Tag: HLURB

Land Reclassification Prevails: Exempting Properties from Agrarian Reform Coverage

The Supreme Court ruled that land validly reclassified from agricultural to residential use by a local government unit (LGU) before June 15, 1988, is exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This decision emphasizes the authority of LGUs in land use decisions and protects property owners who acted in accordance with local ordinances prior to the implementation of CARP. The ruling reinforces the principle that a single valid reclassification is sufficient for exemption, clarifying the roles of different government agencies in determining land use.

From Coconut Farm to Residential Zone: When Zoning Laws Shield Land from Agrarian Reform

This case, Noel L. Ong, Omar Anthony L. Ong, and Norman L. Ong v. Nicolasa O. Imperial, et al., revolves around a parcel of land in Camarines Norte owned by the Ongs. The land, initially covered by a Notice of Coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), became the subject of a dispute when the Ongs claimed it was exempt due to its reclassification as residential land prior to the effectivity of CARL. This dispute reached the Supreme Court, requiring a determination of whether a local government’s reclassification of land prior to June 15, 1988, could exempt it from CARP coverage, and the extent of the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR) authority over such reclassified lands.

The facts of the case are straightforward. The Ongs, registered owners of a 40.5-hectare property, received a Notice of Coverage from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO). They protested, arguing that the land was a grazing area, and its size was below the threshold for CARP coverage. The MARO countered that the land was used for coconut production, not grazing. The Ongs then applied for exemption, presenting certifications indicating the land was reclassified as residential by the municipality of Daet. This application was initially denied by the DAR, but later approved by the Office of the President, leading to the Court of Appeals reversing the Office of the President’s decision.

At the heart of this case lies Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657, which defines agricultural land. According to this law, it refers to land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. Section 4 further specifies the scope of CARP, covering all public and private agricultural lands. Therefore, land that is not agricultural is outside the scope of CARP. The critical question, then, becomes who has the authority to classify land, and when does that classification take effect?

The Supreme Court pointed to local government units, stating that the power to reclassify land is granted by law to the local government. The court emphasizes that a single valid reclassification of land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect, is sufficient for exemption. This principle had been established in earlier rulings, such as Buklod Nang Magbubukid set Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc, where it was unequivocally held that lands previously converted by government agencies to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL are outside its coverage.

The court also referenced the DAR Handbook for CARP Implementors, recognizing the LGU’s authority to reclassify lands under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code. This acknowledges the role of local governance in land use planning and the need for coordination between national and local policies. This approach contrasts with a centralized model, allowing LGUs to respond to local needs and development priorities.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court addressed the Court of Appeals’ concern about discrepancies between certifications from the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The Court of Appeals had deemed these discrepancies significant enough to overturn the Office of the President’s decision. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the certifications, when considered together, demonstrated substantial compliance with the requirements for exemption. This approach emphasizes substance over form, recognizing that minor inconsistencies should not invalidate an otherwise valid reclassification.

The Supreme Court underscored the principle that the power of local governments to convert or reclassify lands is not subject to the approval of the DAR. The Court quoted Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals stating that municipal and/or city councils are empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. The appellate court also stated that the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR].

Further clarifying the sequence of events, the Supreme Court addressed the timing of the HLURB’s involvement. It noted that City Ordinance No. 1313, enacted by the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/residential area. Since there was no HLURB at that time, approval by its predecessor agency, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), was sufficient. This historical perspective is crucial, as it acknowledges the evolution of regulatory bodies and their respective roles in land use planning.

The Court also discussed the retrospective application of laws, stating that neither the Ministry of Human Settlements nor the HSRC could have exercised its power of review retroactively absent an express provision to that effect in Letter of Instructions No. 729 or the HSRC Charter, respectively. Citing Article 4 of the Civil Code, the Court emphasized that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. This principle protects vested rights and ensures predictability in legal application.

The ruling has significant implications for property owners and agrarian reform beneficiaries. For property owners, it provides assurance that valid reclassifications made by LGUs prior to June 15, 1988, will be respected, shielding their properties from CARP coverage. For agrarian reform beneficiaries, it clarifies the scope of CARP, ensuring that it applies to truly agricultural lands, not those already designated for other uses.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The central issue was whether a local government’s reclassification of land from agricultural to residential use before June 15, 1988, exempts the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court ruled that a valid reclassification by a local government unit (LGU) prior to June 15, 1988, does exempt the land from CARP coverage, emphasizing the authority of LGUs in land use decisions.
Who has the authority to reclassify land?	The power to reclassify land is granted by law to the local government units (LGUs). This authority is recognized under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code.
When must the reclassification have occurred to be exempt?	To be exempt from CARP, the reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural use must have occurred before June 15, 1988, when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect.
What if there are discrepancies in the certifications?	The Supreme Court ruled that minor inconsistencies should not invalidate an otherwise valid reclassification, emphasizing substance over form.
Does the DAR have authority over reclassified lands?	The power of local governments to convert or reclassify lands is not subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
What is the role of the HLURB in land reclassification?	The HLURB’s role is to oversee and approve local land use plans and zoning ordinances. In cases where there was no HLURB yet, its predecessor agency, the HSRC, could have been involved.
Is there a retrospective application of laws?	The Supreme Court held that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, protecting vested rights and ensuring predictability in legal application.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in this case reaffirms the balance between national agrarian reform goals and the autonomy of local governments in land use planning. By prioritizing local zoning decisions made prior to the implementation of CARP, the ruling protects property rights and encourages orderly land development. It also serves as a reminder of the importance of clear and consistent documentation in land use matters.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Noel L. Ong, et al. v. Nicolasa O. Imperial, et al., G.R. No. 197127, July 15, 2015

July 15, 2015

Mortgage Nullification and Condominium Buyer Protection: Balancing Rights and Obligations

In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court addressed the extent to which a mortgage on a condominium project can be nullified when executed without the prior written approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), as required under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957. The court clarified that while such a mortgage is indeed invalid, the nullification applies only to the interest of the complaining buyer and does not automatically void the entire mortgage contract. This decision balances the protection of condominium buyers with the stability of real estate financing, setting a precedent for future disputes involving similar circumstances.

Aurora Milestone Tower: Can One Unit Owner Sink an Entire Mortgage?

The case stemmed from a dispute involving United Overseas Bank of the Philippines (United Overseas Bank), J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc. (JOS Managing Builders), and EDUPLAN Philippines, Inc. (EDUPLAN). JOS Managing Builders, the developer of the Aurora Milestone Tower condominium project, mortgaged the property to United Overseas Bank without securing the necessary HLURB approval. Subsequently, EDUPLAN, a unit buyer who had fully paid for its unit, discovered the unapproved mortgage and filed a complaint seeking to nullify the mortgage and compel the issuance of its condominium title. The HLURB initially ruled in favor of EDUPLAN, declaring the entire mortgage void. This decision was later appealed to the Court of Appeals, which initially dismissed the petition due to the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The Supreme Court, however, took a different view, holding that the issue of whether non-compliance with the HLURB clearance requirement would result in the nullification of the entire mortgage contract or only a part of it is a purely legal question which will have to be decided ultimately by a regular court of law. The court emphasized that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal, requiring interpretation and application of the law rather than technical expertise. This determination paved the way for the Court to address the substantive legal question at the heart of the dispute.

The central legal issue revolved around the interpretation and application of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957, which mandates prior HLURB approval for any mortgage on a subdivision lot or condominium unit. The court acknowledged the varying conclusions in jurisprudence regarding the extent of nullity in such cases. Some rulings, like Far East Bank & Trust Co. v. Marquez, had previously held that the mortgage is void only with respect to the portion of the property under mortgage that is the subject of the litigation. Other cases, such as Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. SLGT Holdings, Inc., had nullified the entire mortgage contract based on the principle of indivisibility of mortgage under Article 2089 of the New Civil Code, which states:

Article 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt may be divided among the successors-in-interest of the debtor or of the creditor, x x x.

