ASG Law

Tag: Collective Bargaining Agreement

  • Master’s Degree Requirement for College Faculty: Upholding Educational Standards Over Collective Bargaining Agreements

    The Supreme Court affirmed that a Master’s degree is a mandatory requirement for college faculty members, reinforcing the government’s authority to ensure quality education. The Court held that a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) cannot override this requirement, as the pursuit of high educational standards is of public interest. This ruling emphasizes that educational institutions must prioritize qualified educators, and CBAs must align with existing laws and regulations to maintain the integrity of higher education.

    Whose Rules Apply? Tenure, CBAs, and the Pursuit of Qualified Professors

    This case revolves around the employment of Raymond A. Son, Raymond S. Antiola, and Wilfredo E. Pollarco, who were full-time professors at the University of Santo Tomas (UST). UST, like other higher education institutions, operates under the regulatory authority of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The central conflict emerges from the professors’ lack of the Master’s degree typically required for their positions. Although the university hired them, they were unable to obtain the said degree within the prescribed period. The professors argued that they had acquired tenure by default under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the UST Faculty Union. This CBA provision stated that faculty members serving six consecutive semesters on a full-time basis, despite lacking a master’s degree, could be considered tenured. The critical legal question is whether a CBA can supersede the CHED’s regulations regarding faculty qualifications, particularly the requirement for a Master’s degree.

    The situation was further complicated by CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08, which mandated the strict implementation of minimum qualifications for faculty members, including the Master’s degree requirement. UST, acting on this memorandum, decided not to renew the appointments of faculty members who had not completed their Master’s degrees. The professors argued that this decision violated their tenurial rights under the CBA. Respondents countered that the CHED Memorandum Order took precedence over the CBA. The Labor Arbiter initially ruled in favor of the professors, upholding the CBA provision. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed this decision, aligning with the CHED Memorandum Order, until the Court of Appeals sided with UST, emphasizing the importance of academic freedom and regulatory compliance in education.

    The Supreme Court centered its analysis on the interplay between contractual agreements and regulatory mandates. The Court emphasized that the requirement of a Master’s degree for undergraduate program professors has been in place since 1992 through DECS Order 92. This order, issued under the Education Act of 1982, carries the force and effect of law. The court quoted University of the East v. Pepanio, stating that the masteral degree requirement for tertiary education teachers is reasonable and aligns with public interest. The CBA provision regarding tenure by default was deemed void because it conflicted with the then-existing 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. The Court highlighted that a void contract produces no civil effect, citing Article 1409 of the Civil Code, which states that contracts with objects contrary to law are void from the beginning.

    Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

    (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;

    The Supreme Court then addressed the argument that CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 was being applied retroactively. The Court clarified that the memorandum merely reiterated the existing requirement of a masteral degree. Petitioners were found unqualified to teach in UST’s undergraduate programs due to their failure to obtain the said master’s degrees despite having ample time to do so. The Court stated that both parties were, in a way, violating the law. UST was maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, while the professors agreed to be employed despite knowing their lack of qualifications. The Court invoked the doctrine of pari delicto, stating that neither party could seek legal aid from the Court under these circumstances.

    Latin for ‘in equal fault,’ in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto. Under the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims “ex dolo malo nonoritur actio” and “in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.”

    The Court further emphasized that the minimum requirement of a Master’s degree had been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. It was clarified that any inaction from the government to strictly enforce this requirement did not erase the violations committed by educational institutions or the parties involved. The Court dismissed the argument that UST was in estoppel or had waived the application of CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 by agreeing to the tenure by default provision in the CBA. Such a waiver, the Court reasoned, would be contrary to law and would prejudice the rights of students and the public, who have a right to expect quality education from qualified personnel. The Supreme Court emphasized its previous rulings in cases like University of the East v. Pepanio and Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica’s College, which affirmed the mandatory nature of these qualifications.

    Building on this principle, the Court explicitly stated that UST’s decision not to renew the professors’ appointments was a valid exercise of academic freedom and management prerogative. Academic freedom, as enshrined in the Constitution, includes the right of educational institutions to determine who may teach and to set standards for their faculty. This extends to the school’s prerogative to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers to fulfill the constitutional mandate of quality education. The Court recognized that protecting the rights of laborers should not lead to the oppression or self-destruction of the employer, highlighting the need for a balanced approach that respects both employee rights and institutional autonomy.

    The practical implications of this ruling are significant for both educational institutions and faculty members. Educational institutions must ensure that their faculty meet the minimum qualifications set by regulatory bodies like CHED. Institutions can’t circumvent these requirements through Collective Bargaining Agreements or other contractual arrangements. Faculty members need to be aware of the qualifications required for their positions and take the necessary steps to meet them. The decision underscores the importance of aligning CBAs with existing laws and regulations, preventing conflicts that could compromise educational standards. Ultimately, this ruling reinforces the state’s authority to regulate and supervise educational institutions to protect the public interest and ensure quality education.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) could supersede the Commission on Higher Education’s (CHED) regulations regarding the minimum qualifications for college faculty, specifically the requirement for a Master’s degree.
    What did the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) state? The UST-UST Faculty Union CBA had a provision that allowed faculty members who served six consecutive semesters on a full-time basis to acquire tenure, even if they did not possess the required Master’s degree.
    What did CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 mandate? CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 directed the strict implementation of minimum qualifications for faculty members in undergraduate programs, including the requirement of possessing a Master’s degree.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling? The Supreme Court ruled that the CHED Memorandum Order took precedence over the CBA, meaning that the Master’s degree requirement was mandatory and could not be overridden by a contractual agreement.
    What is the doctrine of pari delicto? The doctrine of pari delicto states that when two parties are equally at fault in an illegal agreement, neither party can seek legal relief from the courts; the courts will leave them as they are. In this case, both the university and the professors were considered at fault – the university for hiring unqualified personnel and the professors for accepting employment without meeting the qualifications.
    What is academic freedom, and how does it apply to this case? Academic freedom is the right of educational institutions to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. In this case, the Court recognized that UST’s decision not to renew the professors’ appointments was a valid exercise of academic freedom.
    What is the significance of DECS Order 92, Series of 1992? DECS Order 92, Series of 1992, also known as the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, established the minimum qualifications for faculty members, including the requirement of a Master’s degree. This order has the force and effect of law.
    Can faculty members waive the Master’s degree requirement through a CBA? No, the Supreme Court ruled that the Master’s degree requirement cannot be waived through a CBA, as such a waiver would be contrary to law and would prejudice the rights of students and the public to receive quality education from qualified personnel.

    This case underscores the importance of adhering to regulatory standards in the field of education. While collective bargaining agreements provide a framework for labor relations, they cannot undermine the state’s power to ensure quality education through mandated qualifications. Institutions and educators alike must be vigilant in upholding these standards to maintain the integrity of the educational system.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Raymond A. Son, et al. v. University of Santo Tomas, G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018

  • Retrenchment During Rehabilitation: When Financial Statements Aren’t Always Required

    In a retrenchment, employers often need to prove they’re suffering severe financial losses. But what happens when a company is already under corporate rehabilitation? The Supreme Court clarified that in such cases, presenting audited financial statements isn’t always necessary. The Court emphasized that judicial notice can be taken of the financial difficulties of a company undergoing rehabilitation, streamlining the requirements for retrenchment in these specific circumstances. This ruling provides clarity for businesses undergoing financial restructuring and offers a more practical approach to labor disputes arising from retrenchment during corporate rehabilitation.

    From Skies to Courtroom: When PAL’s Financial Turbulence Met Labor Laws

    This case revolves around the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) and Philippine Airlines (PAL). In 1998, PAL implemented a retrenchment program, leading to the termination of numerous cabin crew personnel. FASAP challenged the legality of this retrenchment, arguing that PAL had not sufficiently proven its financial losses and had unfairly implemented the program. The initial legal battles saw conflicting decisions, with the Court of Appeals siding with PAL, while the Supreme Court’s Third Division initially favored FASAP. The central legal question became whether PAL had lawfully retrenched its employees, considering its financial status and the procedures it followed.

