relevant election paraphernalia, election returns, and ballots in order to determine whether fraud and irregularities attended the canvass of the votes.

The Supreme Court highlighted the COMELEC’s duty to resolve election cases expeditiously and its authority to resort to every reasonable and efficient means available to settle the controversy. The technical examination ordered by the COMELEC First Division, by comparing signatures and thumbprints on the EDCVL, VRRs, and Book of Voters, was deemed a reasonable, efficient, and expeditious means of determining the truth or falsity of allegations of fraud and irregularities in the canvass of votes. Consequently, the Court concluded that the COMELEC First Division did not abuse its discretion in allowing the technical examination of the election paraphernalia.

FAQs

What was the main issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the Supreme Court could directly review an interlocutory order issued by a division of the COMELEC in an election protest case.
What is an interlocutory order?	An interlocutory order is a decision made by a court or administrative body that deals with a specific issue within a larger case, but does not resolve the entire case.
Can you appeal an interlocutory order directly to the Supreme Court?	Generally, no. The Supreme Court held that interlocutory orders from a COMELEC division must first be appealed to the COMELEC en banc before reaching the Supreme Court.
*What is the role of the COMELEC en banc* in this process?**	The COMELEC en banc reviews decisions and orders made by its divisions. It must rule on a motion for reconsideration before a case can be elevated to the Supreme Court.
What did the petitioners argue regarding due process?	The petitioners claimed they were denied due process because they weren’t given a chance to oppose the motion for technical examination before it was granted.
How did the court address the due process argument?	The Court stated that the COMELEC is not required to solicit oppositions and that the petitioners had an opportunity to object but failed to do so in a timely manner.
What was the significance of the technical examination of election paraphernalia?	It was a method to verify the integrity of the election process by comparing signatures and thumbprints on election documents to uncover potential fraud or irregularities.
Did the COMELEC have the authority to order the technical examination?	Yes, the Court ruled that the COMELEC’s authority to resolve election protests includes the power to order technical examinations to ascertain the validity of election results.
*What is the Kho v. COMELEC* case and why was it mentioned?**	Kho v. COMELEC is a prior Supreme Court case that provides an exception allowing direct appeal to the Supreme Court when a COMELEC division acts with grave abuse of discretion. However, the court found it inapplicable in this case.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the established protocols for appealing COMELEC decisions, emphasizing the importance of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. This ruling ensures a more streamlined and efficient resolution of election disputes, underscoring the COMELEC’s authority to employ necessary means, such as technical examinations, to ascertain the true will of the electorate.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 201796, January 15, 2013

January 15, 2013

Election Gun Ban: Upholding Restrictions Despite Procedural Errors

The Supreme Court in Escalante v. People addressed the complexities of procedural law concerning appeals. The Court ruled that failure to file a timely appeal results in the finality of the lower court’s decision, even if the imposed penalty was incorrect. The case underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules, particularly the strict deadlines for filing appeals, as these rules ensure order and prevent endless litigation. Though the Court acknowledged an error in the penalty imposed for violating the election gun ban, it could not rectify the mistake due to the decision’s finality, highlighting the delicate balance between justice and adherence to legal procedure.

When Does a Missed Deadline Mean a Lost Case?

Raul B. Escalante, then the Municipal Mayor of Almagro, Samar, found himself embroiled in legal trouble following a fiesta celebration in Barangay Biasong on April 3, 1995. During the event, Escalante allegedly possessed a firearm, leading to charges of violating Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, and Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended, for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

The prosecution presented evidence that Escalante, while a guest of honor, brandished a firearm after being heckled during a speech. Conversely, the defense claimed that the firearm belonged to a police officer, and any possession by Escalante was merely incidental when he tried to disarm the officer. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Escalante on both charges, but the Court of Appeals (CA) later dismissed the illegal possession charge, affirming only the conviction for violating the election gun ban.

Escalante then sought to appeal his remaining conviction to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This legal maneuver proved fatal because the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of following the correct procedure for appeals. The proper remedy, according to the Court, was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which Escalante had failed to file within the prescribed 15-day period. This failure to adhere to the rules of court sealed Escalante’s fate, despite a recognized error in the imposed penalty.