The Supreme Court, however, sided with the view espoused in Philippine National Bank v. Lim, reverting to the principle that a unit buyer has no standing to seek the complete nullification of the entire mortgage, as their actionable interest is limited to the unit they have purchased. The Court found this approach more in line with law and equity. While a mortgage may be nullified if it violates Section 18 of P.D. No. 957, such nullification only applies to the interest of the complaining buyer and cannot extend to the entire mortgage. This ruling recognizes that a buyer of a particular unit or lot lacks the standing to demand the nullification of the entire mortgage.

Building on this principle, the Court reasoned that since EDUPLAN had an actionable interest only over Unit E, 10th Floor, Aurora Milestone Tower, it lacked the standing to seek the complete nullification of the subject mortgage. The HLURB, therefore, erred in voiding the whole mortgage between JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank. The Court, however, also affirmed EDUPLAN’s right to the transfer of ownership of its unit, as it had already paid the full purchase price. This right is enshrined in Section 25 of P.D. No. 957, which states:

Issuance of Title. The owner or development shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit, x x x.

Thus, JOS Managing Builders has the obligation to cause the delivery of the Title to the subject condominium unit in favor of EDUPALN. The Court clarified that the failure of JOS Managing Builders to secure prior approval of the mortgage from the HLURB and United Overseas Bank’s failure to inquire on the status of the property offered for mortgage placed the condominium developer and the creditor Bank in pari delicto. Hence, they cannot ask the courts for relief for such parties should be left where they are found for being equally at fault.

More importantly, the Court underscored that the prior approval requirement under P.D. No. 957 is intended to protect buyers of condominium units from fraudulent manipulations by unscrupulous sellers and operators, such as failing to deliver titles free from liens and encumbrances. This is in line with the protective intent of P.D. No. 957, safeguarding buyers from unjust practices by developers who may mortgage projects without their knowledge or the HLURB’s consent. Consequently, failure to secure the HLURB’s prior written approval does not annul the entire mortgage between the developer and the bank, as this would inadvertently extend protection to the defaulting developer. To rule otherwise would affect the stability of large-scale mortgages prevalent in the real estate industry.

From all the foregoing, the Court affirmed that HLURB erred when it declared the entire mortgage constituted by JOS Managing Builders, Inc. in favor of United Overseas Bank null and void based solely on the complaint of EDUPLAN which was only claiming ownership over a single condominium unit of Aurora Milestone Tower. Accordingly, the mortgage executed between JOS Managing Builders and United Overseas Bank is valid.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the lack of HLURB approval for a condominium mortgage automatically nullifies the entire mortgage or only affects the rights of the complaining unit buyer. The Supreme Court clarified the scope of nullification in such cases.
What is Presidential Decree No. 957?	P.D. No. 957, also known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree, is a law designed to protect individuals who purchase subdivision lots or condominium units from unscrupulous developers. It aims to prevent fraudulent practices and ensure the delivery of titles free from liens.
What does Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 require?	Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 requires that any mortgage on a subdivision lot or condominium unit must have the prior written approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). This requirement is intended to safeguard the interests of unit buyers.
What is the significance of HLURB approval for mortgages?	HLURB approval ensures that the proceeds of the mortgage loan will be used for the development of the condominium or subdivision project, and it provides a mechanism to protect the interests of unit buyers. It helps prevent developers from using mortgage loans for other purposes.
Who bears the burden of complying with Section 18 of P.D. 957?	The burden of complying with Section 18 of P.D. 957 primarily rests on the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project. They are responsible for obtaining the necessary HLURB approval before mortgaging any unit or lot.
What is the ‘in pari delicto’ principle?	The in pari delicto principle states that when two parties are equally at fault, the law will not provide a remedy to either party. The parties will be left in their current situation, without any legal recourse.
What happens if a developer mortgages a property without HLURB approval?	If a developer mortgages a property without HLURB approval, the mortgage is considered null and void, but only to the extent of protecting the rights of the complaining unit buyer. The entire mortgage is not automatically invalidated.
What rights does a condominium buyer have when a mortgage lacks HLURB approval?	A condominium buyer can seek the nullification of the mortgage as it affects their specific unit and compel the developer to issue a title free from the unauthorized lien. They can protect their individual investment.
Can a condominium buyer seek the nullification of the entire mortgage contract?	No, a condominium buyer typically lacks the standing to seek the nullification of the entire mortgage contract. Their actionable interest is limited to their individual unit.

In summary, the Supreme Court’s decision in United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, Inc. vs. The Board of Commissioners-HLURB, J.O.S. Managing Builders, Inc., and Eduplan Phils., Inc. clarifies the scope of mortgage nullification under P.D. No. 957, balancing the need to protect condominium buyers with the stability of real estate financing. This ruling provides valuable guidance for developers, lenders, and unit buyers alike, ensuring a more predictable and equitable legal framework for resolving disputes related to unapproved mortgages on condominium projects.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, Inc. vs. The Board of Commissioners-HLURB, G.R. No. 182133, June 23, 2015

June 23, 2015

Navigating Appeal Deadlines: The ‘Fresh Period Rule’ and Administrative Cases in the Philippines

The Supreme Court clarified that the “fresh period rule,” which allows a new 15-day period to appeal a decision after a motion for reconsideration is denied, applies only to judicial appeals, not administrative ones. This means that parties appealing decisions in administrative bodies like the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) must adhere to stricter deadlines, calculating the appeal period from the original decision date, less the time already elapsed before filing the motion for reconsideration. Failing to do so can result in the dismissal of the appeal, as demonstrated in this case, highlighting the importance of understanding procedural rules in administrative proceedings.

From Housing Dispute to Higher Courts: Did San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders Miss Its Chance?

This case originated from a simple contract to sell between San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Inc. (SLR Builders) and Ma. Cristina F. Bayang. After fully paying for her lot in Violago Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, Cristina Bayang sought the execution of a deed of absolute sale and the transfer of the title. SLR Builders failed to comply, leading Bayang to file a complaint for specific performance and damages with the HLURB. The HLURB ruled in favor of Bayang, ordering SLR Builders to execute the deed and deliver the title, or alternatively, to reimburse the payment with legal interest, along with damages and an administrative fine.

SLR Builders appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which dismissed the appeal. Undeterred, they further elevated the case to the Office of the President (OP). The OP dismissed the appeal because it was filed beyond the prescribed period. The crux of the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the “fresh period rule” applied to administrative appeals, specifically an appeal from the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP. This rule, established in the case of Domingo Neypes, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., grants a fresh 15-day period to file a notice of appeal after receiving the order dismissing a motion for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court firmly rejected the application of the “fresh period rule” to administrative appeals. It emphasized that the Neypes ruling explicitly covers only judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court cited Panolino v. Tajala, where it previously addressed a similar issue involving an appeal from a DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. In Panolino, the Court clarified that the “fresh period rule” is confined to judicial appeals, while administrative appeals are governed by specific administrative orders. This distinction is critical because it dictates how the appeal period is calculated.

The rules governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are found in Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in conjunction with Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987. These regulations stipulate that if a motion for reconsideration is denied, the aggrieved party has only the remaining balance of the original prescriptive period to appeal, calculated from the date of receiving the denial. In other words, the time spent waiting for the resolution of the motion for reconsideration is deducted from the initial appeal period.

Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President, pertinently reads:

Section 2. Appeal. – Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.

The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of appeal to the Office of the President.

