Tag: DAR Administrative Order

Understanding Landowner Retention Rights Under Philippine Agrarian Reform: Key Insights from a Landmark Case
Landowner Retention Rights in Agrarian Reform: Clarity and Proof are Paramount

Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform v. Diana H. Mendoza, G.R. No. 204905, July 14, 2021

Imagine inheriting a piece of land from your family, only to find out that you might lose it because of complex legal requirements you never knew about. This scenario is not uncommon in the Philippines, where the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) aims to redistribute agricultural lands to landless farmers. The case of Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform v. Diana H. Mendoza sheds light on the intricacies of landowner retention rights, a crucial aspect of agrarian reform that can significantly impact property owners and their heirs.

In this case, Diana Mendoza sought to retain agricultural land originally owned by her father, Clifford Hawkins. However, her application was denied due to her failure to provide sufficient evidence of her right to retain the land. The central legal question revolved around whether Mendoza could exercise her father’s right of retention posthumously and the validity of a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) executed years after her father’s death.

Legal Framework of Landowner Retention Rights

Landowner retention rights are enshrined in the Philippine Constitution and further detailed in Republic Act No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution mandates the State to undertake agrarian reform, subject to reasonable retention limits prescribed by Congress. This provision aims to balance the rights of landowners with the needs of landless farmers.

Section 6 of RA 6657 specifies that no person may retain more than five hectares of agricultural land, except under specific conditions. To implement this law, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 2, series of 2003, which outlines who may apply for retention and the required documentation. A key provision states that the right of retention of a deceased landowner may be exercised by his heirs, provided they can show proof that the decedent manifested his intention to exercise this right during his lifetime and before August 23, 1990.

These legal principles are crucial for landowners and their heirs to understand, as they directly impact their ability to retain portions of their agricultural lands. For example, if a landowner dies without expressing their intention to retain land, their heirs may face challenges in maintaining ownership over the property.

The Journey of Mendoza’s Case

Diana Mendoza’s legal battle began when she applied for retention of agricultural land in Piat, Cagayan, originally owned by her father, Clifford Hawkins. The land had been subject to a VOS in 2001, which Mendoza claimed was executed 17 years after her father’s death in 1984. She argued that she should be allowed to retain the land as her father’s heir.

The DAR Municipal Office initially recommended approving Mendoza’s application, citing her inability to exercise her right of retention under previous agrarian laws. However, the DAR Provincial Office rejected her application, noting that Hawkins had not manifested his intention to exercise retention rights at the time of the VOS.

Mendoza appealed to the DAR Secretary, who upheld the denial, emphasizing her failure to prove her relationship with Hawkins and his death. Undeterred, Mendoza escalated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), which remanded the case to the DAR Regional Director for further investigation into the VOS’s validity and its impact on Hawkins’ heirs.

The Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the case, focusing on whether Mendoza could exercise her father’s retention rights. The Court’s decision highlighted the importance of timely and proper documentation:

“Respondent must not only establish her right as Clifford’s heir, but she must also prove: (1) Clifford’s death; (2) his manifestation during his lifetime of the intention to exercise his right of intention; and (3) the fact that such manifestation was done before August 23, 1990.”

The Supreme Court concluded that Mendoza failed to meet these requirements, thus upholding the DAR’s denial of her application.

Practical Implications and Key Lessons

This ruling underscores the importance of clear documentation and timely action for landowners and their heirs under the agrarian reform program. Landowners must explicitly manifest their intention to retain land during their lifetime, and heirs must provide comprehensive proof of their relationship and the decedent’s intentions.

For property owners, this case serves as a reminder to engage with the DAR proactively and ensure all necessary documentation is in place. Heirs should be aware of the specific requirements and deadlines for exercising retention rights, as failure to comply can result in the loss of valuable property.

Key Lessons:
- Landowners should document their intention to retain land before their death.
- Heirs must provide proof of their relationship to the deceased and the decedent’s retention intentions.
- Challenges to the validity of a VOS should be raised promptly and in the appropriate forum.
Frequently Asked Questions

What is the right of retention under agrarian reform?

The right of retention allows landowners to keep a portion of their agricultural land, up to five hectares, as mandated by RA 6657.

Can heirs exercise the deceased landowner’s right of retention?

Yes, but they must prove that the deceased manifested their intention to exercise this right during their lifetime and before August 23, 1990.

What documents are required to apply for retention?

Applicants need to submit proof of ownership, the landowner’s manifestation of intent to retain, and, if applicable, proof of the landowner’s death and the heir’s relationship to the deceased.

What happens if a landowner fails to manifest their intention to retain land?

Their heirs may not be able to exercise the right of retention, and the land may be fully subject to agrarian reform distribution.

Can the validity of a VOS be challenged?

Yes, but it must be done in a timely manner and through the appropriate legal channels, not during a retention application.

How can landowners ensure their rights are protected?

By engaging with the DAR, documenting their intentions clearly, and consulting with legal professionals specializing in agrarian reform.

ASG Law specializes in agrarian reform law. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.
July 14, 2021
Understanding Disturbance Compensation in Land Conversion: Insights from a Philippine Supreme Court Case
The Importance of Timely Claims and Documented Agreements in Disturbance Compensation Cases

Purificacion v. Gobing, G.R. No. 191359, November 11, 2020

Imagine a family that has tilled the same land for generations, suddenly facing the upheaval of land conversion. The promise of fair compensation is their lifeline, yet what happens when the promised compensation falls short? This is the heart of the case of Lucila Purificacion against Charles T. Gobing and Atty. Jaime Villanueva, where the Supreme Court of the Philippines delved into the intricacies of disturbance compensation in the context of agricultural land conversion.

In this case, Lucila Purificacion, a tenant on a piece of agricultural land in Cavite, claimed that she was entitled to a 1,000-square meter lot as part of her disturbance compensation when the land was converted into a residential subdivision. The central legal question was whether Lucila’s claim for additional compensation was valid and timely, given the existing agreements and the statutes of limitations.

Legal Context

Disturbance compensation is a critical aspect of land reform laws in the Philippines, designed to protect tenants and farmworkers when agricultural lands are converted to non-agricultural uses. The primary legal framework governing this is Republic Act No. 3844, also known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, which stipulates that tenants displaced by land conversion must be compensated.

Section 36 of RA 3844 specifies that the compensation should be at least five times the average gross harvests on the landholding during the last five preceding calendar years. Additionally, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1990, further elaborates on the terms of compensation, stating that it can be in cash, kind, or both, and should be mutually agreed upon by the parties involved.

Key to understanding this case is the concept of a ’cause of action,’ which, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, refers to the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. In the context of disturbance compensation, the cause of action arises when the tenant is displaced and the compensation is deemed insufficient.

Case Breakdown

Lucila Purificacion and her late husband Jacinto were tenants on a 35,882-square meter agricultural land in Imus, Cavite, which was sold by the landowners to Charles Gobing for conversion into the Gold Lane Subdivision. In May 1993, they received a disturbance compensation of P1,046,460.00, but Lucila claimed an additional 1,000-square meter lot was promised.

Lucila presented a May 20, 1993 letter and an unnotarized Malayang Salaysay as evidence of this promise. However, the notarized Malayang Salaysay, executed on July 1, 1993, did not mention the additional lot. This discrepancy became central to the legal proceedings.

The case journeyed through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), and the Court of Appeals (CA). Initially, the PARAD dismissed Lucila’s claim but later reversed its decision, granting her the 1,000-square meter lot. The DARAB reversed this ruling, and the CA affirmed the DARAB’s decision.

The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s decision, emphasizing two key points:
- Lucila’s action had prescribed under Section 38 of RA 3844, which states that any cause of action under the Code must be commenced within three years after it accrues. Lucila filed her complaint more than six years after receiving the initial compensation.
- The notarized Malayang Salaysay, which did not mention the additional lot, was given more weight than the unnotarized document due to the presumption of regularity.
The Court quoted, “Section 38 of RA No. 3844… provides that an action to enforce any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued.” Another critical quote was, “a notarized document ‘has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.’”