    The Supreme Court ultimately sided with PAL, reversing its earlier decision and affirming the Court of Appeals’ ruling. The Court recognized that PAL’s admission into corporate rehabilitation was sufficient evidence of its financial difficulties. This admission, coupled with FASAP’s own acknowledgment of PAL’s financial woes, relieved PAL of the burden of presenting audited financial statements to prove its losses. The Court emphasized that while audited financial statements are typically essential for establishing financial distress, they are not the exclusive means of doing so. In situations where a company is undergoing corporate rehabilitation, judicial notice can be taken of its financial condition.

    Building on this principle, the Court discussed that PAL acted in good faith when implementing the retrenchment program. The Court stated that PAL had consulted with FASAP prior to the retrenchment, and its decision to implement “Plan 22” instead of “Plan 14” was a legitimate exercise of management prerogative. The Court further held that PAL used fair and reasonable criteria in selecting the employees to be retrenched, adhering to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with FASAP. This adheres to the existing jurisprudence about financial stability during a crisis.

    The Court also upheld the validity of the quitclaims signed by the retrenched employees. Finding that the quitclaims met the requirements for validity, including a fixed amount as full and final settlement, a clear explanation of the benefits being relinquished, and a statement that the employees signed the document voluntarily and with full understanding, and found no evidence of duress or coercion. As such, a valid exercise of one’s business does not translate to any employer liability.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Philippine Airlines (PAL) lawfully retrenched its employees, considering its financial status and the procedures it followed, especially given its admission into corporate rehabilitation.
    Did PAL need to present audited financial statements to justify the retrenchment? The Supreme Court said no; because FASAP admitted PAL’s financial troubles and the company was already under corporate rehabilitation, it was unnecessary to present audited financial statements.
    What is judicial notice, and how did it apply in this case? Judicial notice is when a court recognizes certain facts without formal proof. In this case, the Court took judicial notice of PAL’s financial difficulties due to its ongoing rehabilitation proceedings.
    What criteria did PAL use to select employees for retrenchment? PAL used both efficiency ratings and inverse seniority, adhering to the terms outlined in its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with FASAP, ensuring a structured and equitable approach.
    Were the quitclaims signed by the retrenched employees considered valid? Yes, the Court upheld the validity of the quitclaims, finding that they met the required legal standards for informed consent and fair consideration.
    What does it mean for a company to undergo corporate rehabilitation? Corporate rehabilitation is a legal process where a financially distressed company undergoes restructuring to regain solvency. The SEC’s order alone sufficiently established PAL’s grave financial status.
    What is retrenchment? Retrenchment is the termination of employment due to business losses or to prevent losses, a measure used by employers to minimize business costs. It must follow specific legal guidelines to be considered lawful.
    What requirements must be met for a retrenchment to be lawful? The retrenchment must be necessary, the losses substantial, supported by sufficient evidence, done in good faith, and based on fair and reasonable criteria.

    This Supreme Court decision offers crucial guidance for employers facing financial difficulties and considering retrenchment. By recognizing the validity of alternative forms of evidence during corporate rehabilitation, the Court struck a balance between protecting workers’ rights and acknowledging the realities of business operations. This ruling underscores the importance of good faith, transparency, and adherence to CBA provisions in implementing retrenchment programs. For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP) vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., ET AL., G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018

  • CBA vs. Bank Policy: Protecting Workers’ Rights Against Unilateral Changes in Loan Terms

    The Supreme Court ruled that Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) could not unilaterally impose a credit-checking requirement on its employees’ salary loan applications when that requirement was not part of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). This decision underscores the importance of adhering to negotiated agreements and protecting workers from arbitrary changes to their benefits. The court emphasized that a CBA is the law between the parties and cannot be modified without mutual consent, safeguarding the rights of employees to participate in decisions affecting their welfare.

    When a Bank’s Loan Plan Clashes with a Union’s Collective Bargaining: Who Prevails?

    In this case, the Hongkong Bank Independent Labor Union (HBILU) challenged HSBC’s implementation of a credit-checking requirement for salary loans, arguing that it violated the existing CBA. The CBA, which governed the terms and conditions of employment between HSBC and its employees, did not include any provision for external credit checks as a prerequisite for loan approval. HSBC, however, contended that the credit check was part of its Financial Assistance Plan (Plan), which had been approved by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and was therefore a valid condition for granting loans.

    The heart of the dispute revolved around the interplay between the CBA, a negotiated agreement between the employer and employees, and the Plan, a policy implemented by the bank with the approval of the BSP. The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether HSBC could unilaterally impose a condition not found in the CBA, even if that condition was part of a BSP-approved plan. To fully understand this issue, it is crucial to examine the facts of the case, the relevant legal framework, and the court’s reasoning.

    The factual background reveals that in 2001, the BSP issued the Manual of Regulations for Banks (MoRB), which allowed banks to provide financial assistance to their employees, subject to BSP approval of the financing plans. HSBC subsequently submitted its Financial Assistance Plan to the BSP, which included a credit-checking proviso. The BSP approved this plan in 2003. Over the years, the plan underwent several amendments, all approved by the BSP. Meanwhile, HBILU and HSBC entered into a CBA covering the period from April 1, 2010, to March 31, 2012. Article XI of the CBA outlined the terms for salary loans, but it did not mention any requirement for external credit checks.

    During negotiations for a new CBA, HSBC proposed amendments to Article XI to align it with the BSP-approved Plan. These amendments sought to include the phrase “Based on the Financial Assistance Plan duly approved by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)” in the loan provisions and to explicitly subject loan availment to employees’ credit ratios. HBILU objected to these amendments, arguing that they would curtail its members’ access to salary loans and violate BSP regulations. Faced with the union’s opposition, HSBC withdrew its proposed amendments, and Article XI remained unchanged.

    Despite withdrawing the proposal, HSBC sent an email to its employees on April 20, 2012, announcing the enforcement of the Plan, including the credit-checking provisions. This email stated that adverse findings from external credit checks could result in the disapproval of loan applications. Subsequently, in September 2012, HBILU member Vince Mananghaya applied for a loan under Article XI of the CBA. His application was denied due to adverse findings from the external credit check. HBILU then raised this denial as a grievance issue, arguing that the credit check was an additional requirement not sanctioned by the CBA.

    The Supreme Court, in its analysis, emphasized the constitutional right of employees to collective bargaining and participation in decision-making processes affecting their benefits. According to Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the State shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities. Furthermore, workers shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. These constitutional provisions underscore the importance of protecting workers’ rights to negotiate and participate in decisions that impact their employment terms.

    The court also cited Article 253 of the Labor Code, which prohibits either party from terminating or modifying a CBA during its lifetime. This provision is crucial for maintaining stability and predictability in labor relations. The Court argued that tolerating HSBC’s conduct would be tantamount to allowing a blatant circumvention of Article 253 of the Labor Code. It would contravene the express prohibition against the unilateral modification of a CBA during its subsistence and even thereafter until a new agreement is reached. It would unduly license HSBC to add, modify, and ultimately further restrict the grant of Salary Loans beyond the terms of the CBA by simply adding stringent requirements in its Plan, and having the said Plan approved by BSP in the guise of compliance with the MoRB.

    The Supreme Court found that HSBC’s enforcement of the credit-checking requirement was a unilateral modification of the CBA. The court emphasized that the Plan was never made part of the CBA, and HBILU had vehemently rejected its incorporation. Thus, the bank could not unilaterally impose new conditions on the availment of salary loans. This prohibition against unilateral modification is a cornerstone of labor law, designed to prevent employers from undermining the collective bargaining process.

    The court further noted that even if the Plan had been approved by the BSP, it could not override the provisions of the CBA. The court stated that if it were true that said credit checking under the Plan covers salary loans under the CBA, then the bank should have negotiated for its inclusion thereon as early as the April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2012 CBA which it entered into with HBILU. However, the express provisions of said CBA inked by the parties clearly make no reference to the Plan. And even in the enforcement thereof, credit checking was not included as one of its requirements.