The Court underscored the importance of adhering to these specific rules for administrative appeals. Unlike judicial appeals where the “fresh period rule” provides a new starting point upon denial of a motion for reconsideration, administrative appeals require a precise calculation of the remaining appeal period. Failure to comply with these deadlines can have significant consequences, including the dismissal of the appeal. In this particular instance, SLR Builders missed the deadline, resulting in the OP’s dismissal of their appeal, a decision upheld by the Court of Appeals and ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court’s decision serves as a reminder to legal practitioners and litigants alike regarding the critical importance of understanding and complying with procedural rules, especially in administrative proceedings. The “fresh period rule” is not a universal principle applicable to all appeals; its application is specifically limited to judicial appeals governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. In administrative cases, the specific rules and regulations of the relevant agency must be carefully followed to ensure that appeals are filed within the prescribed period. This case underscores the need for diligence and accuracy in calculating appeal deadlines to avoid the risk of dismissal and ensure that a party’s right to appeal is not forfeited due to procedural errors.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the “fresh period rule” applies to administrative appeals, specifically an appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President.
What is the “fresh period rule”?	The “fresh period rule” allows a new 15-day period to file an appeal after receiving the order dismissing a motion for reconsideration or new trial. This rule was established in the case of Domingo Neypes v. Court of Appeals.
Does the “fresh period rule” apply to all appeals?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that the “fresh period rule” applies only to judicial appeals governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and not to administrative appeals.
What rules govern the appeal period in this case?	Appeals from the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President are governed by Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765 and Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18.
How is the appeal period calculated in administrative cases after a motion for reconsideration is denied?	The appealing party has only the remaining balance of the original prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of the notice denying the motion for reconsideration.
What was the outcome of the case?	The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, which upheld the Office of the President’s dismissal of the appeal for being filed out of time.
Why was the appeal dismissed?	The appeal was dismissed because San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders filed their appeal beyond the prescribed period, failing to account for the time already elapsed before filing their motion for reconsideration.
What is the significance of this ruling?	This ruling highlights the importance of understanding and complying with specific procedural rules in administrative proceedings, as the “fresh period rule” does not apply and strict deadlines must be adhered to.

In conclusion, this case emphasizes the crucial distinction between judicial and administrative appeals regarding appeal periods. Litigants and legal practitioners must be well-versed in the specific rules governing each type of appeal to ensure compliance and avoid the risk of having their appeals dismissed. The “fresh period rule” provides clarity in judicial appeals, but administrative appeals require careful calculation and adherence to the agency’s specific regulations.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Inc. v. Bayang, G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015

April 20, 2015

Rehabilitation Proceedings: HLURB Request and Timelines in Corporate Recovery

In Lexber, Inc. v. Dalman, the Supreme Court addressed the procedural aspects of corporate rehabilitation, particularly concerning real estate companies. The Court held that a prior request from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is not a mandatory requirement before a trial court can give due course to a rehabilitation petition. Furthermore, the lapse of the 180-day period for approving a rehabilitation plan does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the petition, especially when delays are attributable to the court’s evaluation process. This decision clarifies the roles of regulatory bodies and the judiciary in corporate rehabilitation, emphasizing a balanced approach that considers both regulatory oversight and the potential for successful rehabilitation.

Real Estate Rescue: Does HLURB’s Approval Dictate a Company’s Recovery?

Lexber, Inc., a real estate developer, faced financial difficulties due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, leading it to file a petition for rehabilitation. Among its creditors were the Spouses Dalman, who sought either the delivery of their purchased property or a refund. The trial court initially gave due course to the petition, but the Spouses Dalman challenged this decision, arguing that the HLURB’s prior request for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver was necessary and that the rehabilitation plan had not been approved within the prescribed 180-day period. The Court of Appeals (CA) sided with the Spouses Dalman, prompting Lexber to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, while ultimately denying Lexber’s petition due to a supervening event (the trial court’s dismissal of the rehabilitation petition), clarified critical aspects of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. The Court emphasized the importance of avoiding conflicting rulings with the CA’s ongoing review of the trial court’s dismissal order, particularly since the dismissal was based on the disapproval of Lexber’s rehabilitation plan—a more substantive reason. This decision highlights the procedural remedies available in rehabilitation cases and the need for a streamlined approach to prevent multiple appeals and potential inconsistencies.

The Court addressed the CA’s reliance on Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree (PD) 902-A, as amended, which pertains to the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver upon the request of a government agency supervising or regulating the corporation. The CA interpreted this provision to mean that the HLURB’s prior request was a prerequisite for the trial court to give due course to Lexber’s rehabilitation petition. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, drawing a distinction between entities like banks and insurance companies, where specific laws mandate the central regulatory bodies’ involvement in appointing receivers, and real estate companies regulated by the HLURB.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the HLURB’s enabling law does not grant it the power to appoint rehabilitation receivers. The Court highlighted that the HLURB’s powers primarily focus on regulating real estate practices to protect the investing public from fraudulent activities, rather than intervening in the general corporate acts of companies under its supervision. This delineation of powers underscores the principle that administrative agencies’ authority is limited to what is expressly conferred or necessarily implied by their enabling acts.

“An administrative agency’s powers are limited to those expressly conferred on it or granted by necessary or fair implication in its enabling act. In our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, its branches and administrative agencies exercise only those powers delegated to them as ‘defined either in the Constitution or in legislation, or in both.’”

Regarding the 180-day period for approving a rehabilitation plan, the CA had ruled that the trial court’s failure to meet this deadline automatically warranted the dismissal of the rehabilitation petition, citing Rule 4, Section 11 of the Interim Rules. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that while the term “shall” generally implies a mandatory character, it is not an inflexible criterion. The Court noted that Lexber had filed a motion for an extension of the approval period, which the trial court did not resolve, and that the trial court continued to conduct hearings even after the 180-day period had lapsed.

In construing the provisions of the Interim Rules, the Supreme Court took cognizance of Rule 2, Section 2, which directs courts to liberally construe the rules to carry out the objectives of PD 902-A and to assist parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of rehabilitation cases. Applying the Interim Rules, the Supreme Court held that the procedural lapse of the 180-day period for approving the rehabilitation plan should not automatically result in the dismissal of the petition, especially when the delay is attributable to the court’s evaluation process. The trial court’s decision to approve or disapprove a rehabilitation plan is not a ministerial function but requires extensive study and analysis. Therefore, Lexber should not be penalized for the trial court’s need for more time to evaluate the plan.

The Court’s interpretation of the Interim Rules aligns with the policy of liberal construction to facilitate the rehabilitation of distressed corporations. This approach ensures that procedural technicalities do not unduly hinder the opportunity for a struggling company to regain financial stability. The decision underscores the importance of a balanced approach, considering both the regulatory framework and the potential for successful rehabilitation.

“Rule 2, Section 2 of the Interim Rules dictates the courts to liberally construe the rehabilitation rules in order to carry out the objectives of Sections 6(c) of PD 902-A, as amended, and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination of rehabilitation cases.”