Practical Implications

This ruling underscores the importance of timely action in legal claims related to disturbance compensation. It also highlights the significance of notarized documents in legal proceedings, as they carry a presumption of regularity that can be difficult to overcome.

For tenants and farmworkers facing land conversion, this case serves as a reminder to:
- Ensure all agreements regarding compensation are clearly documented and notarized.
- Be aware of the three-year statute of limitations for filing claims under RA 3844.
- Seek legal advice promptly if there are discrepancies or disputes over compensation.
Key Lessons:
- Document all agreements thoroughly and ensure they are notarized to avoid disputes.
- Act within the statutory time limits when filing claims for disturbance compensation.
- Understand the legal definitions and implications of key terms like ’cause of action’ and ‘presumption of regularity.’
Frequently Asked Questions

What is disturbance compensation?

Disturbance compensation is a payment or benefit given to tenants or farmworkers displaced due to the conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses, as mandated by RA 3844.

How is the amount of disturbance compensation determined?

The minimum amount should be five times the average gross harvests on the landholding during the last five preceding calendar years, but it can be negotiated between the parties.

What is the statute of limitations for filing a disturbance compensation claim?

Under RA 3844, any claim must be filed within three years from when the cause of action accrues.

Why are notarized documents important in legal cases?

Notarized documents carry a presumption of regularity, meaning they are considered valid and executed properly unless proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.

What should tenants do if they believe their compensation is insufficient?

Tenants should seek legal advice immediately and gather all relevant documentation to support their claim, ensuring they act within the statutory time limits.

Can tenants negotiate for compensation in kind?

Yes, compensation can be in cash, kind, or both, as per DAR AO No. 1, series of 1990, and should be mutually agreed upon by the parties.

ASG Law specializes in agrarian and property law. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.
November 11, 2020
Unlocking Fair Compensation: How the Supreme Court Redefines Just Compensation in Agrarian Reform Cases
Judicial Independence in Determining Just Compensation: A Landmark Ruling

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Jose Cuenca Garcia, G.R. No. 208865, September 28, 2020

Imagine a farmer who has toiled the land for decades, only to find that the government’s valuation of their property falls far short of its true worth. This scenario is not uncommon in the realm of agrarian reform, where the balance between public interest and private property rights is delicate. In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Jose Cuenca Garcia, the Supreme Court of the Philippines delivered a significant ruling that underscores the judiciary’s role in ensuring fair compensation for landowners. This decision highlights the complexities involved in determining just compensation and sets a precedent for future agrarian reform cases.

The case revolves around Jose Cuenca Garcia, a landowner whose 10.999-hectare rice land in Ajuy, Iloilo, was acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) initially valued the land at P647,508.49, a figure Garcia contested as being too low. The dispute over the land’s value led to a legal battle that ultimately reached the Supreme Court, raising critical questions about the factors that should be considered in determining just compensation.

The Legal Framework of Just Compensation in Agrarian Reform

Just compensation is a constitutional right enshrined in Article III, Section 9 of the Philippine Constitution, which states that “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” This principle is further elaborated in Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which provides guidelines for determining just compensation in land acquisition cases.

The CARL outlines several factors to be considered, including the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, the land’s nature, actual use, and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and assessments made by government assessors. Additionally, social and economic benefits contributed by farmers and farmworkers, as well as the non-payment of taxes or government loans, are taken into account.

In practice, the DAR issues administrative orders, such as DAR Administrative Order No. 05-98, which translate these factors into a formula for valuation. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that these administrative guidelines are not binding on courts, which have the ultimate authority to determine just compensation.

The Journey of Garcia’s Case Through the Courts

Jose Cuenca Garcia’s journey to secure fair compensation for his land began when he rejected the DAR’s initial valuation in 1998. After the DAR Adjudication Board affirmed the valuation, Garcia took his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). The RTC, recognizing the outdated nature of the DAR’s data, adjusted the valuation to P2,196,367.40, citing more recent sales transactions and tax declarations.

The Land Bank of the Philippines appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC had erred by considering factors not included in the DAR’s formula, such as the land’s strategic location. The CA upheld the RTC’s decision, affirming that the courts have the discretion to consider all relevant evidence to ensure a just valuation.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case reinforced the judiciary’s role in determining just compensation. The Court emphasized that the SAC’s jurisdiction is original and exclusive, and its determination of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be dictated by administrative orders. As Justice Leonen stated, “The final determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The Special Agrarian Court is not merely tasked to verify the correctness of the computation of the Department of Agrarian Reform, but it is also given the jurisdiction to make its own, independent evaluation.”

The Court also highlighted the importance of using current and relevant data in valuation. In Garcia’s case, the Court noted that the RTC’s use of sales transactions from 1997, closer to the date of taking in 1998, was more appropriate than the DAR’s reliance on transactions from 1987 and 1988. Additionally, the Court clarified that while the strategic location of the land was mentioned, it was not factored into the final valuation, ensuring that the computation adhered to the principles of just compensation.

Practical Implications and Key Lessons

This ruling has significant implications for landowners and agrarian reform beneficiaries alike. It underscores the importance of judicial oversight in ensuring that the constitutional right to just compensation is upheld. Landowners facing similar disputes can take heart from this decision, knowing that courts have the authority to consider all relevant evidence and adjust valuations accordingly.

For businesses and property owners, the ruling serves as a reminder of the need to stay informed about the legal landscape surrounding property rights and compensation. It is crucial to gather and present current and comparable data to support claims for just compensation.

Key Lessons:
- Judicial independence is crucial in determining just compensation, ensuring that valuations are not solely dictated by administrative guidelines.
- Landowners should gather recent and relevant data to support their claims for just compensation.
- The strategic location of a property may be considered in discussions but should not directly influence the valuation formula.
Frequently Asked Questions

What is just compensation in the context of agrarian reform?

Just compensation refers to the fair market value of the property at the time of its taking by the government for agrarian reform purposes. It aims to balance the public interest in land redistribution with the private property rights of landowners.

Can the courts deviate from the DAR’s valuation formula?

Yes, courts have the authority to make independent evaluations and may deviate from the DAR’s formula if necessary to ensure a just valuation based on the evidence presented.

What factors are considered in determining just compensation?

Factors include the cost of acquisition, current value of similar properties, the land’s nature, use, and income, sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and government assessments, as well as social and economic benefits contributed by farmers and farmworkers.

How can landowners challenge the DAR’s valuation?

Landowners can challenge the DAR’s valuation by filing a petition for the determination of just compensation before a Special Agrarian Court, presenting evidence such as recent sales transactions and updated tax declarations.

What role do Special Agrarian Courts play in agrarian reform cases?

Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for determining just compensation, ensuring that landowners receive a fair valuation based on judicial review.

ASG Law specializes in agrarian reform and property law. Contact us or email hello@asglawpartners.com to schedule a consultation.
September 28, 2020

Just Compensation: Courts’ Role in Agrarian Reform Valuation

In agrarian reform cases, the Supreme Court affirms that while administrative agencies like the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) provide essential formulas for land valuation, the final determination of just compensation rests with the courts. Courts can deviate from these formulas if warranted by evidence, ensuring fair compensation to landowners. This decision emphasizes judicial discretion in balancing the interests of landowners and agrarian reform beneficiaries, safeguarding against valuations that are either unrealistically low or unduly burdensome. The ruling clarifies that the 5% cash incentive for voluntary land sales applies only to the cash portion of the payment, not as an addition to the total compensation, thereby maintaining affordability for farmer-beneficiaries and promoting the goals of agrarian reform.

Land Valuation Under CARP: Can Courts Override DAR Formulas?

This case, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria Franco, revolves around the valuation of agricultural lands compulsorily acquired by the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria Franco owned parcels of agricultural land in Barangay Maquina, Dumangas, Iloilo, and offered these lands for sale to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in 1995 under the Voluntary Offer to Sell program. Of the 14.444 hectares, 12.5977 hectares were acquired and distributed to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries. The pivotal issue emerged when the Francos disputed the initial valuation of P714,713.78 made by the DAR, later adjusted to P739,461.43, which they eventually withdrew from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) while still contesting its adequacy.

