ASG Law

Tag: Grave Abuse of Discretion

  • Certiorari as Remedy: Challenging Ombudsman Decisions in Administrative Cases

    The Supreme Court clarified that when the Ombudsman exonerates a respondent in an administrative case, the complainant’s proper recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. This ensures that the complainant is not left without a remedy to question the Ombudsman’s ruling, particularly when grave abuse of discretion is alleged. The ruling reinforces the availability of judicial review to check potential abuses of power by government instrumentalities, even in cases where statutes appear to limit appeal rights.

    Navigating Justice: When Can You Question an Ombudsman’s Decision?

    This case stems from a vehicular accident involving Maria Nympha Mandagan and Rufino Dela Cruz, an employee of the Local Government Unit (LGU) of San Juan City. Mandagan filed an administrative complaint against Dela Cruz and Ding Villareal, another LGU employee, alleging Grave Misconduct, Gross Negligence, and Serious Dishonesty, relating to the accident and subsequent handling of the matter. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, leading Mandagan to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was then dismissed on the ground that the proper remedy was a petition for review. The central legal question is whether the CA erred in dismissing Mandagan’s petition, specifically questioning the appropriate remedy for assailing an Ombudsman decision that exonerates a respondent in an administrative case.

    The resolution of this issue hinges on the interpretation of Republic Act No. 6770, also known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989,” and Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07). Section 27 of R.A. 6770 states that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. Furthermore, any order imposing a penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month’s salary is considered final and unappealable. This provision is mirrored in Section 7, Rule III of AO 07, which explicitly states that when a respondent is absolved of the charge, the decision is final, executory, and unappealable.

    However, the apparent finality of these decisions does not leave an aggrieved party without recourse. The Supreme Court, in Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario, clarified that even when the Ombudsman’s ruling is deemed “final and unappealable,” the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court remains available. This remedy is grounded in the Constitution, which empowers courts to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

    The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the complainant in an administrative complaint the right to appeal where the Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the administrative charge, as in this case. The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts, to effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the respondent is granted the right to appeal but only in case he is found liable and the penalty imposed is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month suspension or a fine equivalent to one month salary.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that the absence of a statutory right to appeal does not equate to the absence of any remedy whatsoever. The Court reiterated that the power of judicial review, exercised through a petition for certiorari, is a fundamental check on government action, ensuring that tribunals act within their jurisdiction and do not commit grave abuse of discretion. In this context, “grave abuse of discretion” implies an act that is capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic, such that it is tantamount to a lack of jurisdiction.

    In the present case, because the Ombudsman’s ruling exonerated Dela Cruz and Villareal from administrative liability, Mandagan correctly availed herself of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. This was the appropriate avenue to challenge the Ombudsman’s ruling on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, erred in dismissing the petition on the technicality that Mandagan should have filed a Rule 43 petition for review. The Supreme Court, recognizing that the dismissal was based on a procedural misstep, remanded the case to the CA for a resolution on the merits.

    This ruling highlights the importance of understanding the nuances of administrative procedure and the available remedies when challenging decisions of quasi-judicial bodies like the Ombudsman. It underscores that while certain decisions may be deemed final and unappealable in the traditional sense, the power of judicial review remains a vital safeguard against potential abuses of discretion. The decision serves as a reminder to legal practitioners and litigants alike to carefully assess the nature of the ruling being challenged and to select the appropriate remedy to ensure that their grievances are properly addressed by the courts.

    The Supreme Court’s decision also carries practical implications for individuals who file administrative complaints with the Ombudsman. It clarifies that if the Ombudsman exonerates the respondent, the complainant cannot appeal the decision through the typical channels. Instead, the complainant’s recourse is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion. This remedy is not an appeal on the merits of the case but a challenge to the process and the legal basis of the Ombudsman’s decision.

    The standard for proving grave abuse of discretion is high. It requires demonstrating that the Ombudsman acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner. Therefore, a complainant seeking to avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari must present a strong case that the Ombudsman’s decision was not based on a reasoned consideration of the facts and the law but rather on an abuse of power. The availability of certiorari provides a check on the Ombudsman’s power, ensuring that decisions are not made arbitrarily or in violation of fundamental rights.

    In summary, the Mandagan v. Dela Cruz case reinforces the principle that the remedy of certiorari remains available to challenge Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases where the respondent is exonerated. This remedy serves as a vital safeguard against potential abuses of discretion by government instrumentalities, ensuring that justice is served even in situations where traditional appeal rights are limited.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Maria Nympha Mandagan’s petition for certiorari, which challenged the Ombudsman’s decision to exonerate Rufino Dela Cruz and Ding Villareal in an administrative case. Specifically, it concerned the correct remedy to assail an Ombudsman decision that absolves a respondent of administrative charges.
    What is a petition for certiorari? A petition for certiorari is a legal remedy used to question the decisions or actions of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, alleging that they acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
    When is a petition for certiorari the appropriate remedy? A petition for certiorari is appropriate when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is typically used to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, rather than errors of judgment.
    What is grave abuse of discretion? Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
    What did the Ombudsman decide in this case? The Ombudsman dismissed the administrative complaint filed by Maria Nympha Mandagan against Rufino Dela Cruz and Ding Villareal for lack of factual and legal bases. The Ombudsman found that the allegations of misconduct, negligence, and dishonesty were not supported by the evidence presented.
    Why did the Court of Appeals dismiss Mandagan’s petition? The Court of Appeals dismissed Mandagan’s petition for certiorari on the ground that she availed herself of the wrong remedy. The CA believed that the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, not a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
    What was the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case? The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Mandagan’s petition for certiorari. The Court held that when the Ombudsman exonerates a respondent in an administrative case, the complainant’s proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 43.
    What is the significance of this ruling? This ruling clarifies the appropriate remedy for challenging Ombudsman decisions that exonerate respondents in administrative cases. It ensures that complainants are not left without recourse to question potentially erroneous or abusive decisions by the Ombudsman.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Mandagan v. Dela Cruz provides valuable guidance on the remedies available to challenge decisions of the Ombudsman. It underscores the importance of understanding the nuances of administrative procedure and the significance of the remedy of certiorari in safeguarding against potential abuses of discretion by government instrumentalities. This ruling ensures that justice is served even in situations where traditional appeal rights are limited, reinforcing the accountability of public officials and the protection of individual rights.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Maria Nympha Mandagan, Petitioner, v. Rufino Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 228267, October 08, 2018

  • Balancing the Right to Travel: When Can Courts Restrict an Accused’s Movement?

    The Supreme Court has clarified the extent to which courts can restrict the constitutional right to travel of individuals facing criminal charges. While courts can issue hold departure orders to ensure jurisdiction over the accused, these restrictions must be reasonable and based on concrete facts, not mere speculation. This ruling emphasizes that an accused person, presumed innocent, retains fundamental rights, subject only to necessary limitations that guarantee their availability for legal proceedings.

    Liberty on a Leash: How Far Can Travel Be Limited During Trial?

    Joseph C. Sy, facing charges for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, sought permission from the Sandiganbayan (SB) to travel abroad for business and personal reasons. The SB denied his requests, citing concerns about his potential flight risk and questioning his citizenship. Sy challenged these denials, arguing that they infringed on his right to travel and were based on insufficient evidence. This case highlights the delicate balance between an accused’s constitutional rights and the court’s need to maintain jurisdiction.