Arguments Against Lexber	Arguments for Lexber
HLURB’s prior request is mandatory under Sec. 6(c) of PD 902-A for real estate firms undergoing rehabilitation. Failure to approve a rehabilitation plan within 180 days from the initial hearing warrants dismissal of the petition.	Sec. 6(c) of PD 902-A does not explicitly require HLURB’s prior request for a real estate company’s rehabilitation. Outright dismissal for non-compliance with the 180-day period goes against the Interim Rules’ policy of liberal construction to facilitate rehabilitation.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the trial court’s part when it gave due course to the rehabilitation petition, despite the absence of the HLURB’s prior request and the lapse of the 180-day period for the approval of a rehabilitation plan.
Is HLURB’s prior request mandatory for rehabilitation of real estate companies?	No, the Supreme Court clarified that the HLURB’s prior request for the appointment of a receiver of real estate companies is not a condition sine qua non before the trial court can give due course to their rehabilitation petition.
What happens if the 180-day period for rehabilitation plan approval lapses?	The Supreme Court ruled that the lapse of the 180-day period for the approval of the rehabilitation plan should not automatically result in the dismissal of the rehabilitation petition, especially if the delay is due to the court’s evaluation process.
What is the significance of the Interim Rules in this case?	The Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation govern the procedural aspects of rehabilitation cases. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of liberally construing these rules to facilitate the rehabilitation of distressed corporations.
What is the role of the HLURB in corporate rehabilitation?	The HLURB’s role primarily involves regulating real estate practices to protect the investing public from fraudulent activities. Its powers do not extend to intervening in the general corporate acts, such as the rehabilitation, of companies under its supervision.
What is the legal basis for the HLURB’s powers?	The HLURB’s powers are based on its enabling law, Executive Order 648, which enumerates the powers that the HLURB is authorized to exercise. The Supreme Court emphasized that administrative agencies’ authority is limited to what is expressly conferred or necessarily implied by their enabling acts.
What is the effect of the trial court’s disapproval of Lexber’s rehabilitation plan?	The trial court’s disapproval of Lexber’s rehabilitation plan and dismissal of the rehabilitation petition led to a separate proceeding in the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. No. 103917), which reviewed the dismissal for substantive reasons (the disapproval of the rehabilitation plan).
Why did the Supreme Court deny Lexber’s petition in this case?	The Supreme Court denied Lexber’s petition due to the pendency of CA G.R. No. 103917, which was reviewing the trial court’s dismissal of the rehabilitation petition. The Court wanted to avoid conflicting rulings with the CA’s decision in that case.

The Lexber v. Dalman case offers key insights into the procedural aspects of corporate rehabilitation in the Philippines. It clarified that HLURB’s explicit request is not mandatory to kick off rehabilitation, and time extensions can be flexible. These clarifications foster a supportive approach to corporate rehabilitation, allowing businesses a fair chance at financial recovery without undue regulatory obstacles.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: LEXBER, INC. VS. CAESAR M. AND CONCHITA B. DALMAN, G.R. No. 183587, April 20, 2015

April 20, 2015

Untimely Appeal: The Finality of HLURB Decisions and the Strict Observance of Appeal Periods

The Supreme Court affirmed that decisions from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) become final if appeals to the Office of the President (OP) are filed beyond the prescribed 15-day period. Swire Realty Development Corporation’s failure to file its appeal on time rendered the HLURB’s decision final and executory, thus entitling Jayne Yu to the rescission of their Contract to Sell due to the developer’s delay in completing and delivering the condominium unit. This underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules and timelines in administrative appeals, as failure to do so can result in the loss of the right to challenge adverse decisions.

Missed Deadlines, Lost Rights: Examining Procedural Compliance in Property Disputes

The case revolves around a Contract to Sell between Jayne Yu (respondent) and Swire Realty Development Corporation (petitioner) for a condominium unit and parking slot in Makati City. Yu fully paid for the unit by September 24, 1997, and made a down payment for the parking lot. However, Swire Realty failed to deliver the unit on time, prompting Yu to file a complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages before the HLURB.

The HLURB ENCRFO initially dismissed Yu’s complaint, but the HLURB Board of Commissioners reversed this decision, ordering the rescission of the contract. Swire Realty then appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The OP initially dismissed the appeal due to the untimely filing but later granted Swire Realty’s motion for reconsideration, reinstating the HLURB ENCRFO’s original decision. Yu then appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the OP’s decision and reinstated the HLURB Board of Commissioners’ rescission order. The Supreme Court was asked to rule on whether Swire Realty’s appeal was timely filed before the OP and whether rescission of the contract was proper.

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of the appeal period first, citing established jurisprudence that the period to appeal decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 15 of PD No. 957 and Section 2 of PD No. 1344. These special laws provide an exception to the thirty-day period under Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18.

As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited administrative order allows aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order.

The Court noted that Swire Realty received the HLURB Board of Commissioners’ decision on April 17, 2006, giving it until May 2, 2006, to file an appeal. Instead, Swire Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 28, 2006, which only suspended the running of the 15-day period. Administrative Order No. 18 dictates that the time during which a motion for reconsideration is pending shall be deducted from the appeal period. Since Swire Realty received the HLURB Board Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration on July 23, 2007, it had only four days, or until July 27, 2007, to file its appeal to the OP. The appeal, however, was filed on August 7, 2007, eleven days late, rendering the HLURB Board of Commissioners’ decision final and executory.

The Supreme Court emphasized that procedural rules are not mere technicalities that can be disregarded at will. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in accordance with the law. The Court stated:

while the dismissal of an appeal on purely technical grounds is concededly frowned upon, it bears emphasizing that the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal are not harmless and trivial technicalities that litigants can just discard and disregard at will. Neither being a natural right nor a part of due process, the rule is settled that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Turning to the issue of rescission, the Court invoked Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which allows the injured party to seek rescission of the obligation if the other party fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The provision states:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

The Court agreed with the CA’s finding that Swire Realty incurred a delay in the performance of its obligation, amounting to a breach of contract. The condominium unit was not completed and delivered to Yu within the stipulated period, as evidenced by the HLURB ENCRFO’s ocular inspection report. The report revealed that the amenities under the approved plan had not been provided as of May 3, 2002, and the unit had not been delivered as of August 28, 2002, beyond the December 1999 deadline under the license to sell.

Given the delay and the incomplete state of the unit, the Supreme Court affirmed that Yu was entitled to rescind the contract and demand a refund of the purchase price. However, the Court modified the CA’s decision to include moral damages of P20,000.00.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issues were whether Swire Realty’s appeal to the Office of the President was timely filed and whether rescission of the Contract to Sell was proper due to the developer’s delay in delivering the condominium unit.
What is the appeal period for HLURB decisions to the Office of the President?	The appeal period is 15 days from receipt of the HLURB Board of Commissioners’ decision, as provided by special laws (PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344), which take precedence over the 30-day period in Administrative Order No. 18.
What happens when a Motion for Reconsideration is filed?	Filing a Motion for Reconsideration suspends the running of the appeal period. However, once the motion is resolved, the remaining days of the original appeal period resume.
What legal provision allows for rescission of a contract?	Article 1191 of the Civil Code allows for the rescission of reciprocal obligations if one party fails to comply with their obligations, entitling the injured party to choose between fulfillment or rescission with damages.
What constitutes a breach of contract in property sales?	A breach occurs when the developer fails to deliver the property within the agreed-upon timeframe or fails to complete the unit according to the approved plans and specifications.
What evidence did the Court rely on to find a breach?	The Court relied on the HLURB ENCRFO’s ocular inspection report, which detailed the incomplete state of the condominium unit and the lack of promised amenities beyond the agreed completion date.
What is the significance of adhering to procedural rules?	Adhering to procedural rules, like appeal periods, is crucial because the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and failure to comply can result in the loss of that right.
What damages are typically awarded in rescission cases?	In rescission cases, the injured party is typically entitled to a refund of the purchase price and may also be awarded damages, such as moral damages and attorney’s fees, to compensate for the breach.
Can administrative agencies disregard technical rules?	While administrative agencies have some flexibility, they cannot disregard mandatory procedural rules, especially when specific laws prescribe appeal periods.