Dissatisfied, the Francos filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), seeking a judicial determination of just compensation. The SAC fixed the compensation at P1,024,115.49, ordering LBP to pay the balance with legal interest and an additional 5% cash payment as an incentive for the voluntary offer, Land Bank appealed, arguing that the SAC’s valuation was inconsistent with Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998 (Administrative Order No. 5). The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the SAC’s ruling, emphasizing that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, leading LBP to further appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court took on the challenge of determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Special Agrarian Court’s valuation, which used a variation of the formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, and if the 5% cash incentive should be an additional award on the entire compensation amount. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, Republic Act No. 6657, aims to redistribute land to landless farmers, ensuring they have the opportunity to own the lands they cultivate. The law balances the rights of farmers with the landowners’ right to just compensation.

Just compensation is not merely about the monetary value, but also about the timeliness of the payment, ensuring that landowners are promptly compensated for the taking of their property. This principle is deeply rooted in constitutional mandates and several laws enacted to ensure fair treatment in agrarian reform. The Constitution, in Article XIII, Section 4, mandates the State to undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the rights of farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands they till, subject to the payment of just compensation and incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

The role of courts, particularly the Special Agrarian Courts, is critical in this process, as they are vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation. This jurisdiction ensures that the final decision on land valuation is made by an impartial body capable of considering all relevant factors. It is clear that the DAR’s land valuation is preliminary and not final; the courts have the ultimate authority to review and finalize the compensation amount.

The Supreme Court has consistently upheld that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, as highlighted in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, which states that no statute or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings regarding just compensation. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides factors for determining just compensation, including the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, and tax declarations. Administrative Order No. 5 translates these factors into a formula:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where:

LV	=	Land Value
CNI	=	Capitalized Net Income
CS	=	Comparable Sales
MV	=	Market Value per Tax Declaration

Despite these guidelines, the Supreme Court has recognized that courts are not strictly bound by this formula, particularly when faced with unique circumstances that warrant a deviation. Courts can relax the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before them. It is essential that courts act within the bounds of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and its implementing rules, ensuring that any deviation from the formula is based on reasoned explanation and evidence on record.

In this case, the Special Agrarian Court deviated from the basic formula by averaging the valuation derived from Administrative Order No. 5 with the market value of the properties based on tax declarations. The Supreme Court, referencing Land Bank v. Palmares, found that this method resulted in a “double take up” of the market value per tax declaration, which compromised the affordability of the land for farmer-beneficiaries. The Supreme Court stressed that while administrative issuances deserve great respect, their application must harmonize with the law they seek to interpret, noting that in Alfonso v. Land Bank, any deviation must be supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on evidence.

Regarding the 5% cash incentive under Section 19 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Supreme Court clarified that it applies only to the cash portion of the compensation, not as an additional amount on top of the total just compensation. To properly understand this, Section 19 must be read in connection with Section 18, which details the modes of compensation:

SECTION 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amounts as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.

SECTION 19. Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sale. — Landowners, other than banks and other financial institutions, who voluntarily offer their lands for sale shall be entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash payment.

The Supreme Court highlighted that Section 19 provides an incentive for landowners who voluntarily offer their lands for sale. However, this incentive should not unduly burden the government or compromise the affordability of the land for the beneficiaries. If the additional 5% were to be paid on top of the awarded just compensation, the law would not have specified that the additional payment is a “cash payment.” Thus, if a landowner is entitled to 35% cash payment for lands below 24 hectares, they would receive 40% cash payment instead when voluntarily offering their land.

The High Tribunal framed its discussion around the constitutional underpinnings of agrarian reform, emphasizing the importance of balancing social justice with the rights of landowners. The decision underscores the judicial role in ensuring that just compensation is both fair and affordable, thereby promoting the long-term success of agrarian reform programs.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Special Agrarian Court properly determined just compensation for land acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, particularly concerning deviations from the DAR’s valuation formula and the application of the 5% cash incentive.
Can courts deviate from the DAR’s land valuation formula?	Yes, courts can deviate from the DAR’s land valuation formula if a strict application is unwarranted by the specific circumstances, provided that the deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation based on evidence.
What does “just compensation” mean in the context of agrarian reform?	“Just compensation” refers to the full and fair equivalent of the property taken, ensuring landowners are promptly and adequately compensated for the loss of their land, balancing their rights with the goals of agrarian reform.
Is the DAR’s land valuation final and binding?	No, the DAR’s land valuation is preliminary; the final determination of just compensation rests with the courts, which have the power to review and adjust the valuation as necessary.
What is the significance of the 5% cash incentive for voluntary land sales?	The 5% cash incentive is designed to encourage landowners to voluntarily offer their lands for sale, expediting the agrarian reform program, but it applies only to the cash portion of the compensation, not as an additional amount on top of the total just compensation.
What factors are considered in determining just compensation?	Factors include the cost of acquisition, current value of like properties, nature, actual use and income of the land, sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and assessments made by government assessors.
What is the role of the Special Agrarian Courts?	Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, ensuring a judicial review process that balances the rights of landowners and the objectives of agrarian reform.
What was the formula used to calculate land value?	The formula used to calculate land value is LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1), where LV is Land Value, CNI is Capitalized Net Income, CS is Comparable Sales, and MV is Market Value per Tax Declaration.
How did the Special Agrarian Court deviate from the DAR’s guidelines in this case?	The Special Agrarian Court deviated by averaging the valuation derived from Administrative Order No. 5 with the market value of the properties based on tax declarations, which the Supreme Court found to be a “double take up” of the market value.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Land Bank v. Franco clarifies the balance between administrative valuation and judicial determination in agrarian reform cases. By emphasizing the court’s role in ensuring just compensation, the decision seeks to protect both the rights of landowners and the affordability of land for farmer-beneficiaries, promoting the overall goals of agrarian reform.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Land Bank v. Franco, G.R. No. 203242, March 12, 2019

March 12, 2019

Land Rights and Tenant Protection: Clarifying Ownership Transfer Under Agrarian Reform

In Digan v. Malines, the Supreme Court addressed the complexities of land ownership transfer under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, affirming the cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) issued to petitioners. The Court clarified that only landowners as of October 21, 1972, or their heirs, could claim retention rights under P.D. No. 27. Despite the prohibition on land transfers after this date, the Court recognized an exception for direct sales to actual tenant-farmers, reinforcing the agrarian reform’s goal of emancipating tenants. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to agrarian laws while protecting the rights of legitimate tenant-beneficiaries.

From Tillers to Owners: Can Land Sold to Tenants Be Reclaimed?

The case revolves around a land dispute in Cervantes, Ilocos Sur, where Modesta Paris owned three parcels of agricultural land. In 1972, these lands were placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Subsequently, in 1978, Paris sold a portion of her land to Noemi Malines and Jones Melecio, with the consent of the petitioners, who were identified as qualified farmer-beneficiaries. Later, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the petitioners, leading Malines and Melecio to file a petition for their cancellation. This legal battle raised critical questions about land ownership, tenant rights, and the validity of land transfers under agrarian reform laws.

At the heart of the dispute was whether the transfer of land from Paris to Malines and Melecio was valid under P.D. No. 27. The law generally prohibits the transfer of tenanted rice and corn lands after October 21, 1972, to protect tenant-farmers. However, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued memorandum circulars that recognized the validity of direct sales between landowners and tenant-beneficiaries under specific conditions. The Supreme Court had to determine if the sale to Malines and Melecio fell within this exception and whether the EPs issued to the petitioners should be cancelled.

The Court emphasized that the right of retention under P.D. No. 27 is reserved for landowners as of October 21, 1972, and their heirs. As Malines and Melecio acquired the land after this date, they could not claim retention rights. This interpretation reinforces the intent of P.D. No. 27 to protect the rights of tenant-farmers who were tilling the land at the time the law was enacted. It also prevents subsequent landowners from circumventing the agrarian reform program by claiming retention rights.