    HSBC argued that the credit-checking requirement was a long-standing policy applied to all employees, but the court found this unconvincing. The court noted that HSBC failed to provide sufficient evidence to support this claim. In contrast, HBILU presented evidence that the requirements for salary loans changed only after the April 20, 2012, email blast. This email announced the strict enforcement of the credit-checking requirement, indicating that it was a new imposition rather than a continuation of an existing policy. Thus, no other conclusion can be had in this factual milieu other than the fact that HSBC’s enforcement of credit checking on salary loans under the CBA invalidly modified the latter’s provisions thereon through the imposition of additional requirements which cannot be found anywhere in the CBA.

    The court also addressed the argument that the credit-checking requirement was mandated by banking regulations. The dissenting opinion cited Section X304.1 of the MoRB, which requires banks to ascertain that borrowers are financially capable of fulfilling their commitments. However, the court clarified that this provision is a general guideline and must be interpreted in conjunction with Section X338.3, which specifically applies to salary loans under the fringe benefit program of the bank. Section X338.3 excludes loans under the fringe benefit program from the general requirements of Section X304.1. In specifying that “[a]ll loans or other credit accommodations to bank officers and employees, except those granted under the fringe benefit program of the bank, shall be subject to the same terms and conditions imposed on the regular lending operations of the bank,” Sec. X338.3 clearly excluded loans and credit accommodations under the bank’s fringe benefits program from the operation of Sec. X304.1.

    The court also rejected the argument that Republic Act No. 8791 (General Banking Law of 2000) required a credit check on all borrowers. The court stated that A reading of RA 8791, however, reveals that loan accommodations to employees are not covered by said statute. Nowhere in the law does it state that its provisions shall apply to loans extended to bank employees which are granted under the latter’s fringe benefits program. The court further noted that BSP Circular 423, Series of 2004, provides alternative measures to protect the bank from losses, such as requiring co-makers, chattel mortgages, or assignment of retirement benefits.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in this case underscores the importance of upholding the integrity of collective bargaining agreements. It clarifies that employers cannot unilaterally impose new conditions on employee benefits that are not part of the CBA, even if those conditions are part of a company policy or a plan approved by a regulatory agency. This decision reaffirms the constitutional right of workers to participate in decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits, and it reinforces the principle that a CBA is the law between the parties and cannot be modified without mutual consent.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether HSBC could unilaterally impose a credit-checking requirement for employee salary loans when the CBA did not include such a requirement. The Supreme Court ruled against HSBC, emphasizing that the CBA terms must prevail.
    What is a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)? A CBA is a negotiated contract between a labor union and an employer that outlines the terms and conditions of employment for the employees represented by the union. It covers aspects such as wages, working hours, and benefits.
    What is the significance of Article 253 of the Labor Code? Article 253 of the Labor Code prevents either party from unilaterally terminating or modifying a CBA during its lifetime. This ensures stability and predictability in labor relations, protecting employees from arbitrary changes.
    What was HSBC’s justification for the credit-checking requirement? HSBC argued that the credit check was part of its Financial Assistance Plan (Plan), which had been approved by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). They claimed the Plan should be considered a valid condition for granting loans.
    Why did the Supreme Court rule against HSBC’s justification? The Court emphasized that the Plan was never integrated into the CBA and that the union had rejected its inclusion. Therefore, HSBC could not unilaterally impose it on employees without violating the CBA.
    Does this ruling mean that banks can never conduct credit checks? No, the ruling does not prohibit credit checks in general. It specifically addresses the situation where a CBA exists and the credit check is not part of that agreement.
    What are the implications of this ruling for other companies? This ruling serves as a reminder to all companies that they must honor the terms of their CBAs and cannot unilaterally impose new conditions on employee benefits without negotiation and agreement from the union.
    What is the role of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) in this case? The BSP is the central bank of the Philippines, and it approves financial assistance plans for banks. However, the court clarified that BSP approval does not override the terms of a CBA.
    How does this ruling affect the balance between management prerogative and worker’s rights? This ruling clarifies that management’s prerogative is not absolute and is subject to the limitations imposed by law and collective bargaining agreements. It reinforces the importance of protecting workers’ rights to participate in decisions affecting their benefits.

    This case serves as a significant reminder to employers of the importance of upholding collective bargaining agreements and respecting the rights of workers to participate in decisions that affect their welfare. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the principle that a CBA is a binding contract that cannot be unilaterally modified, ensuring stability and fairness in labor relations.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: HONGKONG BANK INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION (HBILU) VS. HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LIMITED, G.R. No. 218390, February 28, 2018

  • Wage Increases and Management Prerogative: Balancing CBA Terms and Business Discretion

    The Supreme Court ruled that employers have the right to set hiring rates based on market conditions, even if it leads to wage similarities between newer and older employees. This decision clarifies that wage increases due to market adjustments do not automatically constitute a violation of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) or create wage distortions. It reinforces the principle that management has the prerogative to make business decisions, provided they are exercised in good faith and do not circumvent employee rights.

    When Hiring Rates Clash with CBA: Can Employers Adjust Wages Freely?

    This case revolves around a dispute between the Philippine Geothermal, Inc. Employees Union (PGIEU) and Chevron Geothermal Phils. Holdings, Inc. regarding wage increases. The union alleged that Chevron violated their CBA by granting salary increases to probationary employees, Sherwin Lanao and Jonel Cordovales, before they attained regular status, leading to wage distortion. The core legal question is whether the increases were a violation of the CBA or a valid exercise of management prerogative to adjust hiring rates.

    The petitioner, PGIEU, argued that Chevron’s actions contravened Article VII, Section 1 of the CBA, which outlines wage increases for regular employees. They pointed to Annex D of the CBA, which specifies eligibility for wage increases based on the employee’s regularization date. The union contended that the premature wage increases given to Lanao and Cordovales, who were probationary at the time of the supposed increase, distorted the wage structure. This resulted in their salaries equating those of regular employees, effectively erasing the wage distinction based on merit and seniority. The union sought a corresponding increase in their members’ salaries to maintain the established wage hierarchy.

    Chevron, the respondent, countered that the increases were not a violation of the CBA but rather a reflection of adjustments in the company’s hiring rates. They asserted that the hiring rates at the time of Lanao and Cordovales’ employment were higher compared to previous years. This was explained as part of Chevron’s remuneration philosophy of having “similar value for similar jobs,” where salaries and hiring rates are reviewed annually and adjusted based on computed job values. Chevron maintained that there was no wage distortion, as the salary differences were due to varying hiring dates and rates.

    The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of Chevron, finding that PGIEU failed to substantiate its claims of premature wage increases and resultant wage distortion. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision, emphasizing the deference given to the factual findings of labor officials with expertise in such matters. The CA held that the Voluntary Arbitrator did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the union’s complaint.

    The Supreme Court, in its decision, agreed with the CA and the Voluntary Arbitrator. The Court emphasized that the increase in the salaries of Lanao and Cordovales was not pursuant to the wage increase agreed upon in the CBA 2007-2012. Rather, it was the result of the increase in hiring rates at the time they were hired. The Court quoted Chevron’s explanation:

    Salaries and hiring rates are reviewed annually and adjusted as necessary based on the computed values of each job, an employee’s tenure or seniority in his/her current position will not influence the value of the job.

    The Court highlighted the difference in hiring rates between employees hired at different times, using the example of Robert Gawat, who was hired earlier, and Lanao. At the time of Gawat’s hiring, the rate was lower compared to when Lanao was hired. This difference accounted for the salary levels and was not a violation of the CBA.

    The Court then addressed the issue of wage distortion, referring to Republic Act No. 6727, which defines it as:

    …a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rate between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills, length of service or other logical bases of differentiation.

    The Court clarified that Article 124 of the Labor Code only covers wage adjustments and increases due to a prescribed law or wage order. The increase in Lanao and Cordovales’ salaries was not due to a prescribed law or wage order but rather due to the hiring rates at the time of their employment. The Court cited Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Company, which laid down four elements of wage distortion:

    • An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates;
    • A significant change in the salary rate of a lower pay class without a concomitant increase in the salary rate of a higher one;
    • The elimination of the distinction between the two levels;
    • The existence of the distortion in the same region of the country.