This case serves as a reminder of the importance of diligently observing procedural rules, particularly appeal periods, in administrative proceedings. Developers must also ensure timely completion and delivery of contracted properties to avoid potential rescission and liability for damages. The case also underscores that procedural rules are in place for a purpose and are not to be taken lightly.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Swire Realty vs. Yu, G.R. No. 207133, March 09, 2015

March 9, 2015

Land Reclassification and Agrarian Reform: Prior Zoning Determines CARP Coverage

The Supreme Court has ruled that lands classified as non-agricultural in zoning ordinances approved before June 15, 1988, are exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This decision underscores the importance of land classification prior to the enactment of CARP, providing landowners with a basis to seek exemption from agrarian reform coverage. However, the Court emphasized that substantial evidence is necessary to prove that the lands in question fall within the non-agricultural classification to qualify for this exemption.

From Farms to Factories? Zoning Laws vs. Agrarian Reform

The case of Remigio D. Espiritu and Noel Agustin vs. Lutgarda Torres del Rosario revolved around a dispute over landholdings in Angeles City, Pampanga. Lutgarda Torres del Rosario sought to exempt her land from CARP coverage, claiming it had been reclassified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The farmers, led by Remigio Espiritu, contested this, arguing that the land was still classified as agricultural under existing zoning ordinances. This conflict brought to the forefront the question of how prior land classifications interact with agrarian reform laws and the extent of evidence required to prove such classifications.

Del Rosario’s application for exemption hinged on an alleged reclassification of Lot Nos. 854 and 855 in Barangays Margot and Sapang Bato, Angeles City, from agricultural to non-agricultural or industrial lots in March 1980. This claim was initially supported by an order from then Secretary of Agrarian Reform Roberto M. Pagdanganan. However, this order was later revoked by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman based on certifications from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) indicating that the landholdings were within an agricultural zone. The legal framework governing this issue is rooted in Republic Act No. 6657, which aims to redistribute agricultural lands to landless farmers. However, the law does not cover lands already classified for non-agricultural uses before its enactment.

The Court of Appeals initially sided with Del Rosario, citing a denial of due process due to misdirected notices and questioning the authority of Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, emphasizing that Del Rosario was not deprived of due process because she was able to file a motion for reconsideration, which was considered on its merits. The Supreme Court referenced the case of Department of Agrarian Reform v. Samson, clarifying that due process in administrative proceedings requires only a fair opportunity to explain one’s side or seek reconsideration. Moreover, the Court highlighted that Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision was presumed valid and effective, as he was considered a de facto officer at the time, and no evidence was presented to prove that his actions were ultra vires.

Building on this principle, the Supreme Court clarified that the official acts of a de facto officer are valid, protecting the public’s dealings with individuals whose authority appears to emanate from the State. This legal principle ensures stability and reliability in governmental functions. Further solidifying its stance, the Court invoked the presumption of regularity in official acts, stating that this presumption prevails unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. This places a significant burden on parties seeking to challenge official actions.

In resolving the central issue, the Supreme Court considered the land classifications and zoning ordinances applicable to the property. The court examined the interplay between local government authority to reclassify land and the Department of Agrarian Reform’s mandate to implement agrarian reform. Citing Heirs of Luna v. Afable, the Court affirmed the power of local governments to reclassify agricultural lands into non-agricultural lands through zoning ordinances. However, the Court also emphasized that for such reclassifications to exempt land from CARP coverage, the zoning ordinance must have been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1988.

The court referenced Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, which clarified that the Department of Agrarian Reform’s authority to approve or disapprove land conversions applies only to conversions made on or after June 15, 1988. This opinion became the basis for subsequent DAR issuances, stating that prior conversion clearances were unnecessary for lands classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657. The Court found that both the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office of the President had determined the lands in question to be agricultural based on certifications from the HLURB and ocular inspections. The evidence showed that the land was classified as agricultural in the 1978 zoning ordinance and that the area remained predominantly planted with sugarcane and corn.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted the petition, reinstating the orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Office of the President, which had classified the land as agricultural and subject to CARP coverage. This decision underscores the importance of establishing the land’s classification prior to June 15, 1988, and the need for substantial evidence to support claims of non-agricultural use. The Court’s ruling reinforces the presumption of regularity in official acts and the principle that administrative agencies’ factual findings are generally accorded great respect and finality. This precedent is critical for landowners seeking to exempt their properties from agrarian reform laws, as it sets a high evidentiary bar and emphasizes the significance of historical land classifications.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether the land in question was classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARP) in 1988, which would exempt it from CARP coverage.
What evidence is needed to prove land reclassification?	Substantial evidence is needed, such as zoning ordinances approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1988, and certifications from relevant government agencies.
What is the significance of Department of Justice Opinion No. 44?	DOJ Opinion No. 44 clarifies that the Department of Agrarian Reform’s authority to approve or disapprove land conversions applies only to conversions made on or after June 15, 1988.
What does due process mean in administrative proceedings?	Due process in administrative proceedings means providing a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Who has the power to reclassify agricultural land?	Local government units have the power to reclassify agricultural lands into non-agricultural lands through zoning ordinances, subject to approval by the HLURB.
What is a ‘de facto’ officer?	A ‘de facto’ officer is one who derives appointment from one having colorable authority, and whose appointment is valid on its face; the acts of a de facto officer are valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer.
What is the presumption of regularity?	The presumption of regularity means that official acts of public officers are presumed to have been performed in the regular course of business and are valid unless proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
What was the HLURB’s role in this case?	The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) was the agency whose certifications were used to determine the land’s classification, as their approval of zoning ordinances is critical for exemption from CARP.
What was the impact of the Court of Appeals decision?	The Court of Appeals initially sided with Del Rosario, but the Supreme Court reversed this decision, emphasizing that Del Rosario was not deprived of due process because she was able to file a motion for reconsideration.

This case clarifies the legal standards for exempting land from CARP based on prior land classifications, emphasizing the importance of documented zoning ordinances and the presumption of regularity in official actions. The ruling provides a framework for landowners and agrarian reform beneficiaries to understand their rights and obligations under the law.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU VS. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. 204964, October 15, 2014

October 15, 2014

When Towers Topple: Balancing Public Safety and Telecommunications Expansion in Nuisance Law

The Supreme Court held that declaring a cellular base station a nuisance requires a full trial to weigh evidence concerning its impact on residents’ health and safety. The ruling emphasizes the need for a balanced approach, considering both public welfare and the interests of telecommunications businesses. This decision ensures that nuisance claims against infrastructure projects are thoroughly scrutinized, safeguarding community well-being while acknowledging the necessity of modern communication services.

Cellular Towers and Community Concerns: Can They Coexist Without Becoming a Nuisance?

This case, Smart Communications, Inc. v. Aldecoa, revolves around a complaint filed by residents of Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, against Smart Communications, Inc. The residents sought the abatement of a cellular base station constructed near their homes, arguing it constituted a nuisance. They cited concerns about the tower’s structural integrity, potential health hazards from radiation, noise and fumes from the generator, and the lack of proper permits. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially dismissed the complaint via summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, declaring the base station a nuisance.

Smart Communications elevated the case to the Supreme Court, questioning the appellate court’s decision. The primary issues before the Supreme Court were whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the base station a nuisance and whether it should have ruled on the validity of the locational clearance. The Supreme Court addressed both procedural and substantive aspects of the case, providing clarity on the application of nuisance law and administrative remedies.

One crucial procedural aspect examined by the Supreme Court was the principle of **exhaustion of administrative remedies**. This principle dictates that before seeking judicial intervention, parties must first utilize all available administrative processes. In this case, the residents did not exhaust the administrative remedies available through the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) concerning the locational clearance. Quoting Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court emphasized that “if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to…then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought.”

The Court also invoked the **doctrine of primary jurisdiction**, noting that courts should not preemptively resolve issues within the competence of administrative bodies. The HLURB, as the primary agency for land use development, has specific procedures and expertise to handle disputes related to locational clearances for cellular base stations. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling on the validity of Smart Communications’ locational clearance without the residents first pursuing administrative remedies through the HLURB.

