Tag: DAR Authority

Protecting Farmers’ Rights: DAR’s Authority and CARP Coverage in Hacienda Looc

The Supreme Court affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) authority to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, emphasizing its exclusive original jurisdiction over the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) implementation. The Court highlighted DAR’s power to investigate acts aimed at circumventing CARL’s objectives, lending significant weight to its findings when supported by substantial evidence. This ruling underscores the government’s commitment to agrarian reform and the protection of farmers’ rights against attempts to evade land redistribution.

Hacienda Looc’s Land Dispute: Tourism vs. Farmers’ Rights

The consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court revolved around Hacienda Looc, a vast property in Nasugbu, Batangas, previously awarded to farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs). These CLOAs were later canceled on the premise that the lands were excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The central legal question was whether portions of Hacienda Looc should remain under CARP coverage, prioritizing farmers’ rights, or be excluded to facilitate tourism development, as argued by Fil-Estate Properties, Inc.

The dispute began when Asset Privatization Trust (APT) offered portions of Hacienda Looc to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme. From 1991 to 1993, DAR distributed 25 Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) covering 3,981.2806 hectares of land. Later, Asset Privatization Trust sold its rights and interests in Hacienda Looc to Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (Manila Southcoast), which then entered into a joint venture agreement with Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (Fil-Estate) to develop the land. This prompted Fil-Estate to file a petition seeking the exclusion of these lots from CARP coverage, arguing that the lands had slopes of more than 18%.

The farmer-beneficiaries contested the cancellation proceedings, alleging they were denied due process and that some waivers were falsified. This led to Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao instructing Undersecretary Soliman to conduct a fact-finding investigation, which revealed irregularities. Based on these findings, Secretary Garilao declared 70 hectares of the land as covered under CARP. This decision was challenged by Fil-Estate, leading to multiple appeals and court decisions. The Supreme Court ultimately consolidated these cases to resolve the conflicting claims.

Fil-Estate argued that Nasugbu, Batangas, was classified as a tourism zone, thus exempting the land from CARP. They cited Proclamation No. 1520, issued by President Ferdinand Marcos, which declared Nasugbu a tourist zone under the Philippine Tourism Authority’s control. According to Fil-Estate, this classification superseded CARP regulations, regardless of the land’s slope or agricultural development. They further argued that Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao exceeded his scope of review by looking at the validity of the cancellation of the 25 Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA).

Reyes, et al. countered that an appeal before the Office of the President was the proper remedy against Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao’s Orders. They relied on experts who characterized the lands as agricultural and questioned the accuracy of the findings that some areas had slopes of at least 18%. Additionally, they contended that Proclamation No. 1520 had been repealed by Executive Order Nos. 448 and 506, which mandated the transfer of suitable agricultural lands, reserved for specific purposes but no longer used, to DAR for distribution under CARP.

The Supreme Court addressed several procedural and substantive issues. It upheld the validity of a compromise agreement between some parties, excluding certain lots from litigation, but emphasized that such agreements must adhere to agrarian reform laws. The Court affirmed that appealing to the Office of the President was the correct procedure, aligning with existing regulations at the time. It found no evidence of willful forum shopping by Reyes, et al., clarifying that the rule against forum shopping applies to initiatory pleadings, not comments or petitions to reopen cases.

Regarding the scope of Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao’s review, the Court emphasized the broad powers granted to DAR under Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657. This section allows DAR to investigate acts aimed at circumventing the objectives of CARP and to correct errors that would defeat the substantive rights of farmer-beneficiaries. The Court stated that Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao did not exceed his jurisdiction in considering all controversies surrounding Hacienda Looc, especially given the allegations of fraudulent cancellations of CLOAs.

Delving into the substantive issue of CARP coverage, the Court considered whether the classification of Nasugbu as a tourism zone automatically excluded the land. Citing Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NSFW, the Court clarified that Proclamation No. 1520 merely identified areas with potential tourism value and did not automatically reclassify agricultural lands. This proclamation directed the Philippine Tourism Authority to identify specific geographic areas for tourism development, implying that not all lands within the zone were intended for non-agricultural use.

The Court emphasized that the power to determine whether land should be included in CARP coverage lies with the Department of Agrarian Reform, an administrative body with special competence in agrarian matters. Furthermore, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 excludes lands with slopes of 18% and over, except those already developed. However, the Court upheld the factual findings of Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao regarding the slope and development of the lots, deferring to the expertise of the administrative agency.

Regarding Associate Justice Gonzales-Sison’s non-inhibition, the Court found no compelling reason for disqualification. Allegations of bias and partiality were insufficient without concrete evidence of acts or conduct demonstrating prejudice. The Court reiterated that mere suspicion of bias does not warrant inhibition, as judges are presumed to dispense justice impartially.