    The Court held that the increase in Lanao and Cordovales’ salaries did not meet these elements and was not a result of erroneous application of the CBA but a consequence of higher hiring rates in 2009. The Court also emphasized the importance of management prerogative, which allows employers to regulate all aspects of employment, including setting hiring rates. This prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of employees. The Court cited Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, noting that labor law does not authorize the substitution of the employer’s judgment in the conduct of its business.

    The Court further noted in Bankard Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade Unions v. National Labor Relations Commission, expanding the interpretation of wage distortion could:

    An employer would be discouraged from adjusting the salary rates of a particular group of employees for fear that it would result to a demand by all employees for a similar increase, especially if the financial conditions the business cannot address an across-the-board increase.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the CA’s decision. The Court reiterated that factual findings of labor officials, who have expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded respect and finality when supported by substantial evidence.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Chevron violated the CBA by granting wage increases to probationary employees, leading to wage distortion, or if it was a valid exercise of management prerogative.
    Did the Supreme Court find a violation of the CBA? No, the Supreme Court found that Chevron did not violate the CBA, as the wage increases were due to adjustments in hiring rates rather than an erroneous application of the CBA terms.
    What is management prerogative? Management prerogative refers to the employer’s right to regulate all aspects of employment, including setting hiring rates, as long as it is exercised in good faith and with due regard to employee rights.
    What constitutes wage distortion? Wage distortion occurs when an increase in prescribed wage rates eliminates or severely contracts the intentional quantitative differences in wage rates between employee groups, effectively erasing distinctions based on skills or seniority.
    Are all salary differences considered wage distortions? No, not all salary differences are considered wage distortions. The Labor Code specifies that wage distortion pertains to adjustments due to prescribed laws or wage orders, not market-driven adjustments in hiring rates.
    What did the Court say about increasing the wages of other employees? The Court clarified that a general increase in wages is not automatically required to maintain differences between employees’ salaries unless a genuine wage distortion, as defined by the Labor Code, exists.
    Why did the Court uphold the employer’s decision? The Court upheld the employer’s decision because Chevron demonstrated that the salary adjustments were based on market rates at the time of hiring and were not intended to circumvent the CBA or labor laws.
    What is the significance of hiring rates in this case? Hiring rates are significant because they reflect the employer’s ability to attract qualified candidates based on current market conditions, which can justify salary differences even among employees in similar positions.
    What happens if an employer voluntarily increases salary rates? If an employer voluntarily increases salary rates due to factors like higher productivity or increased competitiveness, it does not automatically trigger a requirement to increase all employees’ salaries.

    This case illustrates the importance of balancing CBA terms with the employer’s need to adapt to market conditions. The Supreme Court’s decision provides clarity on the scope of management prerogative in setting hiring rates and helps prevent unwarranted claims of wage distortion when salary adjustments are based on legitimate business reasons.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Philippine Geothermal, Inc. Employees Union (PGIEU) v. Chevron Geothermal Phils. Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 207252, January 24, 2018

  • When Union Disaffiliation Leads to Dismissal: Understanding Security Clauses and Strike Illegality

    In Ergonomic Systems Philippines, Inc. v. Enaje, the Supreme Court addressed the legality of dismissing employees based on a union security clause and the validity of a strike. The Court ruled that a mother federation cannot invoke a union security clause to demand the dismissal of local union members and officers, and it deemed the strike illegal due to the union’s failure to comply with procedural requirements, specifically the strike vote. This decision clarifies the distinct roles of local unions and their federations and underscores the importance of adhering to labor laws during strikes.

    Can a Mother Union Terminate Employees? Disaffiliation, Dismissal, and the Rights of Workers

    The case of Ergonomic Systems Philippines, Inc. v. Emerito C. Enaje, et al., decided by the Supreme Court, revolves around a labor dispute stemming from the disaffiliation of a local union from its mother federation, Workers Alliance Trade Unions-Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (Federation). Following the disaffiliation and internal charges against union officers, the Federation demanded that Ergonomic Systems Philippines, Inc. (ESPI) terminate certain union officers and members based on a union security clause in their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). ESPI complied, leading to a strike by the local union and subsequent dismissal of participating members. The central legal question is whether the Federation could invoke the union security clause to demand the dismissal of the employees and whether the strike was conducted legally.

    The Supreme Court began its analysis by clarifying the scope of the union security clause. It emphasized that only the local union, Ergonomic Systems Employees Union, could invoke the union security clause in the CBA. The court stated that the CBA was explicit that the union was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. Therefore, the Federation’s demand for dismissal was deemed invalid, as it overstepped its role as merely an agent of the local union. The Court underscored the autonomy of local unions in their relationships with federations.

    “A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the former acts in representation of the latter. Hence, local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent.”

    Building on this principle, the Court affirmed the right of local unions to disaffiliate from their mother federations, citing Philippine Skylanders, Inc. v. NLRC: “The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is not a novel thesis unillumined by case law.” This established that the Federation’s action was an overreach, and it lacked the authority to demand dismissals. Even if the local union chose to disaffiliate, the Federation would still not be able to demand the dismissal from employment of the union officers and members.

    The Court then turned to the legality of the strike staged by the local union. It outlined the procedural requirements for a valid strike under Article 278 of the Labor Code, which includes filing a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), obtaining a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership through secret ballot, and giving notice to the NCMB of the voting results at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory.

    In this case, the union failed to comply with these mandatory requirements. While the union filed a notice of strike, it commenced the strike before securing a strike vote and submitting the report to the NCMB. The strike vote was taken and reported to the NCMB *after* the strike had already begun. The Court explicitly stated that the union’s non-compliance rendered the strike illegal. Because of this, there were different liabilities for union officers and members.

    Concerning the liabilities of the union officers and members, the Court made a distinction based on Article 279(a) of the Labor Code. This section holds that any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike may be declared to have lost their employment status, while ordinary union members can only be dismissed if they committed illegal acts during the strike. In this particular case, the Court found the union officers to be liable since they had knowledge that the requirements for a valid strike were not met.

    However, for the union members, the Court determined that there was a lack of sufficient evidence to prove they committed illegal acts during the strike, such as obstruction or violence. Therefore, their dismissal could not be justified on these grounds. The ruling recognized the need to protect the rank-and-file members who participated in the strike without necessarily being aware of its illegality.

    The Court also addressed the issue of back wages. Citing G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, the Court held that the dismissed workers were entitled only to reinstatement without back wages, as they did not render work for the employer during the strike. Because the strike was illegal, the “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor” principle applied, meaning there could be no wage for no work performed. The court reasoned that fairness and justice dictated that back wages be denied to employees who participated in illegal concerted activities to the detriment of the employer.

    Despite denying back wages, the Court recognized the prolonged period since the strike and the resulting strain in relations between the employer and employees. As a compromise, the Court deemed separation pay appropriate in lieu of reinstatement. The separation pay was set at one month’s salary for each year of service, balancing the union members’ years of service with the employer’s losses due to the illegal strike.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether a mother federation could demand the dismissal of employees based on a union security clause in a CBA between a company and a local union, and whether the strike conducted by the union was legal.
    Can a mother federation invoke a union security clause? No, the Supreme Court ruled that only the local union that is a party to the CBA can invoke the union security clause, not the mother federation. The federation only serves as the agent of the local union.
    What are the requirements for a legal strike? The requirements include filing a notice of strike with the NCMB, obtaining a strike vote approved by a majority of the union membership, and notifying the NCMB of the voting results at least seven days before the strike.
    What happens if a union fails to meet the strike requirements? If a union fails to comply with these requirements, the strike is considered illegal, which can have consequences for both union officers and members.
    What are the liabilities for union officers in an illegal strike? Union officers who knowingly participate in an illegal strike may be declared to have lost their employment status, meaning they can be dismissed.
    What are the liabilities for union members in an illegal strike? Union members can only be dismissed if they committed illegal acts during the strike, and there must be sufficient evidence to prove these acts.
    Are dismissed workers entitled to back wages if the strike was illegal? No, the Supreme Court ruled that workers are not entitled to back wages for the period they did not work during an illegal strike, based on the principle of “a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor.”
    Why was separation pay awarded in this case? Separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement due to the prolonged period since the strike and the strained relations between the employer and employees.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Ergonomic Systems Philippines, Inc. v. Enaje clarifies the responsibilities and limitations of labor federations and unions. It also reinforces the necessity of adhering to legal procedures during strikes to protect the rights and welfare of both employers and employees.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Ergonomic Systems Philippines, Inc. v. Enaje, G.R. No. 195163, December 13, 2017

  • Seafarer Death Benefits: Proving Work-Relatedness Under POEA-SEC and CBA

    In a claim for death benefits, the burden of proving that a seafarer’s death was work-related lies with the claimant, not the employer. The Supreme Court clarified that the claimant must present substantial evidence to establish the connection between the seafarer’s work and their cause of death to receive full benefits under the POEA-SEC (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract). If work-relatedness is not proven, benefits may still be available under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), albeit at a reduced amount, depending on the agreement’s terms.