However, the Supreme Court clarified that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies on the locational clearance issue did not warrant the complete dismissal of the case. The core of the residents’ complaint was the claim that the cellular base station constituted a nuisance, endangering their health and property. According to Article 694 of the Civil Code, “A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses…or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.” The issue of whether the base station met this definition required a full trial.

The Court emphasized that the RTC’s initial decision to grant summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact existed. A summary judgment is only proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,” as stated in Rule 35 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the residents raised valid concerns about the structural integrity of the tower, potential health risks from radiation, and the excessive noise and fumes from the generator. These concerns required the presentation of evidence and cannot be resolved through summary judgment. The Court cited Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, clarifying that “a genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.”

The Supreme Court elaborated on the factors a court must consider when determining whether something constitutes a nuisance. Drawing from AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corporation, the Court noted that the determination involves extensive factual considerations such as the locality, character of the surroundings, the nature, utility, and social value of the use, the extent and nature of the harm involved, and the nature, utility, and social value of the use or enjoyment invaded. The Court stated that, “What is a reasonable use of one’s property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable invasion of another’s use and enjoyment of his property so as to constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules, but must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case…”

In effect, the Court highlighted that the lower courts did not consider any of the foregoing factors or tests before summarily dismissing or granting the appeal. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that without the parties presenting evidence on the contested facts, there was no factual basis for declaring Smart Communication’s cellular base station a nuisance or for ordering the cessation of the operations. Given the competing interests—the residents’ health and safety versus the telecommunications business interests and the public’s need for cellular mobile telephone services—the Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC for a full trial.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Smart Communications, Inc. v. Aldecoa underscores the importance of balancing public safety with the need for telecommunications infrastructure. It clarifies the procedural requirements for challenging the operation of such facilities, emphasizing the need to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. It also reinforces the principle that nuisance claims require a thorough factual inquiry, ensuring that decisions are based on concrete evidence rather than speculation. The case serves as a reminder that while telecommunications services are essential, they must be provided in a manner that does not unduly infringe upon the health and well-being of the community.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a cellular base station constituted a nuisance, warranting its abatement, and whether the Court of Appeals prematurely ruled on the validity of the station’s locational clearance.
What did the Supreme Court decide?	The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that a full trial was necessary to determine if the cellular base station was indeed a nuisance. It also stated that the Court of Appeals prematurely ruled on the locational clearance issue.
What is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies?	This principle requires parties to utilize all available administrative channels before seeking judicial intervention. In this case, the residents should have first pursued remedies through the HLURB regarding the locational clearance.
What is a nuisance under Philippine law?	According to Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is anything that injures health, offends the senses, shocks decency, obstructs public passages, or impairs property use.
What factors are considered in determining if something is a nuisance?	Courts consider the locality, character of surroundings, nature and utility of the use, extent of harm, and the social value of the uses involved when determining if something is a nuisance.
Why did the Supreme Court reject the summary judgment?	The Supreme Court rejected the summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed, such as the structural integrity of the tower and the health risks from radiation and noise.
What is the role of the HLURB in this case?	The HLURB (Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) is the primary government body responsible for regulating land use and issuing locational clearances for projects like cellular base stations.
What happens now that the case has been remanded to the RTC?	The case will return to the Regional Trial Court for a full trial, where both parties will have the opportunity to present evidence and arguments regarding whether the cellular base station constitutes a nuisance.
What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?	The doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that courts should not resolve issues within the competence of administrative bodies with specialized expertise, like the HLURB.

This case highlights the ongoing tension between technological advancement and community well-being. The Supreme Court’s decision to remand the case for trial ensures that all factual issues are thoroughly examined, balancing the interests of telecommunications companies with the rights of residents to a safe and healthy environment.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Arsenio Aldecoa, et al., G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013

September 11, 2013

Prejudicial Question Doctrine: HLURB’s Role in Criminal Cases for Subdivision Violations

The Supreme Court held that a pending administrative case in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for specific performance, filed by a buyer of subdivision lots to compel the seller to deliver transfer certificates of title (TCTs) for fully paid lots, constitutes a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This means that the determination by the HLURB of the seller’s obligation to deliver the TCTs is a necessary precursor to resolving criminal charges based on the non-delivery of those TCTs. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

BF Homes’ Unfulfilled Promise: When an HLURB Case Halts Criminal Prosecution

San Miguel Properties, Inc. (SMPI) purchased residential lots from BF Homes, Inc. SMPI fully paid for these lots, but BF Homes failed to deliver the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) for twenty parcels of land. Consequently, SMPI filed a criminal complaint against BF Homes’ officers for violating Presidential Decree No. 957, which penalizes the non-delivery of titles. Simultaneously, SMPI filed an administrative case with the HLURB seeking specific performance, compelling BF Homes to release the TCTs. This situation raised a critical legal question: Could the HLURB case, an administrative proceeding, constitute a prejudicial question that would halt the criminal prosecution?

The heart of the issue revolves around the concept of a prejudicial question. This legal principle applies when a decision in one case is essential to determining the outcome of another. As the Supreme Court explained, a prejudicial question is one where “the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.” In essence, if the HLURB case could resolve a key issue that directly impacts the criminal charges, the criminal case should be suspended until the HLURB makes its determination. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, agreeing that the HLURB case did indeed present a prejudicial question. The Court emphasized that the HLURB’s determination of whether BF Homes was legally obligated to deliver the TCTs was a crucial factor in deciding whether the company’s officers could be held criminally liable for non-delivery. This is because, should the HLURB rule that BF Homes had no obligation to deliver the titles (for instance, due to questions about the authority of the person who originally sold the lots), then there would be no basis for a criminal charge under Presidential Decree No. 957.

Building on this principle, the Court addressed the nature of the HLURB’s jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the HLURB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots. In this context, the administrative case before the HLURB was not merely a civil matter; it was the proper venue to determine the contractual obligations between SMPI and BF Homes. Because the HLURB was in the best position to determine the validity of the sales transactions, its decision would directly impact the basis of the criminal charge.

This ruling also touches on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine holds that courts should defer to administrative agencies on matters within their expertise. Given the HLURB’s specialized knowledge in real estate matters and its mandate to regulate the sale of subdivision lots, the Court reasoned that the HLURB was best equipped to resolve the issue of BF Homes’ obligation to deliver the TCTs. This deference to administrative expertise ensures that decisions are made by those with the appropriate technical knowledge and experience.

The Court addressed SMPI’s argument that the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 is malum prohibitum, meaning that the mere failure to deliver the TCTs constitutes a crime regardless of intent. The Court clarified that even in cases of malum prohibitum, courts must avoid absurd results by interpreting procedural laws reasonably. To proceed with a criminal case when the very basis for the obligation to deliver the titles was in question would be unreasonable and unjust.