Building on this principle, the Court examined the validity of the direct sale to Malines and Melecio. While P.D. No. 27 generally prohibits land transfers after October 21, 1972, exceptions exist for sales to actual tenant-tillers. The Court noted that the petitioners themselves admitted that Malines and Melecio were qualified beneficiaries in possession and cultivation of the land. This admission was crucial, as it established that the sale was made to actual tenant-farmers, falling within the exception to the general prohibition.

The Court quoted the petitioners’ admission from their answer in the first DARAB case:

That petitioner[s] Jose Melecio and Noemi Malines had been identified as Farmer Beneficiaries being in possession and cultivation of the land particularly Lot No. 4.0 and Lot No. 4-1 respectively, attached hereto and form an integral part and marked as Annex[es] “D-1” and “D-2” are the Survey PSD-014230 (OLT) Lot Description.

The Court further elucidated on the concept of abandonment within the context of agrarian reform, particularly concerning the rights and obligations of farmer-beneficiaries. Abandonment, under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 02-94, leads to disqualification from the agrarian reform program. The Court explained that for abandonment to be established, two key elements must be present: first, a clear and evident intent to abandon the land; and second, an external act that manifestly demonstrates this intent.

To further clarify the conditions under which direct sales are permissible, the Court referenced DAR Memorandum Circular (MC) Nos. 2 and 2-A, series of 1973, and MC No. 8, series of 1974. MC No. 2-A explicitly prohibits the transfer of ownership after October 21, 1972, except to the actual tenant-farmer tiller, with the cost of the land to be determined according to Presidential Decree No. 27. MC No. 8 reinforced this by stating that no actions should be taken to undermine the intent and provisions of Presidential Decrees, Letters of Instructions, Memoranda, and Directives, especially concerning the transfer of tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21, 1972, except to actual tenant-farmers or tillers in strict conformity with P.D. No. 27 and DAR requirements.

The Court also gave weight to the joint affidavit of waiver executed by the petitioners. In this affidavit, the petitioners stated that they were not interested in purchasing the land and that it could be offered to other persons. The Court found that this affidavit demonstrated a clear intent to abandon any rights they may have had over the land. Citing Buensuceso v. Perez, the Court held that an agrarian reform beneficiary who allows another person to lease the awarded land effectively surrenders his rights. The execution of the waiver, therefore, disqualified the petitioners from being beneficiaries of the subject land.

In the matter of whether the EPs issued to the petitioners had become indefeasible, the Court asserted that the mere issuance of an EP does not shield the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary from scrutiny. EPs can be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules, and regulations. DAR AO No. 02-94 lists several grounds for the cancellation of registered EPs, including misuse of financial support, material misrepresentation of qualifications, illegal conversion, and neglect or abandonment of the awarded land for a continuous period of two calendar years. The Court concluded that the petitioners’ abandonment of their rights through the joint affidavit of waiver was sufficient ground for the cancellation of their EPs.

The Court acknowledged that the EPs issued to the petitioners circumvented the agrarian reform program’s objectives. Because ownership of the land had already been validly transferred to qualified farmer-beneficiaries through the 1978 sale, awarding the same land to other beneficiaries via EPs would undermine the rights of the former and disrupt the integrity of the agrarian reform process. As the subject land was no longer available for distribution under P.D. No. 27 at the time the EPs were issued to the petitioners, the Supreme Court deemed these EPs irregular and void.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision to cancel the EPs issued in favor of the petitioners, but on different grounds. The Court emphasized that the sale of the subject land to Malines and Melecio was valid, as they were qualified tenant-farmers. The petitioners had abandoned any rights they may have had over the land, and the EPs were issued in violation of agrarian reform laws. This decision reinforces the protection of tenant rights and the importance of adhering to the provisions of P.D. No. 27.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the Emancipation Patents (EPs) issued to the petitioners should be cancelled, considering that the land had been previously sold to qualified tenant-farmers.
Who could claim retention rights under P.D. No. 27?	Only landowners as of October 21, 1972, or their heirs, could claim retention rights under P.D. No. 27.
Are all land transfers prohibited after October 21, 1972?	No, transfers to actual tenant-farmers or tillers are valid if they strictly conform to the provisions of P.D. No. 27 and DAR requirements.
What is the effect of an affidavit of waiver by a farmer-beneficiary?	An affidavit of waiver demonstrates a clear intent to abandon rights over the land, disqualifying the beneficiary from the agrarian reform program.
Can Emancipation Patents be cancelled after one year from issuance?	Yes, EPs can be cancelled even after one year for violations of agrarian laws, rules, and regulations, as outlined in DAR AO No. 02-94.
What constitutes abandonment of awarded land?	Abandonment requires a clear intent to abandon and an external act showing such intent, such as failure to cultivate the land for two calendar years.
What happens if land is sold to qualified tenant-farmers?	If land is validly sold to qualified tenant-farmers, it cannot be subsequently awarded to other farmer-beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27.
Why were the petitioners’ EPs cancelled in this case?	The EPs were cancelled because the petitioners had abandoned their rights, and the land had already been validly sold to qualified tenant-farmers.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Digan v. Malines clarifies the nuances of land ownership and transfer under agrarian reform laws. By upholding the rights of legitimate tenant-beneficiaries and reinforcing the importance of adherence to agrarian laws, the Court contributes to the stability and integrity of the agrarian reform program. This ruling serves as a guide for future cases involving land disputes and the rights of tenant-farmers.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Digan v. Malines, G.R. No. 183004, December 06, 2017

September 17, 2018

Finality of Agrarian Reform Orders: Upholding Due Process and Timeliness in Land Disputes

In agrarian disputes, the Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of adhering to procedural rules to ensure fairness and finality. The ruling in Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. v. Ruben Alcaide underscores that finality in administrative orders, especially those concerning land reform, must be respected to maintain the integrity of the legal process. This case clarifies the responsibilities of landowners and their counsel in monitoring cases and complying with deadlines, reinforcing the principle that negligence can have significant legal consequences.

Land Reclassification Showdown: When Does an Agricultural Land Shed Its Skin?

The case originated from a dispute over the classification of certain landholdings owned by Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) had declared these properties as agricultural land, placing them under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. contested this classification, arguing that the land had been reclassified as industrial by the local municipality. This reclassification, they claimed, exempted the land from CARP coverage. The dispute escalated through various administrative levels, eventually reaching the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the DAR’s order declaring the land as agricultural had attained finality and whether the company was denied due process.

The Supreme Court, in its resolution, focused on the procedural aspects of the case, particularly the timeliness of the petitioner’s actions and the implications of failing to notify the DAR of changes in legal representation. The Court emphasized that the DAR Order dated June 8, 2001, had indeed attained finality. This determination was based on several key factors. First, the Court noted that the motion for reconsideration filed by Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. was submitted well beyond the 15-day reglementary period. According to the Court, this delay alone was sufficient to render the DAR’s order final.

Adding to this, the Court pointed out that the company’s counsel had failed to officially notify the DAR of a change of address. This failure resulted in the DAR deeming the June 8, 2001 Order as served, further solidifying its finality. The Court stated, “Failure of petitioner’s counsel to officially notify the DAR of its change of address is an inexcusable neglect which binds his client.” This highlights a crucial principle: parties are responsible for ensuring that their legal representatives keep the relevant authorities informed of their current contact information.

Furthermore, the Court invoked the principle that “actual knowledge” is equivalent to “notice.” The fact that Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. filed a Motion to Lift Order of Finality indicated that they had actual knowledge of the June 8, 2001 Order. The Court reasoned that this knowledge triggered the timeline for filing a motion for reconsideration, which they failed to meet. The Court, citing Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, reinforced that once a decision becomes final and executory, it should no longer be disturbed. This principle ensures stability and predictability in legal proceedings.

The petitioner also argued that the DAR failed to comply with the pre-ocular inspection requirements of DAR Administrative Order No. 1 of 1998, violating their constitutional right to due process. However, the Court found that the DAR had sufficiently complied with the prescribed procedure. The Court cited the existence of a “Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report,” which, despite some omissions, indicated that an inspection had been conducted. The Court stated, “With the issuance of the Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO is presumed to have regularly performed his or her duty of conducting a preliminary ocular inspection, in the absence of any evidence to overcome such presumption.”