    The constitutional right to travel, a component of personal liberty, cannot be curtailed without due process. However, this right is not absolute; it is subject to constitutional, statutory, and inherent limitations. One such inherent limitation is the court’s authority to prevent individuals charged with crimes from leaving the country. This power ensures that court orders and processes remain effective, as explained in People v. Uy Tuising:

    An accused is prohibited from leaving the Philippine jurisdiction “because, otherwise, [the court’s] orders and processes would be nugatory; and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the court from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines, they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.”

    This restriction, as highlighted in Silverio v. Court of Appeals, serves to keep the accused within reach of the courts, allowing the legal proceedings to progress without undue delay. The court in Silverio emphasized that preventing departure from the Philippines is a valid restriction to ensure the accused can be dealt with according to the law. The balance lies in protecting the public interest while upholding individual rights.

    The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sandiganbayan (SB) committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Sy’s travel request. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious exercise of judgment, tantamount to a lack of jurisdiction or a refusal to perform a legal duty. While the accused bears the onus of justifying their travel, this should not be unduly denied if it does not impede the court’s jurisdiction. The court outlined several factors to consider when assessing travel requests, including:

    • Purpose of the travel
    • History of similar travels before the case
    • Ties to the Philippines and destination country
    • Availability of extradition treaties
    • Reputation of the accused
    • Travel itinerary with confirmed return tickets
    • Possibility of reporting to the Philippine embassy

    These variables ensure a balanced assessment, respecting the accused’s presumption of innocence while addressing legitimate concerns. The court found the SB’s reliance on Sy’s Chinese lineage and unresolved citizenship claims to be insufficient justification for restricting his travel. Sy’s birth certificate indicated Filipino citizenship, and his frequent travels before the case suggested his intentions were not to flee prosecution. This approach contrasts with merely speculative reasons, which do not justify limiting constitutional rights.

    Furthermore, Sy’s role as Chairman of Global Ferronickel Holdings, Inc. (FNI) and his involvement in various trade organizations highlighted the necessity of his foreign travels for business purposes. Similar to Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, where the court allowed travel due to the petitioner’s role in San Miguel Corporation, Sy’s responsibilities required him to oversee international operations. The Supreme Court emphasized that restricting Sy’s business travels could economically threaten the companies he represents, thus underscoring the importance of balancing legal restrictions with economic realities.

    While granting the petition in part, the Supreme Court clarified that future travel requests should be filed with the Sandiganbayan first, as it holds primary jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court acts as a reviewing tribunal, focusing on whether the SB abused its discretion. In subsequent requests, the SB should consider the guidelines provided in this decision. The court also suggested measures to mitigate concerns about Sy absconding, such as:

    • Requiring a travel bond
    • Submission of detailed travel itineraries
    • Limiting the duration and scope of travel
    • Requiring appearance before a Philippine consul
    • Designating a personal agent
    • Mandating a report upon return to the Philippines

    These measures offer a flexible approach, allowing the court to manage risks while respecting the accused’s rights. Ultimately, the decision reinforces the principle that the right to travel, though fundamental, can be reasonably restricted to serve the State’s interest in criminal prosecution. However, such restrictions must be grounded in concrete evidence and judiciously applied, balancing individual liberties with the need for effective legal proceedings.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the Sandiganbayan (SB) gravely abused its discretion by denying Joseph C. Sy’s motions to travel abroad, infringing upon his constitutional right to travel. The Supreme Court assessed the balance between an accused’s rights and the court’s need to maintain jurisdiction.
    What is a Hold Departure Order (HDO)? A Hold Departure Order (HDO) is a legal order issued by a court, preventing a person, typically an accused in a criminal case, from leaving the country. Its purpose is to ensure the court maintains jurisdiction over the individual.
    Can a person released on bail travel abroad? While being released on bail grants provisional liberty, it does not guarantee an unrestricted right to travel abroad. The court’s permission is required, and travel can be restricted to ensure the accused remains accessible for legal proceedings.
    What factors do courts consider when deciding on travel requests? Courts evaluate factors such as the purpose of travel, travel history, ties to the Philippines and the destination country, availability of extradition, reputation, and travel itinerary. These factors help determine the likelihood of the accused returning.
    What does “grave abuse of discretion” mean? Grave abuse of discretion refers to a judgment so capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary that it is equivalent to lacking jurisdiction or failing to perform a legal duty. It implies an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to act according to the law.
    What is the role of a birth certificate in determining citizenship? A birth certificate is considered prima facie evidence of the facts contained within it, including citizenship. Unless contradicted by other evidence, it is generally accepted as proof of a person’s citizenship.
    What kind of travel restrictions can a court impose? Courts can impose travel bonds, require detailed itineraries, limit the travel area and duration, mandate reporting to a Philippine consul, designate a personal agent, and require a report upon return. These measures aim to ensure the accused’s return.
    What was the effect of the court’s decision? The Supreme Court nullified the Sandiganbayan’s denial of Sy’s third travel request, underscoring the need for a balanced assessment of travel requests. The decision provided guidelines for future requests, emphasizing the presumption of innocence and the need for concrete evidence to restrict travel.

    This case reaffirms the importance of balancing individual rights with the State’s interest in ensuring justice. Courts must carefully consider all relevant factors before restricting an accused’s right to travel, ensuring that such restrictions are reasonable and based on concrete evidence.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: JOSEPH C. SY v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 237703, October 03, 2018

  • Immediate Execution of Ombudsman Decisions: Upholding Administrative Authority

    The Supreme Court ruled that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are immediately executory, even pending appeal. This means that penalties such as suspension are enforced right away, ensuring that public officials are held accountable without delay. This landmark ruling reinforces the Ombudsman’s authority to swiftly address misconduct in public service.

    Navigating Due Process: When Can an Ombudsman’s Order Be Immediately Enforced?

    This case, Office of the Ombudsman v. Elmer M. Pacuribot, revolves around the immediate execution of an Ombudsman’s decision. Elmer M. Pacuribot, a municipal treasurer, was found administratively liable for Immorality or Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct and was suspended for nine months. The Ombudsman ordered the immediate implementation of this suspension. Pacuribot questioned this order, arguing that it should be stayed pending the resolution of his motion for reconsideration or appeal. The Court of Appeals sided with Pacuribot, but the Supreme Court ultimately reversed this decision, reinforcing the Ombudsman’s power to enforce its decisions promptly.

    The central legal question is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion by ordering the immediate execution of its decision against Pacuribot. The key lies in interpreting Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17. This rule explicitly states that an appeal does not stop the decision from being executory. The Supreme Court, in its analysis, emphasized the importance of upholding the Ombudsman’s authority to ensure swift accountability in public service.

    The Court’s reasoning builds upon previous jurisprudence, particularly the Samaniego case. While an earlier decision in Samaniego had created some ambiguity, the Court clarified its stance in a later En Banc resolution. This resolution unequivocally affirmed the immediate executory nature of Ombudsman decisions. The Court highlighted that delaying the execution of penalties would undermine the Ombudsman’s effectiveness and the public interest in maintaining ethical standards in government.

    The Supreme Court addressed Pacuribot’s arguments regarding due process and the right to appeal. The Court acknowledged the right to appeal but stressed that this right does not automatically stay the execution of the Ombudsman’s decision. The Court pointed out that, should Pacuribot win his appeal, he would be entitled to back pay and other emoluments he did not receive during his suspension, therefore, mitigating any potential prejudice caused by the immediate execution.

