In a dispute involving concurrent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ruled that when both military and civilian courts have authority over a case, the court that first takes cognizance of the case maintains jurisdiction, preventing duplicate proceedings. The decision clarifies the application of a Memorandum of Agreement between the Ombudsman and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), emphasizing coordination to avoid conflicting decisions. This ruling underscores the importance of adhering to established jurisdictional rules to ensure judicial efficiency and protect the rights of individuals facing administrative charges.
Double Jeopardy or Due Process? Mislang’s Fight Against Grave Misconduct Charges
Col. Noel P. Mislang faced grave misconduct charges before the Office of the Ombudsman related to allegations of conspiracy to assassinate a former mayor and involvement in the shooting of two soldiers. Simultaneously, he underwent a General Court Martial at the Philippine Army Headquarters for the same acts. The Court of Appeals (CA) sided with Mislang, citing res judicata because the military court had already acquitted him. The Supreme Court (SC) was asked to determine whether the CA erred in setting aside the Ombudsman’s decision, and whether the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies was properly applied in this case.
The Office of the Ombudsman argued that it possessed concurrent jurisdiction with the General Court Martial and that its decision to dismiss Mislang was supported by substantial evidence. The Ombudsman also raised procedural issues, claiming Mislang failed to exhaust administrative remedies and did not properly attach necessary documents when appealing to the CA. Mislang countered that he was denied due process because he never received copies of the complaints against him, hindering his ability to adequately respond to the charges. He further contended that the General Court Martial’s prior acquittal barred the Ombudsman from proceeding with the same accusations.
Addressing the procedural concerns first, the Supreme Court found no basis to dismiss Mislang’s appeal for alleged technical defects. The Court noted that the CA had a copy of the assailed Joint Decision, negating any prejudice from the supposed omission. Furthermore, the Court acknowledged exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, particularly when due process violations are alleged. Here, Mislang claimed he was denied the opportunity to respond to the accusations due to the Ombudsman’s failure to provide him with copies of the complaints. This raised a valid due process concern, justifying his direct recourse to the CA.
Regarding jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed that both the Ombudsman and the General Court Martial share concurrent jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary cases involving military personnel. This concurrency stems from the nature of court-martial proceedings, which possess both penal and administrative disciplinary aspects. The Articles of War, particularly Article 96 concerning conduct unbecoming an officer, highlights the disciplinary character of military justice. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the principle is that the body that first takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals. The Court cited Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, stating that when multiple authorities can discipline, “the body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction”.
However, the Court then addressed the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated January 28, 2004, between the Ombudsman and the AFP. The MOA aimed to prevent conflicting decisions and conserve government resources. Although the MOA recognized the Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, it also stipulated that non-graft and corruption cases against military personnel should be endorsed to the AFP. The purpose of this provision was to promote coordination and avoid parallel investigations. The Supreme Court stated that the MOA was not an abrogation of the Ombudsman’s plenary jurisdiction, noting that “the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties”.
According to the Court, the AFP first acquired jurisdiction in Mislang’s case. The affidavits of Rosqueta and Barcelona were executed at the Philippine Army Headquarters prior to the filing of the complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman. Additionally, Mislang had already been reassigned pending investigation by the AFP. Despite this, the Ombudsman proceeded with its own investigation. By doing so, the Ombudsman failed to adhere to the principle of concurrence of jurisdiction as operationally recognized by the MOA, and should have refrained from further acting on the complaints. This is because, even with concurrent jurisdiction, concurrent exercise is not permitted; the first body to exercise jurisdiction excludes others. This principle prevents forum shopping, which the court called, “malpractice of law”.
Even if the Ombudsman had validly exercised its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found that its decision was not based on substantial evidence. The Court emphasized that the Ombudsman failed to afford Mislang administrative due process. There was no evidence showing that Mislang received copies of the complaint-affidavits. Mislang asserted that he was never furnished the complaint, preventing him from submitting a counter-affidavit or position paper. Due process in administrative proceedings requires that respondents have the right to a hearing, to present evidence, and that decisions be based on the evidence presented. Because the Ombudsman’s factual conclusions relied solely on the allegations in the complaint-affidavits, and Mislang was not given the opportunity to present his side, the CA correctly determined that the Joint Decision lacked substantial evidence. The Court highlighted that while administrative bodies are not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure, they must still adhere to fundamental evidentiary rules.
The Supreme Court applied the rule of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, stating that the Ombudsman relied solely on the allegations of self-confessed killers-for-hire to implicate Mislang as a co-conspirator. This rule dictates that the act or declaration of a conspirator can only be used against co-conspirators if the conspiracy is proven by independent evidence, aside from the extrajudicial confession. Here, the CA found no such corroborating evidence. The Supreme Court echoed that there must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence and that a reasonable mind must find the evidence adequate to support a conclusion. Therefore, the Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the CA’s decision.
FAQs
What was the central legal issue in this case? | The central issue was determining which tribunal, the Office of the Ombudsman or the General Court Martial, had jurisdiction over the administrative charges against Col. Mislang, and whether due process was observed. The court also addressed what happens when multiple bodies have concurrent jurisdiction. |
What is the significance of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Ombudsman and the AFP? | The MOA outlines the lines of disciplinary authority and aims to prevent conflicting decisions. It stipulates that non-graft and corruption cases against military personnel should be endorsed to the AFP for investigation. |
What is the principle of ‘exhaustion of administrative remedies’? | This principle requires parties to exhaust all available administrative remedies before resorting to judicial review. However, exceptions exist, such as when there is a violation of due process or when the issue involves a purely legal question. |
What does ‘substantial evidence’ mean in administrative proceedings? | Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It refers to relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. |
What is the rule of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet? | This rule states that acts or declarations of a conspirator are not admissible against a co-conspirator unless the conspiracy is proven by independent evidence. This protects individuals from being implicated solely based on the statements of others. |
What was the basis for the CA’s decision to set aside the Ombudsman’s ruling? | The CA found that the Ombudsman’s decision lacked substantial evidence and that Mislang was denied administrative due process. Mislang was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the charges against him. |
How does the Court define concurrence of jurisdiction? | The Court defines it as the body that first takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. This is in recognition of judicial efficiency and the prevention of forum shopping. |
Why did the Supreme Court deny the Ombudsman’s petition? | The Supreme Court ruled that the AFP had first acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Ombudsman also failed to provide Mislang with due process and that its decision was not supported by substantial evidence. |
This case underscores the importance of adhering to jurisdictional boundaries and ensuring due process in administrative proceedings. It clarifies the operational effect of agreements between government agencies intended to streamline investigative processes. The ruling protects individuals from potential abuses of power and ensures that decisions are based on reliable evidence.
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Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COL. NOEL P. MISLANG, G.R. No. 207926, October 15, 2018