Moreover, the Court addressed the petitioner’s claim that the land had been reclassified from agricultural to industrial. While the local municipality had indeed reclassified the land, this reclassification had not been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or authorized by the DAR, as required under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Without these approvals, the reclassification was deemed invalid for CARP purposes.

The Court also dismissed the petitioner’s reliance on a tax declaration indicating “proposed industrial” use, noting that a proposal is distinct from an actual reclassification. The dissenting opinion argued that the June 8, 2001 Order had not become final because the petitioner was not properly served a copy of the order. The dissenting justice highlighted that the petitioner only received a copy of the order when they received a letter from a DAR director on September 10, 2001. However, the majority opinion prevailed, underscoring the importance of procedural compliance and the consequences of negligence.

This case serves as a reminder of the importance of due diligence in legal proceedings. Landowners and their legal representatives must be vigilant in monitoring their cases and complying with deadlines. Failure to do so can result in the loss of legal rights and the enforcement of unfavorable orders. The ruling also reinforces the principle that administrative orders, once final, are binding and should not be easily disturbed.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the DAR’s order declaring the land as agricultural had attained finality, and whether the petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings.
Why did the Supreme Court rule against Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc.?	The Supreme Court ruled against the company because it found that the DAR’s order had become final due to the company’s failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration and notify the DAR of a change of address.
What is the significance of the “Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report” in this case?	The report was significant because it indicated that the DAR had conducted a preliminary inspection of the land, which is a requirement under DAR Administrative Order No. 1 of 1998.
What role did the local municipality’s reclassification of the land play in the Supreme Court’s decision?	The local municipality’s reclassification of the land as industrial was deemed invalid for CARP purposes because it had not been approved by the HLURB or authorized by the DAR.
What does the case say about the importance of notifying the DAR of a change of address?	The case emphasizes the importance of notifying the DAR of a change of address, as failure to do so can result in orders being deemed as served, even if they were not actually received.
What is the meaning of “finality of judgment” in the context of this case?	Finality of judgment means that the DAR’s order can no longer be appealed or modified, and it is binding on all parties involved.
How does this case relate to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)?	The case relates to CARP because it involves a dispute over whether certain land should be covered by the program, which aims to redistribute agricultural land to landless farmers.
What is the main takeaway from this case for landowners involved in agrarian disputes?	The main takeaway is that landowners must be vigilant in monitoring their cases, complying with deadlines, and ensuring that their legal representatives keep the relevant authorities informed of their current contact information.

The ruling in Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. v. Ruben Alcaide serves as a crucial reminder of the importance of procedural compliance and due diligence in agrarian disputes. It underscores that finality in administrative orders must be respected to ensure fairness and stability in the legal process. This case highlights the responsibilities of landowners and their counsel in adhering to procedural rules and timelines, reinforcing the principle that negligence can have significant legal consequences.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. v. Ruben Alcaide, G.R. No. 167952, July 05, 2017

July 5, 2017

Agrarian Reform: Voluntary Land Transfer and the Validity of Emancipation Patents

The Supreme Court in Heirs of Spouses Hilario Marinas and Bernardina N. Marinas v. Bernardo Frianeza, et al., G.R. No. 179741, December 9, 2015, ruled on the validity of emancipation patents issued under a Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. It held that consent from all co-owners is not required for land transfers under Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27) and that the issuance of emancipation patents is valid even if full payment of amortization is made after the issuance, provided the Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme was validly entered into. This decision clarifies the scope and implementation of agrarian reform laws, especially concerning voluntary land transfer agreements.

From Co-Ownership Conflicts to Farmland Freedom: Examining Land Transfer Under PD 27

This case revolves around a parcel of land in Pangasinan originally owned by Hilario G. Marinas. Upon his death, the land was co-owned by his wife, Bernardina, and their ten children. In 1978, Bernardina, with the consent of her children, entered into Agricultural Leasehold Contracts with several farmers. Later, in 1989, she signed a Landowner-Tenant Farmers Deed of Undertaking, transferring ownership of portions of the land to these farmers under PD 27. Emancipation Patents (EPs) were subsequently issued to the farmers. Years later, the heirs of Hilario and Bernardina filed a complaint seeking to nullify the patents, arguing that the transfers were made in bad faith and without compliance with legal requirements.

The petitioners argued that as co-owners, they did not consent to the transfer and that the respondents secured the titles illegally. They claimed the respondents knew of their co-ownership and took advantage of Bernardina, who only had a 1/11 share in the property. They further alleged non-compliance with legal requirements, including the failure to pay the value of the land and the lack of notice to the co-owners. The respondents countered that the complaint was premature due to the failure to exhaust administrative remedies and presented a certification showing that they had fully paid the required amortizations.

The Regional Adjudicator dismissed the complaint, a decision affirmed by the DARAB, finding no evidence of bad faith and noting the respondents’ full payment of amortizations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed these rulings, ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents due to insufficient evidence of completed amortization payments. The Supreme Court then took up the case, focusing on the nature of land transfers under PD 27 and the validity of the emancipation patents issued.

The Supreme Court emphasized that land transfers under PD 27 are not akin to conventional sales under civil law. In fact, the transfer is akin to a forced sale.
Quoting Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City v. Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court stated:

The twin process of expropriation of lands under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has been aptly described in common law jurisdictions as “sale made under the process of the court, and in the mode prescribed by law,” and “which is not the voluntary act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment, tax lien, etc.” Yet a forced sale is clearly different from the sales described under Book V of the Civil Code which are conventional sales, as it does not arise from the consensual agreement of the vendor and vendee, but by compulsion of law. Still, since law is recognized as one of the sources of obligation, there can be no dispute on the efficacy of a forced sale, so long as it is authorized by law.

Therefore, the consent of all co-owners is not necessary for the validity of the transfer. As long as the property is covered under PD 27, the obligation to transfer ownership arises, regardless of the consent of individual co-owners. Moreover, the Court clarified that the Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment scheme is merely a mode of implementing PD 27, as provided under Executive Order No. 228. It concerns only the manner of payment or mode of compensation and does not remove the transaction from the coverage of agrarian reform laws. Bernardina’s choice to avail of this scheme did not require the consent of all the co-owners.

Regarding the petitioners’ claim to exercise their right of retention, the Court pointed out that this right can be waived. DAR Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1991, states that a landowner is deemed to have waived the right of retention by entering into a direct-payment scheme agreement. Thus, Bernardina, by entering into the Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme without any reservation, waived her right to retain a portion of the land, and her successors-in-interest are bound by this waiver.

The Court also addressed the issue of illegal conversion, stating that the record lacked sufficient proof to support the claim and that such factual questions cannot be resolved by the Court, as it is not a trier of fact. As such, it declined to rule on this issue.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, which had ordered the cancellation of the emancipation patents. The Court of Appeals had reasoned that there was no competent evidence to prove the respondents had paid the full amortizations for the lots awarded to them. The Supreme Court, however, found that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the cancellation of respondents’ emancipation patents.

The Court pointed out that the law allows different modes of payment, including voluntary arrangements for direct transfer/payment schemes under terms and conditions mutually acceptable to both parties. In this case, Bernardina chose to enter into a Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme, and the Landowner-Tenant Farmers Deed of Undertaking, executed between the parties on May 23, 1989, contained the signatures of DAR representatives, implying compliance with applicable guidelines. This Deed of Undertaking, with terms and conditions voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, should be held binding upon Bernardina and her successors-in-interest.

Furthermore, the Court noted that there was nothing in the Deed of Undertaking to show that the parties conditioned the issuance of emancipation patents on the complete payment of the value of their corresponding lots. Therefore, the fact that payments were made subsequent to the issuance of the patents did not affect the validity of the patents’ issuance. The Deed also specified that failure to pay for a period of three years would result in foreclosure by the landowner, further supporting the view that title immediately vested upon the respondents.