    Sailing the Seas of Contracts: Whose Burden is it to Prove the Cause of Death?

    Efren B. Malicse, an able-bodied seaman, passed away while working on board Maersk Tide. His widow, Rosemary G. Malicse, sought death benefits, arguing that her husband’s death was covered under the ITF (International Transport Workers’ Federation) Agreement, which provides benefits regardless of the cause of death. The company offered a partial settlement based on the CBA but denied full benefits, claiming the death was not work-related. The legal question before the Supreme Court was: Who bears the burden of proving whether the seafarer’s death was work-related, and which contract—POEA-SEC, CBA, or ITF Agreement—applies?

    The Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of the ITF Agreement. The Court emphasized that before a claimant can avail of the benefits under the ITF Agreement, specific conditions must be met. These conditions include proof that the seafarer was a member of a union affiliated with the ITF and that the company had a special agreement with the union or the ITF. The Court found that the lower courts had failed to establish these conditions with concrete evidence. Because the respondent failed to prove these conditions, the court ruled that the ITF Agreement could not be the basis for awarding death benefits.

    Given the inapplicability of the ITF Agreement, the Court turned to the POEA-SEC and the CBA. The Court reiterated the principle that CBA clauses that are more beneficial to the seafarer prevail over the POEA-SEC. Section 20(A)(1) of the POEA-SEC stipulates a death benefit of US$50,000 for work-related deaths, while the CBA provided US$80,000 for deaths due to accidents and US$40,000 for deaths from natural causes or illness. However, to claim the higher benefit under the POEA-SEC, the claimant must first establish that the death was work-related.

    Building on this principle, the Court addressed the critical issue of the burden of proof. The Court unequivocally stated that the burden of proving entitlement to benefits lies with the claimant, not the employer. This means Rosemary had to provide substantial evidence demonstrating that Efren’s death was work-related. The Court cited previous rulings to support this position, emphasizing that claimants cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption of work-relatedness but must actively substantiate their claims.

    The Court highlighted that the CA erred by placing the burden on the employer to prove that the seafarer’s death was not work-related. Instead, the correct approach is to assess whether the claimant has proven the requisites for compensability under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC. These requisites include demonstrating that the seafarer’s work involved specific risks, the disease was contracted as a result of exposure to those risks, the disease was contracted within a specific period of exposure, and there was no negligence on the part of the seafarer.

    Applying these principles to the case, the Court found that Rosemary failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish the work-relatedness of Efren’s death. She did not describe the specific tasks Efren performed on board the vessel or explain how his work environment contributed to his illness. The Court emphasized that general statements without supporting documents or medical records are insufficient to prove a causal link between the seafarer’s work and their death. Because of the respondent’s failure to prove work-relatedness, the higher death benefit under the POEA-SEC was not applicable.

    Despite the lack of proof of work-relatedness, the Court acknowledged that Rosemary was still entitled to benefits under the CBA. Section 25(5) of the CBA provided a death benefit of US$40,000 regardless of the cause of death, as long as the seafarer died while employed by the company. Since Efren died during his employment, Rosemary was entitled to this amount. The Court noted that the company had already offered this amount in good faith, negating any basis for imposing moral or exemplary damages, or attorney’s fees.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court clarified the burden of proof in seafarer death benefit claims and emphasized the importance of providing substantial evidence to establish work-relatedness. While the ITF Agreement was deemed inapplicable due to lack of evidence, the CBA provided a safety net for the claimant. The Court reversed the CA’s decision and ordered the company to pay the US$40,000 benefit under the CBA, without additional damages or fees.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was determining who bears the burden of proving whether a seafarer’s death is work-related for the purpose of claiming death benefits, and which contract governs the benefits.
    What is the POEA-SEC? The POEA-SEC is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract, which sets the minimum terms and conditions of employment for Filipino seafarers.
    What is a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)? A CBA is a negotiated agreement between an employer and a labor union representing the employees, which can provide more beneficial terms than the POEA-SEC.
    Who has the burden of proof in claiming death benefits? The claimant (e.g., the seafarer’s beneficiary) has the burden of proving that the seafarer’s death was work-related to claim the higher benefits under POEA-SEC.
    What evidence is needed to prove work-relatedness? Substantial evidence is required, including a description of the seafarer’s tasks, how the work environment caused the illness, and medical records linking the illness to the work.
    What happens if work-relatedness is not proven? If work-relatedness is not proven, the beneficiary may still be entitled to benefits under the CBA, depending on its terms, even if the death was not work-related.
    What did the Court rule regarding the ITF Agreement in this case? The Court ruled that the ITF Agreement was not applicable because the claimant failed to prove that the seafarer’s union was affiliated with the ITF and that there was a special agreement with the company.
    What death benefit was awarded in this case? The Court awarded the death benefit of US$40,000 provided under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) because the claimant did not prove that the seafarer’s death was work-related.
    Why were moral and exemplary damages not awarded? Moral and exemplary damages were not awarded because the company had acted in good faith by offering the US$40,000 benefit under the CBA, negating any indication of bad faith or malice.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Rosemary G. Malicse, G.R. Nos. 200576 & 200626, November 20, 2017

  • Union Security Clauses: Limitations on Dismissal Based on Union Constitution

    In the case of United Polyresins, Inc. v. Marcelino Pinuela, the Supreme Court ruled that an employee’s dismissal based on a union’s constitution was invalid because the specific provisions cited did not authorize expulsion from union membership, only the removal of union officers. The Court emphasized that employers cannot terminate employees based on union actions if those actions are not explicitly justified under the union’s governing documents or the Labor Code. This decision underscores the importance of aligning dismissal procedures with both the union’s constitution and the broader legal framework protecting workers’ rights.

    When Union Expulsion Leads to Illegal Dismissal: A Case of Misinterpreted Constitutions

    The case revolves around Marcelino Pinuela, who was employed by United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) and served as the president of the Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA). During his term, a P300,000 loan from UPI to PORFA became due, leading to disputes over the union’s finances. Following internal investigations and accusations of mismanagement, Pinuela was expelled from PORFA, which then led UPI to terminate his employment, citing the union security clause in their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The central legal question is whether Pinuela’s dismissal was valid, given the circumstances of his expulsion from the union and the specific provisions of PORFA’s constitution.

    The Labor Arbiter initially dismissed Pinuela’s complaint for illegal dismissal, but the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed this decision, then later reversed itself again, finding the dismissal valid but awarding separation pay and nominal damages. The Court of Appeals (CA), however, sided with Pinuela, stating that there was insufficient evidence to support his expulsion from PORFA and that he was not properly informed of the charges against him. This led UPI to appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing that both substantive and procedural due process were observed in Pinuela’s dismissal.

    At the heart of the issue is the interpretation of PORFA’s constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f), which were cited as grounds for Pinuela’s expulsion. These provisions address the impeachment and recall of union officers, stating grounds such as misappropriation of union funds and willful violation of union rules. However, the Supreme Court noted that these provisions relate to removing officers from their positions, not expelling members from the union. According to the Court, any officer found guilty under these provisions should be removed from office but not necessarily stripped of their union membership. This distinction is critical because it directly impacts the validity of the dismissal under the union security clause.