Finally, the Court rejected Del Mundo, et al.’s reliance on the community of interest principle to excuse their failure to appeal. The Court clarified that the community of interest principle applies when a reversal of judgment on appeal benefits all parties with interwoven rights, even those who did not appeal. However, this principle cannot be invoked to revive a lost right to appeal. Thus, the Supreme Court denied all petitions, affirming the lower courts’ decisions.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether certain portions of Hacienda Looc should remain under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) or be excluded to allow for tourism development. This involved determining the extent of the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) authority and the validity of land classifications.
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court upheld the DAR’s authority to adjudicate agrarian reform matters and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court supported the DAR’s findings that certain areas of Hacienda Looc were covered under CARP, prioritizing farmers’ rights over Fil-Estate’s tourism development plans.
What is the significance of Proclamation No. 1520 in this case?	Proclamation No. 1520 declared Nasugbu, Batangas, as a tourist zone. However, the Supreme Court clarified that this proclamation did not automatically reclassify all agricultural lands to non-agricultural use. It merely identified areas with potential tourism value, requiring further delineation by the Philippine Tourism Authority.
What is the ‘community of interest’ principle, and how did it apply (or not apply) here?	The ‘community of interest’ principle suggests that a reversal of judgment on appeal should benefit all parties with interwoven rights, even those who did not appeal. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that this principle could not be used to revive the right to appeal for parties who failed to file a timely appeal.
What powers does the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) have?	The DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, including the implementation of CARP. It has the power to investigate acts aimed at circumventing CARP’s objectives, summon witnesses, and correct errors that would defeat the rights of farmer-beneficiaries.
What is the 18% slope rule under CARP?	Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 excludes lands with slopes of 18% and over from CARP coverage, except for those that are already developed. This provision aims to balance agricultural land distribution with ecological considerations.
What must a judge do if they are perceived to be biased?	A judge may voluntarily inhibit themselves from a case if they feel they cannot be impartial. However, mere allegations of bias are insufficient; there must be concrete evidence of acts or conduct demonstrating prejudice to warrant inhibition.
What is the effect of a compromise agreement in agrarian disputes?	A compromise agreement can settle agrarian disputes, but it must comply with agrarian reform laws. It is binding only on the parties who entered into it, and their heirs and assigns. The absence of a special power of attorney renders the compromise void.

This case reinforces the Department of Agrarian Reform’s crucial role in safeguarding the rights of farmer-beneficiaries. By clarifying the scope of tourism zone classifications and affirming the DAR’s investigative powers, the Supreme Court has set a precedent that prioritizes agrarian reform and equitable land distribution.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. vs. PAULINO REYES, ET AL., G.R. No. 152797, September 18, 2019

September 18, 2019

Land Reclassification vs. Conversion: Clarifying DAR’s Authority Over Agricultural Land Use

The Supreme Court, in Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) vs. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) authority to regulate the conversion of agricultural lands reclassified for non-agricultural uses after June 15, 1988. This decision clarifies that reclassification alone does not automatically allow a landowner to change the use of agricultural land; a conversion process approved by the DAR is still required, safeguarding agricultural productivity while respecting local government’s land use planning.

From Farms to Factories: Who Decides the Fate of Reclassified Land?

This case arose from a challenge by the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) against several administrative orders issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). CREBA questioned DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum No. 88, arguing that these issuances exceeded the DAR Secretary’s jurisdiction and violated local autonomy and constitutional rights. Specifically, CREBA contested the DAR’s assertion of authority over lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes after June 15, 1988, the date Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, took effect. The central legal question was whether the DAR Secretary had the authority to regulate reclassified lands, or if that power rested solely with the LGUs. This pitted national land use policy against local autonomy, with significant implications for developers and landowners.

The petitioner, CREBA, contended that the DAR Secretary acted without jurisdiction by including lands reclassified after June 15, 1988, within the definition of agricultural lands subject to conversion regulations. CREBA argued that this inclusion expanded the legal definition of “agricultural lands” beyond what was intended by Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435, also known as “The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997.” Furthermore, CREBA asserted that DAR AO No. 01-02 infringed upon the local autonomy of LGUs, violating Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code, and the constitutional mandate on local autonomy.

The Supreme Court dismissed CREBA’s petition, emphasizing the importance of adhering to the judicial hierarchy. The Court noted that while it, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, direct resort to the Supreme Court is only warranted in cases involving special and important reasons. The Court found that CREBA failed to demonstrate such exceptional circumstances justifying a direct appeal. Moreover, the Court characterized CREBA’s petition as one for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court only has appellate jurisdiction. Even if the case was filed at the correct venue, the Court determined it would still be dismissible.