    The decision also underscores the constitutional basis for the Ombudsman’s rule-making powers. Section 13(8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. This authority, coupled with the provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the Ombudsman to create rules that ensure the effective performance of its functions. The Court emphasized that allowing lower courts to stay the execution of Ombudsman decisions would encroach upon these constitutionally granted powers.

    The Supreme Court contrasted the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman with the general provisions of the Rules of Court. While the Rules of Court may apply suppletorily to cases before the Ombudsman, they do so only when the Ombudsman’s rules are silent on a particular procedural matter. In this case, Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman’s rules specifically addresses the execution of decisions, thus taking precedence over any conflicting provisions in the Rules of Court. This application of the principle of Specialis derogat generali—the specific prevails over the general—reinforces the primacy of the Ombudsman’s rules in administrative cases within its jurisdiction.

    The Court also addressed the impact of Pacuribot’s death on the case. While Pacuribot passed away during the pendency of the proceedings, the Court maintained that his death did not render the issue moot. The Court emphasized that it retains jurisdiction to determine whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, resolving the case could have implications for Pacuribot’s estate, particularly regarding any retirement benefits or other accrued entitlements.

    The ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Pacuribot has significant implications for public officials and the administration of justice in the Philippines. It clarifies the scope of the Ombudsman’s authority to enforce its decisions promptly and effectively. By upholding the immediate executory nature of Ombudsman decisions, the Court reinforces the importance of accountability in public service and deters misconduct by government officials.

    The ruling also provides guidance for lower courts in handling appeals from Ombudsman decisions. The Court’s emphasis on the primacy of the Ombudsman’s rules of procedure clarifies the standard for granting or denying stays of execution. Lower courts must now give greater deference to the Ombudsman’s authority and exercise caution in issuing orders that would undermine the Ombudsman’s ability to enforce its decisions.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The central issue was whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion by ordering the immediate execution of its decision suspending Elmer Pacuribot. This involved interpreting the rules governing the execution of Ombudsman decisions pending appeal.
    What did the Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are immediately executory, even pending appeal. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, upholding the Ombudsman’s authority.
    What is the basis for immediate execution of Ombudsman decisions? Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, explicitly states that an appeal does not stop the decision from being executory. This rule is rooted in the Ombudsman’s constitutional and statutory mandate.
    Does this mean a public official has no right to appeal? No, public officials still have the right to appeal Ombudsman decisions. However, the appeal does not automatically stay the execution of the penalty.
    What happens if the official wins the appeal? If the official wins the appeal, they are entitled to back pay and other emoluments they did not receive during the suspension. This compensates for any prejudice caused by the immediate execution.
    Does the death of the respondent affect the case? No, the Court clarified that even if the respondent dies during the pendency of the case, the Court retains jurisdiction to resolve the issue. This ensures that the Ombudsman’s authority is upheld and that any implications for the respondent’s estate are addressed.
    Why is immediate execution important? Immediate execution is important to ensure accountability in public service and to deter misconduct by government officials. It prevents delays in the enforcement of penalties and maintains public trust in the integrity of government.
    What is the Specialis derogat generali principle? This legal principle means that a specific rule prevails over a general rule. In this case, the specific rule in the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure regarding the execution of decisions takes precedence over the general provisions of the Rules of Court.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Office of the Ombudsman v. Elmer M. Pacuribot reinforces the authority of the Ombudsman and the importance of accountability in public service. The ruling provides clear guidance on the immediate executory nature of Ombudsman decisions and its impact on the rights of public officials.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ELMER M. PACURIBOT, G.R. No. 193336, September 26, 2018

  • Binding Counsel: When Attorney Negligence Impacts Client Rights in Philippine Law

    In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Angeline V. Paez, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that a client is generally bound by the actions of their counsel, even if those actions constitute mistakes or negligence. PAGCOR sought relief from this rule, arguing that its counsel’s negligence deprived it of due process. However, the Court found that PAGCOR failed to demonstrate the level of gross negligence required to overcome the general rule, and further, that PAGCOR was not, in fact, deprived of due process. This decision reinforces the importance of diligent oversight of legal representation and highlights the limitations of excusing procedural errors based on attorney negligence.

    The Case of the Missed Deadline: Can Attorney Negligence Excuse a Lost Appeal?

    This case arose from the dismissal of Angeline V. Paez, a PAGCOR employee, after she allegedly tested positive for methamphetamine in a random drug test. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) initially upheld her dismissal, but later reversed its decision, citing PAGCOR’s failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Specifically, the CSC found that Paez was not properly notified of the positive screening result, denying her the opportunity to contest the findings through a confirmatory test. PAGCOR then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was eventually dismissed due to PAGCOR’s failure to comply with court orders. This failure led to the central question: Can PAGCOR be excused from its counsel’s negligence, or should it be bound by it?

    The CA initially dismissed PAGCOR’s petition for review due to non-compliance with its orders to provide the correct addresses of the respondent and her counsel. After the respondent voluntarily submitted to the CA’s jurisdiction, the petition was reinstated. However, PAGCOR again failed to comply with a subsequent order to furnish the respondent with a copy of the petition, leading the CA to deem the petition abandoned and dismiss it. PAGCOR then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that its counsel’s negligence should not bind it and that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion.

    The Supreme Court addressed whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing PAGCOR’s petition for review. The Court emphasized that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right or a component of due process. As such, it must be exercised in accordance with the Rules of Court. Failure to comply with these rules can result in the loss of the right to appeal. The court also reiterated that a special civil action for certiorari is an independent action available only when there is no appeal or other adequate remedy, and it cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.

    The Court found that PAGCOR had missed the deadline to file an appeal by certiorari and instead filed a petition for certiorari, which is an improper substitute. This procedural misstep was fatal to PAGCOR’s case. Even if the Court considered the petition on its merits, it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA. The Court emphasized the general rule that a client is bound by the acts of their counsel, even mistakes.

    The Supreme Court acknowledged exceptions to this rule, such as when the counsel’s negligence is so gross that it deprives the client of due process, or when the application of the rule would result in the deprivation of liberty or property, or when the interests of justice require relief. However, the Court found that PAGCOR failed to prove that its counsel’s negligence was so gross as to warrant an exception to the general rule. According to the court, gross negligence implies a complete absence of care or a thoughtless disregard of consequences, and mere allegations are not sufficient; it must be proven with evidence.

