In People v. Naag, the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of a dying declaration and an extrajudicial confession in a murder case. The court ruled that the extrajudicial confession was inadmissible due to violations of the accused’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation. However, the victim’s statement, “Si Edwin, si Edwin,” made while fleeing, was deemed admissible as part of res gestae, providing crucial circumstantial evidence for the conviction, despite the inadmissibility of the confession.
When Last Words Speak Volumes: Examining Dying Declarations and Confessions in a Double Murder
This case revolves around the brutal murders of spouses Atty. Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. and Rosita Fontelera in Olongapo City. Edwin Naag y Roque, along with Joselito Alcantara, was accused of the crime. Only Naag was apprehended and tried. The prosecution’s case hinged on two critical pieces of evidence: the dying declarations of Rosita Fontelera and the extrajudicial confession of Edwin Naag. The central legal question was whether these pieces of evidence were admissible and sufficient to secure a conviction.
The prosecution presented evidence including autopsy reports detailing the extensive injuries sustained by both victims. Dr. Richard Patilano, the medico-legal officer, testified to the severity of the stab wounds, noting that Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. suffered 46 stab wounds, many of which were fatal. Rosita Fontelera suffered fewer stab wounds, but they were nonetheless deadly. The doctor noted that the wounds were inflicted by a pointed instrument. This testimony provided a grim picture of the violence inflicted upon the victims, setting the stage for the introduction of the contested evidence.
One of the most critical pieces of evidence presented was the testimony of Eufracio Banal, a church member who encountered Rosita Fontelera shortly after the attack. Banal testified that while assisting the severely wounded Rosita, she repeatedly uttered, “Si Edwin, si Edwin.” This statement was offered as a dying declaration, suggesting that Rosita Fontelera identified Edwin Naag as one of her assailants. The admissibility of this statement as a dying declaration became a key point of contention in the case.
Another significant piece of evidence was the extrajudicial confession of Edwin Naag. In this confession, Naag admitted to being present at the scene of the crime and implicated himself, along with others, in the stabbings. However, the defense challenged the admissibility of this confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of Naag’s constitutional rights. Specifically, the defense contended that Naag was interrogated without the effective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court scrutinized the circumstances surrounding Naag’s confession. The Court noted discrepancies in the confession document, including the absence of Atty. De la Cruz’s name in the opening statement and inconsistencies in the typeface used. Citing Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution, the Court emphasized that any person under investigation for a crime has the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Further, this right can only be waived in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The Court found that Naag was not effectively informed of his rights, nor did he validly waive them. The Court highlighted that there was no explicit question posed to Naag about whether he was willing to testify without counsel. As the Court noted, “Accused-appellant was not asked whether he was willing to testify even without the assistance of counsel. If he was willing to testify only with the assistance of counsel, he should have been asked if he had one. If he said he wanted to have counsel but could not afford one, he should have been asked if he wanted one to be appointed for him.” Due to these violations, the Supreme Court declared Naag’s extrajudicial confession inadmissible as evidence.
Despite the inadmissibility of the confession, the Court considered Rosita Fontelera’s dying declaration. The defense argued that the statement “Si Edwin, si Edwin” was incomplete and ambiguous. However, the Court distinguished this case from People v. De Joya, where a similar statement was deemed inadmissible due to its incompleteness. In Naag, the Court emphasized the context in which Rosita Fontelera made the statement.
The Court noted that Rosita Fontelera was saying “Si Edwin, si Edwin” not only when found inside the pizza parlor, but also as she was running away wounded. This context, combined with the fact that Rosita was fleeing from Naag, clarified the meaning of her words. The Court invoked Rule 130, Section 42 of the Rules on Evidence, which allows statements made during or immediately after a startling occurrence to be admitted as part of res gestae.
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be considered as part of res gestae.
The Court reasoned that Rosita Fontelera’s statement, made in the context of a startling event—the attack—indicated that Naag was her assailant. Furthermore, the Court highlighted circumstantial evidence supporting Naag’s guilt, including his presence at the scene, his subsequent flight, and his motive for the crime.
Naag admitted to being at the Fontelera residence at the time of the killing. His explanation for being there, that he was there to do repair jobs, was contradicted by Rodrigo Fontelera, Jr. who denied that any repairs were done. The Court found it suspicious that Naag was accompanied by individuals unknown to the Fonteleras. This raised doubts about Naag’s version of events. Moreover, Naag’s flight from the scene was considered evidence of guilt. The Court noted, “Flight is evidence of guilt. For as the proverb says, ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’”
Additionally, the Court found that Naag had a motive for killing the Fonteleras, stemming from his family’s eviction from their land in Novaliches. This motive, combined with the other circumstantial evidence, strengthened the case against Naag. The Court ultimately concluded that the combination of all the circumstances produced a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, as required by Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
FAQs
What was the key issue in this case? | The key issue was the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession and a dying declaration as evidence in a murder trial, and whether these pieces of evidence, along with circumstantial evidence, were sufficient to convict the accused. |
Why was Edwin Naag’s extrajudicial confession deemed inadmissible? | Naag’s confession was ruled inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel during custodial investigation. The Court found that he did not effectively waive these rights. |
What is a dying declaration and why is it significant in this case? | A dying declaration is a statement made by a person who believes their death is imminent, concerning the cause and circumstances of their impending death. In this case, Rosita Fontelera’s statement identifying Edwin Naag as her assailant was crucial evidence. |
How did the court justify admitting Rosita Fontelera’s statement as a dying declaration? | The court admitted Rosita Fontelera’s statement under the principle of res gestae, as it was made during or immediately after a startling occurrence (the attack). The statement was also considered in context, as Rosita was fleeing from Naag while uttering his name. |
What is the legal principle of res gestae? | Res gestae allows the admission of statements made during or immediately after a startling event, if the statements relate to the circumstances of the event. This is because such statements are considered spontaneous and less likely to be fabricated. |
What circumstantial evidence supported the conviction of Edwin Naag? | The circumstantial evidence included Naag’s presence at the scene of the crime, his subsequent flight from the area, and his motive stemming from his family’s eviction from the Fontelera’s land. These elements, combined with the res gestae statement, formed a strong case. |
What is the significance of “flight” in criminal law, according to this case? | The court cited the proverb, “the wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion,” implying that Naag’s flight from the scene of the crime was an indication of his guilt, showing his consciousness of guilt. |
What was the final ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Naag? | The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision finding Edwin Naag guilty of murder, but modified the amount of funeral expenses awarded. The conviction was primarily based on the admissible res gestae statement and the corroborating circumstantial evidence. |
This case underscores the importance of adhering to constitutional rights during custodial investigations, while also highlighting the significance of contextual analysis in evaluating the admissibility and weight of evidence like dying declarations. The ruling in People v. Naag provides guidance on how courts should assess the totality of circumstances when determining guilt in the absence of a valid confession.
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Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: People vs. Naag, G.R. No. 123860, January 20, 2000