The Court clarified that the special civil action for certiorari is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari were not met in this case because the DAR Secretary, in issuing the challenged administrative orders, acted within his mandate to implement the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. The Court emphasized that the Secretary was not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions, thereby precluding the application of certiorari. The Court further elucidated the distinction between lack of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion to clarify why the DAR Secretary’s actions did not fall under any of these categories.

Even addressing the substantive arguments, the Supreme Court found no merit in CREBA’s claims. The Court cited Executive Order No. 129-A, which vested the DAR with the responsibility of implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and authorized the DAR to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation, including the approval or disapproval of land conversion. The Court reasoned that the DAR Secretary, in defining agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, merely acted within the scope of his authority to regulate land use conversion.

Building on this principle, the Court referred to Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which affirmed the DAR’s authority to approve land conversions after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988. The Court also cited jurisprudence, particularly Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, which held that agricultural lands, even if reclassified, must undergo the process of conversion under the DAR’s jurisdiction. This jurisprudence established June 15, 1988, as the cut-off date for automatic reclassifications, meaning that any reclassification after that date requires DAR approval.

The Court addressed CREBA’s argument that DAR AO No. 01-02 violated Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 by covering non-awarded and reclassified lands. The Court referenced Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which stated that requiring DAR clearance for reclassified lands prevents landowners from evading compliance with the agrarian reform program. The Supreme Court also reiterated the distinction between reclassification, which is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses, and conversion, which is the act of changing the current use of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR. The court in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals emphasized that reclassification alone does not automatically allow a landowner to change the land’s use; conversion is still required.

The Court rejected CREBA’s contention that DAR AO No. 01-02 infringed upon the local autonomy of LGUs. The Court cited Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, which grants LGUs the power to reclassify agricultural lands but explicitly states that “nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.” This provision, according to the Court, recognizes the DAR’s authority to approve land conversions. The Court also dismissed CREBA’s claims that DAR AO No. 01-02 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Court noted that the administrative and criminal penalties provided in the administrative order were consistent with Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which prescribe penalties for illegal or premature conversion of lands.

Finally, the Court addressed CREBA’s argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of land use conversion applications, was unconstitutional. The Court emphasized that the memorandum was issued upon the President’s instruction to address the conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development amid a worsening rice shortage. The Court concluded that the memorandum was a valid exercise of police power made in the interest of the general welfare.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over lands that have been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial, or for other non-agricultural uses by Local Government Units (LGUs).
What is the difference between reclassification and conversion of land?	Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR.
When did the DAR’s authority to regulate land conversion take effect?	The DAR’s authority to regulate land conversion took effect on June 15, 1988, the date Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, took effect.
Does reclassification of agricultural land automatically allow a landowner to change its use?	No, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. They must undergo the process of conversion before they are permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.
What is the basis for the DAR’s authority to regulate land conversion?	The DAR’s authority to regulate land conversion is based on Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 6657, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990.
Does DAR AO No. 01-02 violate the local autonomy of LGUs?	No, DAR AO No. 01-02 does not violate the local autonomy of LGUs because the power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute and is subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
What is the significance of DAR Memorandum No. 88?	DAR Memorandum No. 88 temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development.
Are there penalties for illegal or premature conversion of agricultural lands?	Yes, there are administrative and criminal penalties for illegal or premature conversion of agricultural lands, as provided for under DAR AO No. 01-02, Republic Act No. 6657, and Republic Act No. 8435.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in CREBA vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform reinforces the DAR’s crucial role in regulating land use conversion, particularly for lands reclassified after June 15, 1988. This ruling balances the need for agricultural preservation with the recognition of local government’s land use planning powers. This decision has a far reaching impact not only on the construction business but also the agricultural sector of the philippines.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) VS. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010

June 18, 2010

Land Reclassification vs. Conversion: Clarifying DAR’s Authority Over Agricultural Lands

This Supreme Court decision clarifies the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) authority over agricultural land reclassification and conversion. The Court affirmed that lands reclassified to non-agricultural uses after June 15, 1988, still require DAR conversion clearance before they can be used for non-agricultural purposes. This ruling impacts landowners seeking to develop agricultural land for other uses, emphasizing the need to comply with DAR regulations even if local government units have already reclassified the land.

From Farms to Factories: When Does DAR Still Call the Shots?

The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) filed a petition challenging the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended, and DAR Memorandum No. 88. CREBA argued that the DAR Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction by regulating lands already reclassified for residential, commercial, or industrial uses by local government units (LGUs). CREBA contended that these administrative issuances violated the local autonomy of LGUs and the due process rights of landowners. The central issue was whether the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over lands reclassified as non-agricultural after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988.