    The Court found that PAGCOR’s excuses for its failure to comply with the CA’s orders – heavy workload and water damage in its offices – did not amount to gross negligence. The Court also pointed out that PAGCOR was not deprived of due process, as it had the opportunity to be heard before the CSC and the CA. The court stated that PAGCOR was given every opportunity to be heard but failed to take advantage of the said opportunities, and thus, the general rule applies. The Supreme Court also criticized PAGCOR’s cavalier attitude towards court processes and procedures, reminding it that substantial justice is not a magic potion that automatically compels the Court to set aside technical rules, especially when a litigant disregards the Rules of Court and court directives.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the negligence of PAGCOR’s counsel should be excused, allowing PAGCOR to avoid the consequences of failing to comply with court orders and missing the deadline for appeal. The Court ruled that the client is generally bound by the actions of their counsel.
    What is the general rule regarding a client’s responsibility for their lawyer’s actions? The general rule is that a client is bound by the actions of their counsel, even if those actions are mistakes or negligent. This is because the lawyer is seen as an agent of the client.
    Are there any exceptions to this rule? Yes, there are exceptions, such as when the counsel’s negligence is so gross that it deprives the client of due process, or when the application of the rule would result in the deprivation of liberty or property, or when the interests of justice require relief. The party claiming exception must prove the grounds for exception.
    What is considered “gross negligence” in this context? Gross negligence is defined as the want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It examines a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
    Did the Supreme Court find that PAGCOR’s counsel was grossly negligent? No, the Supreme Court did not find that PAGCOR’s counsel was grossly negligent. The Court considered the excuses provided by PAGCOR to be insufficient to establish gross negligence.
    Did PAGCOR have an opportunity to be heard in court? Yes, PAGCOR had the opportunity to be heard before the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that PAGCOR was not deprived of due process.
    Why did the Court reject PAGCOR’s petition for certiorari? The Court rejected PAGCOR’s petition for certiorari because it was an improper substitute for a lost appeal. PAGCOR had missed the deadline to file an appeal by certiorari and could not use a special civil action to circumvent this deadline.
    What is the significance of complying with the Rules of Court? Complying with the Rules of Court is essential for exercising the right to appeal. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and it must be exercised in accordance with the rules. Failure to comply can result in the loss of the right to appeal.

    In conclusion, this case serves as a reminder of the importance of diligently monitoring one’s legal representation and adhering to procedural rules. While exceptions exist, the general rule that a client is bound by the actions of their counsel remains a cornerstone of Philippine jurisprudence. The ruling emphasizes the need for parties to take responsibility for their legal representation and to ensure that their counsel is acting with due diligence.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINE V. PAEZ, G.R. No. 230084, August 20, 2018

  • Appeal vs. Certiorari: Understanding the Proper Remedy Against Court Orders in the Philippines

    The Supreme Court clarified that a final order dismissing a case must be challenged through an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Choosing the wrong legal remedy, like filing a petition for certiorari when an appeal is available, is a critical error that can result in the dismissal of the case. This decision underscores the importance of understanding the correct procedural steps in Philippine law to protect one’s legal rights.

    Navigating Legal Pathways: Choosing Between Appeal and Certiorari in Property Disputes

    In the case of Editha S. Medina, Raymond A. Dalandan, and Clemente A. Dalandan vs. Sps. Nicomedes and Brigida Lozada, the central legal question revolves around the proper remedy to question a court order dismissing a complaint based on res judicata. The petitioners initially filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance, which was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the grounds that the matter had already been decided in a previous case. Instead of appealing this dismissal, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC’s order was merely interlocutory and not a final judgment on the merits. The CA dismissed the petition, holding that appeal, not certiorari, was the correct remedy. This decision highlights the critical distinction between these two legal avenues and the consequences of choosing the wrong one.

    The Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the CA’s decision, emphasizing that when a court order fully disposes of a case, the proper remedy is an appeal. Appeal, as outlined in Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is the mechanism for reviewing judgments or final orders that completely resolve a case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do. In contrast, certiorari, governed by Rule 65, is a special civil action used to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The SC underscored that these remedies are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive, meaning one cannot substitute for the other.

    The court explained the nature of a final order, stating that “an order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court.” The dismissal of the complaint based on res judicata was a final order because it terminated the proceedings in the RTC, precluding any further action by that court on the matter. Therefore, the petitioners’ recourse was to appeal the RTC’s decision to the CA within the prescribed period. By choosing certiorari instead, they pursued an improper remedy, which led to the dismissal of their petition. This underscores a fundamental principle of Philippine remedial law: the availability of appeal generally precludes the use of certiorari.

    The concept of res judicata, central to the RTC’s dismissal, is a legal doctrine that prevents parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court. As the RTC pointed out, for res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met:

    (1.) the former judgment or order must be final;
    (2.) it must be a judgment, or an order on the merits;
    (3.) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
    (4.) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

    The RTC concluded that these elements were present, as the title of the applicant Nicomedes J. Lozada was confirmed by a previous decision of LRC No. M-24. While the petitioners disputed the RTC’s application of res judicata, the SC emphasized that the appropriate avenue for challenging this ruling was through an appeal, where the CA could review the RTC’s factual and legal conclusions.

    Moreover, the SC noted that the petitioners’ petition for certiorari was filed beyond the 60-day period prescribed by Rule 65. Even if certiorari had been the proper remedy, the petitioners’ failure to comply with the procedural requirements would have been fatal to their case. This highlights the importance of adhering to deadlines and procedural rules in legal proceedings. Ignorance of the law excuses no one, and failing to observe these rules can result in the loss of legal rights.

    This case serves as a cautionary tale for litigants and legal practitioners alike. It reinforces the importance of carefully assessing the nature of a court order and choosing the correct remedy. Filing a petition for certiorari as a substitute for a lost appeal is a common mistake that can have devastating consequences. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are distinct, and each serves a specific purpose in the Philippine legal system. Understanding these distinctions is crucial for navigating the complex landscape of procedural law.

    To further clarify the distinct roles of appeal and certiorari, consider the following table:

    Feature Appeal Certiorari
    Purpose To review and correct errors of judgment or fact made by the lower court. To correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
    Scope of Review Broad review of the entire case, including factual and legal issues. Limited to jurisdictional issues and grave abuse of discretion.
    Availability Available when a judgment or final order completely disposes of the case. Available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
    Nature of Action Ordinary course of law. Special civil action.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the petitioners correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to question the RTC’s order dismissing their complaint based on res judicata.
    What is res judicata? Res judicata is a legal doctrine that prevents parties from relitigating issues that have already been decided by a competent court. It requires identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the two cases.
    What is the difference between appeal and certiorari? Appeal is used to review errors of judgment or fact, while certiorari is used to correct grave abuse of discretion. Appeal is generally available when a final order disposes of a case, while certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or adequate remedy.
    When is certiorari the proper remedy? Certiorari is the proper remedy when a court acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or other adequate remedy available.
    What is a final order? A final order is one that completely disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do. An order dismissing a complaint is generally considered a final order.
    What happens if you choose the wrong remedy? If you choose the wrong remedy, such as filing a petition for certiorari when an appeal is available, your petition may be dismissed outright.
    What is the time period for filing a petition for certiorari? Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari must be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be reviewed.
    Why did the CA dismiss the petition in this case? The CA dismissed the petition because the petitioners should have appealed the RTC’s order of dismissal, as it was a final order. Certiorari was not the proper remedy.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Medina v. Lozada serves as a crucial reminder of the importance of understanding and adhering to the procedural rules governing appeals and certiorari. Choosing the correct remedy and complying with the prescribed timelines are essential steps in protecting one’s legal rights. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the case and the loss of the opportunity to seek redress.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Editha S. Medina, et al. v. Sps. Nicomedes and Brigida Lozada, G.R. No. 185303, August 01, 2018

  • Defining Probable Cause in Philippine Plunder Cases: Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman

    The Supreme Court upheld the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against Senator Jinggoy Estrada, John Raymund de Asis, and Janet Lim Napoles for plunder and graft, emphasizing the broad discretion afforded to the Ombudsman in prosecuting criminal complaints against public officials. This decision reinforces the principle that a preliminary investigation only requires evidence showing a crime was likely committed, without needing absolute certainty or evidence sufficient for conviction, thus allowing cases to proceed to trial where the accused can fully exercise their rights.

