Tag: Enforceability of Contracts

  • Enforceability of Venue Stipulations in Contracts of Adhesion: PILTEL vs. Tecson

    The Supreme Court ruled that venue stipulations in contracts of adhesion are enforceable, provided the agreement to the venue is exclusive, in writing, and made before the suit. This means that even if a contract is presented on a “take it or leave it” basis, its terms, including where lawsuits must be filed, are binding if they are clear and the weaker party understood and agreed to them. Parties entering into contracts, even standard form contracts, are expected to comply with the agreed-upon venue for legal disputes.

    The Case of the Roaming Venue: Can Fine Print Confine a Lawsuit’s Location?

    This case revolves around a dispute between Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL) and Delfino Tecson. Tecson, a subscriber, filed a complaint against PILTEL in Iligan City. PILTEL sought to dismiss the case, arguing that the mobiline service agreements signed by Tecson contained a provision specifying that any legal action must be brought in Makati City. The trial court denied PILTEL’s motion, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals. This brought the case to the Supreme Court to determine the validity and enforceability of the venue stipulation in PILTEL’s service agreement.

    The core issue before the Supreme Court was whether the venue stipulation in the mobiline service agreement was binding on Tecson, considering that the agreement was a contract of adhesion. A contract of adhesion is one where one party prepares the contract and the other party merely affixes their signature or “adheres” to it, often without the opportunity to negotiate the terms. While contracts of adhesion are not automatically invalid, courts scrutinize them carefully to ensure fairness, particularly when one party is in a significantly weaker bargaining position.

    The Supreme Court referred to Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows parties to agree in writing on an exclusive venue for litigation before a lawsuit is filed. To be valid and binding, the venue stipulation must be exclusive in nature, expressed in writing, and entered into before the suit. In PILTEL’s mobiline service agreement, paragraph 22 stipulated that suits arising from the agreement “shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila,” and that the subscriber “expressly waives any other venue.”

    The Court acknowledged that the mobiline service agreement was a contract of adhesion. However, it emphasized that such contracts are not inherently invalid. The rule is that ambiguities in contracts of adhesion are construed against the drafter. However, if the terms are clear and leave no doubt about the parties’ intentions, the literal meaning prevails. The Supreme Court has consistently held that contracts of adhesion are binding unless the weaker party is left with no choice and is deprived of an opportunity to bargain effectively.

    In this instance, Tecson entered into six subscription contracts on different dates. The Court presumed that Tecson had the opportunity to read the terms and conditions of the agreements each time. The Court distinguished this case from Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, where the venue stipulation on a passage ticket was invalidated due to the passengers’ limited opportunity to examine the terms amid crowded conditions. Here, Tecson had multiple opportunities to review and even reject the terms of the service agreements.

    The Supreme Court emphasized the principle that a duly executed contract is the law between the parties, obligating them to comply fully and not selectively with its terms, and that this principle applies to contracts of adhesion. Therefore, the Court held that the venue stipulation in PILTEL’s mobiline service agreement was binding on Tecson. Consequently, the Court granted the petition, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, and dismissed the case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, without prejudice to Tecson filing a new complaint in the proper venue (Makati City).

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether a venue stipulation in a contract of adhesion is enforceable, compelling the parties to litigate only in the agreed-upon location.
    What is a contract of adhesion? A contract of adhesion is a standard-form contract drafted by one party, typically a business, and presented to the other party on a “take it or leave it” basis, with no room for negotiation.
    Is a contract of adhesion automatically invalid? No, a contract of adhesion is not automatically invalid; however, courts carefully scrutinize them for fairness and to ensure the weaker party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms.
    What is a venue stipulation? A venue stipulation is a contractual provision specifying the particular court or location where any legal disputes arising from the contract must be filed and litigated.
    Under what conditions is a venue stipulation valid? A venue stipulation is valid if it is exclusive, in writing, agreed upon by the parties before the filing of a lawsuit, and the terms are clear and unambiguous.
    What did the Supreme Court decide in this case? The Supreme Court ruled that the venue stipulation in PILTEL’s mobiline service agreement was enforceable, requiring Tecson to file his complaint in Makati City, as stipulated in the contract.
    What happens if a contract of adhesion is ambiguous? If a contract of adhesion contains ambiguities, those ambiguities are typically construed against the party that drafted the contract (the stronger party).
    What does this case mean for consumers entering into contracts? This case highlights the importance of reading and understanding the terms of contracts, including venue stipulations, as they can be binding even in contracts of adhesion.