    “However, these provisions refer to impeachment and recall of union officers, and not expulsion from union membership. This is made clear by Section 2(e) of the same Article XV, which provides that ‘(t)he union officers impeached shall ‘IPSO FACTO’ to [sic] be considered resigned or ousted from office and shall no longer be elected nor appointed to any position in the union.’ In short, any officer found guilty of violating these provisions shall simply be removed, impeached or recalled, from office, but not expelled or stripped of union membership.”

    The Supreme Court emphasized that PORFA’s constitution only authorizes removal from the union under Article X, Section 6, which pertains to the failure to pay union dues. Grounds for disqualification from membership are also listed in Article IV, which includes individuals with subversive ideas or those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Since Pinuela’s case did not fall under any of these categories, his expulsion was deemed unauthorized. Even though he was charged with estafa, he had not been convicted, making his disqualification as a union member improper. The Court concluded that the termination of Pinuela’s employment based on the cited provisions of the union’s constitution was erroneous and did not constitute just cause for termination.

    The Court also addressed UPI’s reliance on Cariño v. National Labor Relations Commission, clarifying that the cited case involved existing suspension and expulsion provisions within the CBA and union constitution, which were absent in PORFA’s documents. Moreover, the Court noted that UPI’s loan to PORFA could be construed as an unfair labor practice, according to Article 248(d) of the Labor Code, which prohibits employers from assisting or interfering with labor organizations, including providing financial support. This point underscores the complex interplay between employer actions, union governance, and labor law.

    ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:

    x x x x

    (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters;

    The Supreme Court suggested that PORFA should consider amending its constitution to include specific rules on the discipline of its members. While unions have the right to prescribe rules for membership retention, they cannot expel members or cause their dismissal without just cause. According to Article 249(b) of the Labor Code, it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee or terminate them without adhering to the terms under which membership is available to other members. This reinforces the principle that union security clauses must be implemented fairly and in accordance with both the union’s rules and the broader protections afforded to employees under labor law. The absence of clearly defined disciplinary procedures in the union’s constitution was a critical factor in the Court’s decision.

    The ruling emphasizes that union security clauses cannot be used arbitrarily to justify the dismissal of employees. Employers and unions must ensure that any actions taken under such clauses are consistent with the union’s constitution, the CBA, and the Labor Code. The case serves as a reminder of the importance of due process and the need for clear, justifiable grounds for expulsion from a union before an employer can terminate an employee’s contract. The Supreme Court’s decision protects employees from unjust dismissal and underscores the limitations of union security clauses when applied inconsistently with union rules and legal standards.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether Marcelino Pinuela’s dismissal was legal, considering his expulsion from the union was based on provisions in the union’s constitution that did not authorize expulsion but only the removal of officers from their positions. This raised questions about the validity of using the union security clause to terminate his employment.
    What is a union security clause? A union security clause is a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that requires employees to maintain membership in the union as a condition of employment. It allows an employer to terminate an employee who is no longer a union member in good standing.
    What did the Supreme Court rule in this case? The Supreme Court ruled that Pinuela’s dismissal was illegal because his expulsion from the union was not based on valid grounds under the union’s constitution. The Court emphasized that the provisions cited for his expulsion only applied to removing officers from their positions, not terminating their union membership.
    Why was the union’s constitution important in this case? The union’s constitution was crucial because it defined the grounds for expulsion and disqualification from membership. The Supreme Court examined the constitution to determine whether Pinuela’s actions justified his expulsion, ultimately finding that they did not.
    What is the significance of the Cariño v. NLRC case mentioned in the decision? Cariño v. NLRC was cited by the petitioners to support their argument that Pinuela’s dismissal was valid. However, the Supreme Court distinguished this case, noting that it involved existing suspension and expulsion provisions that were absent in PORFA’s constitution.
    What is unfair labor practice, and how does it relate to this case? Unfair labor practice refers to actions by employers or unions that violate employees’ rights. In this case, the Court noted that UPI’s loan to PORFA could be seen as an unfair labor practice, as it constitutes giving financial support to a labor organization.
    What was the role of due process in this case? Due process is a fundamental right that requires fair treatment and an opportunity to be heard before adverse actions are taken. The Court of Appeals found that Pinuela was not properly informed of the charges against him, indicating a lack of procedural due process, which further supported the ruling that his dismissal was illegal.
    What is the impact of this ruling on employers and unions? This ruling emphasizes the importance of employers and unions adhering strictly to the terms of collective bargaining agreements and union constitutions when enforcing union security clauses. It also underscores the need for unions to have clear and justifiable grounds for expelling members.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: United Polyresins, Inc. v. Marcelino Pinuela, G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017

  • Backwages Calculation: Ensuring Full Compensation for Illegally Dismissed Employees in the Philippines

    In the Philippines, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to full backwages from the time of dismissal until actual reinstatement. This landmark Supreme Court case clarifies that backwages must include not only the base salary at the time of dismissal but also all allowances and benefits regularly received, including those under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The ruling emphasizes that employers are solely responsible for these payments, and interest accrues on unpaid backwages from the finality of the decision until full satisfaction, ensuring complete restitution for the unlawfully terminated employee.

    UCCI vs. Valmores: Did the Company Shortchange an Illegally Fired Employee?

    United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UCCI) dismissed Victoriano Valmores, a Senior Utilities Inspector, due to pressure from the United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. Employees’ Labor Organization (UELO). Valmores filed an illegal dismissal complaint, leading to a protracted legal battle. The core legal question revolved around how to correctly calculate Valmores’ backwages after the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found his dismissal illegal and ordered his reinstatement. This included determining whether CBA benefits and salary increases during the period of his illegal dismissal should be factored into the computation of his backwages.

    The Labor Arbiter initially computed backwages without including CBA benefits, which Valmores contested. The NLRC then ordered a re-computation, including CBA benefits, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA). UCCI appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that backwages should be based solely on the salary at the time of dismissal, excluding subsequent increases and benefits. Citing BPI Employees’ Union-Metro Manila v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, UCCI maintained that including prospective wage increases and CBA benefits was legally unfounded.

    Valmores, represented by his parents due to his death during the appeal, argued for the inclusion of all CBA benefits he received at the time of dismissal and sought a 12% annual interest on the judgment. He also asserted that UCCI alone should be liable for the backwages. UCCI countered that both UCCI and UELO were held liable in the original NLRC decision, which had become final and executory.

    The Supreme Court addressed three key issues: the correct basis for computing backwages, the nature of UCCI’s liability, and the appropriate interest rate. The Court referred to Article 279 of the Labor Code, which mandates reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits. It affirmed that full backwages should be pegged at the wage rate at the time of dismissal, unqualified by deductions and increases.

    However, the Court clarified that the base figure for backwages must include not only the basic salary but also all regular allowances and benefits being received at the time of dismissal. This ensures that the employee is fully compensated for what they lost due to the illegal dismissal. The Court emphasized that while subsequent salary increases and benefits granted after the dismissal should not be included, CBA benefits regularly received before the illegal dismissal must be added to the base figure.

    Article 279. Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

    The Court acknowledged that while Valmores claimed entitlement to various CBA benefits, he needed to prove he was actually receiving them at the time of his dismissal. Despite this, the Court found that UCCI’s failure to produce relevant documents, including the CBA, hindered Valmores from substantiating his claim. The NLRC and CA correctly noted that UCCI’s suppression of this evidence allowed for the presumption that such evidence would be adverse to UCCI if presented. This underscored the employer’s responsibility to provide necessary documentation for accurate backwage computation.

    Regarding the liability for backwages, the Supreme Court clarified that UCCI, as the employer responsible for the illegal dismissal, was solely liable. Although the original NLRC decision held both UCCI and UELO liable, the Court emphasized that the body of the decision indicated that UCCI’s actions directly led to the illegal dismissal. This aligned with the principle that the employer bears the primary responsibility for ensuring due process and fair treatment in termination cases.

    WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding respondents liable for illegal dismissal and ordering them to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages from the date of dismissal on 22 February 1996 to the date of actual reinstatement.

    SO ORDERED.

    The Court addressed the conflict between the body of the decision, which focused on UCCI’s actions, and the dispositive portion, which held both UCCI and UELO liable. Referencing established legal principles, the Court favored the body of the decision because it clearly established UCCI’s primary responsibility. This reaffirms that in cases of conflict, the rationale of the decision should justify the fallo or dispositive portion.

    Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of a 12% annual interest on the monetary award from the finality of the NLRC decision until full payment. This interest rate, based on Article 2209 of the Civil Code and the precedent set in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, compensates Valmores for the delay in receiving his rightful compensation. This underscored the importance of prompt compliance with labor rulings to mitigate further financial burdens on employers.

    In its final ruling, the Supreme Court granted the motion for substitution filed by Valmores’ heirs, authorized their substitution for the deceased Valmores, denied UCCI’s petition, and affirmed the CA’s decision with modifications. The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for re-computation of Valmores’ backwages, using the base salary plus CBA benefits being regularly received as of February 22, 1996. Finally, UCCI was declared solely liable for these backwages, along with a 12% annual legal interest from November 17, 2003, until full satisfaction.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was determining the correct method for computing the backwages of an illegally dismissed employee, specifically whether to include benefits granted under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The Supreme Court clarified that backwages must include the base salary at the time of dismissal, as well as any allowances and CBA benefits the employee was regularly receiving at that time.
    Who was responsible for the illegal dismissal in this case? The Supreme Court determined that United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UCCI), as the employer, was solely responsible for the illegal dismissal of Victoriano Valmores. While the labor union played a role in the events leading to the dismissal, UCCI’s failure to conduct its own investigation and ensure due process made them primarily liable.
    What is included in the computation of full backwages? Full backwages include the employee’s salary at the time of dismissal, allowances, and any other benefits they were regularly receiving, including those under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Salary increases and benefits implemented after the dismissal are not included, but the benefits the employee had a right to at the time of dismissal are included.
    What interest rate applies to unpaid backwages? A legal interest rate of 12% per annum applies to unpaid backwages, calculated from the date the decision becomes final until the amount is fully satisfied. This interest compensates the employee for the delay in receiving their rightful compensation.
    What was the basis for including CBA benefits in the backwages? The inclusion of CBA benefits is based on Article 279 of the Labor Code, which states that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. The Court interpreted this to mean that all benefits the employee was regularly receiving at the time of dismissal must be included.
    Why was the case remanded to the Labor Arbiter? The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for re-computation of Valmores’ backwages. This was to ensure that all CBA benefits he was regularly receiving as of February 22, 1996, were properly included in the calculation.
    What happens if the employer fails to produce necessary documents? If the employer fails to produce necessary documents, such as the CBA, there is a presumption that the evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This can lead the court to rule in favor of the employee’s claims regarding their entitlement to certain benefits.
    Can the dispositive portion of a decision be overruled by the body of the decision? Yes, in certain circumstances, the dispositive portion (fallo) of a decision can be overruled by the body of the decision. This occurs when there is a clear conflict between the two, and the body of the decision provides a clear and rational basis for a different outcome.

    This case underscores the importance of properly calculating backwages for illegally dismissed employees, ensuring they receive full compensation for their losses. It serves as a reminder for employers to comply with labor laws and provide due process in termination cases.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. vs. Victoriano B. Valmores, G.R. No. 201018, July 12, 2017

  • Backwages in Illegal Dismissal Cases: Ensuring Full Compensation for Lost Earnings

    In cases of illegal dismissal, the Supreme Court has affirmed that full backwages must include all benefits the employee regularly received at the time of their unlawful termination. This ensures that illegally dismissed employees are fully compensated for their lost earnings and benefits, bridging the gap between their dismissal and reinstatement. The court emphasizes that employers cannot unilaterally exclude CBA benefits and other allowances, affirming the employees’ right to a fair and just resolution.

    UCCI vs. Valmores: Should Backwages Include Benefits Beyond Basic Salary?

    United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UCCI) faced a legal challenge regarding the computation of backwages for its former Senior Utilities Inspector, Victoriano B. Valmores, who was illegally dismissed. The core dispute revolved around whether the backwages should only cover the basic salary or if it should also include the various benefits provided under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). UCCI argued that backwages should be limited to the basic salary at the time of dismissal, excluding any subsequent increases or benefits granted during the period of illegal termination. Valmores, on the other hand, contended that full backwages should encompass all benefits he was receiving at the time of his dismissal, in addition to the basic salary. This legal battle reached the Supreme Court, seeking clarity on the proper computation of backwages to ensure fair compensation for illegally dismissed employees.

    The Supreme Court addressed the issue by emphasizing the importance of Article 279 of the Labor Code, which mandates that an employee unjustly dismissed is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, along with full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits. The Court clarified that the base figure for computing backwages should include not only the basic salary but also the regular allowances the employee was receiving at the time of dismissal. This ensures that the employee is compensated for what they lost due to the dismissal.

    However, the Court also stated that the amount does not include increases or benefits granted during the period of dismissal. This is because, as far as the illegally dismissed employee is concerned, time stood still at the moment of their termination, and only resumes upon reinstatement. Therefore, the employee should only receive backwages that include the amounts they were receiving at the time of their illegal dismissal, but not the benefits granted to their co-employees after their dismissal. This position aligns with the principle that backwages aim to restore the employee’s economic position as if the illegal dismissal had not occurred.

    Building on this principle, the Court noted that salary increases and benefits are not automatically given but are subject to conditions. Thus, the employee’s claim for increases in salary, meal subsidy, safety incentive pay, and other financial assistance for the period from 1997 until 2007 should be excluded from backwages. However, CBA allowances and benefits that the employee was regularly receiving before their illegal dismissal should be added to the base figure. The court highlighted that Article 279 of the Labor Code explicitly states that backwages shall be inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.

    Nonetheless, the Court underscored that the employee still had to prove their entitlement to the benefits by submitting evidence of having received them at the time of the illegal dismissal. This requirement stems from the need to verify the specific benefits the employee was receiving before the termination. The Court noted that in a similar case, the claim for CBA benefits was denied because the employee was unable to prove that they were receiving such benefits at the time of the illegal dismissal. Therefore, it is essential for the employee to provide sufficient evidence to establish their entitlement to the claimed benefits.

    In this specific case, the employee was unable to discharge their burden because the relevant documents, including the CBA, were in the exclusive possession and custody of UCCI. The Labor Arbiter did not rule on the employee’s motion to compel the production of these documents, which further complicated the matter. Consequently, the NLRC and the CA observed that the disparity between the employee’s salary at the time of dismissal and their reinstatement salary should have prompted the Labor Arbiter to investigate the employee’s entitlement to other benefits under the CBA. The Court, therefore, deemed it appropriate to remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for the proper determination of the CBA benefits that the employee had been receiving as of February 22, 2006.

    Another critical aspect of this case was the liability for the payment of backwages. The Court clarified that UCCI, as the employer effecting the unlawful dismissal, was solely liable for the backwages of the employee. While the NLRC’s decision initially declared both UCCI and the UELO liable, the Supreme Court emphasized that the employer bears the primary responsibility for ensuring that employees are not unjustly terminated. This position is consistent with established jurisprudence, which imposes upon employers the obligation to accord employees substantive and procedural due process before complying with any demands to dismiss them. The Court explained that the failure of UCCI to carry out this obligation made it solely liable for the illegal dismissal of Valmores.