    PDAF Scandal Unveiled: Did the Ombudsman Abuse Discretion in Estrada’s Indictment?

    This consolidated case examines whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, John Raymund de Asis, and Janet Lim Napoles for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, related to the misuse of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). The central legal question revolves around the extent of judicial review permissible over the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause, balancing the need to combat corruption with protecting individual rights against unfounded accusations.

    The Supreme Court’s consistent policy is to maintain non-interference in the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause, recognizing its broad powers under both the Constitution and Republic Act 6770. The Court acknowledges the Ombudsman’s expertise in assessing evidence and defers to its sound judgment, unless grave abuse of discretion is evident. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law.

    Probable cause, in this context, is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It requires evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects, demanding more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify conviction. The elements of the crime charged should be present. The court has stated that “only facts sufficient to support a *prima facie* case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty.”

    In determining probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present, but not definitively established, enough that their presence becomes reasonably apparent. It was further added that:

    [O]wing to the nature of preliminary investigations, the “technical rules of evidence should not be applied” in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that “the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented.” Thus, in *Estrada v. Ombudsman (Estrada)*, the Court declared that since a preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties, “probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.”

    The petitioners were charged with plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements:

    1. That the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
    2. That he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) hereof; and
    3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated, or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

    On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are:

    1. That the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers);
    2. That he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and
    3. That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

    The Court analyzed the evidence presented by the Ombudsman, including the testimonies of whistleblowers, affidavits, business ledgers, and COA reports. The Court found that the Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict Estrada, as the elements of the crimes charged were reasonably apparent based on the evidence on record. The Court emphasized that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence; and the presence or absence of the elements of the crime charged is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.

    The Court also addressed the arguments raised by Justice Velasco in his dissent, specifically regarding the admissibility and credibility of the evidence used by the Ombudsman. The Court reiterated its stance that technical rules on evidence should not be rigidly applied during preliminary investigations, and that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.

    Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, upholding the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against all the petitioners. The case will proceed to trial, where the guilt or innocence of the accused will be determined based on the evidence presented.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict Senator Estrada, de Asis, and Napoles for plunder and graft, and the extent of judicial review over the Ombudsman’s determination.
    What is probable cause in this context? Probable cause exists when facts and circumstances would lead a reasonable person to believe the accused committed the crime, requiring more than suspicion but less than evidence for conviction. It implies probability of guilt determined in a summary manner.
    Can hearsay evidence be used to establish probable cause? Yes, hearsay evidence can be used to establish probable cause during a preliminary investigation as long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. It is because the preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties.
    What is the role of the Ombudsman in prosecuting public officials? The Ombudsman has broad powers to investigate and prosecute criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The office is considered the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of public service.
    What is the *res inter alios acta* rule, and does it apply here? The *res inter alios acta* rule states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another. The Supreme Court ruled that technical rules on evidence, including the *res inter alios acta* rule, should not be rigidly applied in preliminary investigation.
    What is plunder, according to Philippine law? Plunder is committed when a public officer, by himself or in connivance with others, amasses ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 million through a combination or series of illegal acts. These acts include misappropriation, receiving kickbacks, or taking undue advantage of official position.
    What is Section 3(e) of RA 3019? Section 3(e) of RA 3019 prohibits public officers from causing undue injury to any party or giving any private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. It penalizes corrupt practices by public officers in the performance of their functions.
    What was the effect of the Ombudsman’s findings? The Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause allowed the case to proceed to trial before the Sandiganbayan. The accused is given a chance to defend themselves, and the courts will then proceed to hear the evidence.
    What was De Asis’s role in the case? De Asis was a driver, messenger, and janitor for Napoles and allegedly assisted in the fraudulent processing and releasing of PDAF funds. He was also designated as president/incorporator of a Napoles-controlled NGO.
    Who is Janet Lim Napoles in the case? Napoles is the central figure of the PDAF scandal. She is the alleged mastermind of the operation, facilitating the transfer of PDAF and creating non-governmental organizations for the purpose.

    This decision reinforces the considerable deference given to the Ombudsman’s judgment in determining probable cause, underscoring the importance of allowing corruption cases to proceed to trial. It affirms the principle that a preliminary investigation is not a trial, and that technical rules of evidence should not unduly hinder the prosecution’s ability to present its case. Future cases involving public corruption are likely to rely on this ruling as precedent for upholding the Ombudsman’s discretion.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, et al. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212761-62, July 31, 2018

  • Liquidation Orders: Upholding BSP Authority Over Insolvent Banks

    The Supreme Court affirmed the authority of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to order the liquidation of banks deemed insolvent, even when stockholders challenge the decision. This ruling clarifies that the BSP’s Monetary Board is not required to conduct an independent investigation into a bank’s viability before ordering liquidation; it can rely on the findings of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). For bank stockholders, this means the BSP’s decisions regarding liquidation are final and executory unless grave abuse of discretion can be proven. The decision reinforces the BSP’s role in maintaining financial stability and protecting depositors by ensuring swift action against failing banks.

    Apex Bancrights vs. BSP: Can the Monetary Board Solely Rely on PDIC Findings?

    In the case of Apex Bancrights Holdings, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the central legal question revolved around the extent of the Monetary Board’s discretion in ordering the liquidation of a bank. Specifically, the petitioners, stockholders of Export and Industry Bank (EIB), argued that the Monetary Board should not have relied solely on the findings of the PDIC that EIB could no longer be rehabilitated. The stockholders claimed that the PDIC had frustrated efforts to rehabilitate the bank and that the Monetary Board had a duty to conduct its own independent assessment before ordering liquidation. This case provides a critical examination of the checks and balances within the Philippine financial regulatory framework.

    The legal framework governing this case is primarily found in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653, also known as “The New Central Bank Act.” This section outlines the proceedings for receivership and liquidation of banks and quasi-banks. According to the Act, the Monetary Board can forbid an institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the PDIC as receiver if it finds that the bank:

    (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community; (b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution.

    The law further states that if the receiver (PDIC) determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated, the Monetary Board shall notify the board of directors and direct the receiver to proceed with liquidation. The actions of the Monetary Board are deemed final and executory, subject only to a petition for certiorari on the grounds of excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

    In this case, EIB encountered financial difficulties and was placed under receivership by the PDIC. The PDIC initially attempted to rehabilitate the bank but ultimately concluded that rehabilitation was not feasible. Based on this determination, the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 571, directing the PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of EIB. The stockholders challenged this resolution, arguing that the Monetary Board should have made its own independent assessment of EIB’s viability before ordering liquidation. However, the Court of Appeals upheld the Monetary Board’s decision, and the Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s ruling.

    The Supreme Court emphasized that Section 30 of RA 7653 does not require the Monetary Board to conduct an independent factual determination of a bank’s viability before ordering liquidation. The Court reasoned that the law explicitly states that once the receiver determines that rehabilitation is no longer feasible, the Monetary Board is obligated to notify the bank’s board of directors and direct the receiver to proceed with liquidation.

    If the receiver determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume business in accordance with the next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in writing the board of directors of its findings and direct the receiver to proceed with the liquidation of the institution.

    The Court further noted that the BSP and PDIC are the principal agencies mandated by law to determine the financial viability of banks and facilitate the receivership and liquidation of closed financial institutions. The ruling underscores the importance of adhering to the plain language of the statute, following the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, which dictates that the literal meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute should be applied without attempted interpretation.