Moreover, the Supreme Court rejected SMPI’s argument that only the party who initiated the related case (in this instance, the specific performance action) could raise the defense of a prejudicial question. The Court held that the rule on prejudicial question makes no such distinction. The defense can be raised by any party when the resolution of one case is logically determinative of the other. This ensures that the principle of avoiding conflicting decisions is upheld regardless of who raises the issue.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether a pending administrative case in the HLURB for specific performance could constitute a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of a criminal prosecution for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, finding that the HLURB’s determination of the obligation to deliver titles was a necessary antecedent to the criminal case.
What is a prejudicial question?	A prejudicial question arises when the resolution of an issue in one case is a logical antecedent to the issue in another case. The case posing the prejudicial question must be lodged in a different tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal.
What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?	The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that courts should defer to administrative agencies on matters within their expertise. This means that if a case requires the specialized knowledge of an administrative body, the courts should allow that body to resolve the issue first. This avoids the scenario where courts might render decisions on matters for which they lack expertise.
What is Presidential Decree No. 957?	Presidential Decree No. 957, also known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree, regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums. It aims to protect buyers from unscrupulous developers and sellers by requiring them to fulfill their obligations, such as delivering titles upon full payment.
*What is the meaning of malum prohibitum?*	Malum prohibitum refers to an act that is wrong simply because it is prohibited by law, regardless of whether it is inherently immoral. In the context of this case, SMPI argued that the non-delivery of titles was a malum prohibitum under Presidential Decree No. 957. The mere failure to deliver the titles constitutes a crime regardless of intent.
Who can raise the defense of a prejudicial question?	The Supreme Court clarified that any party can raise the defense of a prejudicial question, regardless of who initiated the related case. The determining factor is whether the resolution of one case is logically determinative of the other.
Why did the Court suspend the criminal case in this instance?	The Court suspended the criminal case because the HLURB was in a better position to determine the validity of the sales transactions and whether BF Homes was legally obligated to deliver the TCTs. Should the HLURB determine that there was no such obligation, there would be no basis for the criminal charges.
What happens after the HLURB makes a decision?	After the HLURB makes a decision on the specific performance case, the criminal case can proceed. If the HLURB rules that BF Homes was obligated to deliver the titles, the criminal case will proceed. If the HLURB rules otherwise, the criminal case may be dismissed.

This case highlights the importance of administrative agencies in resolving disputes that fall within their area of expertise. By recognizing the HLURB’s role in determining contractual obligations related to real estate, the Supreme Court ensured that criminal prosecutions are based on sound legal foundations. This decision provides clarity on the application of the prejudicial question doctrine in situations where administrative and criminal proceedings are intertwined.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. Sec. Hernando B. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, September 04, 2013

September 4, 2013

Due Process Prevails: Protecting the Rights of Unheard Parties in Property Disputes

The Supreme Court has affirmed that individuals not involved in a legal case cannot be bound by its outcome, upholding the fundamental right to due process. The Court emphasized that a person’s right to assert ownership over property cannot be extinguished in a case where they were not a party. This ensures that those with legitimate claims have the opportunity to defend their interests in a proper legal proceeding, preventing unjust deprivation of property rights. This ruling reinforces the importance of inclusive legal processes that respect the rights of all stakeholders, even those not initially part of a dispute.

Property Rights at Stake: Can a Condo Be Sold Without All Claims Heard?

This case revolves around a condominium unit initially under contract to be sold to Reynaldo Poblete and Tomas Villanueva by Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI). Poblete and Villanueva then assigned their rights to Michael J. O’Pallick, who eventually paid the full purchase price and obtained a Deed of Sale from PPGI. Although O’Pallick took possession, he failed to register the Deed of Sale.

Meanwhile, Teresa C. Aguilar won a case against PPGI in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied several PPGI properties, including the condominium unit. O’Pallick filed a third-party claim, asserting his ownership, but the public auction proceeded, and Aguilar emerged as the highest bidder. When PPGI failed to redeem the property, a final Deed of Sale was issued to Aguilar, who then obtained a new title in her name.

O’Pallick then filed a case to quiet title, seeking to nullify the levy and sale to Aguilar, arguing that the sale to him by PPGI transferred all rights to the unit, and Aguilar’s acquisition created a cloud on his title. The core legal question is whether O’Pallick, who was not a party to the HLURB case between Aguilar and PPGI, is bound by its outcome, and whether his unregistered Deed of Sale is sufficient to protect his claim against a subsequent levy on execution.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially dismissed O’Pallick’s case, reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction to annul the HLURB’s actions. However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, emphasizing that O’Pallick’s absence in the HLURB proceedings meant he could not be bound by its results. The CA highlighted that since the execution sale proceeded despite O’Pallick’s third-party claim, he had no choice but to file a separate action to assert his rights, which is in line with due process considerations. It cited The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Court of Appeals, stating that “the issue as to whether or not there was illegal levy on properties on execution can be threshed out in [a] separate action.”

The CA also echoed Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals, indicating that an independent action is permissible when the plaintiff is a stranger to the case where the writ of execution was issued. Aguilar argued that PPGI remained the registered owner when the levy occurred, and O’Pallick’s unregistered sale couldn’t prejudice her rights. She further contended that a previous Supreme Court decision (G.R. No. 157801) had already recognized her as the absolute owner.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with Aguilar’s contentions and upheld the CA’s decision. The Court emphasized that the principle of due process dictates that no person should be prejudiced by a ruling in a case where they were not a party. The Court cited Green Acres Holdings, Inc. v. Cabral, stating:

“The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.”

The Court clarified that G.R. No. 157801 did not definitively resolve O’Pallick’s claim. It pointed out that O’Pallick’s amended complaint sought the annulment of Aguilar’s title, characterizing the case as a suit for annulment of title rather than merely quieting title. This distinction is crucial because it recognizes O’Pallick’s direct challenge to the validity of Aguilar’s ownership based on the prior unregistered sale.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that O’Pallick, as a prior purchaser, had a right to be heard on his claim. His failure to register the Deed of Sale does not automatically negate his right to assert ownership, especially since he was not given an opportunity to do so in the HLURB case. It stated that:

Thus, we agree with the CA’s pronouncement that since respondent was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein. Because he was not impleaded in said case; he was not given the opportunity to present his case therein. But, more than the fact that O’Pallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he had the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser of the very same condominium unit, he had the right to be heard on his claim.

The Court’s decision underscores the importance of due process in property disputes. It protects the rights of individuals who may have legitimate claims to property but were not involved in prior legal proceedings affecting that property. The ruling reinforces the principle that unregistered interests, while not binding on the whole world, can still be asserted against parties who had knowledge of such interests or who are not considered innocent purchasers for value.

The implications of this case are significant for property law and conveyancing. It serves as a reminder to conduct thorough due diligence before purchasing property, especially when there are indications of prior unregistered claims. The decision also highlights the need for inclusive legal processes that ensure all stakeholders have the opportunity to present their case, preventing unjust outcomes that could arise from excluding relevant parties.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The key issue was whether Michael J. O’Pallick, who was not a party to the HLURB case, was bound by its decision, and whether his unregistered Deed of Sale could protect his claim against a subsequent levy on execution.
Why did the Court of Appeals reverse the RTC’s decision?	The CA reversed the RTC because O’Pallick was not a party to the HLURB case and therefore could not be bound by its outcome. The CA emphasized his right to file a separate action to protect his claim.
What is the significance of O’Pallick’s Deed of Sale being unregistered?	While the unregistered Deed of Sale does not bind the whole world, it can still be asserted against parties who had knowledge of the sale or who are not considered innocent purchasers for value.
What did the Supreme Court say about the previous case, G.R. No. 157801?	The Supreme Court clarified that G.R. No. 157801 did not definitively resolve O’Pallick’s claim. It acknowledged that the issue of wrongfully vested title could be raised in a separate proceeding.
How did the Supreme Court classify O’Pallick’s case?	The Supreme Court classified O’Pallick’s case as a suit for annulment of title, rather than merely quieting title, due to his direct challenge to the validity of Aguilar’s ownership.
What is the main principle that the Supreme Court upheld in this case?	The main principle upheld was the constitutional guarantee of due process, which states that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling in a case where they were not a party.
What is a third-party claim, and why was it important in this case?	A third-party claim is a claim filed by someone who is not a party to a lawsuit, asserting ownership or interest in property being levied or attached. In this case, O’Pallick filed a third-party claim to assert his ownership of the condominium unit.
What should potential property buyers learn from this case?	Potential property buyers should conduct thorough due diligence before purchasing property, especially when there are indications of prior unregistered claims, to avoid future disputes and protect their investment.