The Court distinguished this case from those requiring full payment of just compensation prior to the issuance of an emancipation patent, noting that those cases did not involve voluntary land transactions similar to the arrangement in this case. The Court also cited DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1991, which states that the terms and conditions of a voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme should include the immediate transfer of possession and ownership of the land in favor of the identified beneficiaries. Thus, title, whether in the form of an Emancipation Patent or a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), can be issued upon execution of the agreement between the landowner and the farmer-beneficiary.

For these reasons, the Supreme Court declared the Emancipation Patents issued to the respondents valid.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the emancipation patents issued under a Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme were valid, despite the lack of consent from all co-owners and the fact that full payment of amortization was made after the issuance of the patents.
Is consent of all co-owners required for land transfer under PD 27?	No, the Supreme Court held that consent from all co-owners is not required for land transfers under PD 27. The obligation to transfer ownership arises as long as the property is covered by PD 27.
What is a Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme?	A Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme is a mode of implementing PD 27, allowing landowners to voluntarily transfer their lands to qualified beneficiaries under terms and conditions acceptable to both parties, subject to DAR approval.
Can a landowner waive their right of retention?	Yes, a landowner can waive their right of retention. Entering into a direct-payment scheme agreement without any reservation is considered a waiver of the right to retain a portion of the land.
Does full payment of amortization need to precede the issuance of emancipation patents?	Not necessarily. In cases of Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Schemes, the Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of emancipation patents can be valid even if full payment is made after the issuance, provided the agreement was validly entered into.
What is the effect of a Landowner-Tenant Farmers Deed of Undertaking?	The terms and conditions of the Landowner-Tenant Farmers Deed of Undertaking, if voluntarily agreed upon by the parties and compliant with applicable guidelines, are binding on both the landowner and their successors-in-interest.
What happens if a farmer-beneficiary fails to pay the amortizations?	The parties can agree to terms for failure of payment. In this case, the parties agreed that failure to pay for a period of three years will be cause for the foreclosure by the landowner of their corresponding portion.
What is the effect of an Emancipation Patent or CLOA?	The Court held that title, whether in the form of an Emancipation Patent or a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), can be issued upon execution of the agreement between the landowner and the farmer-beneficiary.

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case clarifies the nuances of agrarian reform laws, particularly regarding voluntary land transfers and the requirements for issuing emancipation patents. It underscores the importance of adhering to the terms of voluntary agreements and the binding nature of waivers of retention rights. This case provides a valuable framework for understanding the rights and obligations of landowners and farmer-beneficiaries in agrarian reform programs.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Heirs of Spouses Hilario Marinas and Bernardina N. Marinas v. Bernardo Frianeza, et al., G.R. No. 179741, December 9, 2015

October 31, 2016

Just Compensation in Agrarian Reform: Balancing Landowner Rights and Public Interest

In agrarian reform cases, determining just compensation for expropriated land is a judicial function that necessitates a comprehensive consideration of factors outlined in Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) and the applicable administrative orders issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Supreme Court clarified that courts must adhere to both the statutory guidelines and the DAR’s valuation formulas to ensure fair compensation to landowners while upholding the goals of agrarian reform. This balance is essential to protect the rights of landowners and the interests of farmer beneficiaries, ensuring that the compensation reflects the real value of the property at the time of taking. The Court emphasized that outdated valuations and unilateral assessments by government agencies could not suffice as just compensation, highlighting the judiciary’s role in securing equitable outcomes.

From Coconut Estate to Contentious Claim: How Should Just Compensation be Calculated?

The case of Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Susie Irene Galle revolves around a dispute over just compensation for a 356.8257-hectare property in Zamboanga City, known as the Patalon Coconut Estate. The land, owned by Susie Irene Galle, was placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) initially valued the property at P6,083,545.26, a valuation that Galle rejected. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) later set the compensation at P10,627,148.00. Unsatisfied, Galle filed a case with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), seeking a more accurate determination of just compensation. The SAC initially awarded Galle P316,753,632.00, but this was later modified by the Court of Appeals (CA) to P296,308,061.28. Both DAR and LBP appealed, leading to this Supreme Court decision.

At the heart of the legal matter was whether the lower courts properly computed the just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and the applicable DAR administrative orders. DAR and LBP contended that the CA and SAC failed to apply the prescribed valuation formula, which considers factors such as the cost of acquisition, current value of like properties, and actual use of the land. Galle, on the other hand, argued that the government’s valuations were confiscatory and did not reflect the true value of her property at the time it was taken.

The Supreme Court found that both the SAC and the CA erred in their valuation methods. Specifically, the Court noted that neither court had properly applied the formula outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 (AO 6), as amended by Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994 (AO 11). These administrative orders provide a detailed framework for calculating land value based on various factors, including capitalized net income, comparable sales, and market value per tax declaration. The Court emphasized that while the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, it must be exercised within the bounds of the statutory and regulatory framework established by RA 6657 and its implementing rules.

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

The Court stated that using outdated data, such as valuations from 1988, was inappropriate for determining the fair market value in 1993, when the property was taken. The principle of eminent domain requires that the landowner receive the market value of their property at the time of the taking. The Court cited jurisprudence emphasizing the need for current and accurate assessments to avoid arbitrary or confiscatory outcomes.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court addressed the procedural issues raised by DAR and LBP, particularly regarding prescription and forum-shopping. DAR and LBP argued that Galle’s claim had prescribed due to her failure to file the case within the 15-day period prescribed by the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. They also contended that Galle was guilty of forum-shopping for filing multiple cases involving the same issue. The Court dismissed these arguments, stating that the original DARAB decision was null and void due to its reliance on outdated and inaccurate data.

Since the DARAB decision was invalid, Galle’s right to seek judicial determination of just compensation was not foreclosed. There was no basis for the claims of prescription or forum-shopping. The Court noted that the fundamental issue was the proper computation of just compensation, which must be determined by considering both Section 17 of RA 6657 and the applicable DAR administrative orders.

This approach contrasts with the lower courts’ reliance on a commissioner’s report that did not adhere to the required valuation formula. The Supreme Court stated that the SAC and CA should have conducted a more thorough analysis of the evidence, taking into account all the factors specified in RA 6657 and the DAR’s administrative orders. Because of these errors, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

The Court emphasized that in exercising its judicial function, the Court must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors. This uniform system will ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd, baseless and even contradictory to the objectives of our agrarian reform laws as just compensation. This system will likewise ensure that the just compensation fixed represents, at the very least, a close approximation of the full and real value of the property taken that is fair and equitable for both the farmer-beneficiaries and the landowner.

Recognizing the prolonged nature of the case and the hardship faced by Galle’s heirs, the Court authorized them to withdraw P7,534,063.91, the amount LBP was willing to pay, pending the final determination of just compensation by the CA. This decision reflects the Court’s commitment to ensuring just and timely payment to landowners, even as the legal proceedings continue.

The Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeals to receive evidence and determine the just compensation due to Susie Irene Galle’s estate. The CA was instructed to consider Section 17 of RA 6657, the applicable DAR administrative orders, including AO 6 and AO 11, and prevailing jurisprudence. The CA was further directed to submit a report on its findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court within 90 days.