    The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Monetary Board’s power to close and liquidate banks is an exercise of the State’s police power, which is subject to judicial review. However, the Court clarified that such actions can only be set aside if they are shown to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust, or tantamount to a denial of due process or equal protection. In this case, the Court found no evidence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Monetary Board.

    The decision in Apex Bancrights Holdings, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has significant implications for the banking industry and its stakeholders. It reinforces the authority of the BSP to act decisively in cases of bank insolvency to protect depositors and maintain financial stability. The ruling also clarifies the relationship between the BSP and PDIC in the receivership and liquidation process, emphasizing that the Monetary Board can rely on the PDIC’s findings regarding a bank’s viability.

    This ruling confirms that the Monetary Board’s actions in insolvency proceedings are generally final and executory, and courts should not interfere unless there is convincing proof of arbitrary action or bad faith. The decision serves as a reminder that bank stockholders must demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion to challenge the BSP’s decisions in this area. It also underscores the importance of banks maintaining adequate capital and complying with regulatory requirements to avoid intervention by the BSP and PDIC.

    The decision provides clarity on the scope of judicial review in cases involving bank closures and liquidations. It clarifies that while the courts can review the Monetary Board’s actions for grave abuse of discretion, they should not substitute their judgment for that of the regulatory agencies. Instead, the courts should focus on whether the Monetary Board acted within its jurisdiction and whether its actions were supported by evidence. This limits the scope of judicial intervention and allows the BSP to act quickly and decisively in cases of bank insolvency.

    In practical terms, this means that stockholders have a limited window to challenge such decisions, as highlighted in the ruling. The legal challenges must be based on concrete evidence of grave abuse of discretion, not simply disagreements with the BSP’s assessment of the bank’s financial condition. Therefore, this decision reinforces the stability of the Philippine banking system by ensuring the swift resolution of cases involving insolvent banks, protecting the interests of depositors and creditors. It demonstrates the balance between regulatory power and the rights of bank owners, emphasizing the importance of regulatory expertise and decisive action in maintaining financial stability.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Monetary Board of the BSP gravely abused its discretion by ordering the liquidation of EIB based on the PDIC’s findings without conducting its own independent assessment.
    What did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court ruled that the Monetary Board did not gravely abuse its discretion and that it could rely on the PDIC’s findings to order the liquidation of EIB.
    What is the legal basis for the BSP’s actions? The legal basis is Section 30 of RA 7653, which outlines the proceedings for receivership and liquidation of banks and authorizes the Monetary Board to act based on the receiver’s determination.
    What recourse do stockholders have in such cases? Stockholders can file a petition for certiorari within ten days, but only on the grounds of excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
    What does “grave abuse of discretion” mean in this context? “Grave abuse of discretion” means an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or acting in contemplation of law, not based on law and evidence.
    What is the role of the PDIC in bank liquidation? The PDIC acts as the receiver and is responsible for gathering assets, administering them for the benefit of creditors, and determining if rehabilitation is feasible.
    Can the courts restrain the BSP’s actions? The actions of the Monetary Board are final and executory and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari.
    Why is this ruling important? This ruling reinforces the authority of the BSP to act decisively in cases of bank insolvency, protecting depositors and maintaining financial stability.

    In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Apex Bancrights Holdings, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas affirms the BSP’s authority in overseeing bank liquidations. The decision underscores the importance of regulatory expertise and swift action in maintaining financial stability. The court ruling provides legal clarity and reinforces the framework for bank receivership and liquidation in the Philippines.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: APEX BANCRIGHTS HOLDINGS, INC. VS. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, G.R. No. 214866, October 02, 2017

  • Judicial Discretion: Independent Evaluation Required When Amending Criminal Information

    The Supreme Court ruled that trial courts must exercise independent judgment when deciding whether to amend a criminal information, even if the prosecutor recommends it. This means judges can’t simply rubber-stamp the prosecutor’s decisions but must assess the evidence themselves. The ruling ensures that the court acts as an impartial arbiter of justice and the accused’s rights are protected. The Court emphasized that once a case is filed, the trial court is duty-bound to evaluate the evidence independently, safeguarding against potential abuses of prosecutorial discretion.

    Did the Judge Abdicate Responsibility? Scrutinizing Criminal Information Amendments

    This case revolves around a criminal complaint filed by Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna, Inc. (petitioner) against its employees, Melanie M. Canicon and Merlita L. Espeleta (respondents), for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. After a preliminary investigation, an information for estafa was filed against Canicon, Espeleta, and a third employee. Espeleta filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation, claiming she hadn’t had the chance to present her evidence during the initial inquiry. Subsequently, the prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case against Espeleta. The RTC granted the prosecutor’s motion and admitted an amended information dropping Espeleta as an accused.

    The petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied. Later, a different judge recalled the order admitting the amended information, reinstating Espeleta as a co-accused. Espeleta then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted, leading to the reinstatement of the original order that excluded her from the charge. This back-and-forth prompted the petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA denied the petition, leading to the current petition before the Supreme Court. The core legal question is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it allowed the amendment of the criminal information based on the prosecutor’s recommendation, without conducting an independent evaluation of the evidence.

    The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the petitioner’s standing to file the petition without the conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). While generally, only the OSG can represent the State in criminal appeals, the Court recognized an exception. A private complainant has the right to file a petition for certiorari if the dismissal of the criminal case is tainted with grave abuse of discretion affecting the civil aspect of the case. In this instance, the Court found that the petitioner did have standing because the dismissal of the case against Espeleta foreclosed the petitioner’s right to the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case.

    The Court then tackled the question of double jeopardy, determining whether reinstating the original information would violate Espeleta’s constitutional rights. The Court clarified that double jeopardy attaches when the following elements are present: a valid information, a court of competent jurisdiction, arraignment and plea, and conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the accused’s express consent. While the first three elements were met, the Court found that Espeleta’s express consent to the dismissal through her counsel’s lack of objection to the amendment of the information meant that jeopardy did not attach. Thus, reinstating the original information would not violate her right against double jeopardy.

    Turning to the central issue, the Court emphasized that while the public prosecutor has the discretion to determine probable cause, this discretion is not absolute once an information is filed in court. At that point, any remedial measure, including reinvestigation or amendment of the information, is subject to the court’s discretion. The Court cited Crespo v. Mogul, stating that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the Court.

    Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

    Building on this principle, the Supreme Court referred to Martinez v. Court of Appeals, which stresses that the trial court must make its own independent assessment of the case and not merely accept the conclusions of the executive department. In other words, the judge must be convinced that there is no sufficient evidence against the accused after assessing the evidence. The Court found that the RTC, in this case, failed to make such an independent assessment when it allowed the amendment of the information, thus constituting grave abuse of discretion.

    The Court highlighted that both the original order granting the amendment and the subsequent order reinstating it lacked any indication that the judge had independently examined the facts and evidence. As the Supreme Court made clear in *Mosquera v. Panganiban*:

    The question in this case is not so much whether the MeTC has the authority to grant or not to grant the public prosecutor’s motion to withdraw the information—it does—but whether in the exercise of that discretion or authority it acted justly and fairly. In this case, the MeTC did not have good reason stated in its order for the reinstatement of the information against petitioner, just as it did not have good reason for granting the withdrawal of the information.