    This case underscores the importance of understanding contract terms, even in standardized agreements. While contracts of adhesion are scrutinized, clear and unambiguous venue stipulations are generally enforceable, impacting where legal disputes can be pursued.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION vs. DELFINO TECSON, G.R. No. 156966, May 07, 2004

  • Upholding Contractual Rights: The Enforceability of First Refusal in Property Sales

    The Supreme Court, in this case, affirmed the enforceability of a right of first refusal in property leases, preventing the lessor from selling to a third party without first offering the property to the lessee. This decision underscores the importance of honoring contractual obligations and protects lessees’ rights to acquire property they have invested in. It clarifies that a right of first refusal is a valid and enforceable component of a lease agreement, ensuring fairness and predictability in property transactions. The Court prioritized contractual sanctity over claims of public welfare, emphasizing that even government entities must adhere to their contractual commitments.

    NDC vs. Firestone: Can a University Override a Tenant’s Right to Buy?

    In the 1960s, the National Development Corporation (NDC), a government entity, leased a portion of its Manila property to Firestone Ceramics, Inc. (FIRESTONE) for its ceramic manufacturing business. The lease agreements granted FIRESTONE the right of first refusal, meaning that if NDC decided to sell the property, FIRESTONE would have the first opportunity to purchase it. Years later, NDC attempted to transfer the property to Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) without offering it to FIRESTONE. FIRESTONE sued to enforce its right of first refusal, leading to a legal battle that reached the Supreme Court. The central legal question was whether NDC could disregard FIRESTONE’s contractual right and transfer the property to PUP.

    The Supreme Court meticulously examined the facts and the contractual agreements between NDC and FIRESTONE. Several contracts of lease contained provisions requiring FIRESTONE to construct buildings and improvements on the leased premises, demonstrating a significant investment by FIRESTONE. The 1978 contract expressly granted FIRESTONE the first option to purchase the leased premises if NDC decided to sell the property. The Court emphasized that a right of first refusal is a valuable contractual right that cannot be unilaterally withdrawn, especially when it stands upon valuable consideration.

    The Court noted that NDC’s attempt to transfer the property to PUP was, in essence, a sale. Despite NDC’s argument that the transaction was merely a transfer between government entities, the Court recognized that NDC and PUP are separate legal entities with their own charters. The cancellation of NDC’s debt to the national government in exchange for the property transfer constituted a valid form of consideration, satisfying the elements of a sale. The Supreme Court held that all three essential elements of a valid sale – consent, determinate subject matter, and consideration – were present in the transaction between NDC and PUP. A contract of sale is defined as an agreement where one party commits to transfer ownership and deliver a specific item to another, who in turn pays a sum of money or its equivalent. This definition aligned with the NDC-PUP transaction.

    Furthermore, the Court highlighted PUP’s actions after the transfer as an admission of the sale. PUP posted notices within the compound, asserting ownership and demanding that occupants vacate the premises. This conduct demonstrated PUP’s understanding that it had acquired ownership of the property through a sale. The intervention of the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, did not alter the independent existence of NDC and PUP as separate entities. The Court viewed the President’s role as limited to facilitating the relationship between NDC and PUP, not negating the contractual obligations between NDC and FIRESTONE.