The Supreme Court cited Fortune Guarantee and Ins. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, emphasizing that decisions of the CA, regardless of the case’s nature, may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court noted the mandatory nature of perfecting an appeal within the period prescribed by law, referencing Lapulapu Devt. & Housing Corp. v. Group Mgt. Corp. The Court underscored that failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and, therefore, unappealable.

A key principle highlighted in this case is the doctrine of finality of judgment. Once a decision becomes final, it is immutable and unalterable, regardless of any errors in fact or law, as stated in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The Court stressed that a special civil action under Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost remedy of appeal, especially when that loss is due to neglect or an error in choosing the correct remedy, citing Talento v. Escalada, Jr.

Even if the Court were to consider the merits of Escalante’s claim, it would still be dismissed. Escalante argued that he did not possess the firearm with the intent necessary for a conviction under the election gun ban. However, the Court reiterated that questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari, as held in Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. v. Lerma. This limitation prevented the Court from re-evaluating the factual findings of the lower courts regarding Escalante’s possession of the firearm.

The Court pointed out a significant error in the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Section 264 of BP 881 prescribes imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years for election offenses. Moreover, Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law requires an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term not exceeding the law’s maximum and a minimum term not less than the law’s minimum. The lower courts had imposed a straight penalty of one year, which did not comply with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Unfortunately, due to the decision’s finality, the Supreme Court could not correct this error.

The facts of the case revealed conflicting accounts of the events of April 3, 1995. The prosecution’s version depicted Escalante brandishing a firearm and firing a shot, while the defense claimed that Escalante was merely trying to disarm a police officer when a shot was accidentally fired. The RTC and CA credited the prosecution’s version, and the Supreme Court, constrained by procedural rules and the nature of certiorari, could not disturb these factual findings.

The Court acknowledged a significant error in the lower court’s imposition of a straight one-year sentence, rather than an indeterminate sentence as required by law. The law dictates that the penalty for violating the election gun ban should fall within the range of one to six years, allowing for judicial discretion based on the circumstances. However, the Court’s hands were tied by the finality of the lower court’s decision, preventing any modification of the sentence.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Supreme Court could review the Court of Appeals’ decision despite the petitioner’s failure to file a timely appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
What is the election gun ban?	The election gun ban is a prohibition on carrying firearms during a designated period before and after an election, aimed at preventing violence and ensuring a peaceful election process. It is outlined in Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code.
What is a petition for certiorari?	A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action used to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by a lower court or tribunal, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is not a substitute for a regular appeal.
Why couldn’t the Supreme Court correct the penalty?	The Supreme Court couldn’t correct the penalty because the Court of Appeals’ decision had already become final and executory due to the petitioner’s failure to file a timely appeal. Under the doctrine of finality of judgment, a final decision is immutable and unalterable.
What is the Indeterminate Sentence Law?	The Indeterminate Sentence Law requires courts to impose a sentence with a minimum and maximum term, rather than a fixed term, to allow for parole and rehabilitation. This law aims to individualize punishment and encourage reformation of offenders.
What was the procedural mistake made by the petitioner?	The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and failed to file it within the 15-day period. This procedural error led to the dismissal of the petition.
What is the significance of the doctrine of finality of judgment?	The doctrine of finality of judgment ensures that once a case is decided and the decision becomes final, it cannot be altered or modified, even if there are errors. This promotes stability and prevents endless litigation.
Can factual findings of lower courts be reviewed in a certiorari petition?	Generally, no. A certiorari petition is limited to questions of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not to re-evaluation of factual findings made by the lower courts.

Escalante v. People serves as a critical reminder of the importance of adhering to procedural rules in legal proceedings. The case underscores that even if errors are identified, the courts may be powerless to act if proper procedures and deadlines are not met. This case reinforces the need for diligent compliance with legal processes to ensure the protection of one’s rights.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Raul B. Escalante vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192727, January 09, 2013

January 9, 2013