    By simply granting the motion without any evaluation, the RTC abdicated its judicial responsibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstating the original information. This underscores the crucial role of the judiciary in independently evaluating criminal cases, even when the prosecution recommends a particular course of action.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by allowing the amendment of a criminal information based solely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, without conducting its own independent evaluation of the evidence.
    Does a private complainant have standing in a criminal case appeal? Generally, only the OSG can appeal in criminal cases. However, a private complainant can file a petition for certiorari if the dismissal of the case involves grave abuse of discretion affecting the civil aspect of the case.
    What is the meaning of double jeopardy? Double jeopardy is a constitutional right that protects an accused from being tried twice for the same offense if they have already been acquitted, convicted, or the case has been dismissed without their express consent.
    What are the requirements for double jeopardy to attach? The requirements are a valid information, a court of competent jurisdiction, arraignment and plea, and conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the accused’s express consent.
    Can an accused’s motion for reinvestigation equate to express consent for dismissal? No, merely filing a motion for reinvestigation does not equate to the accused’s express consent to the dismissal of the case.
    What is the court’s responsibility when an information is filed? Once an information is filed, the court becomes the sole judge of how to dispose of the case, and any remedial measure is subject to the court’s discretion. The Court must make its own assessment of the evidence, not just accept the prosecutor’s conclusions.
    What happens if the court fails to make its own evaluation of evidence? If the court fails to make its own evaluation of evidence when deciding on a motion to amend the information, it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
    What principle was emphasized from Crespo v. Mogul? Crespo v. Mogul emphasizes that once a complaint or information is filed in court, the disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
    What was the Supreme Court’s final ruling in this case? The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstating the original information, emphasizing the necessity of judicial independence in evaluating criminal cases.

    The Supreme Court’s decision underscores the judiciary’s crucial role in safeguarding the rights of the accused and ensuring that criminal proceedings are conducted fairly and impartially. By requiring trial courts to exercise independent judgment, the ruling protects against potential abuses of prosecutorial discretion and reinforces the principle of due process in the Philippine legal system.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna, Inc. v. Canicon, G.R. No. 196015, June 27, 2018

  • Preliminary Mandatory Injunction: A Clear Right Imperative in Lease Disputes

    In the Philippine legal system, a preliminary mandatory injunction (PMI) is an extraordinary remedy that commands the performance of an act, often altering the status quo. However, its issuance is not a matter of course. The Supreme Court, in SM Investments Corporation v. Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp., clarified that a PMI can only be issued when the applicant demonstrates a clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. This case underscores that without such a clear legal right, a court’s grant of a PMI constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The decision emphasizes the importance of establishing a firm legal basis before compelling a party to act, ensuring that the remedy remains reserved for situations where the right to relief is beyond serious dispute.

    Billboard Battles: When Lease Termination Sparks Injunctive Relief?

    This case stemmed from a contract of lease between Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp. (Mac Graphics) and Pilipinas Makro, Inc. (Makro), where Mac Graphics was granted exclusive use of billboard sites in Makro’s EDSA Cubao and Makati City locations for 20 years. The lease contract stipulated that Mac Graphics was responsible for securing the necessary permits and licenses, although Makro would assist in obtaining barangay, business, and building permits. Additionally, Mac Graphics was required to maintain comprehensive all-risk property insurance, including third-party liability coverage.

    Problems arose when Makro terminated the lease agreement, citing Mac Graphics’ failure to obtain the required permits and insurance. Mac Graphics contested the termination, arguing that Makro did not provide the necessary assistance in securing the permits and that the insurance requirement was rendered impossible due to unforeseen circumstances following Typhoon Milenyo. Subsequently, Mac Graphics filed a complaint for injunction and damages against Makro and SM Investments Corporation (SMIC), claiming that the termination was illegal and seeking to enforce the lease contract. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (WPMI), ordering Makro and SMIC to restore Mac Graphics to the possession of the billboard structures. This decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions.

    The Supreme Court’s decision hinged on the principle that a preliminary mandatory injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should only be granted in cases of clear and unmistakable right. The Court emphasized that the requisites for the issuance of a WPMI are stringent, requiring the complainant to demonstrate (1) a clear legal right, (2) a violation of that right that is material and substantial, and (3) an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In this case, the Court found that Mac Graphics failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the continued enforcement of the lease contract after its pre-termination by Makro.

    The Court noted that Mac Graphics admitted to non-compliance with the stipulations regarding licenses/permits and insurance coverage. While Mac Graphics attempted to justify this non-compliance by invoking circumstances that allegedly made compliance legally and physically impossible, the Court found that Makro had presented a substantial challenge to this position. This substantial challenge created a genuine doubt about the validity of Makro’s pre-termination of the lease contract and the tenability of Mac Graphics’ excuse for non-compliance.

    Moreover, the Court highlighted that granting the WPMI effectively constituted a prejudgment of the main case. By ordering the restoration of Mac Graphics to the billboard sites, the lower courts had implicitly declared Makro’s pre-termination of the lease contract invalid. This prejudgment reversed the rule on the burden of proof, as it assumed the proposition that Mac Graphics was required to prove at trial.

    As the Supreme Court reiterated in Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, “The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial… There would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.”

    The Court also addressed the issue of irreparable injury. Both the CA and RTC found that Mac Graphics would suffer irreparable injury if the WPMI was not granted, citing the termination of contracts by other clients and damage to Mac Graphics’ goodwill and reputation. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that any damage suffered by Mac Graphics was primarily a loss of revenue, which could be measured with reasonable accuracy and compensated with monetary damages. As the Court explained in Power Sites and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon (a Division of Ever Corporation), “a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that is actual, substantial, and demonstrable.” In this case, the potential loss of revenue did not meet the standard of irreparable injury required to justify a WPMI.

    The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a reminder that preliminary mandatory injunctions are not to be issued lightly. Before granting such a remedy, courts must carefully consider whether the applicant has demonstrated a clear and unmistakable right, whether the injury is truly irreparable, and whether the issuance of the injunction would amount to a prejudgment of the case. In the absence of these elements, the grant of a WPMI constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the lower courts committed grave abuse of discretion in granting a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (WPMI) in favor of Mac Graphics. The Supreme Court found that they did, as Mac Graphics failed to demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right.
    What is a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (WPMI)? A WPMI is a court order that requires a party to perform a specific act before a final judgment is rendered. It is considered an extraordinary remedy and is only granted in cases where the right to relief is clear and the injury is irreparable.
    What did Mac Graphics argue in its complaint? Mac Graphics argued that the pre-termination of the lease contract by Makro was illegal and sought to enforce the contract. They claimed that they were prevented from complying with certain requirements due to unforeseen circumstances and that Makro had not provided adequate assistance.
    What were the grounds for Makro’s termination of the lease? Makro terminated the lease agreement due to Mac Graphics’ alleged failure to obtain the relevant Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and local government permits, and the failure to secure comprehensive all-risk property insurance for the billboard sites.
    Why did the Supreme Court reverse the CA and RTC decisions? The Supreme Court reversed the decisions because Mac Graphics did not demonstrate a clear legal right to the continued enforcement of the lease contract, and the potential injury was deemed quantifiable and reparable. The Court found that the WPMI effectively constituted a prejudgment of the main case.
    What is meant by ‘irreparable injury’ in the context of injunctions? ‘Irreparable injury’ refers to damages that cannot be adequately compensated with monetary relief. It involves a degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement.
    How did SMIC get involved in this case? SMIC was involved because it owned a significant portion of Makro’s capital stock, influencing Makro’s decisions. Mac Graphics filed the original complaint against both Makro and SMIC.
    What is the significance of the 90-day ‘remedy period’ in the lease contract? The lease contract stipulated that if either party failed to comply with its obligations, the other party must provide a 90-day written notice to allow the breaching party to remedy the breach. Mac Graphics argued Makro failed to observe this, while Makro contended the breaches were not remediable.