    Finally, the Court addressed the interest rate to be imposed on the monetary award. It was held that the interest rate should be fixed at 12% per annum, reckoned from the finality of the decision of the NLRC until full payment. This interest rate is warranted because UCCI incurred a delay in discharging its legal obligations to pay the employee full backwages. Citing Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the Court affirmed that interest at the legal rate should be imposed on the monetary awards to compensate for the delay caused by the employer’s non-compliance. This measure ensures that the employee is fully compensated for the economic losses suffered due to the illegal dismissal.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The main issue was whether the computation of backwages for an illegally dismissed employee should include benefits granted under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in addition to the basic salary. The Supreme Court had to determine the extent of compensation owed to the employee.
    What does “full backwages” include according to this decision? Full backwages include the employee’s salary at the time of dismissal plus any allowances and benefits they were regularly receiving under the CBA at that time. However, it does not include increases or benefits granted after the dismissal.
    Why was the case remanded to the Labor Arbiter? The case was remanded because there was a need to determine the specific CBA benefits the employee was receiving at the time of his illegal dismissal. The employee could not produce the documents, which were under the employer’s control.
    Who is liable for the payment of backwages in this case? The Supreme Court declared that United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UCCI), the employer, is solely liable for the payment of backwages. The initial NLRC decision included the union, but the Supreme Court clarified that the employer bears the primary responsibility.
    What interest rate applies to the monetary award? The monetary award is subject to a legal interest rate of 12% per annum, calculated from the finality of the NLRC decision on November 17, 2003, until the award is fully satisfied. This compensates the employee for the delay in receiving their rightful compensation.
    What if the CBA documents are in the employer’s possession? If the CBA documents are in the employer’s possession, the employee can request the Labor Arbiter to compel the employer to produce these documents. This ensures that all relevant benefits are considered in the computation of backwages.
    Can an employee claim salary increases during the period of dismissal? No, an employee cannot claim salary increases or benefits granted after their dismissal because time is considered to have stood still for them during that period. Backwages are based on what the employee was receiving at the time of dismissal.
    What is the basis for computing backwages? The basis for computing backwages is the salary rate of the employee at the time of dismissal, inclusive of allowances and other benefits they were regularly receiving under the CBA. This amount serves as the starting point for calculating the total backwages owed.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in UCCI v. Valmores reaffirms the importance of fully compensating illegally dismissed employees. By including all regularly received benefits in the computation of backwages, the ruling ensures that employees are justly restored to their economic positions prior to the unlawful termination.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: UNITED COCONUT CHEMICALS, INC. VS. VICTORIANO B. VALMORES, G.R. No. 201018, July 12, 2017

  • Retirement Benefits: Prior Agreements Prevail Over Labor Code

    In the case of Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Arjan T. Hassaram, the Supreme Court ruled that retirement benefits should be computed based on the existing retirement plans agreed upon by the company and its employees, rather than the general provisions of the Labor Code, provided that these plans offer superior benefits. The Court emphasized that when specific agreements, such as collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) and retirement plans, provide more favorable retirement terms than the Labor Code, those agreements take precedence. This decision clarifies that employees are entitled to the most beneficial retirement package available, reinforcing the importance of negotiated agreements in determining retirement benefits.

    Pilots’ Retirement Pay: Which Plan Takes Flight?

    Arjan T. Hassaram, a former pilot of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), filed a complaint against PAL seeking retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code. Hassaram had previously received P4,456,817.75 under the PAL Pilots’ Retirement Benefit Plan (the Plan). The central legal question was whether Hassaram’s prior receipt of benefits under the Plan precluded him from claiming additional retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code, or whether the specific retirement plans negotiated between PAL and its pilots should govern the computation of his retirement pay.

    The Labor Arbiter (LA) initially ruled in favor of Hassaram, stating that Article 287 of the Labor Code should apply since it provided better benefits than the PAL-ALPAP CBA. However, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA’s decision upon PAL’s motion for reconsideration, citing Hassaram’s receipt of retirement benefits under the Plan. Hassaram then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the NLRC and reinstated the LA’s ruling, stating that the funds received under the Plan were not the retirement benefits contemplated by law. This divergence in rulings set the stage for the Supreme Court to clarify the applicable legal principles.

    The Supreme Court addressed two primary issues: first, whether the amount Hassaram received under the Plan should be considered part of his retirement pay; and second, whether Hassaram was entitled to receive retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code. The Court referenced previous decisions, particularly Elegir v. PAL and PAL v. ALPAP, to establish that amounts received under the PAL Pilots’ Retirement Benefit Plan are indeed part of an employee’s retirement pay. Building on this principle, the Court needed to determine whether Article 287 of the Labor Code should be used to compute Hassaram’s retirement benefits, or whether the company’s own retirement plans should take precedence.

    The Court emphasized that Article 287 of the Labor Code is applicable only when there is no Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) or other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits, or when such agreements provide benefits inferior to those mandated by law. To fully understand the Court’s reasoning, it’s important to examine the provisions of Article 287 of the Labor Code:

    Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

    In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.

    In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.

    In this context, the Supreme Court had to determine which retirement scheme provided superior benefits to Hassaram. This determination involved comparing the benefits provided under Article 287 of the Labor Code with those offered under the retirement plans negotiated between PAL and ALPAP. The Court contrasted these benefits:

    Retirement Scheme Benefits Provided
    Article 287 of the Labor Code Equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service (approximately 22.5 days of salary per year).
    PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plans (a) P5,000 for every year of service under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan; and (b) an equity equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly salary for every year of employment pursuant to the Plan.

    After comparing the schemes, the Supreme Court concluded that the retirement plans provided by PAL were more beneficial than those mandated by Article 287 of the Labor Code. The Court noted that Hassaram, as a member of ALPAP, was entitled to benefits from both the retirement plans under the 1967 PAL-ALPAP CBA and the Plan. Specifically, he was entitled to P5,000 for every year of service under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan and an equity equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly salary for every year of employment pursuant to the Plan. This approach contrasts with the CA’s conclusion that Article 287 should apply because its benefits were supposedly superior. The Supreme Court clarified that the actual benefits under PAL’s retirement plans far exceeded those under the Labor Code.

    Building on this conclusion, the Court declared that Hassaram’s retirement benefits should be computed based on the retirement plans of PAL, not on Article 287 of the Labor Code. Since Hassaram had already received benefits under the Plan, he was only entitled to claim his remaining benefits under the CBA. This meant that PAL was ordered to pay Hassaram the amount of P120,000 (24 years x P5,000) for his 24 years of service to the company. The ruling emphasizes the importance of adhering to negotiated agreements that provide superior benefits to employees, reinforcing the principle that specific agreements prevail over general legal provisions when they are more advantageous to the employee.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether Hassaram’s retirement benefits should be computed based on Article 287 of the Labor Code or on the retirement plans provided by Philippine Airlines (PAL).
    What did the Court rule regarding the PAL Pilots’ Retirement Benefit Plan? The Court ruled that the amount received by Hassaram under the PAL Pilots’ Retirement Benefit Plan must be considered part of his retirement pay. This determination was crucial in deciding which retirement scheme applied.
    When is Article 287 of the Labor Code applicable? Article 287 of the Labor Code is applicable only when there is no CBA or other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits, or when such agreements provide benefits inferior to those mandated by law.
    How did the Court compare the benefits under Article 287 and the PAL retirement plans? The Court found that the PAL retirement plans provided superior benefits, including a higher monthly salary percentage per year of service, compared to the standard formula in Article 287.
    What benefits was Hassaram entitled to? As a member of ALPAP, Hassaram was entitled to P5,000 for every year of service under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan and an equity equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly salary for every year of employment pursuant to the Plan.
    What was the final order of the Court? The Court ordered Philippine Airlines, Inc., to pay respondent Arjan T. Hassaram the amount of P120,000, representing the balance of his retirement pay, computed based on the 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan and the PAL Pilots’ Retirement Benefit Plan.
    Why did the Court choose PAL’s retirement plans over the Labor Code? The Court chose PAL’s retirement plans because they offered more beneficial terms to the employee, consistent with the principle that employees are entitled to the most advantageous retirement package available.
    What was the significance of Hassaram already receiving benefits under the Plan? Because Hassaram had already received benefits under the Plan, he was only entitled to claim his remaining benefits under the CBA, which was calculated based on his years of service.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Arjan T. Hassaram reaffirms the principle that negotiated retirement agreements, offering superior benefits, take precedence over the general provisions of the Labor Code. This ensures that employees receive the most favorable retirement terms available under their specific employment conditions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Arjan T. Hassaram, G.R. No. 217730, June 05, 2017