    The Supreme Court addressed the argument that prioritizing FIRESTONE’s right of first refusal would prejudice public welfare, specifically the constitutional priority accorded to education. The Court recognized the importance of education but emphasized that such importance does not justify the confiscation of private property or the violation of contractual rights. It held that while education may be prioritized for legislative or budgetary purposes, it cannot be used to override binding contractual obligations. The principle of respecting contractual obligations is fundamental to a stable and predictable legal system.

    The Court distinguished this case from Ang Yu Asuncion v. CA, clarifying that a right of first refusal is not merely a preparatory contract but a substantive right that can be enforced. This principle was reinforced by the case of Equatorial Realty Development, Inc., v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., which affirmed that a right of first refusal is enforceable according to the law on contracts. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right of first refusal should be enforced according to the law on contracts rather than on broad interpretations of human relations. The obligation is to ensure that the grantor complies with their duty under the terms in which they should have offered the property to the grantee.

    The Court ultimately upheld the lower courts’ decision, ordering PUP to sell the property to FIRESTONE at P1,500.00 per square meter. While the initial sale to PUP was at a lower price, FIRESTONE had admitted to the higher market value. The Court directed that a ground survey of the leased premises be conducted to accurately determine the area before the sale. The final ruling underscores the importance of honoring contractual obligations and protecting the rights of lessees who have invested in property based on the promise of a right of first refusal.

    FAQs

    What is a right of first refusal? A right of first refusal is a contractual right that gives a party the first opportunity to purchase a property if the owner decides to sell. The owner must offer the property to the holder of the right before offering it to anyone else.
    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the National Development Corporation (NDC) could sell its property to Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) without first offering it to Firestone Ceramics, Inc. (FIRESTONE), which had a right of first refusal.
    What did the Supreme Court decide? The Supreme Court decided that NDC had violated FIRESTONE’s right of first refusal by selling the property to PUP without offering it to FIRESTONE first. The Court ordered PUP to sell the property to FIRESTONE.
    What is the legal basis for the decision? The decision is based on the principle that contracts must be honored and that a right of first refusal is a valid and enforceable contractual right. The Court relied on the law on contracts, emphasizing the importance of mutual obligation.
    What was the consideration for the right of first refusal? The consideration for the right of first refusal was built into the reciprocal obligations of the parties in the lease contract. FIRESTONE’s agreement to lease the property and make improvements served as consideration for NDC’s granting of the right of first refusal.
    Why was the transfer to PUP considered a sale? The transfer was considered a sale because PUP expressed willingness to acquire NDC properties and NDC expressed willingness to sell to PUP. The cancellation of NDC’s liabilities to the national government served as valuable consideration in exchange for the property.
    What price was FIRESTONE ordered to pay for the property? FIRESTONE was ordered to pay P1,500.00 per square meter for the property. Although it was sold at a lower price to PUP, FIRESTONE admitted to the higher market value.
    Can government entities disregard contracts for public welfare? The Supreme Court clarified that public welfare, such as prioritizing education, does not justify violating contractual obligations. Even government entities must honor their agreements.

    This case reinforces the sanctity of contractual agreements, especially concerning property rights. It serves as a reminder that rights of first refusal are legally binding and enforceable, providing security to lessees who invest in properties with such provisions. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that lessors cannot circumvent these rights by selling to third parties without first offering the property to the lessee. This case underscores the judiciary’s commitment to upholding justice and fairness in property transactions.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Polytechnic University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., G.R. No. 143590, November 14, 2001

  • Verbal Contracts in the Philippines: Are Oral Agreements Legally Binding?

    When Your Word is Your Bond: Enforceability of Verbal Contracts in the Philippines

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    In the Philippines, can a handshake seal a deal? This case dives into the surprising strength of verbal contracts under Philippine law. Learn when spoken agreements hold up in court and how to protect your business dealings even without a written contract. This case highlights that in certain situations, your word and actions can indeed be your bond, legally speaking.