This case highlights the importance of protecting due process rights in property disputes. The Supreme Court’s decision ensures that individuals are not unfairly prejudiced by legal proceedings in which they were not involved. The outcome reinforces the need for thorough due diligence in property transactions and inclusive legal processes that consider the rights of all stakeholders.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: Aguilar v. O’Pallick, G.R. No. 182280, July 29, 2013

July 29, 2013

Judicial Consignation: Ensuring Proper Loan Payment When Creditor Identity is Unclear

The Supreme Court clarified that consignation, the process of depositing loan payments to fulfill an obligation, must be done through judicial means. This ruling ensures that when there is uncertainty about who the rightful creditor is, or when the creditor is unknown or refuses payment, the debtor has a legal avenue to settle their debt and avoid default. It emphasizes the importance of following proper legal procedures to protect the rights of both debtors and creditors, reinforcing the principle that consignation is inherently a judicial act governed by specific provisions of the Civil Code.

Navigating Debt: When Uncertainty Clouds Loan Repayment

This case, Spouses Oscar and Thelma Cacayorin vs. Armed Forces and Police Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., revolves around a dispute over loan payments for a property purchased by the Cacayorin spouses. Oscar Cacayorin, a member of AFPMBAI, sought to purchase a property through a loan facility. A Loan and Mortgage Agreement was executed with the Rural Bank of San Teodoro under the Pag-IBIG Home Financing Program. The Rural Bank issued a letter of guaranty to AFPMBAI, promising payment after the property title was transferred to the Cacayorins. Subsequently, AFPMBAI executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Cacayorins, and a new title was issued in their name.

However, the Pag-IBIG loan fell through, and the Rural Bank was placed under receivership by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). AFPMBAI took possession of the loan documents and the title, while the Cacayorins were unable to pay the loan. AFPMBAI demanded payment from the Cacayorins, who, confused about whom to pay due to the bank’s closure and PDIC’s inability to locate their loan papers, filed a complaint for consignation of loan payment, recovery of title, and cancellation of mortgage annotation. The central issue was whether the case fell under the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) or the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

The Supreme Court addressed the issue of jurisdiction, emphasizing that the nature of the complaint determines which court has the authority to hear the case. The Court highlighted that the Cacayorins’ complaint sought permission to consign their loan payment due to uncertainty about the rightful creditor, as stated in their complaint:

6.0 – Not long after however, RBST[22] closed shop and defendant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was appointed as its receiver. The plaintiffs, through a representative, made a verbal inquiry to the PDIC regarding the payment of their loan but were told that it has no information or record of the said loan. This made [sic] the plaintiffs in quandary as to where or whom they will pay their loan, which they intend to pay in full, so as to cancel the annotation of mortgage in their title.

Building on this, the Court referenced Article 1256 of the Civil Code, which provides that a debtor can be released from responsibility by consigning the thing or sum due, even without prior tender of payment, under specific circumstances. One such circumstance is when the creditor is unknown or when two or more persons claim the same right to collect. The Supreme Court clarified the circumstances where consignation is applicable, noting that the petitioners were caught between dealing with the Rural Bank (through PDIC) and AFPMBAI.

Given these circumstances, the Court determined that the Cacayorins had indeed presented a valid case for consignation. The Court reasoned that the petitioners’ predicament stemmed from the fact that they were unsure which entity—the Rural Bank or AFPMBAI—was the rightful creditor. The allegations in the complaint indicated a scenario where the creditor was either unknown or multiple entities claimed the right to collect payment. This uncertainty justified the action for consignation, allowing the debtors to legally settle their obligation despite the confusion.

Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the lack of prior tender of payment was not a fatal flaw in this case. The petitioners filed the case precisely because they were unsure to whom the tender of payment should be made. Article 1256 of the Civil Code authorizes consignation without prior tender when the creditor is unknown or when two or more persons claim the right to collect, solidifying the validity of the Cacayorins’ action.

The Court then addressed the crucial point of jurisdiction, firmly stating that consignation is necessarily a judicial process. Article 1258 of the Civil Code explicitly requires that consignation be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority:

Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.

The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof.

The Court underscored that this provision unequivocally requires consignation to occur within the judicial system, thus excluding other venues. This distinction is critical because it clarifies that while tender of payment can be extrajudicial, consignation must be judicial.

Tender of Payment	Consignation
Can be extrajudicial	Necessarily judicial
Antecedent to consignation	Principal action
Attempt to make a private settlement	Formal legal process

The Court emphasized the difference between tender of payment and consignation. Tender of payment is the act of offering the creditor what is due, while consignation involves depositing the payment with the court when the creditor refuses to accept it or cannot be identified. This distinction is crucial in determining the appropriate legal venue. Given that the Cacayorins’ complaint involved consignation, the HLURB, which typically handles disputes related to subdivision sales, lacked jurisdiction. The RTC was the proper venue because consignation is inherently a judicial act.

The ruling of the Supreme Court hinged on the principle that the nature of the action, as determined by the allegations in the complaint, dictates the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the complaint clearly sought consignation due to the uncertainty surrounding the rightful creditor. Because consignation is an inherently judicial process, the RTC, rather than the HLURB, had jurisdiction over the case.

FAQs

What was the key issue in this case?	The primary issue was determining which entity—the HLURB or the RTC—had jurisdiction over a case involving consignation of loan payment where the creditor’s identity was unclear.
What is consignation?	Consignation is the act of depositing the thing or amount due with the proper court when the creditor refuses to accept it, cannot be found, or is unknown. It allows the debtor to fulfill their obligation and be released from liability.
When is consignation allowed without prior tender of payment?	Consignation is allowed without prior tender of payment when the creditor is absent or unknown, is incapacitated to receive payment, refuses to issue a receipt without just cause, or when two or more persons claim the same right to collect.
What is the difference between tender of payment and consignation?	Tender of payment is the act of offering the creditor what is due, which can be done extrajudicially. Consignation, on the other hand, is the judicial act of depositing the payment with the court when the creditor refuses or cannot receive it.
Why did the Supreme Court rule that the RTC had jurisdiction?	The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction because consignation is necessarily a judicial process under Article 1258 of the Civil Code, which requires the deposit of payment with a judicial authority.
What was the significance of Article 1256 of the Civil Code in this case?	Article 1256 allowed the Cacayorins to proceed with consignation even without a prior tender of payment because they were unsure to whom the payment should be made due to the conflicting claims between the Rural Bank/PDIC and AFPMBAI.
How did the closure of the Rural Bank affect the case?	The closure of the Rural Bank and PDIC’s inability to locate the loan records created uncertainty about who the Cacayorins should pay, which led them to file the case for consignation.
What was the role of AFPMBAI in this dispute?	AFPMBAI possessed the loan documents and the title and demanded payment from the Cacayorins, adding to the confusion about who was the rightful creditor and necessitating the consignation action.

In conclusion, this case underscores the importance of understanding the legal requirements for consignation, especially when dealing with uncertain creditor situations. The Supreme Court’s decision reinforces the principle that consignation is a judicial act, providing clarity for debtors seeking to fulfill their obligations in complex circumstances.

For inquiries regarding the application of this ruling to specific circumstances, please contact ASG Law through contact or via email at frontdesk@asglawpartners.com.

Disclaimer: This analysis is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal guidance tailored to your situation, please consult with a qualified attorney.
Source: SPOUSES OSCAR AND THELMA CACAYORIN VS. ARMED FORCES AND POLICE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. No. 171298, April 15, 2013

April 15, 2013