    This case emphasizes the rigorous standards required for granting preliminary mandatory injunctions, particularly the necessity of establishing a clear legal right and demonstrating irreparable harm. It highlights the judiciary’s role in protecting against the premature enforcement of rights before a thorough trial on the merits. The Supreme Court’s ruling ensures that the extraordinary remedy of a WPMI is reserved for cases where the right to relief is convincingly established and the potential for harm is truly irreparable.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: SM Investments Corporation vs Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp., G.R. Nos. 224337-38, June 25, 2018

  • Due Process in Ombudsman Investigations: The Extent of Discretion and Rights of the Accused

    The Supreme Court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman has broad discretion in conducting investigations and determining probable cause. The Court emphasized that as long as the accused is given the opportunity to present their case, the Ombudsman’s decisions will generally not be interfered with by the courts, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. This means individuals facing investigation must actively participate and present evidence, as the Ombudsman’s findings will be upheld unless a clear violation of rights is demonstrated.

    The Rice Harvester’s Tale: Can the Ombudsman Revisit a Case After COA Scrutiny?

    This case revolves around Feliciano S. Pasok, Jr., formerly the Municipal Agriculturist of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, who faced allegations of malversation and violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Rex Y. Dua, an Agricultural Technician II, filed a complaint detailing several irregularities in the implementation of agricultural programs under Pasok’s watch. These included the non-remittance of funds from various projects and the alleged manipulation of an award for a rice harvester. Pasok denied the charges, claiming that Dua was motivated by malice after he did not accommodate Dua’s promotion due to lack of civil service eligibility. This case scrutinizes the extent of the Ombudsman’s power to investigate and prosecute, and the importance of due process in administrative proceedings.

    The Office of the Ombudsman–Mindanao initially found Pasok guilty of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty and also found probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. However, this decision was set aside pending a report from the Commission on Audit (COA). Subsequently, based on the COA reports, the Ombudsman again found probable cause against Pasok, leading to the current petition. Pasok argued that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion by relying on the COA reports without giving him an opportunity to comment on them, thus violating his right to due process. The central legal question is whether the Ombudsman’s actions deprived Pasok of his right to due process and exceeded the bounds of its investigative authority.

    The Supreme Court addressed Pasok’s claim that his right to due process was violated. The Court reiterated the principle of non-interference in the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers. The Court emphasized that its inquiry in certiorari proceedings is limited to determining whether the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies an act that is whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious, amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It also includes instances where a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence.

    The Court referenced Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, which outlines the powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman. Specifically, Section 13(1) grants the Ombudsman the power to investigate any act of a public official when such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Section 13(5) allows the Ombudsman to request assistance and information from any government agency, such as the COA, to aid in its investigations. These constitutional provisions provide the foundation for the Ombudsman’s broad authority in investigating public officials.

    The Court cited Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, emphasizing that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty. This determination is made through a preliminary investigation. Here, the Court noted that Pasok was given the opportunity to submit his allegations and evidence during the preliminary investigation. He presented pleadings, certifications, and affidavits from witnesses to support his claims. Therefore, the Court found that Pasok could not validly claim that he was deprived of his right to due process.

    The Court addressed the significance of the COA report in the Ombudsman’s decision-making process. The Ombudsman’s directive to the COA to conduct a fact-finding investigation was issued without prejudice to the results of the investigation. This meant that the Ombudsman retained the power to issue a subsequent directive based on its evaluation of the COA reports, even after setting aside its initial decision and resolution. The Supreme Court acknowledged the Office of the Ombudsman’s broad discretion in handling investigations, referencing the case of Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman. This discretion allows the Ombudsman to decide how best to pursue each investigation, including dismissing a preliminary investigation without prejudice if a COA decision is necessary or pursuing the investigation independently.

    To further illustrate the discretion afforded to the Ombudsman, the Court emphasized that varying treatments of similarly situated investigations do not inherently constitute a violation of equal protection or due process rights. In Pasok’s case, the Ombudsman’s decision to revisit the case after receiving the COA report and finding probable cause was deemed within its authority and did not violate Pasok’s rights, as he had been afforded the opportunity to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This ruling reinforces the considerable latitude given to the Ombudsman in conducting investigations.

    This case confirms the judiciary’s reluctance to interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial functions unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of allowing the Ombudsman to independently assess evidence and determine probable cause without undue interference from the courts. It also highlights the necessity for individuals under investigation to actively participate in the process and present their defenses, as the Ombudsman’s findings will be upheld unless a clear violation of rights is demonstrated.

    The case further delineates the powers and duties of the Ombudsman, as well as the parameters for judicial review of its decisions. By upholding the Ombudsman’s findings, the Supreme Court reinforced its commitment to allowing the Ombudsman to function effectively in its role of investigating and prosecuting public officials accused of wrongdoing. This decision serves as a guide for future cases involving the Ombudsman’s authority and the rights of individuals under investigation.

    FAQs

    What was the key issue in this case? The key issue was whether the Office of the Ombudsman–Mindanao acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against Pasok based on COA reports without giving him a chance to comment, thus allegedly violating his right to due process.
    What did the Ombudsman initially find? Initially, the Ombudsman found Pasok guilty of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty and also found probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
    Why was the initial finding set aside? The initial finding was set aside pending the submission of a fact-finding/audit investigation report by the Commission on Audit (COA).
    What was the basis for the Ombudsman’s renewed finding of probable cause? The renewed finding of probable cause was based on the fact-finding reports submitted by the COA.
    What was Pasok’s main argument in his petition? Pasok argued that his right to due process was violated because he was not given an opportunity to comment on the COA reports before the Ombudsman made its finding.
    What was the Court’s ruling on Pasok’s due process argument? The Court ruled that Pasok’s right to due process was not violated because he had been given an opportunity to present his case and defenses during the preliminary investigation.
    What is the extent of the Ombudsman’s investigative power? The Ombudsman has broad investigative power under the Constitution and RA 6770, including the power to request assistance from other government agencies like the COA.
    Under what circumstances will the Court interfere with the Ombudsman’s decisions? The Court will generally not interfere with the Ombudsman’s decisions unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
    What does the ruling imply for public officials facing investigation? The ruling implies that public officials facing investigation must actively participate in the process and present their defenses, as the Ombudsman’s findings will be upheld unless a clear violation of rights is demonstrated.

    In conclusion, this case reaffirms the broad discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting investigations and determining probable cause. It clarifies that due process requires providing the accused an opportunity to be heard, but does not necessarily mandate a right to comment on every piece of evidence considered. The decision underscores the importance of respecting the Ombudsman’s independence in fulfilling its mandate to combat corruption.

    For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

    Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
    Source: Feliciano S. Pasok, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman–Mindanao and Rex Y. Dua, G.R. No. 218413, June 06, 2018