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    G.R. No. 135495, December 14, 2000

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    INTRODUCTION

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    Imagine striking a business deal over a cup of coffee, a simple verbal agreement to supply goods. In today’s world of formal contracts, it seems almost too informal to be legally binding. Yet, Philippine law recognizes the power of the spoken word, especially when actions follow those words. The case of Cordial v. Miranda illuminates this principle, reminding us that contracts aren’t always about signatures on paper; sometimes, a verbal commitment, backed by actions, is enough.

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    This case revolves around a dispute between Genaro Cordial, a rattan supplier, and David Miranda, a businessman. Cordial claimed Miranda verbally agreed to purchase rattan poles. When Miranda refused to pay after delivery, Cordial sued. The central legal question: Was there a valid and enforceable contract despite the lack of a written agreement, and did the Statute of Frauds bar its enforcement?

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    LEGAL CONTEXT: Philippine Contract Law and the Statute of Frauds

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    Philippine contract law, rooted in the Civil Code, emphasizes the principle of consensuality. Article 1305 defines a contract as “a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.” This definition immediately tells us that the essence of a contract is the agreement itself, the meeting of minds, not necessarily the paper it’s written on.

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    Article 1356 of the Civil Code further reinforces this, stating, “Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.” These essential requisites, as outlined in Article 1318, are consent, object, and cause. Simply put, if both parties agree on the terms (consent), there’s a clear subject matter (object), and a valid reason for the agreement (cause), a contract exists, regardless of whether it’s written or spoken.

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    However, there are exceptions. The Statute of Frauds, enshrined in Article 1403(2) of the Civil Code, lists certain types of agreements that must be in writing to be enforceable. This is to prevent fraudulent claims based on verbal agreements alone. Crucially relevant to Cordial v. Miranda is Article 1403(2)(d), which states:

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    (d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action, or pay at the time some part of the purchase money…

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    This means contracts for the sale of goods exceeding P500 generally need to be written. But, and this is a critical “but,” the law also provides an exception: partial performance or execution. If the buyer has already accepted the goods, or paid part of the price, the verbal contract becomes enforceable, despite the Statute of Frauds.

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    CASE BREAKDOWN: Cordial v. Miranda – The Story of a Verbal Agreement

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    Genaro Cordial, seeking to establish himself as a rattan supplier, was introduced to David Miranda by Cecilia Buelva, the widow of a deceased supplier of Miranda. In April 1992, Cordial and Buelva met Miranda in Angeles City. Cordial claimed that during this meeting, he verbally agreed to supply rattan poles to Miranda at specific prices per size, delivered to Angeles City.

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    To fulfill this agreement, Cordial traveled to Palawan, secured a forestry license through Roberto Savilla (another supplier of Miranda), and purchased rattan poles using his own funds. From June to October 1992, Cordial diligently gathered 50,540 pieces of rattan poles, documented in his notebook.

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    On October 29, 1992, Cordial shipped the rattan to Manila. Upon arrival in Malabon, he informed Miranda, who allegedly sent trucks to haul the rattan to his Angeles City residence. Cordial even accompanied the last truckload, claiming Miranda personally received the delivery. A scale report was issued, but notably, it was under Roberto Savilla’s name, not Cordial’s.

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    When Cordial sought payment of P375,000, Miranda refused, denying any contract with Cordial. Miranda claimed his dealings were solely with Roberto Savilla, and all obligations to Savilla were settled. This denial led Cordial to file a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City.

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    The Courtroom Journey: RTC and Court of Appeals Decisions

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    The RTC sided with Cordial, declaring the verbal agreement valid and enforceable. The court found Cordial to be the actual supplier and ordered Miranda to pay P375,000 plus interest, litigation expenses, and attorney’s fees.

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    However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA emphasized the lack of a written contract and found it “incredible” that there was no written documentation for such a substantial transaction, particularly the freight costs. The CA speculated that Cordial might have been an agent or partner of Savilla, with whom Miranda admitted to having dealings. The CA gave weight to cash vouchers showing advances to Savilla, suggesting Miranda believed he was transacting with Savilla all along.