FAQs

What was the main issue in this case?	The main issue was whether the lower courts correctly computed just compensation for land expropriated under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, considering the statutory guidelines and administrative orders.
What is just compensation?	Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the property taken from a private owner for public use, typically involving monetary payment. It aims to ensure the landowner is neither enriched nor impoverished by the expropriation.
What factors should be considered when determining just compensation?	Factors include the cost of acquisition, current value of like properties, nature and actual use of the land, sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and assessments made by government assessors, as outlined in Section 17 of RA 6657.
What is DAR Administrative Order No. 6?	DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, provides a specific formula for valuing lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It takes into account capitalized net income, comparable sales, and market value per tax declaration.
Why did the Supreme Court remand the case to the Court of Appeals?	The Supreme Court remanded the case because the SAC and CA failed to apply the valuation formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, making it necessary to re-evaluate the just compensation based on the correct legal standards.
What is the significance of the date of taking?	The date of taking is crucial because it determines the point in time at which the property’s value is assessed for purposes of just compensation. The landowner is entitled to the market value of the property at the time it was taken.
What is the role of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in these cases?	LBP is responsible for valuing and compensating landowners for properties acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. They propose an initial valuation, which may be subject to judicial review.
What happens if the landowner disagrees with the LBP’s valuation?	If the landowner disagrees with LBP’s valuation, they can file a case with the Regional Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court to seek a judicial determination of just compensation.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Susie Irene Galle underscores the judiciary’s crucial role in ensuring just compensation for landowners affected by agrarian reform. By mandating strict adherence to statutory guidelines and administrative orders, the Court seeks to strike a balance between the state’s interest in land reform and the constitutional right of landowners to receive fair payment for their property. The decision emphasizes the need for accurate, up-to-date valuations and a thorough application of the prescribed formula to achieve equitable outcomes in agrarian reform cases.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. SUSIE IRENE GALLE, G.R. Nos. 171836 & 195213, August 11, 2014

August 11, 2014

Just Compensation and Land Valuation: Ensuring Fairness in Agrarian Reform

The Supreme Court has ruled that just compensation for land acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) must be determined based on the land’s value at the time of taking, and in accordance with a formula prescribed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). This case emphasizes the importance of adhering to established valuation methods to ensure fairness and equity in agrarian reform initiatives. The Court also clarified that a landowner’s prior acceptance of initial compensation does not necessarily preclude them from seeking a judicial determination of just compensation, especially when the initial valuation is deemed inadequate.

From Riceland to Republic: Challenging Land Valuation Under Agrarian Reform

In 1994, Bienvenido Castro voluntarily offered his 9.3390-hectare property in Surigao del Sur to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Castro proposed a price of P60,000.00 per hectare, totaling P560,340.00. However, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), acting on behalf of DAR, assessed the property at a significantly lower value of P15,441.25 per hectare, amounting to P144,205.90 in total. Castro rejected this valuation, leading to a dispute over just compensation and a subsequent legal battle.

The DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) initially handled the matter, but Castro eventually filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), to determine the just compensation for his land. LBP argued that Castro’s case should be dismissed because the DARAB decision on the land’s value had not been appealed to the SAC within the 15-day reglementary period. Despite this, the SAC proceeded with the case, ordering another ocular inspection of the property for a possible revaluation. The case hinged on determining the fair market value of the land at the time it was taken for agrarian reform purposes. The court-appointed commissioners eventually recommended a valuation of P43,327.16 per hectare.

The SAC sided with Castro, fixing the just compensation at P43,327.16 per hectare, totaling P404,632.35. This decision relied heavily on the Commissioners’ Report and Supplemental Reports. The SAC considered the land’s suitability for rice production and compared it to adjacent properties, ultimately deciding that the LBP’s initial valuation was too low. LBP then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Castro had previously accepted LBP’s valuation of P144,205.90, as evidenced by signed documents. They also questioned the Commissioners’ Report, claiming it did not accurately reflect the land’s condition at the time of the initial inspection in 1994. This motion was denied, with the SAC stating that LBP had waived its right to raise this defense by not including it in its initial answer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the SAC’s decision. The CA held that LBP was estopped from claiming Castro had accepted the lower valuation. They also stated that the DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998, which provides a formula for determining just compensation, is not a strict standard that courts must follow without exercising judicial discretion. The CA found that the SAC had properly considered the factors outlined in Section 17 of RA No. 6657 when determining just compensation. LBP then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower courts failed to uphold the government’s right to avail itself of the defense that Castro was estopped from questioning the valuation. LBP also contended that the lower courts failed to use the factors prescribed in Section 17 of RA No. 6657, as implemented by DAR A.O. No. 5, Series of 1998, which it argued are mandatory in nature.

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the DAR’s prescribed formula for determining just compensation. The Court cited previous rulings, including Land Bank of the Philippines v. Goduco, which affirmed that the application of the formula outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, is mandated by law. The formula considers factors such as Capitalized Net Income (CNI), Comparable Sales (CS), and Market Value per Tax Declaration (MV). The Court acknowledged that while the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, courts should still be guided by the administrative formula.

The Court found that the trial court had disregarded the administrative formula without sufficient explanation. It also noted that the trial court incorrectly based its valuation on present prices, rather than the land’s value at the time of taking. The Court reaffirmed the principle that just compensation should reflect the market value of the property at the time of the appropriation, unaffected by subsequent changes. The Court highlighted that the principle of valuation at the time of taking is specifically applicable to land acquired by the government under RA No. 6657. This is because the landowner should receive the fair market value of their property, as it existed when the government took possession.

The Supreme Court also addressed the issue of Castro’s alleged prior acceptance of the initial valuation. The Court acknowledged that LBP had presented evidence of Castro’s acceptance of the government’s offered price of P144,205.90. It noted that the lower courts had incorrectly viewed LBP’s motion for reconsideration as a belated and procedurally unacceptable defense. Instead, the Court emphasized that Castro’s own pleadings contained admissions that the claim had been paid or otherwise extinguished. The Court cited the principle that admissions made in pleadings are conclusive on the party making them, and any contrary proof should be ignored. Here, Castro’s own tax declaration, included in his petition, showed that the Republic of the Philippines owned the land, which served as a judicial admission that Castro no longer owned the property.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts erred in their valuation of Castro’s property and in disregarding his admission of government ownership. The Court emphasized that the landowner is bound by his own statements made in court, particularly the evidence indicating transfer of land ownership to the Republic. The decision reinforces the idea that fairness is for the government, as well as the landowner. This case demonstrates the Supreme Court’s commitment to ensuring that just compensation in agrarian reform cases is determined fairly and consistently, in accordance with established legal principles and administrative guidelines.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was determining the just compensation for land acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), specifically whether the lower courts properly valued the land and considered the landowner’s prior actions. The court needed to determine if the DAR guidelines were followed and if the landowner was estopped from seeking a higher valuation.
What is the DAR’s role in determining just compensation?	The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) provides a formula for determining just compensation, considering factors like Capitalized Net Income (CNI), Comparable Sales (CS), and Market Value per Tax Declaration (MV). While this formula serves as a guide, courts retain the discretion to adjust the valuation based on the specific circumstances of each case.
What does “time of taking” mean in land valuation?	“Time of taking” refers to the point when the State takes possession of the land and deprives the landowner of its use and enjoyment. The land’s market value at this specific time is used to calculate just compensation, and is unaffected by any subsequent changes in the property’s condition.
What is the significance of a landowner’s prior acceptance of compensation?	While a landowner’s prior acceptance of an initial compensation offer can be considered, it does not automatically prevent them from seeking a judicial determination of just compensation if they believe the amount is inadequate. However, admissions made in pleadings are conclusive on the party making them.
What factors should courts consider when determining just compensation?	Courts should consider the land’s nature, its actual use, income, sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and assessments made by government assessors. These factors should be translated into a basic formula and considered in totality to arrive at a fair amount for both parties.
Why did the Supreme Court reverse the lower courts’ decisions?	The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts because they failed to properly apply the DAR’s prescribed formula for determining just compensation and disregarded the landowner’s admission of government ownership in his own pleadings. They failed to base the calculation on the value of the land at the time of taking.
What is the legal principle of judicial admission?	Judicial admission is a statement made by a party in their pleadings or during the course of a legal proceeding that is conclusive and binding on them. This means that the party cannot later contradict or disprove the admission, and the court can rely on it as a basis for its decision.
What practical impact does this ruling have on agrarian reform?	This ruling reinforces the importance of adhering to established valuation methods and considering all relevant factors to ensure fairness and equity in agrarian reform initiatives. It also clarifies the impact of admissions in pleadings and the importance of adhering to the valuation at the time of taking.