The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed CREBA’s petition, upholding the DAR’s authority. The Court emphasized the distinction between reclassification and conversion. Reclassification, as defined in the decision, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural purposes. Conversion, on the other hand, is the act of changing the current use of agricultural land to some other use, which requires approval by the DAR. The Court cited Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, highlighting the distinction:

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use conversion.

Building on this principle, the Court clarified that a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. Landowners must still undergo the process of conversion and secure DAR approval before using the land for other purposes. This requirement applies even if the reclassification was initiated by LGUs or through Presidential Proclamations, provided it occurred on or after June 15, 1988.

The Court addressed CREBA’s argument that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, violated the local autonomy of LGUs. The Court noted that Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code, itself recognizes the DAR’s authority over land conversion. The provision states:

Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

This explicit reservation of Republic Act No. 6657’s provisions affirmed that the power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute and is subject to the DAR’s conversion authority. The Court found that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, did not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The penalties provided in the administrative order were aligned with the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435, which penalize illegal or premature conversion of agricultural lands. By aligning administrative penalties with legislative mandates, the DAR was within its authority to execute laws enacted by Congress.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court addressed the petitioner’s argument regarding the unconstitutionality of DAR Memorandum No. 88, which temporarily suspended land use conversion. The Court found that the memorandum was issued to address rice shortages and to ensure sufficient agricultural land for rice cultivation. The issuance was deemed a valid exercise of police power for the general welfare of the public.

The Court also emphasized that the petition was improperly filed directly with the Supreme Court, violating the principle of the hierarchy of courts. Generally, petitions for certiorari should be filed with the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals before reaching the Supreme Court, unless there are special and important reasons justifying a direct resort. No such compelling reasons were presented in this case. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, the Court laid down the general rule:

A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

The ruling reinforces the DAR’s critical role in regulating land use conversion. This authority ensures the preservation of agricultural lands and the prioritization of food security, even in areas undergoing rapid urbanization. It also emphasizes the need for landowners to comply with both local reclassification requirements and DAR conversion processes to avoid potential legal complications and penalties. While LGUs can reclassify land, the ultimate authority to change its use from agricultural lies with the DAR for lands reclassified after June 15, 1988.

In conclusion, this case clarifies that reclassification of agricultural land by LGUs does not automatically allow for non-agricultural use if such reclassification occurred after June 15, 1988. Landowners must still seek conversion approval from the DAR. The decision underscores the balance between local autonomy and national policy in land use management, affirming the DAR’s role in safeguarding agricultural resources.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over lands reclassified for non-agricultural uses by LGUs after June 15, 1988. CREBA challenged DAR’s authority, arguing it infringed on local autonomy and landowners’ rights.
What is the difference between land reclassification and land conversion?	Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural purposes in a land use plan. Conversion, however, is the act of changing the current use of agricultural land to another use, requiring DAR approval.
Does reclassification by an LGU automatically allow a landowner to use the land for non-agricultural purposes?	No, reclassification alone is not sufficient. If the reclassification occurred on or after June 15, 1988, the landowner must still obtain conversion clearance from the DAR before changing the land’s use.
What is the significance of June 15, 1988, in this case?	June 15, 1988, is the date Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) took effect. This date serves as the cutoff for automatic reclassifications of agricultural lands that no longer require DAR conversion clearance.
Did the Supreme Court find DAR Administrative Order No. 01-02, as amended, unconstitutional?	No, the Court upheld the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 01-02, as amended. It found that the DAR Secretary acted within his authority in issuing the administrative order to implement land use conversion provisions.
Did DAR Memorandum No. 88 violate the Constitution?	No, the Court found that DAR Memorandum No. 88, which temporarily suspended land use conversion, was a valid exercise of police power. It was issued to address rice shortages and ensure sufficient agricultural land for rice cultivation.
Why was CREBA’s petition dismissed?	The petition was dismissed because it was improperly filed directly with the Supreme Court, violating the principle of the hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the DAR Secretary.
What is the practical implication of this ruling for landowners?	Landowners seeking to use agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply with both local reclassification requirements and DAR conversion processes. Failure to obtain DAR clearance can result in legal complications and penalties.

This Supreme Court decision provides crucial guidance on the division of authority over land use. It is essential for landowners, developers, and local government units to understand these distinctions to ensure compliance with relevant laws and regulations. By clarifying the roles of LGUs and the DAR, the ruling promotes a more predictable and legally sound framework for land use planning and development.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

June 18, 2010