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    Supreme Court Intervention and the Final Ruling

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    Cordial elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s factual findings. The Supreme Court agreed with Cordial and reinstated the RTC decision. The Supreme Court highlighted several key points:

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    • Factual Findings of the Trial Court: The Supreme Court gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings, which had the opportunity to directly assess the credibility of witnesses. The Court noted the general rule that factual findings of the trial court are given great respect, especially when affirmed by the CA, but exceptions exist when the findings are contradictory, as in this case.
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    • No Proof of Agency or Partnership: The CA’s theory that Cordial was merely an agent or partner of Savilla was unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court pointed out that the cash advances to Savilla predated Cordial’s involvement and the scale report in Savilla’s name was insufficient to prove agency or partnership. As the Supreme Court stated, “Allegations, after all, are not proofs.”
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    • Privity of Contract: The Supreme Court found sufficient evidence of a direct contractual relationship between Cordial and Miranda. The testimonies of Cordial and Buelva clearly indicated Miranda’s agreement to purchase rattan from Cordial at a set price. The Court quoted Cordial’s testimony detailing the price agreement and Buelva’s corroboration of Miranda agreeing to receive rattan from Cordial.
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    • Statute of Frauds Inapplicable: Crucially, the Supreme Court held that the Statute of Frauds did not apply because the contract was already partially executed. Cordial had already delivered the rattan poles, and Miranda had accepted them. Citing precedent, the Court reiterated that the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts, not those that are fully or partially performed. As the Court emphasized, “In the present case, it has clearly been established that petitioner had delivered the rattan poles to respondent on November 3, 1992. Because the contract was partially executed, the Statute of Frauds does not apply.”
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    Based on these points, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that a valid verbal contract existed between Cordial and Miranda, and it was enforceable due to partial execution.

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    PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: Lessons for Businesses and Individuals

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    Cordial v. Miranda offers valuable lessons for businesses and individuals in the Philippines:

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    • Verbal Contracts Can Be Binding: Philippine law recognizes verbal agreements as valid and enforceable contracts, provided all essential elements (consent, object, cause) are present. You don’t always need a written contract for a deal to be legally binding.
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    • Partial Execution is Key: Even if a contract falls under the Statute of Frauds (like sales of goods over P500), partial performance, such as delivery and acceptance of goods, can take it outside the Statute’s scope, making a verbal agreement enforceable.
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    • Importance of Evidence: While verbal contracts are valid, proving their terms in court can be challenging. Cordial succeeded because he presented credible witness testimony and documentation (his notebook of purchases, evidence of delivery) to support his claim.
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    • Written Contracts are Still Best Practice: Despite the enforceability of verbal contracts in some cases, written contracts are always the best practice, especially for significant business transactions. They provide clarity, prevent misunderstandings, and offer stronger evidence in case of disputes.
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    Key Lessons from Cordial v. Miranda:

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    • Document Your Agreements: Always aim for written contracts, especially for business deals, to avoid ambiguity and disputes.
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    • Keep Records: Maintain records of all transactions, including receipts, delivery documents, and communications, even for verbal agreements.
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    • Act in Good Faith: If you make a verbal promise and the other party acts on it, honor your word. Philippine law, as seen in this case, supports the principle of keeping your promises.
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    FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQs)

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    Q: Are verbal contracts legal in the Philippines?

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    A: Yes, generally verbal contracts are legal and binding in the Philippines, provided they have consent, object, and cause. Philippine law prioritizes the meeting of minds over the form of the contract.

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    Q: When is a written contract required under Philippine law?

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    A: The Statute of Frauds requires certain contracts to be in writing to be enforceable, including agreements for the sale of goods worth P500 or more, agreements not to be performed within a year, and contracts for the sale of real property, among others.

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    Q: What is the Statute of Frauds?

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    A: The Statute of Frauds is a legal principle requiring certain types of contracts to be in writing to prevent fraudulent claims and perjury. It aims to ensure reliable evidence exists for significant agreements.

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    Q: What does