This case serves as a reminder of the complexities involved in determining just compensation in agrarian reform cases and the importance of adhering to established legal principles and administrative guidelines. The Supreme Court’s decision aims to strike a balance between protecting the rights of landowners and promoting the goals of agrarian reform.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

August 28, 2013

Just Compensation and Voluntary Land Sales: Valuing Property Under Agrarian Reform

In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Castro, the Supreme Court addressed the proper valuation of land voluntarily offered for sale under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). The Court ruled that just compensation must be determined based on the property’s market value at the time of taking, not at the time of valuation proceedings. The decision emphasized the importance of adhering to the valuation guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998, while also recognizing the courts’ judicial discretion in determining just compensation. This ruling ensures fair valuation in agrarian reform acquisitions, balancing the interests of landowners and the government.

Voluntary Offer, Disputed Value: Can Prior Agreements Be Overlooked?

Bienvenido Castro voluntarily offered his land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in 1994. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), acting on behalf of DAR, assessed the property at a significantly lower price than Castro’s asking price. When Castro rejected LBP’s valuation, the matter was brought before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Dissatisfied with the DARAB’s proceedings, Castro filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), to determine just compensation.

The LBP argued that Castro’s claim was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and that the DARAB decision had become final. Despite this, the SAC proceeded with the case, eventually fixing the just compensation at a higher amount than LBP’s initial assessment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the SAC’s decision. LBP then appealed to the Supreme Court, raising issues of procedural errors and the SAC’s failure to apply the proper valuation factors as prescribed in Section 17 of RA No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998. The Supreme Court’s analysis delves into the complexities of determining just compensation in voluntary land sale cases under agrarian reform.

The central issue revolves around the valuation of land acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) when the landowner voluntarily offers to sell it to the government. The Court needed to determine if the lower courts correctly valued Castro’s property. Vital to this was the fact that Castro voluntarily offered to sell the land to the DAR in 1994. His petition was a prayer for just compensation, under RA No. 6657, of a parcel of land taken when offered in 1994.

The Supreme Court referenced prior rulings, such as Land Bank of the Philippines v. Goduco, which cited other cases like Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barrido and Land of the Philippines v. Esther Rivera, highlighting the use of a specific formula outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, to compute just compensation for lands, whether acquired voluntarily (VOS) or through compulsory acquisition (CA). The formula is as follows:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where: LV = Land Value, CNI = Capitalized Net Income, CS = Comparable Sales, MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration.

The Court emphasized that the application of this formula is mandated by law, as stated in Goduco. The SAC, as the trier of facts, determines the presence or absence of factors in the formula and their corresponding amounts. This aligns with the principle established in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, reiterated in Land Bank of the Philippines v. DAR, which underscores that the DAR’s formula translates the factors mentioned in Section 17, RA No. 6657 into a basic calculation that the SAC should not disregard.

However, the Supreme Court also recognized the judicial function of determining just compensation, which cannot be unduly restricted. In LBP v. Heirs of Maximo Puyat, the Court clarified that while the DAR formula is a guide, courts are not strictly bound to adhere to it if the specific circumstances do not warrant it. Courts must consider the property’s nature, actual use, income, and value according to government assessors. This principle ensures that the determination of just compensation remains a judicial function, allowing courts to exercise discretion while still considering the administrative guidelines.

In the present case, the Court found an unexplained disregard for the administrative formula, particularly the neglect of factors such as Capitalized Net Income (CNI), comparable sales, and market value per tax declaration. The trial court focused on the suitability of the land for rice production but did not incorporate CNI into the valuation. Instead of relying on comparable sales, the trial court used the value of lots “of the same condition,” without explaining why only one factor was used and why the interplay of factors like net income and market value was not considered. The Supreme Court underscored the necessity of considering all relevant factors as prescribed in the DAR administrative guidelines to arrive at a fair and accurate valuation.

Furthermore, the trial court erred by placing the valuation at present prices rather than at the time of taking. The court referenced tax declarations from 2001, noted that market values generally increase annually, and concluded with a valuation based on this perceived increase. This approach contradicts the established rule that just compensation should reflect the market value of the property at the time of taking, unaffected by subsequent changes. The Supreme Court cited Provincial Government of Rizal v. Caro de Araullo, emphasizing that compensation should be estimated with reference to the property’s value at the time of appropriation to guard against the influence of enhanced values resulting from the enterprise. The Court clarified that the time of taking is when the State takes possession of the property and deprives the landowner of its use, as established in Land Bank v. Livioco, cited in Goduco. This error in valuation was a substantive flaw that warranted the reversal of the lower courts’ judgment.

The Supreme Court addressed the procedural issue of whether LBP waived its right to assert that Castro had already accepted the government’s offered price of P144,205.90. LBP argued that Castro’s acceptance was evidenced by various documents, including the Landowner’s Reply to Notice of Land Valuation and Execution. The trial court ruled that this defense was not raised in the answer or motion to dismiss and was therefore waived. The Court of Appeals upheld this ruling, stating that the failure to raise the defense of consummated sale was a procedural infirmity. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the objection was raised in the motion for reconsideration, which was duly litigated below. The Court noted that Castro’s acceptance of the valuation, LBP’s payment, and Castro’s receipt of payment were all documented and unrebutted.

More significantly, the Supreme Court pointed out that the lower courts overlooked the fact that the LBP payment matched Castro’s admission in his complaint that the Fair Market Value had risen to P245,615.00 upon transfer to the Republic of the Philippines. The tax declaration attached to the petition confirmed that the Republic of the Philippines was the owner, with LBP as the administrator. This judicial admission was conclusive on Castro, precluding any contrary or inconsistent proof. Citing Alfelor and Alfelor v. Halasan and CA, the Court reiterated that admissions in pleadings are conclusive and binding on the pleader, unaffected by contrary proof. The Court referenced Santiago v. De Los Santos, where a dismissal was based on a judicial admission in the complaint. In Santiago, the declaration in the pleading that the land was part of a public forest was deemed conclusive and binding. The Court extended these principles to the present case, holding that Castro’s admission that the Republic owned the land could not be controverted. The Supreme Court concluded that the documented payment by LBP and the transfer of the property to the Republic were fully discussed before the trial court. The lower courts incorrectly viewed LBP’s motion as a belated defense rather than a reminder of the fact, conclusive on Castro, of the transfer of ownership to the Republic. This error of law justified the reversal of the lower courts’ decisions.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was determining the correct method for valuing land voluntarily offered for sale under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657), particularly the timing of valuation and adherence to established guidelines.
What is the significance of DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998?	DAR Administrative Order No. 5 provides a formula for computing just compensation for lands acquired under agrarian reform, whether voluntarily or through compulsory acquisition, ensuring a standardized approach to valuation.
At what point in time should the land be valued?	The land should be valued at the time of taking, which is when the State takes possession of the property and deprives the landowner of its use and enjoyment, not at the time of valuation proceedings.
Can courts deviate from the DAR’s valuation formula?	While courts should consider the DAR’s formula, they are not strictly bound to adhere to it if the circumstances do not warrant it, as the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
What happens if a landowner makes an admission in their pleading?	Admissions made in pleadings are conclusive and binding on the pleader, and any contrary proof submitted by the pleader should be ignored, as such admission is unaffected by any contrary proof submitted by the pleader.
What was the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision to reverse the lower courts?	The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts due to their unexplained disregard for the DAR’s administrative formula, placing the valuation at present prices instead of at the time of taking, and overlooking the landowner’s admission of transfer of ownership to the Republic.
What documents supported LBP’s claim that Castro had accepted the initial valuation?	LBP presented documents such as the Landowner’s Reply to Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition and the Deed of Confirmation of Transfer, which indicated Castro’s acceptance of the government’s offered price.
How did the courts below err in their handling of the case?	The courts below erred by failing to consider relevant factors for valuation, such as Capitalized Net Income (CNI), and by relying on the market value at the time of the decision rather than the time of taking.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Castro clarifies the importance of adhering to the established guidelines for determining just compensation in agrarian reform cases, emphasizing the valuation of land at the time of taking and the significance of judicial admissions. This ruling provides a clear framework for future land valuation disputes, ensuring fair compensation while upholding the principles of agrarian reform.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

August 28, 2013

Tag: DAR Administrative Order

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